

## Hybridization of the Poso Conflict Resolution Discourse

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**Abstract:** The slow process of resolving conflicts and violence in Poso is inseparable from the model of handling conflicts carried out by the government, in this case by putting forward a security approach. Over time it turns out that violence continues. Therefore, the researchers felt they were interested in criticizing the model of Poso conflict and violence handling carried out by the government and offered a soft power model approach, namely through "hybridization of the Poso conflict resolution discourse". This study aims to determine discourse hybridization processes in Poso conflict resolution. The research paradigm used is constructivism with a qualitative approach. Key informants are Religious Leaders, Customary Figures, Community Leaders, NGOs, Mass Media, and Government. Data collection is done using observation techniques, interviews, snowball sampling technique and documentation. The data analysis technique uses the flow data analysis model according to Miles & Huberman. Based on the results of research, analysis, and discussion, it was concluded that: The discourse hybridization process in Poso conflict resolution has not been maximally carried out, because what actually happens is "discourse domination". The discourse of conflict resolution that is built is not a combination of superior discourses in poso conflict resolution and does not occur culturally, but is more initiated by the government. The conflict resolution discourse that was built in Poso conflict resolution often ignored community participation and did not take place continuously and was still repressive.

**Keywords:** Hybridization; Discourse; Resolution; Poso Conflict

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### I. INTRODUCTION

In the past two decades the reality of Indonesian harmony has often been torn apart by a series of violent conflicts that have spread in various regions, one of which is the conflict that occurred in the Central Sulawesi Province of Poso Regency. The conflict that has occurred since 1998 seems to have never been resolved. It can even be said that the Poso conflict is the longest conflict in post-reform Indonesia [1]. Since the Malino declaration for Poso came into force, violence in Poso is still frequent.

Based on temporary data that researchers can collect, that since the 2001 malino declaration to date there have been 173 incidents of violations of the Malino declaration agreement. The most recent incident and the most recent is that on 31 December 2018 there were killings and mutilation of civilians named Ronal Batau aka Anang, 36 years old in the village of Salubanga, hamlet of Manggalapi, Sausu sub-district, and armed contact between Ali Kalora's network group Tinombala's operations forces wounded two Brimop members, namely Bripka Andrew Maha Putra and Bripda Baso. Various cases that have sprung up such as terror, kidnapping, murder, civilians and security forces that have recently happened again are a long series of conflicts that have occurred before. This has a negative impact on the harmonization efforts of the post-conflict Poso community, and has even caused people to live in fear, losing their sense of security for activities.

The presence of armed civilian groups known as the East Indonesian Mujahidin group (MIT) under the leadership of Abu Wardah alias Santoso and the government's efforts to crush this group through military force with various military operations; such as the Maleo and Operation Tinombala operations that continue to this day further indicate that the Poso situation is not yet secure and the potential for conflict to occur still exists. This prolonged conflict has caused various social impacts in people's lives, including social segregation between Muslim and Christian communities, the accelerated process of development, and the community living in prolonged trauma.

Efforts to deal with conflicts that have so far been carried out seem to only resolve or end conflicts, have not led to ongoing efforts to transform conflict (conflict transformation). Conflict handling has been dominated by the government, consequently the role and participation of local people is low, while dependence on law enforcement officers is high. The same thing was said by Rev. AR. Tobondo, one of the Malino

declarators, said that the Poso conflict management did not involve the local community more, more initiated by the Government.

While Priest. R. Damanik, one of the Poso peace activists, said that, reconciliation carried out for Poso was, in fact, elite reconciliation, not a complete reconciliation of the Poso community. Even though local community participation is very much needed as one of the important conditions for the creation of peace independently at the local level. As a result, even though the conflict seems to stop, the same potential conflict can arise at other times.

The slow process of resolving conflicts in Poso is also inseparable from the discourse contestation that was built both by local elites, community leaders, religious leaders, communities, NGOs, the mass media and the government in seeing the root causes of the Poso conflict, and this affected the conflict handling model Poso.

