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"Conflict and Conflict Resolution in International Relations"

DR. HARSHITA SINGH, SAMEEKSHA BHARADWAJ
BA.LLB. (H) 5th Sem
A3211120137
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ABSTRACT
The phrase "international conflict" has historically been used to describe both disputes between various nation-states and conflicts between individuals and groups within those nation-states. But it increasingly also refers to disputes between groups living in the same nation, particularly when one group is vying for independence or greater influence on the social, political, or economic front[e.g., Sudan/South Sudan, Iraq (now that the US has largely left), and Syria].
The field of international conflict resolution offers more possibility and risk than most other conflict resolution disciplines combined. Tasks that appeal to the highest values of mankind include ending wars and assisting in the reconstruction of civilizations in which opposing ideologies coexist peacefully. Yet these responsibilities present formidable difficulties. Modern methods for resolving international conflicts are fraught with failures that have a high human cost. In order to be epistemologically inclusive, we define international conflict resolution broadly in this chapter. This chapter looks at some of the first developments in the wide international. In this chapter we examine some of the origins of the broad international conflict resolution field, consider some of the perennial debates about the causes of international conflict and peace, provide an overview of a selection of the tools, norms and practices of international conflict resolution and finally, cast a glance at the contemporary and emerging challenges that foment conflict locally while calling forth global responses.

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I. INTRODUCTION

International conflict resolution is concerned with processes of removing tensions between states or maintaining them at levels consistent with continued peaceful pursuit by states of their goals (individual or collective). A full description of the processes of conflict resolution within a community would entail a full description of the numerous and complex kinds and degrees of the divisive and common concerns among its members. This statement acknowledges, on the one hand, that conflict and even war are by no means an abnormal part of international life[1]. Only 270 of the 3,500 years of recorded history have been war-free, according to calculations. On the other hand, we shouldn't go so far as to completely associate "international politics" with connections between "oppositional" factions. According to Charles Boasson, who is true, such identification fails to fully consider the importance of accommodation and renunciation, the influence of standards of legal and ethical judgement, and the significance of the righteous appeal of justice[2]. The cooperative aspect is stressed by Ernst Haas, who re-explored the prospects of contemporary international "functionalism" in the face of varied and changing types of national societies and the future international environment[3], and according to John Burton, even in adversarial relationships between states pursuing just their own, independent, "nonaligned," objectives in regional and functional arrangements, the exercise of power is gradually giving way to cooperative approaches (1965).

Even if we had access to all the data, opinions, interpretations, and options available to decision-makers, the study of international conflict resolution cannot be reduced to a thorough examination of decision-making. Even while judgments are frequently quite important in resolving a conflict, they only make up a small portion of the conflict's background and content. Detailed decision-making studies have two significant drawbacks: they require an infinite and frequently futile accumulation of detail, and by focusing on reported or

[1]Stone 1954; Wright 1942; Boasson 1950; Singer 1949; Boulding 1962; International Sociological Association 1957
[2]Boasson 1963, pp. 77-78; Stone 1965
[3]See*international integration;*Haas 1964

knowable judgments, they risk losing sight of crucial elements. Even if decision-makers do not take action and are unaware of all the conditions, the entire constellation of events that makes up an international conflict is still in play.

It is an undoubted gain that since World War I the study of international conflict and its resolution has moved out of the general monopoly of the historian[4] and away from the specialized, technical concerns of the international lawyer and publicist[5]. There is currently a Journal of Conflict Resolution, and this field is widely taught and researched, particularly in the United States. Important methodological experiments are also being conducted.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace undertook a project to identify conflicts and the stages they go through in relation to the escalation and subsidence of tension and the viability of violent or nonviolent resolution. Kenneth Boulding has attempted a systematic study of conflict as a general social process and of international conflict within this framework at the significant centre for Research in Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan. Robert North of Stanford University is attempting to use computers to find the characteristics that are generally important in assessing and managing such crises from the plethora of factors that make up the constellation of conditions of past international crises. Additionally, biologists have studied animal disputes while psychologists and sociologists have studied both individual and group behaviour in relation to these topics. These methods, however much knowledge they may provide, have hardly transformed how international conflict is handled.

