

Nigerian Foreign Policy Posture And Global Image: An Assessment Of Nigeria's Foreign Policy In The Goodluck Jonathan And Muhammadu Buhari's Administrations (2011 – 2017).

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Abstract: Nations sought the attainment of distinct objectives in the process of governing their entities; some of which they attain on their own, while co-operating with other international actors (states and non-state actors like individuals and INGOs) to meet the more difficult goals. All the decisions, actions and inactions of nations involving the cooperation with or support from other entities transcending their borders to solve pending national and regional issues fall within the ambience of foreign policy. Seen as calculated, goal-oriented, and purposive activities altering or creating a condition outside the sovereign boundaries to gain national advantages, usually define vis-à-vis national interest, foreign policy has serious implication for nation's international image. The study examines the extent to which Nigerian foreign policy under the Jonathan and Buhari administrations has impacted on the nation's global image. The study relied on systematic qualitative content analysis of secondary data sources, and the rational choice theory was adopted as the tool of analysis for the study. A cursory thrust into the history of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence revealed that the objectives and principles of the nation's foreign policy have remained the same though with slight modifications. The study argues that the perception of Nigeria at the international level has been poor especially during the period under review. This is attributable to a number of factors like insecurity, corruption, and economic downturns. The paper, therefore, recommends the implantation of mindful efforts to curb insecurity and corruption through fortified institutional frameworks and effective surveillance hinged on resource provision and prudent use, economic diversification, and a re-definition agenda to create a new identity and image for Nigerians, by Nigerians.

Keywords: Foreign policy, global image, national interest, Afrocentrism, concentric circle, corruption, insecurity, rationality, Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, Muhammadu Buhari.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Nations sought the attainment of distinct objectives in the process of governing their entities; some of which they attain on their own, while co-operating with other international actors (states and non-state actors like individuals and INGOs) to meet the more difficult goals. All the decisions, actions and inactions of nations involving the cooperation with or support from other entities transcending their borders to solve pending national and regional issues fall within the ambience of foreign policy. Seen as calculated, goal-oriented, and purposive activities altering or creating a condition outside the sovereign boundaries to gain national advantages, usually define vis-à-vis national interest (Boma-Lysa, Terfa & Tsegay, 2015), foreign policy has serious implication for nation's international image.

The Nigerian case is no different. In fact, the perception of Nigeria when she gained independence on October 1, 1960, was that of a great nation in the making. This perception gained more propensity with Nigeria's Afrocentric policy, anti-apartheid policy, big market for Euro-American finished products, and policy of technical assistance, as well as other 'entrepreneurial, industrial development plan that were put in place to the admiration of the Western-dominated world' (Akinterinwa, 2017). However, Nigeria's image, first at the domestic level, and later at the international level, was not something to be boastful of. The political and socio-economic situations in Nigeria within this period up until the Fourth Republic, as aptly captured by Olorunyomi

(2014), debased Nigeria and the country assumed a pariah status among civilized countries in the world. The nation was plagued by abnormalities in almost every, if not all, facets of the national life which brought about some international sanctions and smeared global image. Particularly, her image has been threatened by the outburst of the 30 month civil war (1967-1970), the Niger Delta crises, the current Boko Haram terrorism, and the violent secessionist agitations of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Added to these are corruption and crime which play key roles in giving the nation a bad perception.

The image crisis that has engulfed the Nigerian state, giving her a negative perception among the comity of nations, has made it difficult to market or advertise Nigeria in, as Ajayi (2005) termed it, the "diplomatic market". Ajayi (2005) further added that laundering the battered image of the nation in the international arena is as difficult as trying to engage in image-making for international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Boko Haram. Little wonder as elected leaders of Nigeria, Presidents Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari bore the brunt of ensuring that the sour image of the nation was rejuvenated. The foreign policy postures of both regimes have been concerned with reforms in investment, bilateral trade, security and anti-corruption oriented domestic and foreign policies. Thus, Nigeria's foreign policy posture took a dynamic shift from her purely Afrocentric thrust towards a more universal, economic and military orientation to attract the outside world. Though comparatively a huge gap exists in the styles of both administrations, both have been severely criticized as lacking seriousness of purpose – the former Administration was seen as lacking the political will to save its image and the current is criticized for misdirection of political will and resources. This has led to the different arguments about the appropriateness of their foreign policy strategies; the extent of their successes; and sustainability of actions.

It is against this background that this research work undertakes an objective assessment of the connection between foreign policy and international image of Nigeria under the Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari's administrations. It takes a chronological look at the trends and dynamisms of Nigeria's image crisis while critically analyzing the implications and effects of Nigeria's foreign policy under Jonathan and Buhari's administrations on Nigeria's global image.

1.2 Statement Of Problem

The goal of every foreign policy is to establish and maintain a cordial relationship with other nations as well as to build a good image for a nation and meet its national and domestic interests. This invariably means that a good foreign policy is important in formulating, maintaining and sustaining a nation's positive image. However, Nigeria's reputation is at a very low ebb under the Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari's administrations. It is alleged that violent crimes is a bane of Nigeria's development. The Boko Haram terrorism, the Niger Delta crises, and the IPOB agitations have earned Nigeria a place amongst the least safe countries of the world (Martin, 2016). The violent crimes perpetrated by these (and many other) groups have led to the death of over 1.3 million Nigerians and the displacement of over 20,000 people, pallid national integration, and ethno-religious chauvinism (Duke & Agbaji, 2017). Also, bedeviled by corruption and the maddening disregard for transparency and accountability, Nigeria's image tarnishes while she simultaneously loses huge foreign direct investments (FDI) and her energetic young human resources that migrate because they believe the country has little or nothing to offer them. Thus, the nation is unable to successfully combat internal insurrections and stands amongst nations with a smeared image of bad governance. This weakens the economy, increases insecurity and maladministration. In fact, according to Transparency International's (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of 2017, Nigeria ranked 148th out of 180 nations that were surveyed which is a slippery dash below her 136th position in TI's 2014, 2015 and 2016 rankings making a mockery of the Nigerian government's acclaimed anti-corruption blitz. Added to this is the fact that the Jonathan and Buhari's administrations, like many other administrations in Nigeria, have never lacked good foreign policies. The problem of Nigeria's foreign policy that is affecting the country's image is not in formulation, but in implementation.

II. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is a slippery and elusive concept. Despite intensifying interest in the phenomenon in the academic sphere over the years, it is still used to refer variously to a process, a strategy, or even an ideology (Heywood, 2007). It is, therefore, difficult to reduce foreign policy to a single theme or definition as there are a plethora of definitions available. For instance, Said and Lerche in Okoro (2002) defined foreign policy of a State as the general principles by which a State governs its relations to the international environment. It is important to observe that this definition is criticized as being very narrow in scope because it refers only to the principles underlying a country's foreign policy. The definition fails to explain the actual relations or interactions that take place among the states in the international arena (Okoro, 2002).

Foreign policy can also be seen as the courses of actions adopted by a state in the interest of the people's welfare. It is not in all cases that states act in the people's interest. The debate in the United States of

America (USA) in 2007 over whether to send yet more 21,000 troops to Iraq highlights the aforementioned point. A majority of the Congress and the public opposed the move, but (former) President, George W. Bush, ignored the Congress and public's thoughts saying he was the "decider" (the Grand Commander of the Federal Republic) in line with Article II of the Constitution of the United States of America (USA), and increased troops levels unilaterally. Consequently, he ignored the War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973 (Rourke, 2009).