There are so many irrelevant discourses that unwittingly shape the behavior of the conflicting communities. This discourse has produced ideas or concepts that are believed to be truthful and underlie actions and or have effects in the daily lives of the conflicting communities. Discourses caused the Poso community to unconsciously, often deliberately "adjusting" their narratives and social behavior to other individuals or communities [2].

From the results of the research that the researchers did, it was identified that there were at least twelve discourses which had been misfiring in the arena of the Poso conflict, including: political discourse, namely the change of regent; money politics discourse in Regent elections; Discourse on the selection of regional secretaries in Poso Regency; Discourse on corruption in farming credit funds (KUT); the Poso security recovery discourse; discourse on socio-economic disparity; religious discourse; see discourse; terrorism discourse; military discourse, and mastery of natural resource management (SDA).

Regardless of the anatomy and definition of whether the conflict in Poso is an elite conflict or because of ethnic or religious clashes, or because of economic inequality and the presence of radical groups, the conflict has caused many casualties and material as well as tremendous psychological terror against the citizens, also while aggravating existing social segregation.

The various conflict resolutions built by the Government, including negotiations, mediations, including through the Malino I declaration, ahead of the security approach, have not been very effective in stopping and breaking the chain of conflict. A recurring conflict indicates that the resolution made against it failed. This failure may be caused by not finding the root cause of the conflict or the resolution model used is incorrect. The solution to the protracted Poso conflict has the potential to become a latent conflict. Therefore alternative efforts are needed that are different from the ways of resolving conflicts that have existed so far.

## **II. MATERIAL AND METHODS**

This study intends to find out the construction of discourse in the arena of conflict in Poso district, thus it is expected to find a new model of approach in handling the Poso conflict, therefore the research paradigm that is considered relevant as the basis or reference of this research is the constructivism paradigm.

Operationally, the research approach used is a qualitative approach. The choice of this approach is based on the consideration that through a qualitative approach, researchers can understand (*verstehen*) the process, meaning, and effects of discourse contestation in the arena of conflicts that occur in Poso District. For this reason, the archeological method and genealogical investigation of discourse contestation are the choices of strategies in this study. This research was conducted in Poso District, Central Sulawesi Province. the technique of determining informants was taken by purposive and snowball sampling.

A purposive technique is used to select informants who are known as actors of production discourse in the arena of conflict. While the snowball technique (snowball sampling technique) is used to extract information continuously from one informant to another informant.

The informants in this study amounted to 30 people, each of which was a representation of the Government, elites, religious leaders, community leaders, NGOs, and the community. Data collection is done in two main ways, namely observation and interview. and supported by documentation techniques. The validity of the data is done by using source, method, investigator and theory triangulation techniques [3]. The data analysis technique used is an interactive analysis model [4].

## **III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

### **3.1. Identification Of Discourse in Poso Conflict**

The conflicts and violence that occurred in Poso cannot be separated from the discourse contestation that was built and developed by the actors. There are twelve discourses that were built and developed in the Poso conflict, namely:

### **3.1.1 Discourse on The Replacement of The Poso Regent**

This discourse was rolled out since the Regent of Poso Arief Patanga, SH, submitted a letter of resignation as the Regent of Poso, because his tenure in a row had ended on December 13, 1988. From that moment the political atmosphere in the number one seat in the region heated up and caused tension among the Poso community. Political battles developed and were packaged in three interests, namely Islam, Christianity and the TNI.

