

# Re-Engineering Manufacturing Systems: An Operational And Accountability-Driven Decision Architecture For Industrial Development

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## **Abstract**

### **Purpose**

*This study aims to reconceptualize industrial development as a decision-centric process by examining how an operational decision architecture can improve manufacturing performance, accountability, and adaptive capacity. Rather than focusing on policy instruments or sectoral choices, the research investigates how the design of industrial decision systems shapes outcomes over time.*

### **Design/Methodology/Approach**

*The study adopts a design-oriented and applied analytical approach. It develops an operational decision architecture and evaluates its application through comparative international case evidence, scenario-based industrial decision analysis, and an applied results assessment. Hypotheses are examined using decision-centered indicators that capture coherence, traceability, correction speed, and accountability activation.*

### **Findings**

*The applied results demonstrate that architecture-guided industrial decisions exhibit higher structural coherence, earlier detection of performance deviation, faster corrective action, and stronger resource allocation discipline compared to non-architected decisions. The findings further show that accountability becomes operationally effective when embedded within decision design rather than imposed ex post.*

### **Originality/Value**

*This study makes an original contribution by introducing decision architecture as a core analytical construct in industrial governance and accounting-informed decision-making. It shifts the focus of industrial policy analysis from policy instruments to decision-system design, offering a novel explanation for persistent performance divergence across manufacturing systems.*

### **Theoretical, Practical, Social, and Economic Implications**

*Theoretically, the study advances a design-based perspective on industrial governance that integrates accounting, decision theory, and institutional analysis. Practically, it provides a decision-centric framework that policymakers can apply without extensive legislative reform. Socially and economically, the proposed architecture enhances accountability, reduces industrial resource misallocation, and supports sustainable manufacturing development in emerging economies, particularly Egypt.*

**Keywords:** *Decision architecture; Industrial governance; Manufacturing development; Accountability; Applied accounting; Egypt*

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Date of Submission: 24-04-2026

Date of Acceptance: 04-05-2026

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## **I. Introduction**

### **Background and Context**

Manufacturing systems have re-emerged as a strategic foundation for economic resilience, productivity growth, and long-term development across both advanced and emerging economies. Recent global disruptions—including supply chain fragmentation, geopolitical tensions, energy price volatility, and technological realignments—have exposed the structural vulnerabilities of manufacturing systems that rely on fragmented decision-making and reactive industrial interventions (Baldwin & Freeman, 2022; Gereffi, 2023). These disruptions have prompted governments to reconsider not only the scale of industrial support, but more fundamentally the way industrial decisions are designed, coordinated, and governed.

Contemporary industrial development debates increasingly recognize that manufacturing performance is shaped by system-level interactions rather than isolated firm-level capabilities. Global value chains, infrastructure constraints, labor productivity, and institutional coordination jointly determine industrial outcomes, making traditional policy instruments insufficient when applied in isolation (Felipe et al., 2020;

OECD, 2023). As a result, the focus of industrial policy has gradually shifted from static incentive schemes toward dynamic approaches that emphasize learning, coordination, and adaptability.

International development institutions and policy-oriented research consistently show that industrial underperformance is rarely caused by a lack of financial resources alone. Instead, weak alignment between strategic objectives and operational execution, limited performance feedback, and inadequate accountability mechanisms undermine the effectiveness of industrial interventions (UNIDO, 2022; World Bank, 2021). These challenges highlight the need to move beyond conventional policy frameworks toward system-oriented approaches that treat manufacturing development as a continuous decision process rather than a sequence of isolated policy actions.

#### Statement of the Research Problem

Despite the renewed emphasis on industrial development, many manufacturing initiatives continue to deliver outcomes that fall short of their stated objectives. The central problem addressed in this study is the absence of an operational, decision-oriented structure that governs how industrial development decisions are formulated, implemented, evaluated, and adjusted over time. In practice, decisions related to sector prioritization, industrial incentives, localization strategies, and infrastructure investments are often taken without a coherent architecture that links expected outcomes to measurable operational signals (Aiginger & Rodrik, 2020; Schmitz et al., 2023).

This deficiency generates multiple systemic failures. First, industrial decisions are frequently assessed *ex post*, limiting the capacity for timely correction when interventions underperform. Second, accountability mechanisms tend to focus on procedural compliance rather than outcome realization, allowing ineffective policies to persist without structured review or termination (Bovens et al., 2021). Third, the absence of integrated feedback loops weakens institutional learning and increases the likelihood of repeated policy errors.

Consequently, manufacturing challenges are often misdiagnosed as sectoral inefficiencies or market failures, while their underlying causes lie in the design and governance of decision-making systems themselves. Addressing this problem requires reframing manufacturing development as a system-level decision challenge rather than a collection of policy tools.

