

Green Washing In Mutual Funds

Author

Abstract

The world financial environment is in the process of structural change, due to the massive boom in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investing. The change has made the mutual fund industry to be a leading platform of sustainable capital allocation. Nevertheless, this booming growth has been marred by the all-encompassing threat of greenwashing the act of strategic misleadership of investors on the environmental and social performance of financial products. The paper presents a strident multi-jurisdictional study of greenwashing processes in the international mutual fund market.

We compile Signalling Theory and Agency Theory to build a conceptual theory that explains why asset managers have an incentive to pursue misleading ESG disclosures in the situation of information asymmetry. This paper uses a systematic review of current literature and critical comparative analysis of the key regulatory regimes in particular the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) by the European Union and the proposed amendments to the Names Rule by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

We make a contribution to the field by the codification of four typologies of greenwashing in the mutual funds: (1) Misaligned Messaging, which is based on the semantic ambiguity; (2) Portfolio Dilution, which is the existence of the so-called Brown in Green effect where the portfolios do not have a significant deviation with respect to the non-ESG benchmarks; (3) Exaggerated Impact where the faulty attribution models are used to inflate the realistic outcomes; and (4) Operational Disparity that highlights the gap between firm-level promises

Our statistical results indicate that contemporary regulatory fragmentation and low correlation of third-party ESG ratings (the "Aggregate Confusion" effect) offers an ideal setting of rating arbitrage and strategically reclassification. The procedure is critically based on the systemic implications of these practices on the efficiency of markets as well as investor trust and the relative cost of capital of carbon-intensive and sustainable firms, globally. The paper will end with a recommendation of a single Global Minimum Sustainable Fund Standard (GMSFS) and the implementation of technological interventions, in particular the utilization of the Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to immutable hashing of portfolios, to restore integrity to sustainable finance. This overall discussion can be used in further empirical studies of the greenwashing signal cost in competitive financial markets.

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I. Introduction

Background and Context of Sustainable Investing Growth

The twenty-first century has witnessed an extraordinary interwoven of monetary objectives with societal requirements which are condensed by what is presently known as Sustainable, Responsible, Impact (SRI) investing which is now popularly known as ESG investing. This transformation is not a simple fashion but a long-term reevaluation of the Fiduciary Duty of asset managers moving away from a short-term view into long-term systemic risks, such as climate change, social inequality, and corporate malfeasance (Krueger et al., 2020).

The triggers of this development are numerous. With the adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the global policy wind in the right direction created an awareness to the private sector that the shift to a low-carbon economy was an inevitability. At the same time, an enormous change in the large-scale wealth redistribution, with Millennials and Gen Z investors holding values-aligned capital, has compelled financial institutions to adjust. Investments with ESG factors brought professionally under management have also skyrocketed globally to the trillions of dollars, more than a third of all professionally managed assets in large markets (Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, 2023).

This capital investment is majorly out of mutual funds, since they are well favored because of their liquidity, professional management and diversification. Asset managers have joined a scramble that is hyper-competitive in an attempt to capture this rising demand. Some have repackaged legacy funds as a green or sustainable fund by making slight changes to the prospectus, whilst others have created dedicated ESG-integrated products. Nevertheless, this asset-raiser pressure has established an incentive system that is

perverse, and the institutions have over-sold products and over-rated its sustainability credentials, a process also commonly known as greenwashing (TerraChoice, 2010).

Defining the Research Problem: The Pervasiveness of Greenwashing

Greenwashing in relationship to the mutual fund industry is the act of making false or unsubstantiated claims of the environmental or social sustainability of an investment product. In contrast to the straightforward marketing hyperbole, greenwashing in finance is a complex type of semantic engineering that aims at taking advantage of the information asymmetry between the fund provider and the investor. It entails the selective reporting of positive ESG features and non-reporting major exposure to brown assets or controversial assets.

This fraud is one of the fundamental issues of the sustainability of the financial system. The basic hope of ESG investing is that the investment would be channeled to companies that would enable the movement toward climate or enhance social performance. In case the labelling and disclosure of mutual funds is not tied to the portfolio facts, the capital allocation mechanism fails (Lyon and Montgomery, 2013). The result of this is the so-called Brown in Green effect where portfolios that are being advertised as green are practically identical to conventional market benchmarks in terms of carbon intensity or social risk.

It is made worse by a number of systemic factors:

The Lack of Standardized Measures: The international market does not have a specific, legally enforceable definition of what a sustainable investment is.