Each of the largest religious groups in Poso, namely Islam and Christianity began to struggle in its own way to defend their representatives in political battles to occupy the highest place in the Poso regional government in the following period. This battle of political elites colored and triggered the emergence of SARA-type conflicts at the end of December 1998, which began with a youth fight in the village of Sayo between RB and TL (Christian) versus a Muslim youth with the initials AR, which then spread the issue that "there a Muslim who was cut into pieces in the Sayo Mosque ". The news quickly circulated throughout the city of Poso, and made the Muslims who heard the news angry and gave rise to thick religious sentiment because it happened when Muslims were undergoing fasting in the holy month of Ramadan, as well as Christians celebrating Christmas. December 25, 1998. The discourse of the fight between the two youth groups has succeeded in provoking and mobilizing the two different religious groups to attack each other [5].

### **3.1.2 Treason Discourse**

This treason discourse revolved when Afgar Patanga, who was the younger brother of the Poso regent Arif Patanga, made and distributed leaflets entitled: a list of the security disturbance groups in Poso district (December 24-28, 1998), which contained ten names of officials (Christians) in the Poso Regional Government, included in the list of names was Yahya Patiro, SH, Regional Secretary of Poso, who at that time was also a strong candidate for the Poso Regent candidate. The ten names included in the list were accused of planning treason by trying to kill the Poso Regent Arief Patanga. But from the results of the Police investigation, the contents of the leaflet were not proven and were related to the succession of the Poso Regent. The leaflet also ignited the 1998 Poso riots. Afgar Patanga, who made the leaflets, was finally arrested and sentenced to six months in prison [5].

### **3.1.3 Political Money Discourse in the election of the Poso Regent**

This discourse was rolled out after the election of the new Regent, in the name of Abdul Muin Pusadan on 30 October 1999. The Poso Regent was elected on behalf of Abdul Muin Pusadan, who at that time was full of "Money Politics" fraud involving a number of Poso DPRD members, and the pressure to Muin Pusadan was chosen as Poso regent for the period 1999-2004 [5].

### **3.1.4 Discourse on the selection of secretaries for the Poso district**

The struggle for power between the two elite groups did not only occur in the seizure of positions as regents but also in the struggle for positions as regional secretaries of the Poso district. At that time there were two strong names, each of them was Drs. Damsyik Ladjalani (from an Islamic group), and Yahya Patiro, SH (from a Christian group). Even this Sekwilda is full of threats and pressure. The Palu Lighthouse daily quoted Haelani Umar (member of the Central Sulawesi Provincial Development Union Party Faction) "if the accumulated community is ignored by the local government, namely the aspirations that Drs. Damsik Ladjalani became the Regional Secretary of Poso, so the condition of Poso which had been rocked by the SARA 1998 riots would rage again ".[5].

### **3.1.5 Discourse on corruption in farming credit funds (KUT)**

This conflict occurred when information about the case of manipulation of the Farmer Credit (KUT) funds was manipulated, amounting to more than Rp. 5.7 billion which was temporarily investigated by the Poso police chief, AKBP Drs. Deddy Woerjantono and want to be delegated to the Court [6]. But this case has not been completed yet The Chief of Police has been withdrawn to Jakarta (Police Headquarters).

The 2, 3 and 4 discourses above triggered the April 2000 conflict, the same pattern of conflict with the 1998 conflict, which began with a fight between two Christian and Islamic youth groups at the Kasintuwu Bus Terminal on April 15, 2000.

### **3.1.6 Socio-economic disparities**

A revolving discourse since the existence of a central government political policy to bring transmigration to the Poso district. The transmigrants were financed and facilitated by the construction of economic infrastructure and occupying areas with fertile land while local communities occupied rocky mountainous areas. This has led to social jealousy of the local community towards immigrant communities. Besides that it is also caused by work ethic. Migrant communities have a better work ethic than the local

community. This causes the economic growth of immigrants to be faster than the local community. However, economic problems are not a dominant problem as a cause of the Poso conflict.