According to Chibundu (2003:1), the term foreign policy can be seen as a "country's response to the world outside or beyond its own frontiers or boundaries. That response may be friendly or aggressive, casual or intense, simple or complex, but it is always there." It may be safe to state here that actions or responses or supports may not be entirely active or direct. In International Relations and most of the other fields in Political Science, it is believed that inaction is an action in itself, or as Robert Dahl (1991) (in Gauba, 2007) pointed out, in politics, refusing to decide is simply deciding to allow others decide for you. One cannot, therefore, be politically neutral. Little wonder some states have been seen to have not taken any action in response to a situation. The United States and Russia's refusal to intervene (militarily) in Syria in 2011 and Iraq in 2003 respectively are quintessential cases. Even the Chinese government, with the nation's standing in global politics and economics, is firm on its decision not to intervene in Syria.

Furthermore, Light (1999) saw foreign policy as the official relations that take place between the units of the international system. Again, foreign policy consists of those discrete official actions of the authoritative decision-makers of a nation's government or their agents which are intended by the decision-makers to influence the behavior of international actors to their own policy. Policy as used here refers, to Okolie (2009:5), "... not as actions based on some grand design but as a continual process of pragmatic adjustment to the actions of others in the international environment." Light's focus on only those official relations makes her definition incomplete as there are a plethora of relations between states which are unofficial or which do not follow the normal foreign policy making channels. The activities of the Red Cross society, Islamic fundamentalists groups who are challenging the orthodox Western beliefs all over the world, and the Cold War politics of sponsoring of coups d'état in the emerging nations of Africa by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) (which translates in English as Soviet State Security Committee), just to mention but a few, are quintessential cases.

Rosenau, Thompson and Boyd (1976) presented a more comprehensive definition by distinguishing three views of foreign policy: as a cluster of orientation; as a set of commitments and plans of actions; and as a form of behavior (cited in Okoro, 2006). Viewed as "a cluster of orientations", foreign policy refers to the general tendencies, attitudes, perceptions, values and principles that underlie the conduct of states in global affairs, e.g. Nigeria's non-alignment, Soviet's expansionism, America's liberal democratization, China's Sino-centrism, and so on. Viewed as a "set of commitments and plans of actions", State's foreign policy could promote or preserve situations abroad in a manner consistent with their basic orientation, e.g. the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by the capitalist bloc, the Soviet Union's WARSAW Pact, the United States Marshall Plan, and do on. Viewed as a "form of behavior", foreign pertains to the concrete steps taken by states vis-à-vis situations abroad, e.g. Nigeria's peacekeeping missions in Liberia, her struggles against the gruesome Apartheid regime and concomitant policies in South Africa, America's war on terrorism, and so on (Okoro, 2006).

From the above definitions, three (3) components are discernible:

1. **The actions of states:** Foreign policy regulates the conducts, actions, agenda and objectives of states in their relations with others;
2. **National or domestic interests which influence these actions:** These domestic interests are myriad ranging from the citizens, diplomats, political executives, bureaucrats, interest groups, etc.; and
3. **External environment of a state towards which these actions are oriented:** These external environment comprises the plethora of actors in the international system – both states and non-state actors like MNCs, terrorist groups, international organizations, etc. – and issues towards which a state's policy action is targeted at.

2.2 Global Image

A country's standing in the international system although dependent on some other factors, is highly dependent on her image perception being positive or negative. The perception of a country by members of the international system, how a country pursues its relations with others, and particularly, the behavior of its citizens at home and abroad combine to determine the country's image (Zimako, 2009). Thus, image making is an essential feature of a nation's foreign policy.

Image can be seen as the perception of a country by other actors in the international arena (both states and non-state actors), which can be a result of objectivity or subjectivity of purpose. The global image of a country, therefore, provides a basis for self-reappraisal in the event of any bad perception (Chidozie, Ibietan & Ujara, 2014). Global image, Boma-Lysa et al (2015) purported, relates to how a country is seen by other global actors when it pursues its relations with others and particularly, the behavior of its citizens at home and abroad.

According to Holsti (1996), image as an individual's (or nation's) perception of an object, fact or condition in terms of badness or goodness as well as the meaning ascribed to, or deduced therefrom. If we extrapolate from that, we can conclude that image-building must necessarily constitute a fundamental element of a nation's foreign policy, suggesting that the way a country is perceived, especially in the 21st Century, is a function of her national image (Adeniyi, 2012).

Accordingly, a nation's dogged pursuit of image-building forms an important determinant of how well the country is doing at home and abroad and is simultaneously an essential element in the strategy for foreign policy formulation and implementation. Drawing from Chidozie et al (2014) and Holsti (1996), it may be safe to state that just as image-making can be objective, it is also relative or subjective in that, images are either good or bad. Both good and bad perceptions have their consequences. But nations, according to their own standards or leaders' perception, perpetually endeavor to have a good image among the comity of nations. Hence, it may appear intangible but the benefits and advantages flowing from a good image are inestimably unquantifiable. Chidozie et al (2014:51) wrote that:

A good image constitutes a source of goodwill and patronage for a country. Investors largely consider this factor in determining where to direct investment funds. It also explains the level of unfriendliness. It is therefore understandable why every government seeks to promote, at all times, a better image nationally and internationally... A good image results in respect, influence and prestige. While, a bad or negative perception of a country's image implies that such a country lacks respect, influence and prestige in the international system.

Indeed, the image issue is a product of perception. There is yet no universally acknowledged scientific standard for perception as it is pervasively subjective. To the extent that human societies are complex, perception is a complex phenomenon (Zimako, 2009). The perception of a nation in international relations is the perception of its people, and the perception of its people is also partly a function of the political leaders' actions and character. Consequently, the image a country attempts to create and project, through its foreign policy, must conform to its citizens' perception of the country, its national interests, and the image expectations of other members of the international community.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

The theory adopted for this study was the "Rational Choice Theory". Also called the "Rational Actor Model" or the "Rational Comprehensive Model" of decision-making, the rational choice theory is an approach used by social scientists to understand human behavior. Becker (1976) (cited in Ogu, 2013) recorded that "the rational choice theory was earlier popularized by a 1992 Nobel Memorial Prize Laureate in Economics Science, Gary Becker, who was one of the first to apply rational actor models more widely" (p. 90). The approach has long been the dominant paradigm in economics, but in recent decades it has become more widely used in other disciplines such as Sociology, Political Science, and Anthropology (Green, 2002). Green (2002) adds that "this spread of the rational choice approach beyond conventional economic issues is discussed by Becker (1976), Radnitzky and Bernholz (1987), Hogarth and Reder (1987), Swedberg (1990), and Green and Shapiro (1996), among other scholars."

The rational comprehensive model of decision-making attempts to understand how public policies come to be adopted using individual based models of political decision-making by voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and interest group members. The theory starts with the basic assumptions that the decision maker is quite a rational being who is interested in making purely rational decisions. In that, as Riker (1995) purported, actors know what they want and can order their wants transitively. Riker (1995:24) further explained that:

These formulations are probably equivalent. To know what one wants requires one to choose the best from among several goals and, failing to attain it, to choose the second best, etc. To order three goals is to decide that one is better than either of the other two and that a second is better than a third, which is exactly a transitive ordering.