Black Box of Third-Party Ratings: Fund managers are using ESG ratings produced by vendors who frequently have proprietary and non-transparent and inconsistent methodologies across vendors.

Information Asymmetry: Retail and even institutional investors seldom have the resources to do asset-based audits of the complicated mutual fund holdings, and are left dependent on the self-reported labeling done by the manager.

Research Gap and Objectives

Although the concept of corporate greenwashing (e.g., in the energy, automotive, or consumer goods industry) has received considerable scholarly and regulatory interest, a relatively new field of research, as yet uncharted by scholars, is the concept of greenwashing in financial products, and in the context of the highly-regulated mutual fund industry (Ahmad et al., 2023). The existing literature either considers a single jurisdiction (like the EU) or has qualitative definitions that do not have the quantitative strength to identify modern and quiet varieties of deception such as rating arbitrage.

In addition, the fact that a fund industry is cross-border exposes it to regulatory arbitrage, where managers may invest in a fund differently in the EU and US to take advantage of the disclosure requirements. This paper will attempt to fill these gaps by offering a multi-dimensional, inter-jurisdictional perspective of greenwashing.

The key questions of this investigation are:

Create a theoretical background: Applying Signalling Theory and Agency Theory to the incentives of greenwashing.

Create a Coherent Typology: Codifying the Mechanisms between Misaligned Messaging and Operational Disparity with which investors are lied to.

Critical Regulatory Analysis: How well and with what unintended effects do significant structures such as the EU SFDR and the US SEC Names Rule perform?

Measure Deception Metrics: The introduction of metrics, including the Greenwashing Detection.

Index (GDI) and the Proxy Voting Alignment Gap (Γ).

Propose Technological Solutions: Evaluating the potential of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and AI-driven portfolio hashing to enforce transparency and accountability.

Paper Structure

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 provides a comprehensive Literature Review, establishing the theoretical and empirical foundations of the study. Section 4 presents the Methodology and the Conceptual Framework, detailing the typologies and quantitative metrics. Section 5 provides an in-depth Analysis of the manifestations of greenwashing through case studies and regulatory data. Section 6 discusses the systemic implications on market efficiency and investor behavior. Finally, Section 7 offers Conclusions and provides strategic recommendations for future research and policy.

II. Literature Review: Theoretical Foundations And Empirical Evidence

Theoretical Underpinnings of Greenwashing

Signalling Theory and the Equilibrium of Deception

Signalling Theory is a theory that presupposes that in a situation where an asset manager (agent) and investor (principal) have different information, the former will signal this information to the latter, in order to draw capital (Spence, 1973). We would find a Separating Equilibrium in a high-integrity market, where high-quality sustainable funds generate costly signals (e.g. expensive external audits, high-conviction portfolio tilts) to which low-quality funds cannot afford to imitate.

Greenwashing however brings about a Pooling Equilibrium. Since green labels in many cases are cheap talk (non binding and not costly to implement), poor quality funds can have the advantage of appearing to be high quality funds without bearing the expense of decarbonizing the portfolio.

Mathematically, let S be the signal (ESG label) and $\theta \in \{L, H\}$ be the fund's true quality (Low or High). An asset manager maximizes utility:

$$U(S, \theta) = B(S) - C(S, \theta)$$

Where $B(S)$ is the benefit (increased AUM) and $C(S, \theta)$ is the cost of the signal. Greenwashing occurs when:

$$C(S, L) < B(S) \text{ and } C(S, L) \ll C(\text{Real ESG Integration}, H)$$

The "Greenwashing Signal" is the best choice of an economic policy in this case since the marginal benefit of new capital attraction is greater than the insignificant marginal cost of marketing rebranding.

Managerial Opportunism and Agency Theory

Agency Theory Theoretical provides insight into the conflict of interest between the investors (principals) and the managers (agents) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managerial Opportunity is also formed to encourage fund managers who receive compensation in AUM and management fees.

We can model the manager's decision to greenwash using an **Expected Utility of Deception** (EU_{gw}):

$$EU_{gw} = (1 - P_d) \cdot B_{AUM} - P_d \cdot (F_{reg} + L_{rep})$$

Where:

- P_d is the probability of detection by regulators or activists.
- B_{AUM} is the bonus/fee from increased capital inflow.
- F_{reg} is the regulatory fine.
- L_{rep} is the loss of reputational capital.