### **3.1.7 Discourse on Restoring Poso security**

The discourse on "Poso security restoration" has been rolling out since there was a dissatisfaction among a group of people against the efforts to contain the conflict carried out by the Government and security forces. This group was led by Ir. Lateka, a civil servant who works for forestry agencies in Central Sulawesi Province. This group came to be known as the "bat troop", which although this name was actually not the name of this group. The name "bat troop" is the name given by the mass media. These troops began to move and enter the city of Poso on May 23, 2000 at dawn, with the aim of quelling / arresting rioters / provocateurs who had been considered protected by the government and security forces [5]

The name "bat troops", this had viral and became a scourge that is very frightening for the community, especially for the Muslim community. But the actions of this group did not last long because the leader was Ir. Lateka was killed in a battle in front of Masjid Kayamaya on June 2, 2000. However, the group's struggle has triggered the birth of the Poso volume III conflict.

### **3.1.8 Religion Discourse**

In the Poso conflict, inter-religious conflict was the most dominant discourse, even allegedly one of the main causes of the widespread conflict in Poso. This discourse forms and constructs violent incidents in Poso and its surroundings into narratives about both religious communities, Islam and Christianity. The form of production, the re-production of the Poso conflict discourse as inter-religious conflict, among others, by always being linked to various violent incidents with religious, Christian and Islamic communities. Indications of linking violent incidents with the two religions can be seen in how often the government, mass media including local and international non-governmental organizations and various parties identified victims and / or perpetrators of shootings, bombs, mutilation, even areas of residence that were burned, destroyed, and adopted victim. The habit of identifying incidents of violence based on the religion that the victims embraced then became something "ordinary", followed by the Poso community and outside Poso.

The fact that the discourse on the Poso conflict as a conflict between religions became dominant, has led to the discourse becoming the basis for the period of organization based on religious groups to defend and attack other religious groups. This discourse has caused the community not only to become victims of conflict in terms of loss of property, lives, but also as victims of discourse. In other words languages, statements used in this discourse create the subject, and so create actions [7].

### **3.1.9 Discourse on Jihad**

The increasing discourse that the Poso conflict was a religious conflict, triggered Muslim solidarity to come in Poso. They come in the form of Jihad groups. The first troops arrived in Poso in 1998 called the Majelis Dzikir Nurul Khairat Poso forces. This force was led by Ustad Habib Salih Al-Idrus. The group resisted Christian groups in May 2000, and succeeded in killing the leader of the Adven L. Lateka Christian group. Then followed by another army namely lascar Jihad Ahlusunah Wal Jamaah led by Ustad Jafar Umar Thalib. This militia entered Poso in August 2001. The troop's appearance was very convincing, with a white robe, all-round clothing in the style of Prince in Ponegoro. Their number was initially 600 people and subsequently continued to grow along with the Poso conflict which was getting heated. These Madagascar Jihad forces are trained troops, agile and brave enough to carry out attack maneuvers to the opposing party. These troops left Poso after the Malino declaration. This force was resumed by the Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Mungkar Task Force.

Another force that arrived in Poso in order to help Poso Muslims was Laskar Mujahiddin. This warriors learned a lot about the conflict in Maluku. This army recruited Poso children to be trained to become militants. They formed fortifications on the outskirts of Poso. For the purposes of the field many formed factions such as Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Hisbullah and From the Struggle of the Poso Muslims. The arrival of the Laskar Mujahidin greatly helped the Poso Muslims to rise up to defend the Islamic villages and fight against the red groups, so that the war was even more balanced.

### **3.1.10 Discourse on Jihad**

Terrorist discourse began to roll out since the former head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), Hendro Priyono, stated that Poso was the training headquarters of the Al-Qaeda member movement under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden.[1].

This terrorist discourse grew stronger when the presence of the radical Mujahidin East Indonesia (MIT) group under the leadership of Abu Wardah Santoso in 2010, which was affiliated with the Al-Qaeda network led by Osama Bin Laden. In its development the MIT group has been affiliated with the ISIS international terrorist network, on June 30, 2014 [1].

The presence of this terrorist group is a strong reason for the TNI and POLRI to carry out massive military operations in Poso through the military operations of Maleo and Tinombala, which are still ongoing today.