Generally speaking, the rational choice approach to political science differs from most political science research, because it assumes that political decisions are consequences of individual choices—even when individuals join groups and participate in collective activities, and all the individuals involved in politics are rational and self-interested men and women. To that extent, therefore, 'rationality' defined by the rational choice theory adopts a more specific and narrower definition, which simply means that "an individual acts as if balancing costs against benefits to arrive at action that maximizes personal advantage." (Friedman, 1953 in Ogu, 2013). Or as Henry (2004) elaborately explained, rationality according to this model is one that:

Tries to learn all the value preference extant in a society, assign each value a relative weight, discover all the policy alternatives available, know all consequences of each alternative, calculate how the selection of any one policy will affect the remaining alternatives vis-à-vis opportunity costs, and ultimately select the policy alternative that is most efficient vis-à-vis costs and benefits of social values (p. 314).

In this light, in his study in 2007, Heywood opined that decisions can be seen to be reached using the following procedures:

1. The nature of the problem is identified;
2. An objective or goal is selected on the basis of an ordering of individual preferences;
3. Identification of contingencies or alternative courses of action(s) available;
4. The available means of achieving this objective are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness, reliability, costs and so on;
5. A decision is made through the selection of the means most likely to secure the desired end (Heywood, 2007).

This model assumes that clear-cut objectives exist, and that human beings are able to pursue them in a rational and consistent manner. For this to occur, Heywood (2007:427) believed that “utility must be homogenous; it must be possible to compare the amount of satisfaction (pleasure or happiness) that each action would bring with that which would result from other action.” However, this is only part of the story. Another important element of the rational actor model is the presence of “constraints”. The presence of constraints, according to Green (2002:7), “makes choice necessary, and one virtue of rational choice theory is that it makes the trade-offs between alternative choices very explicit”. Or put differently, it enables some agents, or group of agents, to maximize utility – that is, choosing the preferred alternative. A typical constraint in a political system is the ‘voting constraint’ which says that the electorate cannot cast his or her vote more than once. Another example, as portrayed by Green (2002), though in economic terms, is the simple one-period consumer choice problem is the ‘budget constraint’, which says that the consumer cannot spend more than her income. Multi-period models allow for borrowing, but in that case the constraint is that the consumer must be able to repay the loan in the future.

The relevance of this theory for this study is best appreciated when viewed against the backdrop of the fact that the leaders in Nigeria are individuals functioning within institutions and are apparently caught in the perpetually rigorous circles of taking rational decisions while aware of the concomitant backwashes of the forgone alternatives. For instance, the Muhammadu Buhari administration’s foreign policy of extended relations with China and the opening of the Nigerian domestic economy to the Chinese currency, the Renminbi Yuan, could be said to have been a well calculated or rational move, in line with the rational choice theory, looking at the contemporary posture of China in world politics, its sporadically growing economic power position, its science and technological developmental strides in modern militarization, and the infrastructural and industrial benefits accruable from relations with the Chinese government.

Furthermore, another relevance of this theory is that it can be used to relate us to the exploration of differences in constitutional design among the different Republics or the entire spectrum of government types in Nigeria – differences in the military regimes and democratic dispensations. In this vein a broad variety of characteristic issues are viewed ranging from electoral equilibrium and disequilibrium, the behavior of bureaucracy, the political power of interest groups, the differences between democratic rules and military dictatorships, the logic of collective action, and the importance of constitutions, among other issues.

III. NATURE OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

It may not be far from the truth to assert that the oft cited belief that state’s exploits and achievements in the international scene are about ‘national interest’ has established the basis of interrelationship of various policies in a state. In explaining national interest, Akinboye (1998) purported that national interest serves two primary purposes – *as an analytical tool* which serves as a conceptual guide by providing the objectives often considered by a state while weighing an intended foreign policy option; and *as an instrument of political action* which serves to justify or repudiate a state’s foreign policy option and action in the international system.

While expressing the universality of this common knowledge, Bukarambe (1990:54) substantiated that “this is even more profound between the internal-external sets of policies because the two dimensions establish the complete process of a state’s policies both within its sovereign self exclusively and between it and the internal environment including non-state actors.” The extent of the essence of a state’s policies – which are determined by a combination of national peculiarities and national perceptions – are such that they are discernible not only vis-à-vis the universal dimension but also in limited settings and even within affinity groups (Bukarambe, 1990). For instance, Africa is distinct from other continents that do not possess Africa’s geo-cultural resemblances; nevertheless even the policy objectives of every African state can vary due to national distinctiveness like geography, demography, natural resources, etc., and can be permanent.

When applied to Nigeria, the foregoing establishes three interrelated perspectives. First, Nigeria also shares the universal premise of an organic link between all its national policies; the dependence and coordination of the policies during implementation; and Nigeria’s peculiarities and attributes differentiates it from other (African) states (Bukarambe, 1990). This ultimately, shapes the country’s national disposition and self-perception and hence the objective basis and nature of its foreign policies away from the general trend.

3.1 Objectives Of Nigerian Foreign Policy

The objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy have since the country's attainment of independence on October 1st, 1960, been broadly spelt out by successive administrations (Akinboye, 1998). Addressing the Parliament on August 20, 1960, the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, identified certain fundamental objectives which guided Nigeria's foreign policy position at the formative years of the nation. These objectives can be summarized as follows:

- Promotion and protection of the national interest of the federation and of its citizens;
- Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states;
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of the other states;
- The promotion of functional cooperation among African States;
- Commitment to the eradication of colonialism and racism on the African continent;
- Membership and active participation in the Commonwealth and the United Nations; and
- Non-alignment in her relationship with the Super Powers (Akinboye, 1998; Ituma, 2012; Uduma & Nwosu, 2015).

The foregoing shows the roadmap for Nigerian Foreign Policy that lacks the basic instruments for implementation. Added to this is the fact that that constituted the country's national interest was not clearly articulated. Hence, Chapter 2, Section 19 of the 1999 Constitution, which is the fundamental objectives and directive principles as provided in Section 19, subsection A-E, encapsulates the Nigeria's foreign policy objectives to include:

- Promotion and protection of the national interest;
- Promotion of African integration and support for African unity;
- Promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations, and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations;
- Respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and
- Promotion of a just world order (1999 Constitution of the FGN; Ajayi, 2005; Ebegbulem, 2010).

A critical observation of these objectives show that of the five foreign policy objectives advanced by the country, only the first objective was basically internally directed. The rest were externally directed in terms of targets and beneficiaries. The second and third objectives focused on the African continent where the forces of colonialism and apartheid were still very strong at the time (Ajayi, 2005). Also, it is noteworthy that since independence, in spite of adjustments, there has been continuity in the substantive focus of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives. Whatever difference there is or has been, is, by and large, a matter of style, emphasis, personality, institutional reform, and historical circumstances within and outside Nigeria (Akinboye, 1998).