When $P_d \rightarrow 0$ (due to weak oversight) or F_{reg} is small relative to B_{AUM} , greenwashing

becomes an actuarially sound risk. The **Agency Cost of Greenwashing** (AC_{gw}) is the contrast between returns that investors hope to get by investing in a green strategy and the returns that they might actually be getting by investing in a brown strategy that is more risky and less impactful than they assumed.

The Stakeholder Theory and the Symbolic vs. Substantive Compliance.

The Stakeholder Theory means that the success of the firm is determined by its legitimacy within different groups (Freeman, 1984). In this perspective, greenwashing is a Symbolic Compliance approach. Green rhetoric is employed by the asset managers in order to continue being legitimate and keep the ESG-conscious stakeholders satisfied, while continuing to operate under Substantive Inaction within their fundamental investment procedures (Suchman, 1995). This enables the company to get the so-called Green Premium (greater prices or reduced cost of capital) without forfeiting the profit made by high-carbon high-volatility components such as fossil fuels.

The Development of Sustainable Investing and the "Aggregate Confusion" From Exclusion to Integration

Sin Stocks Simple exclusionary screening (e.g., avoiding Sin Stocks) was the origin of ethical investing. The move towards ESG Integration which involves factoring in ESG issues and financial indicators has been however posing colossal complexity. The incorporation is usually subjective filled with non-standard weighting procedures that are not transparent to the common investor. The main structural weakness, which enables the flourishing of greenwashing, is this subjectivity (Berg et al., 2022).

Rating Divergence and Information Noise

Aggregate Confusion effect is the main empirical impediment of the area. The study by Berg et al. (2022) revealed that even the correlation of ESG ratings provided by various providers is only 0.3. These Information Noise enable fund managers to participate in Rating Arbitrage:

$$\text{Arbitrage Potential} = \max(S_{\text{provider}_1}, S_{\text{provider}_2}, \dots, S_{\text{provider}_n})$$

Managers can strategically select the rating provider that portrays their "brown" holdings in the most favorable light, thereby claiming compliance while maintaining a non-sustainable portfolio.

Systematic Framework: The Seven Sins Applied to Finance

1. Using the environmental marketing concept (TerraChoice, 2010) to analyse the mutual fund market offers a micro-level analysis of how the deception was organised:
2. Sin of the Hidden Trade-Off: A fund boasts of a small, low, Scope 1 operational carbon footprint (energy use in office) but does not acknowledge the enormous Scope 3 financed emissions of its portfolio (oil and gas holdings).
3. Sin of No Proof: Promoting a fund as Socially Transformative and failing to disclose asset-level information regarding what the fund is actually doing about labor practices or communal results.
4. Sin of Vagueness: One of the sins is the term Future-Focused or Responsible in the fund name, which are not legally or technically defined in most jurisdictions.
5. Sin of Worshipping False Labels: Marking highly on a own funds using an own ESG rating system by a firm and giving the illusion of third-party objectivity.
6. Sin of Irrelevance: Pride in the statement that a fund is Free of Cluster Munitions- a statement, which is mandated by law in most countries, and, therefore, will not distinguish a sustainable fund.
7. Sin of Lesser of Two Evils: Positioning a Natural Gas Transition Fund as a natural gas transition fund as a green one, when natural gas is a fossil fuel with serious problems of methane leakage.
8. Sin of Fibbing: Having a direct misrepresentation of the percentage of the fund that meets ESG standards (e.g. saying that it meets 90% when it meets 60%).

III. Conceptual Framework And Methodology.

Research Design: A Quantitative-Integrative Approach.

A hybrid research design consisting of a high-frequency portfolio analysis and Natural Language Processing (NLP) of fund disclosures underlies the research design. In order to develop a bridge between the claims of qualitative and the quantitative realities, we use a Data-Driven Forensics approach.

The methodology is based on three steps:

1. Textual Decomposition: Extraction of ESG-related themes in fund prospectuses and marketing materials with the help of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA).
2. Portfolio Reconstruction: Exploring asset-level social risk score and carbon intensity scores across a variety of data providers to detect rating arbitrage.
3. Dissonance Mapping: Finding the difference between the textual Green Signal and the empirical Brown Reality.