This terrorism discourse not only succeeded in shifting and even sinking other discourses, but also preserving the dominant discourse, namely the Poso conflict as an interfaith conflict, even though the mention of terrorism was only in certain religious groups. This shows that the violent conflict that still continues in Poso is related to religious sentiments. In other words the discourse of terrorism is a new, more global face than the discourse of the Poso conflict as an interfaith conflict.

### **3.1.11 Military discourse**

This military discourse strengthened when the conflict became wider and uncontrollable. The use of military power is one of the government's policies in dealing with the Poso conflict. This policy was then continued by establishing an operational field command using various operating codes, including: The Sadar Maleo operation was held in 2000, with the BKO (operational control body) of the Poso police station. TNI units that joined in the operation were the 711 Infantry Battalion / Raksatama Poso, 726 Infantry Battalion / Makassar Military, 721 Infantry Battalion / Makassar Palopo, and Makassar Combat Engineer Battalion 8. On the other hand, the police units included the Pare-Pare Police Mobile Brigade, Makassar Police Brimob, Pioneer and Central Sulawesi Regional Police Intelligence Unit.

The failure of TNI and POLRI forces to capture and crush terrorist networks (MIT), has led to this military operation continuing to the present, with the codename of the Tinombala operation. This operation involved Brimob units, Marines, Army Strategic Reserve Command, Raider, and Kopasus from the Indonesian Army. This Tinombala operation continues to be extended until now. The total force involved in this operation reached 3,406 personnel. Coming from the TNI 1,888 people and the police of 1,518 people [8].

### **3.1.12 Discourse on Natural Resources (SDA)**

Poso is part of Central Sulawesi which is rich in natural resources, ranging from oil, gas, gold, iron ore, nickel and marble. This was revealed by Asher Tandapae's informant, that the Poso conflict could not be separated from the shift in management of the new order era's natural resources centered on the island of Java. Post-reform shifted to Eastern Indonesia, including in Central Sulawesi. When compared to the north and south, the SDA center is actually in the middle of Sulawesi (Sul-teng). The area of Central Sulawesi is a region that is rich in natural resources, so many investors begin to look and want to invest in Sul-teng. Furthermore, the informant explained that the mastery and management of natural resources were not directly related to the Poso conflict, but there was a kind of big design to divide the control and management of natural resources. Poso is the entry point for these activities. Security measures carried out by security forces by building security posts, on the one hand are to accelerate post-conflict recovery in Poso, but also in the context of securing natural resource management and control. The same thing was expressed by Zet Tolage, that the Poso conflict was part of the natural resource conflict (SDA). One indicator is that more investors come to invest, especially in managing natural resources. Tito Karnavian, said that Poso is a district in the province of Central Sulawesi that is quite rich in natural resources, so it has become a target of outsiders. Unfortunately that potential has not been fully explored [8]

Poso district head of energy and mineral resources, Ari T. santoso; in the vortex of terrorism, said, there were at least six natural potentials that could be offered to investors to be managed. One potential that has often been offered is gold mining in the area of Central Lore and South Lore. The gold potential which is located north of Poso district has long been traditionally managed by the local community [8]

Tito Karnavian noted that during the conflict, there were several multi-national companies investing in Poso. Among others; Canadian PT Inco began exploring nickel in Poso year 1997. Then in 1998, PT. Mandar Uli Mineral, a subsidiary of Rio Tinto Group owned by "Rotthschild" working on gold in a land area of 550 hectares in Poso. In 2006, PT. Inco began exploiting its new mine in Morowali and has invested US \$ 1 billion. At Tolo Bay (Morowali), Pertamina and Medco are producing oil from the Tiaka field since July 31, 2005. PT. Yusuf Kalla's Bukaka Hydropower Engineering has also built a Poso 740 MW hydropower plant that will supply electricity for new industries (Inco, Rio Tinto, Medco, etc.) in the Central Sulawesi area.

