

Evaluating the Strategic Efficacy of Military Involvement in Internal Security Operations (ISOPs) in Nigeria.

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Abstract: *The millennial global recrudescence of democracy has engendered a new thinking in civil-military relations across the world. A necessary outcome of this new consciousness is the emphasis on the subordination of the military to civil authority, as well as the increased stakes of the institution in the internal security of states. This presupposes, among others, the redefinition of the role of the military within the civil sphere of society. As the principal guardian agent in any state, the primary role of the military is to ensure the protection of the territorial integrity of the state against external aggression and domestic insurrection. However, the military is also constitutionally mandated to assist the Police and other cognate public security agencies in maintaining peace, law and order especially in the face of dire civil unrest. This principle, commonly known as military assistance in Internal Security Operations (ISPOs), has, in practice, raised a number of issues in Nigeria, which needs to be interrogated. This paper, therefore, seeks to evaluate the strategic efficacy of military involvement in ISOPs in Nigeria from the stand-point of select instances. By way of descriptive analysis, predicated on empirical evidence, the paper observes that the involvement of the military in ISOPs in Nigeria has largely been characterized by sundry abuses and excesses, which in effect, defy the essence of the endeavour. The paper recommends strict adherence to professional rules of engagement and best practices as a panacea to the anomaly.*

Keywords: *Military, National Security, Internal Security Operations (ISOPs), Civil-military Relations.*

I. Introduction

The military in any country is the custodian of national security as well as the symbol of national unity. In recognition of its pivotal role, the successive Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1960, 1963, 1979 and 1999) provide for the establishment of the Nigerian Armed Forces, whose functions include:

- a. Defending Nigeria from external aggression;
- b. Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air;
- c. Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly.
- d. Performing such functions as may be prescribed by an Act of then National Assembly (Section 217).

The article 3 above talks about Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). This forms the legal cum constitutional basis for the involvement of the military in Internal Security Operations (ISOPs) in Nigeria. In effect, much as the Nigerian military are traditionally mandated to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, they are also required to play significant role in ISOPs when the need arises. This has become all the more crucial in view of the contemporary security challenges in Nigeria. In the views of Athekam (2012:n.p) “due to some exigencies of contemporary security challenges, soldiers are increasingly involved in Internal Security Operations”. This observation has been corroborated by Ahmad (2012:n.p) when he states:

The pervasive role of the military in dealing with severe challenges to internal security and threats to law and order has been a feature of our nation’s approach to handling national crisis.

However, involvement of the military in ISOPs in Nigeria over the years has been at best controversial. Owing to the perceived excesses of soldiers in that context, there have been popular outcries to the effect that these soldiers are “usurpers, oppressors, or intruders” (Nwolise, 2007: 386). The apparent misgivings which the Nigerian public shares concerning the efficacy, justification and desirability of such operations have been occasioned by the apparent highhandedness which some men of the military have exhibited in the process. According to Ahmad (2012: n.p):

...the military’s brutal efficiency in suppressing internal challenges to security have left indelible marks in Zaki Biam, in Odi, in Maiduguri, in Kano and in many other parts of the North today.

In effect, the popular perception of military involvement in ISOPs in Nigeria has been one of deep-seated misgivings and anxiety. This paper correlates these misgivings and anxiety with the atrocities perpetrated by the misguided elements of the military in the discharge of ISOPs. Consequently, in an attempt to evaluate the strategic efficacy of the military role in ISOPs in contemporary Nigeria, the paper posits that the sundry excesses and atrocities perpetrated by soldiers in the process have tended to bastardize the essence of the endeavour.

II. Conceptual Clarifications

Two key concepts form the thrust of the subject matter of our discourse, namely the military and Internal Security Operations (ISOPs). For the purpose of shared understanding, it is germane to define and contextualize these concepts so as to underscore their denotative meaning in the context of this presentation. This constitutes our next concern.