3.2 Principles Of Nigerian Foreign Policy

The review of Nigeria's foreign policy position over the years does point up a number of philosophical-conceptual building blocks which are strongly related to the state of the international environment. Within the context of decolonization, "self-determination and self-government" were core philosophical principles that informed the country's foreign policy. As the country matured as an independent and sovereign nation, other philosophical principles that became part of Nigeria's foreign policy fundamentals are enlightened national interest, African solidarity, interdependence, internationalism, asymmetric world order and supranational authority (Ogwu, 2005). Since independence, fourteen different regimes have emerged in Nigeria, and as Akinboye (1998:369) opined, "in spite of their different orientations and leadership styles, the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy has been publicly proclaimed by them to be guided by the same principles." These principles include:

- Sovereign and legal equality of all states;
- Respect of territorial integrity and independence of other states;
- Non-interference in the affairs of other states;
- Active involvement in multilateral and bilateral diplomacy;
- Commitment to self-determination and independence of other states;
- Commitment to functional approach as a means of promoting cooperation and peaceful coexistence in Africa (otherwise called 'Afrocentrism'); and
- Non-alignment to any geo-political power blocs (Akinboye, 1998; Uduma & Nwosu, 2015; Wright, 1992).

3.3 Nigerian Foreign Policy Between 1960 And 2017: A Historical Analysis

For a proper understanding, Nigeria's foreign policy between 1960 and 2017 will be examined historically and thematically in relation to the different regimes. The historical periods have been summarized as follows:

- Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's Administration (1960 – 1966);
- Aguiyi Ironsi's Military Regime (January 1966 – July 1966);
- General Yakubu Gowon's Military Junta (1966 – 1975);
- Murtala/Obasanjo Military Regime (1975 – 1979);
- Alhaji Shehu Shagari Civilian Administration (1979 – 1983);
- Buhari/Idiagbon Military Junta (1983 – 1985);
- Ibrahim Babangida's Military Presidency (1985 – 1993);
- Shonekan's Interim National Government (July 1993 – November 1993);
- General Sani Abacha's Military Regime (1993 – 1998);
- Abdulsalami Abubakar's Military Interregnum (1998 – 1999);
- Chief Olusegun Obasanjo Civilian Rule (1999 – 2007);
- Musa Yar' Adua's Administration (2007 – 2010);
- Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's Administration (2010 – 2015); and
- Muhammadu Buhari's Civilian Administration (2015 till date) (Imoukhuede, 2016; Ituma, 2012; Bariledum, Nwibgo & Ojie, 2016; Odubajo, 2017; Okoro, 2002; Uduma & Nwosu, 2015; Ukwuije, 2015)

3.3.1 Tafawa Balewa's Administration (1960 – 1966)

Since the inception of Nigerian foreign policy under the leadership of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa between 1960 and 1966, Afrocentrism was declared the cardinal objective of Nigeria foreign policy premised on the fact that Nigeria's engagement in the international system will be looked at through the binoculars of Africa (Ituma, 2012). In the six-year period within which he served as prime minister, Balewa adopted a policy of non-alignment. Despite this non-alignment posture, the nation's political economy was largely skewed to the West. Later pro-Eastern ties were also recorded in the form of some economic agreements with the Socialist Bloc. Little wonder some scholars like Ituma (2012) and Okoro (2002) believed that Balewa's foreign policy and diplomatic practice was not dynamic but seen as characterized generally by incoherencies, inconsistencies, and contradictions. Also, his administration's foreign policy posture was branded as being conservative. The pursuit of a conservative approach was informed by factors that placed limits on possible radical posturing of Nigeria's alignment (Okoro, 2002).

Balewa's Conservatism notwithstanding, the nation played key role in its support for global peace and security. The Balewa administration marked the foundation of Nigeria foreign policy and participation as an actor in the international system. It ushered Nigeria's presence in notable international organization such as, United Nations, and Commonwealth of nations (Imoukhuede, 2016). In this way, Nigeria contributed troops to the United Nations peace keeping forces in the Congo. The Nigerian government was a core member of the Monrovia Group that embraced the gradual approach to African unity. Hence, Nigeria was instrumental to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1964 (Ituma, 2012; Uduma & Nwosu, 2015).

3.3.2 Aguiyi Ironsi's Military Regime (January 1966 – July 1966)

The Ironsi administration of January 1966-July, 1966, did not stay long enough to formulate any definite foreign policy. It was also preoccupied with the problem of domestic political instability which lasted till 1970 (Ituma, 2012). The Ironsi regime that took over the government eventually negotiated by politicians and top military brass was too short-lived to make any meaningful foreign policy for Nigeria. "Nonetheless, Ironsi ordered the closure of the regional offices overseas and also put an end to the practice whereby regions sent economic missions abroad" (Uduma & Nwosu, 2015:19).

3.3.3 General Yakubu Gowon's Military Junta (1966 – 1975)

According to Ituma (2012), between 1966 and 1970, Nigeria's foreign policy experienced dramatic change under Gowon's regime mainly due to the demands of the civil war. In this vein, Odubajo (2017) opined that for most part, the government's focus was the military security index of the nation's foreign policy. The pre-occupation of the Nigerian military government was, therefore, on how to keep the nation as one through winning the civil war and maintaining the territorial integrity of Nigeria (Imoukhuede, 2016). At the demise of the 30-month civil war in 1970, Nigeria remained indissoluble, numerically preeminent, and a foremost producer of crude-oil. Gowon's administration was the period of oil boom which enhanced the government's efforts to embrace pan-African policies in Africa. This was made clear, as Jubril (2004) (cited in Bariledum et al, 2016) wrote, when Gowon declared in 1972 that "Africa is the Cornerstone of Nigeria's foreign policy." In that same year, Nigeria launched aggressive support for liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Also, in 1975, Nigeria worked with other West African states to ensure the establishment of a viable regional organization that would be to the benefit of all called the 'Economic Community of West Africa States' (ECOWAS) (Ituma, 2012; Odubajo, 2017). Added to these, Bariledum et al (2016) and Okoro (2002) elucidated that under the Gowon military administration, Nigeria paid dues to the Liberation Committee of the OAU campaign against

the Anglo-African states for the creation of ECOWAS; and spearheaded the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) in their struggle to negotiate as one body with the EEC for improved trade relations.

3.3.4 Murtala/Obasanjo Military Regime (1975 – 1979)

From 1975-1979, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime added impetus to the struggle against colonial rule in Africa particularly the Apartheid Regime and the Angolan liberation struggles, and other freedom fighters in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and subsequently opened offices for them in Lagos. The personalities of the two leaders, in addition to the immense resources that accrued from the sale of crude-oil to the international market gave Nigeria the impetus to play an impressive foreign policy role at this time (Ituma, 2012; Odubajo, 2017). Sequel to General Murtala's assassination in 1976, General Obasanjo succeeded and tilted Nigeria's foreign policy towards the West and extinguished the tension which characterized Nigeria-United States relations on account of Nigeria's support for Angola's independence (Ituma, 2012). The nationalization of the assets of British Petroleum (BP) (Genova, 2010) and Barclays Bank as a response to the British government's recognition and clandestine sale of oil to the government of former Rhodesia (Odubajo, 2017; Okoro, 2002), and the insistence on the withdrawal of French military presence in Chad marked the water-shade in Murtala/Obasanjo foreign policy. There was, therefore, greater commitment to Afrocentric Policy marked by coherence in the execution of policy objectives (Ituma, 2012).