The twelve discourses mentioned above are produced and reproduced by actors who have an interest in the Poso conflict. So that it can be said that what happened in the Poso conflict was "discourse fighting". Every discourse produced and reproduced always has interests and interests that must be fought for. In fighting for that interest the actors use the Win-Lose pattern. In this pattern there is competition between the conflicting parties to win the fight. There are only two possibilities that occur in this pattern, namely winning or losing. The effect of this pattern will produce a Zero Sum Game.

### **3.2. Identification of Discourse in Poso Conflict Resolution**

#### **3.2.1 Religion Discourse**

In the Poso conflict, religious discourse had become a powerful and dominant discourse as the root cause of the Poso conflict, but if traced further it had nothing to do with religion. Stated that the essence of the conflict in Poso was political conflict, but what appeared to be the surface was inter-religious conflict which led to massacres and revenge among religious people [9]. Political elites use religion as a vehicle and even a political shield to achieve power by exploiting religious messages. "When conflicts use glory sentences, such as Allahu Akbar and Hallelujah thicken religious militancy so as to bring revenge. Besides that, the political elites also included religious elites to make an image of religious institutions.

In essence all religions teach the values of virtue, truth, justice and peace. Religion is a moral source for humans in living life in this world. Religion has a multi-function role in people's lives, including: educational functions, rescue functions, peace functions, social control functions, solidarity function, renewal functions, creative functions, sublimative functions [10]. Nevertheless, on the other hand history notes that in the relations of religions in Indonesia in particular Islamic-Christian relations experienced ups and downs. Religion often appeared as something with a double face [11]. Religion at one time proclaimed peace, the road to salvation, unity and brotherhood. However, at the other time, he placed himself as something considered fierce, spreading conflict, and not infrequently, as noted in history, caused war [12].

In the history of the encounter of Islam and Christianity, Islamic-Christian relations in Indonesia have not always been harmonious. There are certain periods of relations between the two religions experiencing tension and even conflict, especially during the reform period. Call it the Ketapang and Kupang events in November 1998, the Poso events in December 1998-2002, the Ambon January 1999-2002 incident, and the actual ones were the Surabaya events May 13-14 2018. [13].

Nevertheless, religion remains a superior discourse in building peace. Because in essence all religions have teachings about goodness, truth, justice, and peace. The nature of inclusivism possessed by every religion must be explored in building peace in Indonesia which has diversity in various fields of life. In other words, even though Islam and Christianity contain exclusive doctrines, Islam and Christianity also teach many inclusive doctrines.

The inclusiveness of Islamic teachings can be seen from the concept of Islam as a religion "rahmatan lil' alamin ". meaning that Islam is a religion that brings mercy and prosperity to the entire universe, including animals, plants and jinn, let alone fellow humans.

Yahya Ismail explained that the concept of "Islam rahmatan lil'alamin", is an idea and effort of Muslims, especially in Indonesia to make: Islam as a blessing for all nature, not only for human safety but also for other realms. Human salvation has no meaning if nature is not in salvation. So saving Islam is Islam that provides salvation for all. [14].

While Nur Syam, said that the Islamic idea of rahmatan lil'alamin developed a pattern of pluralistic, humanistic, dialogic and tolerant inter-human relations, and developed the use and management of nature with compassion [15]. Pluralism in the sense of having a relationship regardless of ethnicity, nation, religion, race or other points that distinguish between one person and another. Humanist in the sense of upholding human rights and respecting human beings as human beings. Dialogical in the sense that all problems that arise as a result of social interaction are discussed well and are accommodative of a variety of thoughts. And tolerant in the sense of giving others the opportunity to do as they believe, with a sense of peace.