2.1 The Military: Simply, the military refers to the tripartite divisions of the profession of the arms, viz the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Together, these institutions constitute the custodian of the national security of any nation. They are expected to work in complementary unison in discharge of their duties towards ensuring protection of the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Departmentalization of the military into three arms is a matter of technical specialization. In effect, the Army specializes in land soldiering, the Navy specializes in Sea soldiering, and the Air Force specializes in air soldiering. In spite of this technical specialization, the various arms of the military usually work in operational synergy in their major operations.

2.2 Internal Security Operations (ISOPs): Internal Security Operations (ISOPs) refers to actions carried out by the domestic security agents such as the Police, Customs Service, Immigration Service, and others, for the purpose of containing domestic threats to the security of the country (Nwolise, 2007:385). These threats often relate to dire cases of riots, demonstrations, strikes, communal clashes, terrorism, and the likes, which normally fall outside the constitutional duty of the military. The involvement of the military in such security scenarios is necessitated when the situations are adjudged to have overwhelmed the Police, or other relevant public security agencies. Hence,

If any of them overwhelms the police, the government can call out the military operating alone or jointly with the police to assist the government to bring the situation under quick control (Nwolise, 2007: 385).

Military involvement in ISOPs is an aspect of what is known in the relevant literature as 'Military Assistance to Civil Authority', which, in essence, implies the deployment of one or more arms of the military to act alone or in concert with the other security agencies such as the Police in order to help the government handle humanitarian crisis or any conflict-related emergencies.

III. Historical Overview of Military ISOPs in Nigeria

This sub-section was adapted substantially from an entry into *Beegeale's Bog*, posted August 26, 2011 as well as the contribution of *Nwolise* herein cited. However, the authors take responsibility for any semantic incidents arising from a few technical modifications so effected herewithin. Two patterns of military ISOPs have been persistent in Nigeria over the years. For convenience of this paper, these are identified as: long-spanned and short-spanned ISOPs.

Examples of long-spanned military involvement in ISOPs can be found in the sporadic Maitatsine uprisings of 1980-85, the most serious of which was the Kano episode thereof which lasted between 18 December 1980 and 3 January 1981 and led to the deaths of 4,177 persons. That uprising was put down by the 146 Battalion under the command of a certain Major (later Brigadier General) Haliru Akilu. The said 146 Battalion was itself a unit of Colonel (later Major General) Yohanna Yerima Kure's 3 Mechanised Brigade. In the management of the Kano episode of the 1980s Maitatsine uprisings, the Nigerian Army and the Nigerian Air Force cooperated to bring the crisis in the inland city to a bloody conclusion (Beegeale's Blog, 2011).

In September 2004, the self-styled Taliban staged attacks against police personnel and installations in Northeastern Nigeria and attempted to establish a highland stronghold in the Mandara Mountains straddling the Nigeria-Cameroon frontier in the Far Northeast. It took military action, with NAF helicopter gunships in tow and the use of armour to neutralise the determined zealots after they had gained a foothold in the highlands. Later in April 2007, elements of the 3 Motorised Brigade of the 1 Mechanised Infantry Division battled entrenched insurgents in the town of Panshekara near Kano where they had mounted a challenge against the authority of the State and instituted a brief reign of terror (Beegeale's Blog, 2011).

Another instance of long-spanned ISOPs can be found in the Boko Haram uprising across a 500-mile belt of Nigeria's Far North in July 2009 which left an estimated 800 persons dead. This crisis spanned a period

of one week and saw the airlift of crack troops from Jos and Calabar who formed the core assault group which flattened the Boko Haram stronghold and captured the leader of the group and handed him over to the Nigeria Police. Other relevant examples of long-spanned ISOPs include the Ijaw-Itsekiri conflict in Warri (1996-97 and 2002-3), Tiv-Jukun conflict in the eastern flank of Central Nigeria in the early 2000s and the ongoing Jos conflict, which has seen rival ethnic militia using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and hand grenades and mounting hit-and-run/ride-by attacks against one another. All of these have dragged on for a minimum of two years (Beegeale's Blog, 2011).