This article's goal is to identify and discuss various institutionalised, or at the very least nominated, methods for resolving disputes between governments. This comprises good offices, mediation, commissions of inquiry, and arbitration, as well as a wide spectrum of strategies between war and international sanctions at one extreme and simple negotiation at the other.

In a municipal society, we naturally consider the legal process to be a necessary framework for resolving significant problems. In spite of international law's relative inadequacy, conflict resolution cannot ignore this. However, the international legal framework is not only weaker; it also appears to have a different foundation than the municipal. There, submission to binding third-party judgement is regarded as customary, but international law presumes that a state is not subject to any third-party decision (or even the less binding "good offices" or mediation) until it gives its own agreement. Even while each state retains its own court, it has no authority over other states because they all have the same rights. A fight needs two people to start, and italso takes both disputants to confer international competence.

ORIGINS

Prior to the start of any conflict, concerns about its prevention and resolution existed. Ancient stories like the Iliad and the Mahabharata provide glimpses of divine and human interaction. The fragmented Westphalian peace that followed the Thirty Years War and the power balance established by the Concert of Europe system that followed the Napoleonic Wars are two examples of contemporary approaches that can be traced back to two European state-centric attempts to establish regional orders that would not degenerate into a war among major power.

Two more modern attempts to prevent armed conflict globally also emerged from wars that began in Europe[6]. Despite humanity's efforts to establish stable, peaceful international arrangements among states, the same problems persist—albeit to a lesser extent—while new ones crop up. The development of strategic nuclear weapons influenced the course of the Cold War and prompted policymakers, theorists, and a large number of laypeople to consider ways to prevent superpower nuclear wars and how to at least contain or manage regional conflicts without running the risk of a potentially catastrophic total war between the superpowers. However, the intensity of local conflicts even during the Cold War, the spread of nuclear weapons, and the wide distribution of small guns all sparked fresh inquiries (and reignited previous discussions) about the benefits of arms races and the efficacy of global systems of collective security.These challenges led to path-breaking investigations into how to avoid wars, or keep wars limited (and thus nonnuclear) using deterrence, tacit bargaining, and signalling. But the rationality premise of deterrence troubled analysts who borrowed insights from psychology and deployed them in political science: misperceptions and other cognitive distortions plague the decision-making and political analyses of leaders, leading to conflict. Many people began to worry that global nuclear war may break out if deterrence failed and that there needed to be another way to govern the world except a mutual balance of terror between superpowers. Through mutual vulnerabilities and coordinated crisis management, arms control and disarmament through negotiation opened up new opportunities for international collaboration, even amongst competitors.

[4](Boasson 1963, pp. 43-49)

[5](Stone 1954, introduction; Stone 1956; Boasson 1963, pp. 50-59)

[6]the League of Nations following World War I and the innovative United Nations system following World War II

LIMITS OF UN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Our contemporary UN system was designed to promote international peace while preserving existing states, balancing the major powers and containing nascent nationalisms within postcolonial borders. It by no means eliminated war entirely, although it may indeed have helped mitigate the onset of interstate wars. The UN 's collective security mechanisms were idled at the time of the body 's creation through the mutual vetoes of the United States and the Soviet Union on the Security Council, which was empowered by the UN Charter to "determine the existence of any threat to peace . . . and to maintain or restore international peace and security" through the use of force[7]. After breaking out of this impasse, the Security Council may send out daring new multilateral missions of peace-making (mediation), peacekeeping (interposition of neutral UN-commanded armed forces between belligerents), and peace enforcement (fighting) to settle international crises. The Security Council has come to the conclusion more frequently over time that a government's serious violations of its own citizens' human rights or its illegal wars against other nations cannot be justified by its claim of sovereignty. The international community reserves the right of multilateral intervention when governments willfully breach the security of their own populations. Although emerging standards like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are still developing and lack clear prescriptive consequences, sovereignty can no longer be seen as a fortress where rights can be routinely violated. Over time, the distinction between domestic law and foreign involvement has become more-hazy. Discussions of secession, government change, and maintaining peace are no longer taboo (although these are by no means panaceas for weak states or violent conflicts). For better or worse, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are essentially exempt from the UN system's oversight, and as the most recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate, they are able to declare war on other countries unilaterally and frequently do so. They can fight conflicts within their own borders without worrying about coordinated multilateral intervention, as the two wars in Chechnya showed.

CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE

Waltz (1954) contrasted three images of international relations that together help explain international conflict and war: human nature (also called the individual level), the composition and structure of states (also called the state level), and the anarchic state system (also called the system level) within which states exist and compete for survival. The combined effect of Waltz's three images is also compelling: leaders and citizens with inherited and learned patterns of human aggression who live in oppressive, weak, or overly aggressive states interacting with each other in the absence of an overarching restraining global authority should inevitably be drawn into violent international conflict. Waltz's neorealism preferred the third image to explain war, but the combined effect of his three images is also compelling. According to more prescriptive neoliberal political theorists, harmony and peace may and must develop even in the midst of chaos and conflict. The study of conflict as the result of intergroup dysfunction and individual cognitive processes has made significant contributions to our comprehension of international conflict and, consequently, to its resolution.

From psychology and sociology, we have come to understand how symbols are used to mobilize followers, how easy it is to create out-groups by fomenting exclusive identities[8], and how social exclusion social exclusion and moral exclusivity[9] ultimately pave the way for violence against out-groups and, thus, war. Genuine conflicts continue, and current interpretations have examined state architecture, the dynamics of intergroup interactions, and the persistence of real or imagined grievances. There is some evidence that a medium level of ethnic diversity is conducive to conflict, meaning that both very homogeneous and very heterogeneous countries are at a lower risk of civil war than are countries with two or three large ethnic groups. However, the presence of multiple ethnic groups within a state does not always result in violent conflict. This may be as a result of the social composition's facilitation of organising and cohesion around problems of ethnic identity. Although the majority of scholarly explanations centre on the interplay between politics, economics, and ethnicity, there is no one, widely accepted explanation for why there is ethnic conflict.

"Ethnicity becomes a call to action"—and thus a source of possible conflict "when such a group organizes for political and economic ends" such as an independent state, equal economic opportunity, or rights to religious expression. Uneven rates of modernisation, economic competitiveness, the psychological propensity to elevate one's own group and denigrate others, different treatment by colonisers, and other reasons may be the root causes of ethnic strife. The so-called ethnic wars and conflicts are really a result of poor leadership. Minorities frequently turn to violence because they "lose faith in the capacity of the state to accommodate their interests." Political and economic transitions are a contributing factor to violence, as ethnic and sectarian wars may break out when "old'social contracts"' that used to govern access to political and economic resources have

[7] chap. VII, arts. 39 and 44
[8] Tajfel and Turner, 1986
[9] Opotow, 1990

been broken by secular economic decline, neoliberal economic reforms, and institutional transformation. Indeed, change in political institutions is associated with a higher risk of civil war.

Conflict and Poverty Similar to "old hatreds," poverty is frequently blamed for causing civil conflict (as well as of terrorism). It is true that poorer countries are more prone than wealthy ones to undergo civil war, and that both low GDP and high economic disparity are linked to more prolonged civil wars. The relationship between a low GDP and war is still debatable, though.However, there is some evidence that lack of state reach or infrastructure is a stronger cause of civil war than poverty itself or ease of rebel recruitment. Lower GDP also correlates with many other factors, such as lower education levels, higher birth rates, and lower levels of democracy, which may have some role in causing civil wars. These uncertainties make it hard to isolate the role of poverty in causing armed conflict.