3.3.5 Alhaji Shehu Shagari Civilian Administration (1979 – 1983)

The Shehu Shagari regime marked the end of thirteen years of military rule and the beginning of the Second Republic. The Second Republic which spanned between 1979 and 1983 was characterized by Pro-Western posture, policy inconsistency, and corruption. For Ituma (2012), though the regime brokered peace in the Somali-Ethiopia conflict, Chadian conflict between Goukoni Weddeye and Hissen Habre, and the interstate conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Movement in the Western Sahara, economic crisis forced the administration to expel about two million illegal foreigners in Nigeria, and also succumb to the linkage solution chosen by the West on Namibia's independence. The regime paraded high level of instability generated by cut-throat and bitter politicking, waste and misplaced priorities at the center and states, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency and ineffectiveness and consequently fell to the military again in 1983 (Odubajo, 2017). In the final analysis, Nigeria's foreign policy profile declined terribly during the period of the Shagari administration.

3.3.6 Buhari/Idiagbon Military Junta (1983 – 1985)

Although the Buhari regime was uncompromising in the execution of its domestic policies, it cannot, however, be accused of shying away from making difficult foreign policy decisions. The junta took on the task of redeeming the battered image of the country abroad. The War Against Indiscipline (WAI) was launched at home and equally extended abroad through the campaign against drug trafficking and counterfeiting (Ituma, 2012). The foreign policy of the Buhari regime was basically based on the "concentric circle" theory. Notable features of the regime's foreign policy was the recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), support for Polisario and rejection of apartheid regime in South Africa. The hard posture of the regime worsened her relationship with the West as the face-off over the Alhaji Umaru Dikko extradition request stained Anglo-Nigeria relations (Ituma, 2012). Added to these are the regime's refusal to accept the proposal by the Arab Moslem Group of the Organization of Islamic and Financial Conference which promised Nigeria economic and financial assistance; recognition of the right of Namibian people for independence; encouraged inter-state economic cooperation in West Africa, through the provision of land in Abuja for the building of ECOWAS permanent headquarters (Bariledum et al, 2016; Okoro, 2002); and the junta's expulsion of illegal immigrants, mostly citizens of neighboring West African states in 1985 (Odubajo, 2017). Little wonder the articulation of Nigeria's foreign policy under Buhari's regime to accommodate 'good neighborliness' became an issue of serious concern in literatures. In essence, under Buhari's regime, Nigeria's relations with ECOWAS nations depreciated.

3.3.7 Ibrahim Babangida's Military Presidency (1985 – 1993)

On 27th August 1985 General Babangida assumed the mantle of leadership and thereafter declared himself "Military President." Nigeria's foreign policy agenda during this period was positioned to align with the reversal of the downward slope of Nigeria's economy and this formed the basis for a very strong relationship with the West (Odubajo, 2017). Babangida pursued massive structural policies. He introduced the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986, and also adopted economic diplomacy. Other ambitious foreign policy adventures were the 'Technical Aids Corps Scheme' and the 'Concert of Medium Powers' (Odubajo, 2017). The nation's foreign policy was also Afrocentric in nature as it continued to pursue decolonization of the African continent. Consequently, one of the most daring foreign policy steps of the government was the initiation of the idea, and the provision of human and material resources for ECOWAS' intervention in war-torn Liberia. The Nigerian government in partnership with other ECOWAS states, through the activation of the protocol on

Mutual Defense Assistance of 1981 set up an ECOWAS Military Observer Group, called the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene for the purpose of restoring order in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Odubajo, 2017). Another remarkable event was the re-opening of diplomatic ties with Israel in 1993 after twenty years of face-off.

3.3.8 Ernest Shonekan's Interim National Government (August 1993 – November 1993)

Sequel to the aborted June 12 1993 general elections which was supposed to usher in Chief M.K.O. Abiola as Nigeria's President and the concomitant backlashes, the General Babangida military regime stepped aside, handing over to the Interim National Government of Sir Ernest Shonekan that lasted for only three months. The June 12 events left much to be admired in Nigerian politics and the international community was already displeased with the Nigerian government and all its creations. For Odubajo (2017) it was apparent that the world would only deal with a Nigerian government that emerged from the will of the people through the ballot box.

3.3.9 General Sani Abacha's Military Regime (1993 – 1998)

General Sani Abacha took over power on 17th November, 1993. Under him, Nigeria adopted isolationism. Radical and combative approach to foreign policy became almost synonymous with the Abacha regime, prompting Fawole (2002) to describe it as the most combative and defensive foreign policy in Nigeria's history. The image of Nigeria abroad worsened following the gross abuse of human rights meted out to the opposition; the detention of Abiola, the winner of the June 12, 1993, Presidential election; the extrajudicial murder of minority rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa and nine of his kinsmen (Uduma & Nwosu, 2015; Ituma, 2012); and subsequent expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth of Nations. Abacha's adamant nationalism and autonomy consciousness led to the abrogation of liberalization policies and a sustained anti-Western stance on many issues. The West issued sanctions on Nigeria, restricting credit facilities, and Nigeria's frustration with Britain made her shift relations to China, India, Turkey, Iran and Libya (Ituma, 2012). Also, the regime initiated measures to curb corruption like the War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC), but this was an irony in itself as his government itself was characterized by general mismanagement. The level of corruption was so much that his administration almost emptied the government's treasury and after his death, over US\$600 million and £75 million pounds were recovered from his family (Chidozie et al, 2014).

These nevertheless, in West Africa, Abacha continued Nigeria's commitment to the peacemaking efforts of ECOMOG. These efforts were successful, as domestic political conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone were resolved; even though Nigeria's moral authority waned considerably across the continent because of her military dictatorship.

3.3.10 Abdulsalami Abubakar's Military Interregnum (1998 – 1999)

In 1998, General Abdulsalam Abubakar took over. He adopted, for Ituma (2012), a policy of continuous dialogue and not confrontation with the international community. Abuakar's regime was very brief in terms of Nigeria external relations. He had a notion of a new policy agenda that would take Nigeria out of his problems internationally; a commitment to ensuring that Nigeria takes its rightful place among the comity of nations based on the principles of mutual respect and protection of our national interest (Imoukhuede, 2016). The efforts of Abubakar to repair the damage brought by General Abacha to the nation's diplomacy and standing in the world were well appreciated. The international community accepted Nigeria once again, and sanctions were lifted. In West Africa, Abubakar pursued the peacemaking agenda of ECOWAS through the ECOMOG. His efforts yielded fruit in the resolution of the Sierra-Leonean conflict and the Military coup d'état in Guinea Bissau (Uduma & Nwosu, 2015). As a matter of fact, General Abubakar concluded the transition to civil rule which endeared him to the international community. He handed over to a democratically elected civilian President in May, 1999.

3.3.11 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo Civilian Rule (1999 – 2007)

At the return of democratic rule in 1999, Obasanjo emerged as civilian president and at the onset of his new administration, resuscitation of the economy for the wellbeing of Nigerians was identified as a central platform for sustainable democratic order. Between May 1999 and mid-August 2002, Obasanjo and his foreign affairs minister, Alhaji Sule Lamido, embarked on 113 foreign trips in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas, spending 340 days out of the country (Akindele, 2013), all in a bid to promote Nigeria's bilateral ties, to attract investments and restore the nation's image abroad, even at the expense of very strong criticisms of the president's 'excessive' overseas tours (Chibundu, 2009). These tours produced fruits one of which was the reestablishment of Nigeria's involvement in the Commonwealth at the Commonwealth Summit in Durban, South Africa; her assignment as the Chairman of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) and her admittance into the Strategic Steering Committee of the Commonwealth Executive Session (Okoro, 2002). Also, his shuttle (economic) diplomacy to campaign for investment and debt relief was a move that yielded

results with the inflow of foreign investments especially in the telecommunication sector and with the government's creation of a one-stop investment agency – 'Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission' (NIPC) (Adeniran, 2008), as well as debt relief to the tune of about US\$18 billion from the Paris Club of creditors (Durotoye, 2014).