With reference to what is herein referred to as short-spanned ISOPs, cases in point abound. These include, but are not limited to, the Tiv and Western Nigeria crises of 1962-1965, the post-election violence of 1983 in Western Nigeria, Ife-Modakeke conflict of the late 1990s, the 2000 Sharia crisis in Kaduna which claimed thousands of lives. The Nigerian Army also had to intervene in Yelwa-Shendam, Jos and Kano in 2004 to restore peace after well over a thousand persons had been killed in ethno-religious violence between Hausa Muslims and indigenous Christian peoples in the central highlands and reprisal killings which followed in Hausa Muslim-dominated Kano thereafter. The crisis was so critical that a rare state of emergency was declared in Plateau State.

In the subsequent years, serious ethno-religious violence broke out and reprisal killings followed thereafter and across broad swathes of Northern and Eastern Nigeria in that order, occasioned by perceived indiscretion on the part of a Danish cartoonist in 2006. In 2011, post-election violence again broke out in some disaffected segments of Northern Nigeria leading to the deaths of over 800 persons. It took the intervention of the Nigerian Army to restore normalcy to the restive parts of the federation. For convenience of this paper the afore-mentioned instances of ISOPs have been distinguished from the Civil War, as well as typical amphibious and urban counterinsurgency operations as exemplified by the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies (Beegeale's Blog, 2011). Below is a graphic overview of important military ISOPs in Nigeria since Independence.

Table 1: Military ISOPs in Nigeria (1960 – 2013)

Government/Regime	Period	Area of action
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa	October 1960- January 15, 1960-July 1966	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quelling of the Tiv uprising 1960-64 ▪ Implementation of Emergency rule in Western Region in 1962 ▪ Western region election crisis 1965-1966
General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi	January 15, 1966	*Overtaken by interregnum
General Yakubu Gowon	July 29, 1960-July 29, 1975	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maintenance of Law and order during the 1966 crisis, especially violence in the North. ▪ Quelling the Biafran rebellion 1967-1970 ▪ Joint Military Police anti-robbery patrol
General Murtala Mohammed/Olusegu Obasanjo	July 29, 1975-October 1, 1979	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quelling students riots (Ali must Go) ▪ Joint military Police anti-robbery patrols.
Alhaji Shehu Shagari	October 1, 1979-December 31st 1983	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Anti-smuggling campaigns Lagos. ▪ Management of Ogunpa Flood disaster of 1981 at Ibadan ▪ Maitasine religious crisis in Kano, Bauchi, Kaduna, etc. ▪ 1983 General Elections crisis
General Muhammed Buhari	December 31, 1983-August 31, 1985	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Joint Police Military Security Task Force
General Ibrahim Babangida	August 27, 1985-August 26, 1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quelling the anti-SAP riots of 1989 ▪ Quelling the Zango-kataf mini-war of 1992 ▪ Quelling of June 12 protests of 1993 ▪ Joint Police-Military Security Task Forces
Chief Ernest Shonekan	August 26, 1993-November 17, 1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Joint Police-Military Security Task Forces
General Sani Abacha	November 17, 1993-June 8, 1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quelling of Ogoni uprising of 1993-1994 ▪ Joint Police-Military Security Task Forces.
General Abdulsalami Abubakar	June 8, 1998-May 29, 1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Joint Police-Military Security Task Force
Chief Olusegun Obasanjo	May 29, 1999-May 29, 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Odi crisis, 1999 ▪ Onitsha disturbances, 2006 ▪ Niger Delta crisis, 1999-2009 ▪ Ikeja Bomb blasts, 2001 ▪ Ife-Modakoke crisis, 1999-2000 ▪ Plateau State (Jos) crisis ▪ Sharia and religion-related crisis in parts of

		Northern Nigeria
Alhaji Umaru Yar'Adua	May 29, 2007-May 5, 2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quelling of Islamic insurgency in Bornu (Maiduguri), 2009 ▪ Jos Crisis
Dr. Goodluck Jonathan	May 5, 2010-Present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Book Haram crisis (till date) ▪ Jos crisis (till date) ▪ Post-elections crisis (April, 2011).