#### Research Objectives and Research Questions

In response to the identified problem, this study seeks to develop an operational decision architecture capable of improving the effectiveness and accountability of manufacturing development initiatives. By conceptualizing manufacturing development as a decision system, the study aims to bridge the persistent gap between industrial strategy and operational execution (Andreoni et al., 2021).

Specifically, the research is guided by the objective of designing a decision architecture that embeds accountability and performance feedback directly into industrial decision processes, enabling adaptive governance and continuous improvement (Kattel et al., 2021).

Building on the problem identified above, this study is guided by a set of objectives that collectively aim to improve how manufacturing development decisions are structured and governed. Rather than evaluating individual policy instruments, the study focuses on the decision processes that shape industrial outcomes. This orientation reflects growing recognition in the literature that sustainable industrial development depends on the quality of decision design rather than on policy intensity alone (Rodrik, 2024).

Accordingly, the study pursues three interrelated objectives. First, it seeks to conceptualize manufacturing development as an integrated decision system characterized by interdependencies across sectors, institutions, and operational constraints. Second, it aims to identify the core architectural components required to operationalize accountable industrial decision-making, including decision inputs, performance signals, and corrective feedback mechanisms. Third, the study examines how decision architecture influences manufacturing performance, resource allocation efficiency, and institutional learning over time.

These objectives give rise to the following research questions:

1. How can manufacturing development be reframed as a system-level decision problem rather than a policy domain?
2. What architectural elements are necessary to operationalize accountability within industrial decision processes?
3. How does the design of industrial decision systems affect manufacturing outcomes and policy effectiveness?

By addressing these questions, the study aligns with recent calls for analytically grounded and operationally oriented approaches to industrial development research (Teece, 2020).

#### Significance of the Study

The significance of this study lies in its potential to reshape both scholarly understanding and practical management of manufacturing development. From a policy perspective, governments increasingly face pressure

to justify industrial interventions in terms of measurable outcomes, fiscal discipline, and long-term sustainability. However, existing approaches often lack the operational structures needed to ensure that industrial decisions remain aligned with their intended objectives throughout the policy cycle (McKinsey Global Institute, 2022).

This study contributes by offering a decision-oriented perspective that enhances transparency, enables timely corrective action, and strengthens accountability in manufacturing development initiatives. For industrial systems, such an approach supports more coherent coordination across public and private actors, reducing fragmentation and improving responsiveness to changing economic conditions. For researchers, the study addresses an underexplored dimension of industrial development by explicitly linking decision design to manufacturing performance at the system level.

#### Research Contributions

This study makes several original contributions to the literature on industrial development and governance. First, it advances a conceptual shift from policy-centric analyses toward a decision-based view of manufacturing development, emphasizing the role of decision architecture in shaping industrial outcomes. Second, it extends design-oriented research methodologies into the field of industrial development, an area traditionally dominated by descriptive and evaluative studies (Dekker et al., 2022).

Third, the study introduces accountability as an operational property of decision systems rather than a post hoc control mechanism, thereby reframing governance as an integral component of industrial decision-making. Fourth, it provides an applied analytical lens for assessing industrial interventions based on decision quality rather than solely on ex post performance indicators. Finally, the study generates insights that can be translated into deployable decision protocols, offering practical value for policymakers seeking to improve manufacturing development outcomes without increasing regulatory complexity (Cirera & Maloney, 2021).

#### Structure of the Study

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical foundations underpinning manufacturing systems, decision-oriented governance, and accountability in complex organizational settings. Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology and design-oriented approach adopted in this study. Chapter 4 presents the proposed operational decision architecture for manufacturing systems. Chapter 5 examines comparative case studies of successful industrial development experiences. Chapter 6 provides an applied analysis of the results derived from implementing the proposed architecture. Chapter 7 discusses the findings in relation to existing literature and theoretical expectations. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the study by summarizing key insights and identifying directions for future research.

## **II. Theoretical Foundations And Conceptual Positioning**

### Manufacturing Systems as Complex Decision Systems

Manufacturing systems are increasingly conceptualized as complex adaptive systems characterized by nonlinear interactions, feedback loops, and dynamic constraints. Unlike traditional sectoral views that treat manufacturing performance as the aggregate outcome of firm-level activities, contemporary systems theory emphasizes the role of decision interdependencies across production, logistics, labor, infrastructure, and institutional arrangements (Snowden & Boone, 2020; Helbing, 2021). Within such systems, industrial outcomes emerge from patterns of coordinated decisions rather than from isolated policy interventions.