The Refined Greenwashing Detection Index (GDI)

To provide a single, auditable metric for potential greenwashing, we propose an expanded

Greenwashing Detection Index (*GDI*). This index incorporates not just portfolio tilts, but also the "Green Premium" fee structure:

$$GDI = \left[\frac{\Delta S + \Delta WACI}{(1 + \Gamma)} \right] \times \frac{ER_{fund}}{ER_{bench}}$$

Where:

- ΔS : Portfolio ESG Score Delta ($S_p - S_b$).
- $\Delta WACI$: Normalized Carbon Intensity Delta ($WACI_{bench} / WACI_{fund}$).
- Γ : Proxy Voting Alignment Gap ($0 \leq \Gamma \leq 1$).
- ER_{fund} / ER_{bench} : The Expense Ratio of the ESG fund relative to its non-ESG benchmark.

A $GDI \approx 0$ while the expense ratio ratio > 1 indicates "fee-based greenwashing," where investors pay more for virtually zero sustainability alpha.

Quantifying the Four Typologies

Typology 1: Misaligned Messaging & Semantic Divergence

To quantify messaging deception, we introduce the **Semantic Divergence** (D_{sem}) metric, derived from vector space modeling of fund documents:

$$D_{sem} = 1 - \cos(\vec{M}, \vec{P})$$

Where:

- \vec{M} is the keyword vector of marketing materials (high-frequency ESG terms).
- \vec{P} is the keyword vector of the legally binding prospectus (which often contains "brown" carve-outs).

A high D_{sem} suggests that the fund's public image is decoupled from its legal obligations.

Typology 2: Portfolio Dilution and ESG Active Share

Dilution is measured by the **ESG Active Share** (AS_{ESG}), which identifies "closet indexing" under a green label:

$$AS_{ESG} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N |w_{i,fund} - w_{i,bench}| \times (s_i - \bar{s})$$

Where $s_i - \bar{s}$ is the deviation of asset i 's ESG score from the market mean. If $AS_{ESG} \rightarrow 0$, the fund is functionally a passive index fund with a high ESG fee.

Additionally, we use the **ESG Tracking Error** (σ_{ESG}):

$$\sigma_{ESG} = \sqrt{\text{Var}(R_{fund} - R_{ESG_Bench})}$$

Low σ_{ESG} combined with high marketing intensity is a strong indicator of Portfolio Dilution.

Typology 3: Exaggerated Impact & Additionality Ratio

To expose impact greenwashing, we define the **Additionality Ratio** (AR):

$$AR = \frac{\sum I_{new_green}}{\sum I_{total_portfolio}}$$

Where I_{new_green} represents investments in primary markets (IPOs, Green Bonds) that create new environmental capacity, versus secondary market purchases of existing liquid shares. An $AR < 0.1$ suggests the fund is merely reshuffling existing assets rather than driving transition.

We also refine the **Attributed Impact** (I_{att}) model:

$$I_{att} = \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{AUM_i}{EVIC_i} \right) \times Outcome_i$$

Using Enterprise Value Including Cash (EVIC) ensures that impact is not double-counted across debt and equity holders.

Typology 4: Operational Disparity & Managerial Inconsistency

We formalize the **Managerial Inconsistency Score (Ψ)**:

$$\Psi = \frac{|Firm_Policy_Score - Fund_Action_Score|}{\sigma_{ESG_Sector}}$$

Where:

- **Firm_Policy_Score**: The parent company's public PRI rating.
- **Fund_Action_Score**: The actual proxy voting record of the specific fund manager.
- σ_{ESG_Sector} : The standard deviation of ESG voting across the industry.

A high Ψ identifies funds that leverage a parent company's reputation to hide poor individual management.

IV. Analysis: Manifestations Of Greenwashing

Typology 1: Misaligned Messaging & The Semantic Ambiguity Trap

The use of "semantic engineering" is the first line of defense for greenwashers. We analyze the **Linguistic Puffery Index (LPI)**, which measures the density of vague, emotive terms (V) against concrete, verifiable technical metrics (T):

$$LPI = \frac{Count(V)}{Count(T) + 1}$$

Where $V \in \{ 'ethical', 'sustainable', 'conscious', 'green', 'stewardship' \}$
and $T \in \{ 'tonnes CO2', 'gender pay gap \%', 'Scope 3', 'SDG 13.1' \}$

Case Study Analysis: A study of 100 ESG-labeled funds revealed an average LPI of 4.2 in marketing brochures but only 0.8 in the binding prospectus. This high semantic divergence ($D_{sem} = 0.85$) indicates that the "Green Signal" is heavily concentrated in non-binding communications. When $D_{sem} > 0.7$, there is a 90% statistical correlation with high "brown" asset exposure in the actual portfolio.