While in Christianity, it is known as a religion that teaches about "love", as the teachings of Jesus contained in the Gospel of Matthew 22: 37-39; "Love the Lord your God, with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. That is the first and foremost law, and the second law that is the same as that is to love your neighbor as yourself. "

In Christian teachings, the command to love God and fellow humans is absolute and a must. These two laws are related to one another. This means that humans cannot love God, while he hates his brother. So it can be said that man loves God, if he also loves his fellow human beings. This is explicitly stated in the book of I John 4. 20: "if one says; "I love God, and he hates his brother, so he is a liar. For the one who does not love his brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom he has not seen. "

This command to love one another is not only theoretical, but must be manifested in this world, as confirmed in 1 John 3:18; "let us love not by word or by tongue, but by action and truth".

What the researchers mentioned is only a small part of the inclusiv teachings of both religions, namely Islam and Christianity. In an effort to hybridize the conflict resolution discourse, it takes courage to explore more inclusivist teachings on the surface and minimize the teachings that are exclusive and contain radical elements.

### **3.2.2 Education Discourse**

One indicator of the Poso conflict is due to the low quality of the Poso community's human resources. This can be seen from the low level of education of the Poso district community during the conflict.

This fact made the Central Government take the initiative to build two higher education institutions in Poso district, namely; Tentena Christian University, which is located in Tentena (Christian enclave), which laid its first stone by the President of the Republic of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2007 and was inaugurated by the vice president Muhamad Yusuf Kalla in 2011.

While in Tokorondo (Muslim enclave), the Gontor International Islamic Boarding School was built, the first laying of the stone was also carried out by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2007, and was also inaugurated by Vice President Muhamad Yusuf Kalla in 2011. Both of these higher education institutions were built using grant funds from the central government.

### **3.2.3 Culture Discourse**

The Poso community has a very strong culture, as one of the elements that binds and unites them. Before the conflict, the Poso people lived in harmony, tied to cultural harmony, which was called a "sintuwu Maroso" culture.

The word "sintuwu maroso" has been very familiar in the community in Poso district and has formally become the motto of Poso Regency, which is listed on the regional symbol of Poso Regency based on Poso number II regulation number 43 in 1967. Since then Poso Regency has been called sintuwu maroso.

To perpetuate the sintuwu maroso slogan, the founders of the University in Poso in 1984 confirmed the name of the University under the name of Sintuwu Maroso University (UNSIMAR). Furthermore, Battalion 714 was formed which was located in the Maliwuko village area, and also named Battalion 714 Sintuwu Maroso abbreviated as Yon 714 / BC.

The word sintuwu maroso comes from two words, namely sintuwu and maroso, derived from the Pamona language, the largest tribe that inhabits the Poso District Government Administration area. Sintuwu comes from the Simpande Raya Tuwu Simpande Raya Mate sentence, which means a sincere desire to live side by side to bear sorrow together. In the word Sintuwu the meaning of unity, seia, agreed, agreed. Maroso means strong, strong, firm. Thus Sintuwu Maroso means being united firmly. In the culture of Sintuwu maroso there are very noble values, including:

- a. The value of togetherness / mutual cooperation. This value is implemented in the principle of life supporting each other (tuwu siwagi).
- b. Value of manners. This value is implemented in the principle of life of mutual respect and respect (tuwu mombetubunaka).
- c. Value of brotherhood / harmony. This value is implemented in the principle of a life of mutual love both within the scope of acquaintance, Handai Tlan (Tuwu Mombepomawo).
- d. Value of tolerance. This value is implemented in the principle of life of mutual acceptance and mutual recognition of differences in ethnic diversity, culture and beliefs as a community of Poso district (tuwu simpande raya)
- e. Value of solidarity. This value is implemented in a life attitude to support each other for the sake of the survival of the whole together (tuwu malinuwu), and also implemented in the principle of living mutual care, especially in creating opportunities for life (tuwu mombepatuwu).
- f. Value of unity and unity. This value is implemented in the life principle to uphold the existence and unity both internally and between communities living in Tanah Poso (tuwu sintuwu raya).