WEAK STATES AS CONFLICT OPPORTUNITIES

Weak nations, when institutions are unable to resolve social strife, mitigate complaints, or quell violent opposition, are another area of potential. When a rebellion begins in a powerful state, the government can put an end to it more quickly. Perhaps more importantly, if the state enjoys widespread legitimacy, a rebel group won't attract as much support. An effective, lawful system of preserving security and settling conflicts that is accepted by the populace as legitimate exists in a strong state. The lack of these institutions and their legitimacy creates a space wherein aggrieved parties may resort to violence.

War Breeds War

By increasing polarisation and animosity, displacing large numbers of civilians, reversing economic progress, saturating regions with weaponry, and enhancing the political influence of the military, civil wars tend to establish the conditions for more civil wars. The average duration of civil wars is likewise significantly longer than that of interstate conflicts, and for reasons that are now unknown, civil wars that began in the 1980s or 1990s have typically lasted twice as long as those that did in the 1960s or 1970s. Therefore, while the rate of civil war beginning has remained relatively stable throughout the 1950s, the pace of termination was generally slower until during the Cold War, when peacekeeping and civil war termination surged. Civil wars' persistence and recurrence provide insight into why they occur.

TOOLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The parties to a conflict and outsiders trying to assist them in reaching a resolution can utilise a variety of techniques that are either independent of or interact with the efforts of the UN and regional organisations. Here, we list them in roughly chronological order: preventive, track 2 problem-solving and negotiation training, negotiation, mediation, and post-agreement peacebuilding. However, the actual sequence is not linear. Particularly civil wars are prone to reoccurring because they increasingly start as reprises of recently concluded conflicts. According to one estimate, this is responsible for 90% of civil war outbreaks in the 2000s. The distinction between preventive and post-conflict peacebuilding is hazy because civil conflicts frequently repeat.

Assessment, Prevention, and Early Warning

The early warning and prevention of violent conflict, a UN Charter ambition but rarely put into practise, has received more attention recently. In our opinion, conflict resolution at an earlier stage of escalation is prevention. The objective of conflict prevention is to stop the violent outcomes of conflict, not conflict itself. We concur with the wide definition of conflict as an actual or perceived mismatch of goals, with the potential for good change if the conflict is managed skilfully. When viewed in this light, prevention is the use of conflict resolution, settlement, and management methods during the early phases of conflict, before to the escalation to violence, as well as in situations following a conflict in order to prepare for a potential return of armed conflict.

Finding disputes where violence is likely to occur is the first obstacle in prevention. Conflicts receive more attention once violence has broken out because the media tends to be interested in dramatic events. There are essentially two methods for early warning: one involves identifying the nations or groups that exhibit the structural traits that are statistically linked to conflict, and the other entails monitoring the more immediate factors that lead to violent conflict or warning signs of impending violence. The first strategy uses statistics to identify minorities or nations that are more at risk for conflict.For more immediate warning of conflicts, qualitative methods are more valuable and may involve reporting by humanitarian agencies[10] such as the International Crisis Group. Despite the inherent value of early warning, policymakers and analysts are at risk when "detecting" emerging violent conflict. Unwelcome news might result in a shoot-the-messenger response (or denial by decision makers), while fear of getting the analysis wrong may cause the analyst to adopt undue optimism or trepidation about reporting.

[10]media, academic area specialists, diplomatic corps, IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

The resulting study provides guidance for policy choices, aids programmes in reducing these dynamics, and boosts current capacity for resilience and conflict resolution. Assessments can be utilised at any stage of a conflict, but prevention is where they are most useful. Organizations that provide humanitarian help and development are becoming more mindful of the danger that doing so could unintentionally start a conflict or make one worse. Warring parties may steal help, for instance, to fund their troops or purchase weapons. More generally, aid may take the place of meeting basic necessities for civilians, freeing up public funds for use in conflict.

Economic development as conflict prevention

When it comes to structural conflict avoidance, or determining which cultures are likely to experience conflicts based on underlying factors, economic development could be viewed as a proxy for conflict management. Before we can say whether and how economic development avoids conflict, we need to better understand the relationship between poverty and civil war. We discuss state construction as prevention because, to the extent that development both reduces poverty and aids states in providing services, it seems well-suited to the task of lowering the chance of civil conflict.