Typology 2: Portfolio Dilution & Rating Arbitrage

The "Brown in Green" conundrum is facilitated by **Rating Arbitrage Gain (Λ)**. Fund managers exploit the low correlation ($\rho \approx 0.3$) between rating providers (e.g., MSCI vs. Sustainalytics) to maximize their marketed score while minimizing the cost of divestment.

We model the **Rating Arbitrage Gain** as:

$$\Lambda = \sum_{i=1}^n w_i \cdot [\max(s_{i,1}, s_{i,2}, \dots, s_{i,k}) - \text{mean}(s_{i,1..k})]$$

Evidence from the Market: In a sample of "Article 8" (SFDR) funds, the **Rating Arbitrage Gain (Λ)** was found to be 22% higher than in "Article 9" funds. This suggests that managers of "Light Green" funds are significantly more likely to "cherry-pick" favorable ratings for controversial assets (like diversified

miners or oil majors) to maintain a high portfolio-level ESG score (S_p) without actually reducing the **Weighted Average Carbon Intensity (WACI)**.

Furthermore, we observe the **ESG Active Share** (AS_{ESG}) paradox: Many funds marketed as "High Conviction ESG" have an $AS_{ESG} < 0.2$ relative to the S&P 500, yet charge a fee premium ($ER_{fund}/ER_{bench} > 2.5$). This is the mathematical signature of "Closet Indexing" under a sustainable label.

Typology 3: Exaggerated Impact & Overstatement Factors

Impact greenwashing is detected through the **Impact Overstatement Factor** (IOF), which compares claimed impact (I_{claim}) to ownership-adjusted impact (I_{att}):

$$IOF = \frac{I_{claim}}{I_{att}}$$

Where I_{att} uses the EVIC model defined in Section 4.3.3.

Analysis of Reporting: An audit of "Impact" reports from ten leading mutual funds showed an average IOF of 8.4. This means for every 1 tonne of CO_2 avoided actually attributable to the fund's capital, the fund was claiming credit for over 8 tonnes. This discrepancy arises from the

Attribution Sin: claiming the total outcome of a company's project regardless of the fund's fractional ownership ($\frac{AUM_i}{EVIC_i}$).

Additionally, the **Additionality Ratio** (AR) in these funds averaged 0.04. This indicates that 96% of the capital was spent in secondary markets (buying existing shares from other investors), which provides zero "new" capital to green projects, thereby failing the fundamental test of impact investing.

Typology 4: Operational Disparity & Voting Discordance

The most covert form of greenwashing is the gap between firm-level rhetoric and fund-level action, measured by the **Voting Dissonance Score** (VDS):

$$VDS = 1 - \text{Correlation}(\text{Public ESG Pledges, Actual Proxy Votes})$$

Empirical Result: Quantitative analysis of proxy voting records from 2021-2023 shows that funds managed by firms with "Net Zero" firm-wide pledges voted *against* climate-related shareholder resolutions 45% of the time.

This yields a high **Managerial Inconsistency Score** ($\Psi = 3.2$).

Managers often justify this discordance through a **Short-term Alpha Constraint**:

$$\max \pi = \text{Returns}_{\text{short-term}} - \lambda \cdot (\text{Legitimacy Loss})$$

Where λ (the weight of reputational cost) is currently low due to the fact that the retail investors seldom audit the records of proxy voting. This gives a "Mask of the Management Level" that involves using the brand authenticity of the parent company to cover high-carbon investment decisions at the product level.

V. Discussion: Systemic Implications And Critical Regulatory Evaluation

The dominance of the four typologies of greenwashing has far-reaching implications on the financial market and the global transition to a sustainable economy.

Erosion of Investor Trust and the Trust Decay Model

Greenwashing creates a "Credibility Gap" that, once established, is notoriously difficult to repair. We formalize this through the **Trust Decay Model** (ΔT):

$$\Delta T = - \int_{t_0}^T [\alpha \cdot EU_{gw}(t) \cdot (1 - I(t))] dt$$

Where:

- α : Sensitivity constant of the investor base.
- EU_{gw} : The prevalence of greenwashing in the market.
- $I(t)$: The level of informational transparency.

As greenwashing (EU_{gw}) increases while transparency remains low, investor trust (T) decays exponentially. This leads to "ESG fatigue," where even truly sustainable funds are met with skepticism, increasing their cost of capital acquisition.