Source: Nwolise, O.B.C. (2007: 390-391), with authors' modifications

IV. Military in ISOPs in Nigeria: Sundry Cases, Sundry Abuses, Sundry Atrocities

Experiences of military involvement in ISOPs in Nigeria over the years have been fraught with sundry abuses and atrocities. In this sub-section, an attempt is made to situate this observation from the standpoint of Onitsha, Zaki Biam, and Odi crises.

4.1 The Case of Onitsha (2006)

The Onitsha crisis had its roots in the struggle between the members of the movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and those of the National Association of Road Transport Owners (NARTO) for control of urban motor parks in Onitsha. This struggle degenerated into a sort of anarchy around February, 2006, when the Governor of Anambra State, Mr. Peter Obi, called on President Goodluck Jonathan to direct the deployment of military troops to the State with the intent to restore peace, law, order and public security.

Accordingly, the President directed the deployment of soldiers to work in collaboration with the Police in order to ameliorate the raging crisis. As the operations lasted, some members of the Joint Army and Police Team resorted to untoward acts, which gave the entire exercise a semblance of a praetorian invasion. In effect, there were massive extra-judicial killings, torture, extortion, rape, and the likes. A report of the *Saturday Sun* of July 15, 2006 (P.18) captures the awful scenario thus:

Inhabitants of the commercial city of Onitsha have cried to prominent Igbo indigenes...to come to their rescue in the current invasion, torture, killings, raping and looting of their household properties. One of such inhabitants who claimed to have fallen victim of the menace was Mr. Emma Otugo, who alleged that the Joint Team of soldiers and policemen drafted to Onitsha to flush out members of...MASSOB have turned against innocent citizens. Otugo told *Saturday Sun* on Thursday at Nkpor...that the Team had on Saturday invaded his house at Nkpor and forcefully took away...N38, 000.... He complained that the team had beaten him blue-black, smashed his electronic gadgets before making away with the money, after accusing him of being a member of MASSOB and harbouring other members.

The above citation confirms and corroborates other accounts by observers and eye-witnesses to the effect that the conduct of the soldiers in the context of the crisis under review was bereft of civility and good conscience. In effect, some of these soldiers exhibited tendencies tantamounting to crass impunity and barbarism in the use of force. For instance, a man escorting his two sisters to a place was reported to have been killed while the two sisters of his were raped by soldiers (Nwolise, 2007). Such atrocities engendered widespread outcries and resentment against the military and the government.

4.2 The Case of Zaki Biam (2001)

The Zaki Biam crisis came on the heels of the lingering clashes between the ethnic Jukuns and Tivs in the North Central Nigeria in the early 2000s. At the heat of the crisis, nineteen (19) soldiers sent on ISOPs in the area were assassinated by youths believed to be members of Tiv ethnic militia. This triggered a sort of retaliatory military operation, which resulted in the now notorious Zaki Biam Massacre (*Wikipedia* online, 2013).

The military operation began on October 22, 2001, when soldiers from the 23rd Amored Brigade of the 3rd Amored Division rounded up villagers at Gbeji (in Zaki Biam area of Benue State) in what turned out to be a 'ployed' meeting. The soldiers made the villagers to sit on the ground, separating thereby men from the rest and opening fire on the men indiscriminately (*Human Rights Watch*, October 25, 2001).

In the following days, sporadic attacks continued and spread to the neighbouring villages of Vasae, Anyiin, Iorja, Sankera and Zaki Biam all in Logo and Zaki Biam local Governments of Benue State. In these raids, there were massive killings, destruction of homes and properties, as well as population displacement. This led to widespread protests in some parts of the State, especially in Makurdi where the students of the State owned Benue State University (BSU) staged an anti-government rampage. Hundreds of lives were lost in this crisis (*Human Rights Watch*, October 25, 2001).