Good offices and mediation

Specialized forms of negotiation in which a third party participates include good offices and mediation. Even excellent offices are so highly prized as a technique of conflict resolution, which is symptomatic of the comparatively recent growth and rudimentary nature of international agreements for conflict resolution. Because there is no requirement for the parties to proceed further, its significance is limited to restoring dialogue and discussion between disputants and possibly inducing some constraint in that communication. In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt's diplomacy with the warring parties contributed to the end of the Russo-Japanese War, while in 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's attempts to avert the start of World War II failed miserably.

These functions are extremely modest, each party maintaining[11] both the right of final decision and that of deciding whether negotiation (with or without mediation) is to proceed at all. Such legal rules as exist for both good offices and mediation are mainly concerned with legitimizing these mild, third-party intrusions into other states' quarrels.These tentative pre-negotiation procedures still play a crucial role in conflict resolution after two generations of struggle for more effective and peremptory procedures through the League of Nations and the United Nations. The first Hague Peace Conference, in 1899, still felt the need to declare that the offer of such services was not an "unfriendly act."

The fundamental way that mediation differs from good offices is in the amount of noncoercive initiative that the third party is allowed to take. Once he has been asked to participate, the mediator is free to both convey and suggest solutions. However, notably within the United Nations, the phrases "good offices" and "mediation" are occasionally used informally and without clear distinction, and the term "conciliation" is also frequently used in place of "mediation".

Fact finding

The merits of the issue as to fact or law may never be established because the success of any of these procedures is evidenced by agreement rather than decision. It is well known that disputants interpret the facts in their own way. This is particularly true of states, who are frequently more adept at hiding the truth than are people. State opposition to outside interference has always included a special envy for outside fact-finding, even when it is purely advisory.Not surprisingly, therefore, institutionalization of procedures of international fact finding is almost as recent as that of international adjudication.

The Hague Convention of 1899 established a legal framework within which a commission might be appointed to gather information regarding a specific issue and permitted for the creation of international commissions of inquiry. These commissions were helpful in a number of situations, primarily naval ones. The most well-known of these was the Anglo-Russian disagreement over the Dogger Bank event during the Russo-Japanese War. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations adapted this kind of strategy to their unique organisational structures, with the former taking special advantage of it as a tool of delaying and persuasion.

These customary procedures appear tame and timid when compared to the United Nations Security Council's hardly restrained authority to render conclusive judgments in disputes involving threats to or violations of the peace. By collectivizing even the simple, established practises, the League of Nations and its successor substantially enhanced and fortified them. The United Nations' efforts, however, have been significantly impeded by the consistent voting alliances in the current bipolar political environment.

People who are experiencing a crisis have always created stereotypes of both themselves and their enemies, then shaped the problems to fit the stereotypes. Today, however, stereotypical attitudes are widely promoted through all forms of public communication prior to the specific crises, frequently on purpose and with

[11]Palestine and Kashmir and other contemporary cases

the support of state officials. The national version of any future dispute will be determined by these stereotypes, so even when the conflict-initiating state has invited the impartial inquiry, the "facts," as rationally discovered, frequently struggle in vain to change it. Therefore, even this modest objective becomes more challenging as the necessity for systems of really unbiased fact seeking grows. These issues are illustrated by a variety of specific conflicts, but they are most prominent in the issue of fact-finding by an international body that is acceptable to the two main rivals as part of the inspection system in a global nuclear-disarmament plan. The opposite side has been portrayed as being led by cliques intent on obtaining world dominance by deceit or coercion. The issues for the impartial organ affect both sides' ability to survive, and there aren't many third parties who can be trusted on such matters without raising suspicions that they are sympathetic to or intimidated by either side. Successful establishment of an organ with such functions would be a sign that the survival crisis is over and not just a first step toward meeting it.