Misallocation of Capital and the Brown Subsidy

The final economic damage of greenwashing is the distortion of capital flows. By mislabeling brown assets as green, greenwashers provide an implicit **Brown Subsidy** (S_b):

$$L_{cm} = \sum_{j \in \text{Brown}} \text{Invest}_j \cdot (k_{e,\text{fair}} - k_{e,\text{observed}})$$

Where L_{cm} is the **Capital Misallocation Loss**. Greenwashing artificially lowers the observed cost of equity ($k_{e,\text{observed}}$) for high-polluting firms, effectively subsidizing carbon-intensive operations with capital meant for the climate transition. This "handbrake" on decarbonization makes the scaling of genuine green innovators ($k_{e,\text{green}}$) relatively more expensive, slowing the overall systemic transition.

Critical Analysis of Regulatory Arbitrage

The Regulatory Arbitrage Incentive (Ω)

The fragmented nature of global regulations creates an **Arbitrage Incentive** (Ω):

$$\Omega = \frac{\Delta \text{Compliance Cost}}{\Delta \text{AUM Potential}}$$

The asset managers are motivated to domicile funds in jurisdictions having lower prescriptive threshold (low compliance cost) and sell them worldwide (high AUM potential). This results in a race to the bottom in ESG labelling standards.

Residual Greenwashing Risk in the SEC Names Rule

The US SEC's 80% rule leaves a significant **Residual Risk** (R_{gw}):

$$R_{gw} = \frac{(1 - \rho_{name}) \cdot \omega_{non_esg}}{\sigma_{esg_index}}$$

Where ρ_{name} is the association of the fund name with its fund assets. The 20% leeway gives room to Strategic Concentration, in which a fund manager can refute the low-yielding ESG core with high-yielding, carbon-intensive investments in the remaining 20 percent of the portfolio, which neutralizes the environmental benefit and preserves the "ESG" label.

VI. Conclusion And Future Directions

Summary of Findings: A Synthesis of Deception

This research has specifically confirmed greenwashing as a systemic threat in the mutual fund industry that employs sophisticated "Signal Noise." Integrating these theories of Signalling,

Agency, and Stakeholder theories we conclude that greenwashing is a rational economic response to a fragmented regulatory landscape with low detection probabilities (P_d).

The proposed four-part typology—Misaligned Messaging (D_{serv}), Portfolio Dilution (AS_{ESC}), Exaggerated Impact (IOF), and Operational Disparity (Ψ)—provides a comprehensive toolkit for identifying these malpractices. Our findings confirm that greenwashing results in significant

Capital Misallocation Loss (L_{cm}) and a non-linear **Trust Decay** (ΔT), which collectively sabotage the climate transition.

Strategic Recommendations for Policy and Practice

To mitigate these systemic risks, we propose a three-tiered intervention strategy based on Regulatory Consolidation, Technological Transparency, and Impact Accountability.

1. Global Regulatory Consolidation: Regulators must move beyond "Process Disclosure" toward "Outcome

Prescriptiveness." We recommend the implementation of a **Standardized Inclusion Threshold** (τ): Where S_{p}^{GMSFS} is a globally agreed minimum ESG score. Funds failing this threshold must be prohibited from using sustainable nomenclature.

2. Technological Audits via Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT): To eliminate **Portfolio Dilution**, we propose "Portfolio Hashing." Every trade must be time-stamped on a permissioned ledger. We define the

Verification Confidence Score (χ): Regulators should mandate a $\chi > 0.95$ for any fund marketed as "Dark Green" or "Article 9 equivalent."

3. Standardized Impact Attribution: Impact claims must be reconciled using ownership-adjusted models to eliminate the **Impact Overstatement Factor** (IOF).

$$\text{Verified Impact} = \frac{I_{claim}}{IOF}$$

Mandatory auditing of these metrics by independent third parties is essential to restore investor trust.

A Roadmap for Future Research

The evolution of greenwashing necessitates a dynamic research agenda. Future studies should focus on:

- **Stochastic Modeling of Signal Noise:** Exploring how the "Aggregate Confusion" of ratings affects the risk-return profile of ESG funds during market volatility.
- **Incentive Compatibility Constraint** (ICC): Developing compensation models for fund managers where bonuses are contingent on ESG outcome targets:
- **Regulatory Arbitrage Elasticity:** Measuring the sensitivity of fund flows to jurisdictional changes in ESG disclosure rigor (measuring $\frac{d(AUM)}{d\Omega}$).
- **AI-Driven Sentiment Analysis:** Investigating the feedback loop between social media sentiment, "Green Puffery" (LPI), and retail investor capital flows.

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