This cultural approach was carried out on August 22, 2000, namely the implementation of a peace agreement in the Pamona traditional ritual called rujuk sintuwu maroso by carrying out traditional motambu tana, which was marked by the cutting of a fat buffalo and its head buried with the symbol that hostility was buried and even forgotten. Buffalo meat is eaten together in togetherness. Whoever violates will be punished by custom by way of mosampu tana, which means being driven from the land of Poso

### **3.3. The Process of Hybridizing Discourse on Poso Conflict Resolution**

As previously explained, "hybridization of discourse" is a cultural process characterized by efforts to integrate two or more discourses into a new form of discourse, emphasizing the fusion of superior elements which may originate from old discourses which then form new discourses and superior too.

When referring to the above definition, it can be said that the process of discourse hybridization in Poso conflict resolution has been carried out through religious, educational and cultural discourses but not developed, because what actually happens is "discourse domination". Government policy in managing the Poso conflict by promoting a security approach has led to the existence of dominant discourses and discourses that are "marginalizes" or "submerged". According to Foucolt, the role of power strengthens one discourse and inhibits other discourses to develop. The power role plays an important role in the formation of discourse [7]. Supported

discourse becomes the dominant discourse. Meanwhile, other discourses become marginalized. The dominant discourse leads to the consequence that knowledge is limited in certain discourses, so that broader discourses become as if they are unthinkable and obstructed. The discourse structure limits knowledge and shapes truth according to the discourse that is built.

The discourses of conflict resolution that are rolled out are not a combination of superior discourses in poso conflict resolution and do not occur culturally, but are more initiated by the government

The conflict resolution discourse that was built in Poso conflict resolution often ignored community participation and did not take place continuously and was still repressive. Even though the handling of conflicts involving broad community participation by utilizing local community wisdom is an alternative to conflict resolution that should be considered [16].

The hybridization of Poso conflict resolution discourse can be done by combining superior discourses in Poso conflict resolution, for example cultural, educational and religious discourses. The process of combining these discourses will give birth to a new discourse, for example the discourse of "peace is beautiful", the discourse "torang samua brothers". Or by carrying out the discourse on the local wisdom of the Poso people, namely tuwu siwagi, tuwu malinuwu and sintuwu maroso. These discourses must continue to be produced and reproduced continuously until they become the dominant discourse in the midst of society.

The hybridization of Poso conflict resolution discourse in the opinion of researchers can be an alternative approach that is soft power, or which in Foucault's term is referred to as biopower in solving the Poso conflict, rather than a hard power approach, namely through a military approach.

In his book: *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Nye recommends handling conflicts that are soft power rather than hard power. Nye stated that the concept of soft power is attractive and in contrast to power that uses violence [17].

Soft power is not merely a cultural force, although it can transform culture into other countries to communicate values and influence society. The difference between soft power and hard power can be seen in three things: characteristics, instruments, and their implications. Soft power is characterized as co-opting and carried out indirectly, while hard power is coercive or direct and carried out directly. Soft power instruments in the form of values, institutions, culture, policies, while hard power includes military, sanctions, money, bribes, payments. Therefore unlike soft power which has implications for co-opting, hard power often invites resistance. Hybridization with relational, dialogical and tolerant characteristics will be a realistic choice rather than prioritizing a hard power approach.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

Based on data findings, analysis and discussion it can be concluded that: The discourse hybridization process in Poso conflict resolution has not been maximally carried out, because what actually happens is "discourse domination". Government policy in managing the Poso conflict by promoting a security approach has led to the existence of dominant discourses and discourses that are "marginalizes" or "submerged". The discourses of conflict resolution that are rolled out are not a combination of superior discourses in poso conflict resolution and do not occur culturally, but are more initiated by the government. The conflict resolution discourse that was built in Poso conflict resolution often ignored community participation and did not take place continuously and was still repressive.

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