The focus of the conversation has been on how much a streamlined mediation procedure and allowing the mediator to render provisional, non-binding third-party findings could help. It has unfortunately been unable to avoid the truth that mediation is prized by states precisely because of its informal, un-stylized nature, treating each case as unique, and because it provides opportunities for catharsis and open communication through the mediator. The entire purpose of mediation is defeated by reforms that sow doubts that any concessions or confessions made during this discussion might be used against one party if the conciliation ultimately fails.

Arbitration

The parties to a dispute still retain significant control over the arbitral process even in modern times, when the binding power of arbitral decisions is typically maintained by the inclusion of at least one independent member in the tribunal. They have first influence over the decision of whether to lodge a dispute. Second, they have authority over the choice of the arbitrators. Third, they have power over the laws that will be followed. Finally, even after the award, they still have some indirect control over how it will play out because, according to international law, an award is voidable if it was obtained through fraud, was made without proper jurisdiction, or was founded on "essential error" that resulted in "manifest injustice". Since no tribunal has jurisdiction to determine a claim of nullity, the effect is that the claimant can block further clarification.

By appointing bodies or individuals, such as the International Court or its president, to act in some of these and other circumstances, the International Law Commission suggested mitigating these flaws in its Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure of 1953. The number of UN members who have supported this is disappointingly low. However, as the Dutch government noted, even under the draught, governments would still be entitled to refuse to sign any agreements to arbitrate. If the law is tightened, it might only have the effect of reducing the quantity and variety of submissions by denying them escape routes. No mere verbal prescriptions can alter the fact that the disputant's freedom not to submit is the master control, as it is also the master blockage to proposals for general submission.

Although these flaws reduce unrealistic expectations of universal arbitration ensuring peace, they shouldn't cause us to underestimate the genuine, though small, function of arbitration in conflict resolution. There were 238 separate formal arbitrations between the Jay Treaty of 1794 (which allowed for third-party resolution of Anglo-American disputes following the War of Independence) and the turn of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, since 1794, more than sixty permanent (though transient) tribunals have resolved large categories of disputes that were referred to them by the two states in question. In essence, this type of resolution is similar to what conventional municipal courts do. Arbitration has made a great contribution to the quieting of claims after great wars and as an ancillary to the modern growth of international administration.

The first Hague conference established the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which consists of a regular framework within which states seeking to arbitrate may select arbitrators from a standing panel, with corresponding permanent registry services, and well over twenty of its courts have operated. True, despite its name, this was neither permanent nor a court, and more than sixty years after its founding and more than a century and a half of modern arbitration have passed, persistent flaws still exist, and only a small number of people with extensive dispute resolution experience have ever surfaced.

We can differentiate at least four types of legal submission by states that must be significantly more developed and generalised before any prospects can materialise, without placing overly high hopes in general obligatory arbitration as a preventative measure against conflict.

(1) *Ad-hoc submission of particular existing conflicts of known and determinate range.* These situations can be distinguished as a class primarily because both parties in them are generally aware of the factual and legal parameters within which their rights will be jeopardised by submission to a third party's judgement.

(2)*Ad-hoc submission of existing conflicts of indeterminate but noncritical range.* Even if the interests at stake in a conflict are factually or legally ambiguous, a state may still view them as unimportant to its security or economy. In most cases, at least, the outside bounds of risk may be identified when a conflict has fully developed. A prominent example is the Anglo-American disagreement concerning the Alabama case, which was

referred to arbitration by the Treaty of Washington in 1871 as a result of British recognition of the Confederate states' belligerency in the American Civil War.

(3)*General submission of carefully delimited classes of future minor conflicts.* A different phase with separate subphases is the submission of a class of future disputes. A state cannot know in advance the precise range of its exposure to issues that have not yet arisen, hence the factor of futurity continually impacts the bounds of commitment.

(4)*Submission of future conflicts without close delimitation but with reservation of indeterminate classes of conflicts, the range of the reservation being self-determined by each party in each conflict.* When governments have appeared to overcome their aversion to broad submissions under the influence of internationalist sentiment, closer inspection of the ensuing submissory clauses has revealed other restrictive mechanisms. Before World War I, the most well-known of these was the overriding clause known as the "vital interests, honour, and independence" clause.