More so, the administration made consented efforts at pursuing and recovering some of the looted funds stashed away by previous administrations. According to Igwe (2012), "the monies the Obasanjo regime recovered were US\$709 million and 144 million Pounds Sterling, just a part of the entire loot" (p. 96). Additionally, Obasanjo was poised at retaining Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy as encapsulated in his theme, 'Africa Renaissance.' The administration offered a new vision for Africa – a vision for continental free trade, drawing African states closer in business, commercial standards, dispute resolution and education (Okoro, 2002). Thus, Nigeria championed the adoption of the constitution Act of the Union at the Lome Summit in December 2000, which established the African Union (AU) and later inspired the push for the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

3.3.12 Musa Yar'adua's Administration (2007 – 2010)

Umaru Musa Yar'Adua assumed office in 2007 and introduced the concept of 'citizen diplomacy.' According to Agbu (2009:52), "citizen diplomacy is a political concept depicting the involvement of average citizens engaging representatives of another country or cause either inadvertently or by design." He stressed that the concept sometimes refers to "Track Two Diplomacy", which connotes unofficial contacts between people of different nations, as differentiated from official contacts between governmental representatives. The Yar'Adua philosophy of citizen's diplomacy yielded some impacts. A quintessence was the unanimous selection of Baba Kaigama, an Ambassador, to the United Nations Advisory Committee for a 3-year term in 2008. It also saw the election of two Nigerians as members of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) (Okeke & Sunday, 2014).

Additionally, the peaceful resolution of the Zimbabwean election crises was supported by President Yar'Adua. Musa Yar'Adua mobilizing ECOWAS as its Chairman condemned the coup of 23rd December, 2008 in Guinea and suspended Guinea from its fold. African Union also suspended Guinea. ECOWAS under President Yar'Adua constituted a mediation committee headed by President Blaise Campore of Burkina Faso to organize an election to return the country to civilian rule within six months (Ukwuije, 2015). Nigeria's economic image grew very rapidly and significantly in global arena that resultantly, Nigeria was among the developing countries invited to the G8 (Group of Eight) industrial nation's summit held in Germany. The G8 provided Yar'Adua with an ample opportunity to travel out of the country, for the first time since after his inauguration as the 4th democratically elected president of Nigeria. He seized that opportunity to request for Germans assistance in overhauling the energy sector in Nigeria in so far as the federal government could not fund it alone (Ukwuije, 2015).

It is noteworthy that President Yar'Adua had severe health issues that threatened his life. While he was trying to manage his ill-health, he made no provisions for the Vice President to act in his absence. The result was that Nigeria was without direction in its foreign policy thrust. Domestic politics of power tussle engulfed the polity. Thus, without a leader to steer the nation's international policies, Nigeria lost some grounds at the international level; was conspicuously absent at international meetings and lost many positions in multilateral associations. With his death on May 5th 2010, his Vice, Goodluck Jonathan was appointed acting President until the 2011 election.

3.3.13 Nigeria's Foreign Policy Under President Goodluck Jonathan Administration (2010-2015)

Upon Yar'Adua's untimely death in 2010, Vice-President, Goodluck Jonathan assumed office as the President for the duration of their joint-ticket. At the expiration of the first-term, President Jonathan contested and won the Presidential election in 2011, and thus, presided over Nigeria till 2015 (Odubajo, 2017). Convinced that a lot of changes had taken place during the 50 years of existence of Nigeria's foreign policy thrust, President Jonathan ordered a review of the Foreign Policy document in line with his administration's domestic policy thrust – popularly called the 'Transformation Agenda.' The foreign policy position of the Jonathan administration was generally perceived as a continuation of the foreign policy thrust of his predecessor. This nonetheless, specifically, the administration's foreign policy endeavors were embedded in the attainment of the administration's Transformation Agenda. This Transformation Agenda, according to Ituma (2012), was aimed at addressing the following: macroeconomics frame work and economic direction; job creation; public expenditure management; governance; justice and judicially; legislature; education; health sector; labor and productivity; power sector; information and communication technology; Niger Delta; transportation; foreign policy and economic diplomacy.

In this vein, the government reached out to the rest of the world in seeking assistance for the development of the local economy. Jonathan's attempts paid-off as the Nigerian economy racked in huge capital and foreign investments. As Ukwuije (2015:114) captured it, the administration's foreign policy led to the:

Opening up of Nigeria to the global business community and becoming Africa's number one destination of foreign investors. In the first 6 months of 2014, a total of US\$9.70 billion or ₦1.51 trillion flowed into the national economy as FDI... Under Jonathan's administration, Nigeria rebased its GDP for the first time in over a decade to become the largest economy in Africa, overtaking South Africa and Egypt in the process, and that the proceeds from Nigeria's non-oil export rose to US\$2.97 billion by the end of 2013, up from US\$2.3 billion in 2010... Under the Jonathan's administration, Nigeria became the first country in West Africa to host the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2014. It was also the most successful WEF for Africa (WEFA) in history, boasting of a global reach of 2.1 billion people according to estimates.

Also, strong positions were taken in respect of issues concerning the region and the continent as a whole. Nigeria sided with the West in respect of the political crises in Cote d'Ivoire and Libya. Boma-Lysa et al (2015) recorded that the regime and through its leadership in ECOWAS effectively managed the ouster of Laurent Gbagbo of Cote D'Ivoire when he refused to hand over power, after the 2010 Presidential elections in that country. Again, for Barildum et al (2016), Nigeria's posture of peace played out strongly during the twelve months of the Jonathan administration when it threw its weight behind Libya's National Transitional Council, and championed the ECOWAS Framework Agreement on the situation in Mali.

Nigeria recorded appreciable successes as a new vista in economic and citizen diplomacy continued to open. In line with the citizen diplomacy, Nigeria and South Africa resolved their diplomatic row over the deportation of some Nigerians travelling to South Africa, reviving their bi-national Commission which had been moribund (Bariledum et al, 2016). Also, the relationship between Nigeria and US continued to improve under Jonathan. This is most exemplified in the signing of the first US–Nigeria bi-national Commission. This Alao (cited in Boma-Lysa, et al., 2015) noted, aimed to establish a mechanism for sustained, bilateral, high-level dialogue to promote and increase diplomatic, economic and security co-operation between the two countries. The Commission's main focus was Nigeria's domestic priorities; key components of what Jonathan, termed his transformation agenda.

On the downside though, the inability of the government to crush the Boko Haram insurgents cast a dark cloud on the Jonathan administration's domestic and foreign policy agenda, though the government worked assiduously to ensure the delisting of Nigeria from the US terror list (Odubajo, 2016).