4.3 The Case of Odi (1999)

What is today popularly known as the Odi Massacre was an attack carried out on November 20, 1999 by the Nigeria military on the predominantly Ijaw village of Odi in Bayelsa State. The attack came in the context of the conflict in the Niger Delta over the indigenous rights to oil resources and environmental protection (*Wikipedia* online, 2013).

Prior to the Massacre, twelve (12) members of the Nigerian police were murdered by a gang of restive youths near the village of Odi. In an apparent revenge, the military acting on the directive of the Federal government, invaded the village and raided it. This attack was characterized by intense and excessive use of force. In effect scores of unarmed civilians, including women and children, were killed. All the buildings in the village, except the bank, the Anglican Church and the Community Health Centre, were destroyed, leaving the village in a woeful state of desolation (*Human Rights Watch*, November 1999).

The attack on Odi elicited radical condemnation locally and globally. In this attack, women and girls were raped and desecrated in addition to the wanton killings of innocent villagers. The situation was so awful and pathetic that a concerned popular Nigerian music artiste Timaya chants in Nigerian Pidgin (Special English):

1-----
1999, I swear I no go forget am
When dem finish we people
And make the children orphans
Anytime when I think am
Water de commot my eyes
Somebody say make I leave am
But I say me I must talk am
I say de don kill dem mama, dem papa...

2-----
Na so dem de march de go
Ten thousand soldiers for road
Ask dem where dem de go?
Dem say dem de go Bayelsa
Which place for Bayelsa?
Na place dem call Odi
When dem enter our village
Dem rape our young girls and make us homeless
Dem kill dem mama; dem kill dem papa...
Wetin we go do?

(Timaya, 2000: True Story Album).

The sentiments encapsulated in the above lyrical verses are typical and reminiscent of the popular perception of the Odi incident in the immediate and ex-mediate aftermaths of its occurrence. This incident and others already examined here above point to the fact that military ISOPs in Nigeria have been a veritable source of public anxiety and agony. In the sub-section that follows, an attempt is made to adduce some reason for this unbecoming situation.

V. Evaluation of some Excesses and Abuses of the Nigerian Military in ISOPs

From the standpoint of the cases and instances reviewed above, it is possible to identify some common excesses that are associated with military involvement in ISOPs in Nigeria. Note that these acts amount variously as breach of human rights, violation of the constitution, negation of ethical standards and professionalism of the military, as well as contravention of international laws. The excesses are highlighted below.

5.1 Excessive use of force: This has been a common feature of military ISOPs in Nigeria. These operations have often been characterized by highhandedness, impunity and collective judgment. In the case of Odi and Zaki Biam, men of the military simply descended on non-combatant, villagers, killing and maiming them with impunity. Some of the casualties were innocent, law-abiding citizens of Nigeria, who were oblivious of the issue at stake. They merely became victims of the vindictive operation of the army who were hell bent on retaliation.

5.2 Inhuman Treatments: This has to do with the various degrading treatment unleashed against the populace in by soldiers in the course of ISOPs. Examples include rape, extortion, torture, extra-judicial-killings, looting of property, false accusation deliberate humiliation and intimidation, and the likes of these. For instance, at Odi and Zaki Biam, many young people were arrested and falsely accused of being

masterminds of the killing of security personnel. At Onitsha, a number of youths were arrested and falsely accused of being members of MASSOB (Nwolise, 2007).

5.3 Population displacement: In the cases of Odi and Zaki Biam, the entire villages were raided, leading to mass dislocation of families and attendant population displacement and internal refugee situation. In the recent incident at Farikin Ladi in Plateau State, the villagers were forced to evacuate their traditional abodes and squat in unfriendly and unhealthy destinations in their immediate and remote neighbourhood. In fact, nothing can be more de-humanizing.

5.4 Use of Insulting Graffiti: Soldiers often leave behind some written expressions on the walls off homes or commercial premises in their areas of operation. With particular reference to the Odi incident in Bayelsa State, Abert (2003: 15-17) documented a number of such expressions, some of which are reproduced below:

- “Bastards, why run, come and fight us now?”
- “We don come, where are you bloody fool?”
- “Resource control my foot”.
- “I Fok you mama; wetin you do?”
- “I will kill all Ijaws – By Soldier”
- “Bayelsa will be silent forever”
- “Odi, where is your pride”
- “Dem don run”
- “Where is the Egbesu?”
- “You are burnt”, etc.