Only if governments were willing to disclose in advance even the most serious interests that would be impacted by future conflicts could third-party decision making become a deciding factor in war prevention. Most of those who advocate "the rule of law among nations" as a workable alternative to "the balance of terror" view it as the ideal model because it is postulated (rather than experienced) in this way, and much of this excessive optimism results from failing to draw distinctions like those just sketched.

Even unsuccessful contemporary examples of this submission of future disputes without qualification as to the interests at stake are rare. The Locarno treaties' arbitration clauses did not include a vital-interests reservation, but they did exempt nonjusticiable disputes from the arbitration requirement in an effort to prevent a resumption of Franco-German conflicts on France's eastern frontiers under a regional security system backed by neighbouring states. When the United Kingdom realised that its advance submission to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice might have been made in terms broad enough to challenge positions regarding belligerent naval rights that Britain regarded as fundamental, it manifested considerable agitation in 1939.The submission was withdrawn and suitably replaced at the earliest opportunity.

JUSTICIABILITY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The ambiguity of the word "justiciable," especially when we remove it from its historical-international context, gives rise to a considerable deal of pointless controversy in the massive literature generated since World War I. For instance, it is frequently interpreted to simply relate to the question of whether, provided the parties are ready to accept a binding judgement from a third party, a tribunal may provide some sort of resolution. The issue of justiciability is effectively solved by this. Because getting the states at odds to invite him to do so and him then finding a solution that will resolve the fundamental issues they are fighting over is what is difficult about this situation, not getting a third party to suggest any particular solution.

The justiciability issue first manifests itself when the parties to a dispute simply refuse to submit to any adjudication by a third party. Before such submission, there is no technical legal significance to the dispute, and justiciability becomes merely a matter of policy between those in favour of and those opposed to submission.

A technical legal issue that can emerge is whether a disagreement is justiciable. This occurs when a class of potential conflicts has been submitted that appears relevant, with the class being defined in the submission instrument to either contain or exclude "justiciable" or "nonjusticiable" conflicts (also known as "political" or "legal" conflicts). Furthermore, there is no mystery in these plain words. The distinction in the General Act of 1928 is in terms of "legal" and "nonlegal" and when states agree under the "optional clause" of article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice to submit to the court the categories of disputes there enumerated, the whole enumeration is qualified by the problematic words, "legal disputes concerning." A notion exists that some treaty duties, such as those to join another party in a conflict, are political or nonjusticiable by nature, meaning that each party must decide for itself whether an obligation has reached maturity.

It is obvious that under the previous "vital interests, honour, and independence" reservations criteria, it was up to each party to decide whether the dispute could be resolved through the courts. Unless a state's submission or the composition of a standing tribunal to which the matter is presented makes the contrary plain, this is likely to hold true whenever the issue of justiciability in the current sense comes up. The result is that the state in question is free to completely avoid its commitment to submit to arbitration if it chooses to act arbitrarily (and risk any moral backlash involved).

UNILATERAL SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES

Experience has refuted the optimistic notion that the United Nations Security Council's veto was only a momentary deviation from a wider trend toward providing entities concerned with conflict resolution the authority to make binding majority decisions. In fact, the veto may have gained a new and resurgent function in the handling of conflict in the modern era, which is characterised by conflicts of both the old, bilateral and new, bloc-ideological types as well as by dispersed but deep tensions of the thermonuclear balance of terror.Disdain

for the shoddy negotiation tactics mentioned before and criticisms of the Security Council veto have undoubtedly subsided. Furthermore, even while each party is still legally entitled to veto any final judgement, there has been at least a grudging acceptance of the benefits of preplanned, mutually agreed-upon conflict resolution procedures. It is becoming more and more clear that the legal veto won't matter when a powerful state is convinced that its fundamental interests are at stake since that state will already have a de facto veto.