3.3.14 Nigeria's Foreign Policy Under President Muhammadu Buhari Administration (2015 – 2017)

Muhammadu Buhari assumed office as civilian President in 2015. On the basis of the campaign promises, the administration's foreign policy agenda is structured to assist in the fight against Boko Haram, galvanize the domestic economy for attracting foreign direct investment, and court global cooperation in the fight against corruption (Bello, Dutse & Othman, 2017; Odubajo, 2017). As noted by many, Buhari has a reputation for honesty among the largely corrupt political class. It is generally believed that with his military background and zero tolerance on corruption that he is well-fitted to wage a successful war against insurgency and terrorism and provide the much needed security for the country (Agbu, 2015). With the security threat posed by the Boko Haram insurgency, the new administration embarked upon militaristic and diplomatic strides to cage the sect. Buhari's attempt at co-opting the member-states of the Lake Chad Basic Commission, who are also Nigeria's north-east neighbors, is in line with the aggressive posture to defeating terrorism (Uduma & Nwosu, 2015). The contacts made with various governments, Odubajo (2017) wrote, culminated in the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to curb the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad region. However, as Bello et al (2017) purported, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was not effective although it tried to curtail the activities of Boko Haram as members countries contributed to the war against Boko Haram in Nigeria. With onslaught against the group by MNJTF member countries, Boko Haram targeted these countries for daring to aid Nigeria in the fight against terrorism, thereby giving the Boko Haram action an international dimension (Bello et al., 2017).

The administration just like its predecessors adopted economic diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. Economic revival is one of the cornerstones of Buhari's agenda during the electioneering campaign. This informed his shuttle diplomacy immediately after his swearing-in. No wonder, in search for FDI, Buhari made bilateral and multilateral visits to the United States of America, China, United Arab Emirates, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia and other friendly nations. In line with the nation's economic foreign policy thrust, the Buhari administration can be applauded for invitations to G7 and G20 Summits, receptions in world capitals and the lack of a major foreign policy mishap. As Adekaiyaoja (2017) mentioned, Buhari's economic team has been actively engaged in selling the government economic plan to international investors. A quintessence is the successful Eurobond sales, amidst economic turmoil. Another is the increased bilateral relationship with China and the opening of the Nigerian economy to the Chinese *Renminbi Yuan*. Barely one year after assumption of

office, President Muhammadu Buhari visited China, the visit was on the heels of invitation by Chinese President, Xi Jinping. According to Bello et al (2017:50), the visit:

... led to the signing of the framework to enhance infrastructural development and industrial activities in Nigeria between National Development Reform Commission of China and Ministry of Industry, Trade and investment of Nigeria; Technological and Scientific Cooperation between both countries, the visit lasted for one week. In the aftermath of the visit, a number of the loan was granted to Nigeria especially to finance the deficit of 2016 budget, infrastructure loan for trains, among others.

These loans were, according to Odubajo (2017:86), “the secured commitments for investments worth US\$6 billion from the Chinese government and private companies most of whom signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the Nigerian government as well as private companies.”

Unlike his predecessor, Muhammadu Buhari enjoyed somewhat better relations with the White House. According to Bello et al (2017), relations between both countries under Buhari administration started with a high-level diplomatic meetings between Obama and Buhari, held at Oval on the 20th July 2016. President Obama committed that the United States will assist the government of Nigeria tackle the growing threats of Boko Haram and countering violent extremism. President Buhari also requested Obama administration to assist the government in curtailing corruption which has continued to plague the country, and sought for the assistance of the government towards improving the economy which included reforms in the energy sector by stopping oil theft. The trip was also an opportunity for President Buhari to meet America’s Vice President, Joe Biden, Treasury Secretary, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch and Bob Work the Deputy Defense Secretary (Bello et al, 2017)

3.4 Trends And Dynamics Of Nigeria’s Global Image Crisis And Foreign Policy Posture: The Presidents Goodluck Jonathan And Muhammadu Buhari Administrations (2009 – 2017)

Nigeria’s image crisis is rooted in her history, nature of her independence, character of her leadership and ethno-religious composition, and demographic and geographic endowment. In short, it is rooted in the question of national identity. To construe Nigeria’s national question is to construe her image crisis. Onuoha (2005) captured the interpenetration of the concept of national question and foreign policy enterprise most succinctly thus:

Essentially, the national question involves not only the territorial integrity of Nigeria, power sharing and management of Nigeria’s resources in terms of access, control and distribution, but also the issues of minority interests, ethnicity, citizenship, revenue allocation, the creation of states as well as religious, linguistic, cultural and educational policies. It is about resolving the antagonistic contradictions between the majority and minority ethnic groups, combating tribalism, racialism and any form of ethnic chauvinism....the central question is, to what extent does the issues of national question influence external relations between one country and another? (Onuoha, 2005:406-407).

According to Akinboye (2013) Nigeria had indeed been battling with image crisis for the past three decades. Over the years, Nigeria’s global image has been smeared. The different administrations since independence in 1960 have attempted to rejuvenate the bastardized state of Nigeria’s global image. Some of the attempts have yielded positive results, e.g. the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme, while some have, though arguably, been unsuccessful, e.g. the Structural Adjustment Program.

Under the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan, obvious national security challenges in the country involving the Boko Haram Islamic insurgency, was considered as the most damaging factor to Nigeria’s international image and the litmus test on the administration’s ability to manage Nigeria’s national question (Onuoha, 2014). For Duke, Agbaji and Bassey (2017), Boko Haram operations helped earned Nigeria a place among the least safe countries of the world. In short, Jacob and Akintola (2014:211) have asserted that the terrorist activities of Boko Haram sect have greatly affected Nigeria’s external relations on international economic relations with serious consequences for the country’s economic development. According to Standard and Poor’s Rating Services (S&P) (in Jacob & Akintola, 2014:212):

Nigeria had a ‘very high risk’ in ‘economic resilience’, a ‘high risk’ in terms of ‘economic imbalances’, and a ‘very high risk’ in ‘credit risk in the economy’. Nigeria is a country with a high political risk, low GDP per capita, and large infrastructure needs, all factors that contribute to a volatile and risky operating environment for banks... The industry risk score of ‘7’ for the country was based on its opinion that the country faced ‘very high risk’ in its ‘institutional framework’ and ‘competitive dynamics’, and ‘intermediate risk’ in ‘system wide funding.’

Furthermore, under the Jonathan administration, Nigeria’s image crisis saw an increased tempo with the various cases of corruption perpetrated by government official both by those at the corridors of power and by Nigeria’s military top officials. This high level of corruption in Nigeria under the Jonathan administration is

epitomized, as Duke and Agbaji (2017) wrote, in Nigeria's consistently poor scores in Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and this reduced both foreign and local investments and the integrity of the government in its supposed war against corruption. For instance, Nigeria ranked 136th out of 175 countries in TI's 2014 and 2015 assessments. This translated to the fact that there were no signs of improvement. Also, in its armed forces the extent of corruption could be seen in the Nigerian 2015 Transparency International Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index, a study of corruption risk levels in the Nigerian defense establishment. The report showed that Nigeria was ranked in Band E – the group of countries with very high corruption risk levels in their national defense establishments (Duke & Agbaji, 2017).