Expressions like the afore-mentioned are not only repugnant but capable of inciting resentment against the military and the government. The further insult the psyche and sensibilities of the populace and predispose them to more aggression and restiveness. This and other factors highlighted above account for the negative perception of the military role in ISOPS in Nigeria.

VI. Excesses of the Military in ISOPs: Strategic Implications

The untoward conduct of the military in ISOPs in Nigeria over the years has a lot of implications for the military profession, for rule of law and constitutionalism, and for Nigeria’s national security. In this subsection, an attempt is made to underscore some of these implications from the point of view of the cases under consideration.

6.1 Implications for Constitutionalism, Rule of Law and National Ethos

Atrocities perpetrated by some personnel of the Nigerian military constitute gross violations of the tenets of Nigeria’s constitution. For instance, Section 34(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides for ‘respect for the dignity’ of every Nigerian. Accordingly, therefore, nobody should be subjected to torture, or any other forms of inhuman treatment. This provision is supported by Section 19(b) of the 1999 Constitution which states that “the sanctity of the human person shall be recognized and human dignity shall be maintained and enhanced”.

Similarly, the 1999 Constitution (Section 33-37) guarantees sundry fundamental human rights to citizens, among which are right to life, right to personal liberty, right to privacy, etc. Without prejudice to the entrenched constitutional limitations to these rights, it is obvious that the obnoxious activities of some men of the Armed Forces, such as extortion and rape, looting and brutality, amount to acts of unconstitutionality and a breach of rule of law. The implication of this is that the culprits have little or no respects for the Constitution and the sacrosanct principles thereof.

Again, the excesses of the military in respect of the above violate and desecrate Nigeria’s cherished values as encapsulated in her written national ethos. The National Anthem, for instance, emphasizes the ideal of freedom or liberty. This same virtue is underscored in the Soldiers’ Creed, which reads *inter alia*:

My honour is my faith
I vow my faith in Nigeria
The supremacy of the Constitution
Our heritage of **liberty**
(*Soldiers’ Creed*, vs. 1, emphasis added in bold print)

If soldiers actually and earnestly recognize the supremacy of the Nigerian Constitution and acknowledges same as “our heritage of liberty”, it would be hardly possible and permissible for any of them to engage in acts that tantamount to crass constitutional abuse, as we have noted here above.

6.2 Implications for Military Professionalism

Military Professionalism is a product of long process of training, specialization and practice. It emphasizes acquisition of and devotion to the best practices of the military profession. According to Alabi:

Military professionalism demands of each soldier a devotion to expertise, responsibility and corporateness in the profession of arms. Military professionalism equally demands from each officer, the concept of *ex spirit de corps* in his relationship with fellow officers. The spirit of oneness, accommodation unity and acceptance that the military profession promotes among officers is essential ingredient for which most militaries worldwide are reputed.

Without prejudice to the above citation, military professionalism goes beyond how the soldier conducts himself in relation to his fellow professionals. It emphasizes how the soldiers relate to his job and the etiquette thereof, as well as how he conducts himself vis-a-vis the wider society. In this regard, Ogbaha (1987:6) rightly observed that military professionalism entails:

- a. The soldier understanding his role in the society and what the society expects of him.
- b. The soldier learning and practicing the command (efficiently).
- c. The soldier acquiring a sociality necessary to keep modern, efficient and combat ready army (emphasis added in bracket).

The avowed professionalism of the military in Nigeria has been eroded negated by their excesses in the context of ISOPs. In this respect, Nwolise (2007: 397) avers:

The military ... claim to be professionals, and we do regard them as such. But the atrocities their personnel commit during internal security operations especially – rape, torture, looting, beating, and ex-judicial killing - constitute negations of their professionalism claims or status.