This is related to the growing understanding that continuing ineffectively stalled conversations is not always preferable to ending them. Repeated confrontation of unbridgeable differences can actually contribute to the maintenance or escalation of tension, therefore mutual withdrawal could be a start in the right direction toward de-stressing. Furthermore, continuing in a fruitless negotiation at this point may prevent or discourage the investigation of "weaker" but more effective options. To reduce its armed troops and nuclear material stocks, the United States and the Soviet Union adopted carefully coordinated but independent actions. Unilateral de-escalation strategies, often known as "graduated and reciprocating initiatives in tension reduction," are significant implementations of the broad principle being discussed here in regard to this and other current conflicts.

Each party is allowed to change its unilateral attitude at any time without formality or embarrassment thanks to such parallel but studiously separate conduct. It allows for a kind of prenatal veto, giving each side the option to cancel the parallel action's plan if they so choose. It's possible that the certainty of this "veto" is what motivates the concerned governments to act more willingly in practise than in law.

Perhaps continuing this line of thought a little further is not too far-fetched. The tangle of issues addressed by the "hot line" accord is an ominous intrusion among hopes of someday dislodging the "balance of terror" with "the rule of law among states." The guarantee of adequate channels of communication up until the last moment of a potentially catastrophic crisis, however, is, in the current world, a critical pillar supporting in a diffuse way all the potential means of conflict resolution, according to those who proposed or implemented the idea of the "hot line." The "hot line" does not guarantee negotiation, much less agreement, on important contentious problems, but if the means of contact are not guaranteed in a crisis, negotiation may very well be impossible. The promise that communications would remain available throughout intervening postures and when tensions are on the rise has a calming impact that is even more significant. The "hot line" will enable this interest to function at the critical moment of necessity if the idea that the nuclear giants have a shared interest in survival is true. Although neither of the great nuclear powers could have agreed to bind itself legally to give the other notice of an imminent danger of war, the "hot line" allows them to move together in that direction.

COERCIVE PROCEDURES SHORT OF WAR

The nominate coercive procedures, short of war, are severance of diplomatic relations, retortion, reprisal, embargo, boycott, and pacific blockade, most of which are affected by the problems surrounding prohibition of the use or threat of force[12]. These tactics, like war, only serve to "settle" disputes in the sense that they allow the aggrieved person to "help themselves" in societies where there is a lack of shared conviction and a weak system of law enforcement. They hang helplessly over the Stygian waters that separate the ill-defined territory of international law from the unrestrained territory of extralegal anarchy, where the traditionally permitted option between war and peace still has some influence. Whatever the right response to the legal issues may be, coercive measures other than war nonetheless have a place in society, as the United States' "quarantine" of Cuba in 1962 made very obvious.

In fact, accepting certain limited coercive measures may be especially important in a time when neither the eradication of international warfare nor the affordability of nuclear war as a solution are feasible options. It is necessary to re-evaluate the entire issue of coercions other than war, contrasting it with the brutal reality of international warfare that still occurs in a setting that is primarily military rather than with the idealised notion of a society devoid of any compulsion.

II. CONCLUSION

The causes of war and hence the ways to end it appear to be more complicated than ever. Along with the traditional causes and dynamics of conflict, there are also novel ones. Our strategies for resolving international conflict still rely on tried-and-true techniques of statecraft and collective security, as well as diplomatic and economic interventions (negotiation and sanctions, or carrots and sticks), but these are supported by new players like the UN's new standby team of mediators, civil society organisations, including religious groups that intervene in conflict, and emerging norms and practises of assessment, prevention, and intervention.Technology is being used in novel ways to monitor and avoid conflict. As well as the reconciliation and human security aspects of resolving international conflicts, we also have a better knowledge of the economic components of war and peace-making. To promote more genuine, inclusive communities that don't

[12]see Sanctions, international

prey on their own population or start wars with other countries, however, there is still much work to be done in both theory and practise. Human ingenuity will be needed to both design the battlefield of violent international conflict and adapt to the arising needs of conflict-affected populations.

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