Nigeria's image abroad under the Jonathan administration was not one that was very palatable because of the government's weak and somewhat ineffective and inefficient ties with others nations. This really affected the government's reception of foreign investments and military aids. In fact, the administration's relationship with America left much to be desired. Little wonder the American government refused to sell arms to Nigeria to aid in the fight against Boko Haram, thus prompting Nigeria to turn to Russia. More so, increased poverty in Nigeria has smeared Nigeria's global image. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Nigeria Poverty Profile Report (2010), Nigeria's North-Eastern and North-Western regions had higher figures of 76.3% and 77.7% of relative poverty compared to the 67% and 59.1% figures of the South-Eastern and South-Western regions respectively. This high rate of poverty especially in the nation's Northern regions made a mockery of Nigeria's Afrocentric policy, since charity should, and must always, begin at home.

Under the Buhari administration, Nigeria's image in the international sphere has also been smeared. Human security in Nigeria has been very low in the Buhari's administration. Terrorism, insurgency and violent conflagrations by a multiplicity of groups in Nigeria has been a thorn in the flesh of Nigeria's global image under the Buhari Administration. First is the Boko Haram insurgency that has relatively been weakened. Added to the Boko Haram insurgency are the different cases of violence by the neo-Biafra movement, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), operational in Nigeria's South-Eastern region, the Niger Delta Avengers, Arewa People's Congress, and the current inhumane activities of the Fulani herdsmen-community clashes in the Middle Belt region. In the light of these insecurity issues, for Chidozie et al (2014), many foreign companies have had to withdraw their operations from Nigeria. For those that managed to stay, doing business in the country has become very expensive.

Furthermore, the current economic turmoil besieging the Nigerian economy leaves a sour taste in the mouth when one thinks of how richly blessed the nation is. The Nigerian economy has been simultaneously experiencing heightened inflation of the prices of goods and services and an economic recession since 2016. This recession, it is believed, is caused by a multiplicity of factors like the sabotage of oil wells, oil pipelines, and oil consortia's facilities in the Niger Delta region by the Niger Delta Avengers that has significantly reduced Nigeria's output from 2.2 million barrels per day to less than 1.4 million barrels per day (Raval & Fick, 2016), fall in the price of crude oil in the international market, and the mono-cultural nature of the Nigerian economy. Now, living in Nigeria is difficult as people find it difficult to feed let alone using monies for recreational activities.

Another issue is the Nigerian exchange rate volatility, i.e., the weakened or depreciated value of the Nigerian currency. Under the Buhari administration, the Nigerian currency, Naira, experienced a downward move away from the US Dollar. This means that prices of things will be more costly in the nation owing to the fact that Nigeria will require a huge amount of money to service its dependent economy that has high rate of importation due to the depreciation of the naira. To Clement (2014:268):

... Depreciation of exchange rate raises the cost of imported capital goods, which in turn, would lead to a fall in domestic investment; a depreciation arising from raising the profitability in the tradable goods sector would stimulate investment in this sector but depress investment in the non-tradable. However in an economy that is driven by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows and in capital stock is optima, a real depreciation of exchange rate will result in a decline in domestic investment.

In view of the foregoing, it can be seen that the Nigerian global image is somewhat bad. It is worth reiterating here as Chidozie et al (2014) wrote that a nation's position in the international system is highly dependent on her image perception being positive or negative; a good image results in respect, influence and prestige, while, a bad image entails deficiency in respect, influence and prestige. To that extent, therefore, it can be said that Nigeria lacks respect, influence and prestige in the international system.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

It has been the purpose of this study to not only investigate the nature of the foreign policy of the Nigerian state which have been a concomitant backwash of Nigeria's history of colonialism, and encapsulated within Afrocentrism and national interest, particularly the sovereign and territorial integrity of the nation-state as well as the welfare of Nigerians both at home and abroad, but, also, to examine the extent to which the nature

and direction of Nigerian's foreign policies of the different leaders have hampered on Nigeria's global image. The study essentially undertakes an analysis of foreign policy with a view to explaining the objectives and principles of Nigerian foreign policy. The study was mainly concerned with Nigeria's global image vis-à-vis the foreign policy thrusts of the Jonathan and Buhari's administration regardless of the myriad of administrations that have governed Nigeria. The study argues that the Nigerian society, since independence in 1960, has been challenged by different issues which caused it to have a bad image amongst the comity of nations. It acknowledges that the military incursion of Nigeria's politics and bilateral and multilateral agreements affected not only her foreign policy but also weakened the country's international image. Other cases include the 30-months civil war (between 1967 and 1970), the killing of Ken Saro Wiwa and his nine other kinsmen, the annulment of the June 12 President election alleged to have been won by the late Chief M.K.O. Abiola, the Niger Delta crisis, the Boko Haram insurgency, IPOB agitations, and Fulani herdsmen communal clashes, just to mention a few. In this vein, the study concludes that irrespective of conscious efforts and attempts by the Jonathan and Buhari administrations (and even those before them) to bring Nigeria in a position of positive image and boosting its socioeconomic and political outlook among nations in the international community, the consequences have to a large extent been inefficacious. The nation's image still leaves much to be desired. This can be largely attributed to the nature of the governance, the personality of the leader, and the nature of political and economic rapport in the international scene.

From the review of various literatures on the foreign policy of different administrations in Nigeria, it is pertinent to say that the Nigeria's foreign policy over the years have impacted the image of Nigeria on the global stage. Therefore, to effectively curb this menace, the Federal Government should apply pragmatic approaches. Consequently, the following recommendations will help to improve Nigeria's foreign policy as means to sustain a good image at the international level:

- Mindful efforts should be made to curb insecurity and corruption through fortified institutional frameworks and effective surveillance hinged on resource provision and prudent use.
- The government vis-à-vis the pursuit of good governance should imbibe genuine political will in the anti-graft war, make people-oriented policies (with capital expenditure occupying preeminence in national and state budgets), and provide basic social amenities.
- For the anti-graft war is to be won, the agencies charged with maintaining moral rectitude and probity in governance should be made autonomous. This can be done by ensuring that the Commissions generate and control their own funds so that they do not depend on the federal government. This time they will determine their own fate on how far they are willing to go to prosecute any case. This will reveal to the world that Nigeria is serious and ready to break its unenviable romance with corruption.
- Nigerians in the Diaspora should be properly recognized in the scheme of foreign policy articulation and implementation. They have a prominent role in advancing the foreign policy of the country, by implication her international image, and hence should be given sufficient diplomatic attention.
- Nigeria's foreign policy must be premised solely on national interest with emphasis on national security and welfare, regional and global peace, as well as robust multilateral diplomacy that is tailored along strong strategic partnership with friendly states in the comity of nations.
- For a better foreign policy thrust, the Nigerian government must pursue the diversification of the economy from its mono-cultural, oil-dependent nature to a non-oil dependent economy through the improvement of other sectors, such as agriculture, solid minerals, tourism, etc.
- Additionally, the government should enhance the security condition as well as the improvement of critical infrastructure in the country in order to boost investor confidence.
- There is the need to computerize Nigeria's economy. Computerizing the economy and improving such facilities as credit, visa and value cards cannot but invoke some respect for Nigerians and check fraudulent behaviors, and at the same time make Nigeria attractive to foreign visitors.
- A major substance of the re-definition agenda should be creating a new identity and image for Nigerians. Nigerians lack a positive international identity, designing one for them becomes an urgent task for the nation's diplomats. The diplomatic missions should engage in some aggressive image laundry for the nation and its citizens being exposed to ridicule and embarrassment across the globe. The president, as the nation's chief diplomat, needs to go beyond diplomatic appeals for international recognition, foreign investments and debt relief.

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