The point being stressed here is that the untoward conduct of the military in ISOPs in Nigeria, as exemplified in the afore-stated acts, negates the virtue of military professionalism and cognate ethical standards implicit thereof.

6.3 Implications for national Security of Nigeria

Nigeria's National Security encompasses the country's capability to protect itself from poverty, hunger, ignorance, disease, disaster, or any form of territorial and ecological defenselessness (Okoli, 2010). When soldiers on ISOPs rape Nigerian women and girls, they predispose them to psychological torture and possible medical conditions. When a soldier infected with HIV/AIDS rapes a healthy Nigerian female, he has by that singular dastard act killed that girl or woman and at least one thousand (1, 000) other people, who may likely be exposed to the contagious effect of same disease by virtue of sexual contact/promiscuity. Note that medical malaise such as HIV/AIDS has been one of the greatest threats to national security of nations in Africa (Nwolise, 2007).

6.4 Implications for the Image and Integrity of the Military

The ignominious conduct of the military in ISOPs in Nigeria worsens Civil-Military relations in that context. The popular perception of a soldier who rapes, loots or extorts in the course of ISOPs is that of "a dog that bites its owner" (Nwolise, 2007: 404). Attitude like this erodes the confidence of the civil society in the military and, worse still, dents the image and corporate integrity of the profession before observers in Nigeria and the wider world.

6.5 Implications for the International Humanitarian Law

The International Humanitarian Law derives its essence largely from the Geneva Conventions of the United Nations Organization (1949 and 1977). This law, which has since been increasingly applied to domestic conflicts over the years, prohibits the following acts:

- a. Violence to the life, health, and physical or mental wellbeing of people not taking part in hostilities e.g. mutilation, corporal punishment etc)
- b. Collective punishment
- c. Taking of hostage
- d. Acts of terrorism
- e. Outrages upon personal dignity (e.g. rape, torture, etc)
- f. Pillage, and others (See *The common Article 3, 1949 Geneva Convention*)

Given increasing domestic application of the International Humanitarian Law, it is to be noted that the abuses orchestrated by the Nigerian military in their ISOPs amount to a violation of globally tenable rules of engagement in Internal Security Operations. This is certainly repugnant to the ideals of civilization.

VII. Conclusion and Recommendation

Having noted the various abuses associated with the military's role in ISOPs in Nigeria and having underscored the sundry implications of these abuses, one more thing needs to be addressed to round off the discourse. This is to underscore the strategic efficacy of such operations in Nigeria. The simplest way to come to terms with this task is to appraise the cost-effectiveness of such operations against the critical values of national security. For instance, the praetorian invasions and raids of Nigerian villages at Odi (1999), Zaki Biam (2001) and Onitsha (2006) constituted serious violations of human dignity and liberty that no nation that has concern for national security can afford to condone. When innocent Nigerians are killed, maimed, tortured, raped, brutalized, harassed, or displaced in the name of ISOPs, the outcome is a sort of paradox: a woeful, absurd negativity whereby law and order is sought through lawlessness and at the dire expense of the people. How does it worth it if the people who are meant to be protected are exposed to the worst insecurity? What is the use? Where is the justification?

More importantly, when the outrages and atrocities perpetrated by members of the Nigerian military in ISOPs are considered against their total strategic implications, the verdict would be simple and short: the whole endeavour is counter-productive. Hence this paper posits that until drastic measures are put in place to checkmate the excesses of the military in the conduct of ISOPs, the outcome of such exercises will continue to be counter-effective, opprobrious and notorious. One way of ensuring a desired change in this respect is to prevail on the military to apply itself to the best principles, precepts and rules of engagement in undertaking ISOPs in the country. This would also entail proper supervision and over-sight by the political leadership of the activities of soldiers who are engaged in ISOPs in keeping with the ideal of military subordination to civil authority and the global democratic imperative. To say the least, ISOPs in Nigeria needs to be rigorously transformed in keeping with the prevailing global best practices and precepts. Here lies the candid submission in this paper.

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