Recent research in operations management and industrial economics highlights that manufacturing performance is deeply influenced by how decisions are structured across time and organizational boundaries. Decisions related to capacity expansion, technology adoption, localization, and supply chain configuration interact in ways that amplify or dampen system performance (Ivanov & Dolgui, 2020). Consequently, treating manufacturing development as a linear planning exercise fails to capture the endogenous risks and trade-offs embedded in industrial systems.

Complex manufacturing systems also exhibit path dependence, where early design decisions constrain future options and lock systems into suboptimal trajectories. This insight has significant implications for industrial development strategies, as poorly designed decision processes can generate persistent inefficiencies even in the presence of adequate resources (Arthur, 2021). From this perspective, manufacturing underperformance should be interpreted as a symptom of decision architecture failure rather than merely as an outcome of market or technological constraints.

By framing manufacturing systems as decision systems, attention shifts toward the architecture governing how decisions are initiated, evaluated, coordinated, and revised. Such a shift aligns with emerging governance-oriented approaches that emphasize system steering, learning, and adaptive control rather than static optimization (Helbing et al., 2022).

### From Industrial Policy to Decision-Oriented Industrial Development

The resurgence of industrial policy has been accompanied by growing recognition of its conceptual and operational limitations. Traditional industrial policy frameworks typically focus on selecting sectors, designing incentives, and correcting market failures. However, these approaches often understate the importance of how industrial decisions are operationalized and governed over time (Warwick & Nolan, 2022).

Recent scholarship argues that industrial development should be reframed as a continuous decision process rather than a set of discrete policy actions. This decision-oriented perspective emphasizes the sequencing, coordination, and accountability of industrial interventions, recognizing that policy effectiveness depends on iterative learning and feedback rather than one-off design choices (Kleibrink et al., 2020).

Moreover, evidence from comparative industrial studies suggests that successful manufacturing development experiences are distinguished not by the sophistication of policy instruments, but by the quality of decision governance structures that enable timely adjustment, error correction, and strategic coherence (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2021). In this sense, industrial policy becomes less about “what to support” and more about “how decisions are structured, reviewed, and corrected.”

The shift toward decision-oriented industrial development also addresses long-standing governance challenges. By embedding performance signals and accountability mechanisms within decision processes, governments can mitigate risks of policy capture, inertia, and misallocation without resorting to excessive regulation (Mazzoleni & Nelson, 2020). This perspective provides a conceptual bridge between industrial development, decision science, and governance theory, forming the foundation for the operational decision architecture developed in subsequent chapters.

### Decision Architecture and System Design in Manufacturing Development

The concept of decision architecture originates from the recognition that choices are not made in isolation, but within structured environments that shape information flows, incentives, and behavioral responses. In the context of manufacturing development, decision architecture refers to the systematic configuration of decision inputs, evaluation criteria, sequencing rules, and feedback mechanisms that collectively determine industrial outcomes (Thaler & Sunstein, 2021). Applying this concept to manufacturing systems shifts analytical attention from policy content to decision structure.

Recent advances in design science and operations research emphasize that effective system performance depends on how decision components are arranged and coordinated rather than on the sophistication of individual instruments (van Aken et al., 2021). Manufacturing development decisions—such as capacity expansion, localization thresholds, or incentive allocation—are inherently multi-criteria and intertemporal. Without an explicit architectural logic, such decisions risk fragmentation, inconsistency, and delayed corrective action.

Decision architecture in manufacturing development also plays a critical role in managing trade-offs between competing objectives, including productivity, employment, fiscal discipline, and resilience. Empirical studies in production and operations management show that system-level decision coherence significantly improves adaptive capacity under uncertainty, particularly in environments exposed to shocks and structural change (Shams et al., 2022). From this perspective, decision architecture becomes a strategic asset that enables manufacturing systems to respond dynamically rather than reactively.

Importantly, decision architecture is not a static blueprint. It is an operational design that evolves through continuous interaction with performance signals and environmental feedback. This dynamic view aligns with contemporary system design approaches that emphasize modularity, scalability, and learning-oriented governance (Fixson, 2020). Such properties are essential for sustaining manufacturing development in volatile and innovation-driven contexts.

### Accountability as a System Property

Traditional approaches to accountability in industrial development often treat it as an ex post control mechanism, focused on compliance, reporting, and procedural adherence. However, recent governance literature increasingly conceptualizes accountability as an endogenous property of system design rather than an external oversight function (Ansell et al., 2021). In manufacturing development, this implies embedding accountability directly into decision processes rather than appending it after implementation.

Accountability as a system property requires that decision roles, performance expectations, and corrective responsibilities are clearly specified within the decision architecture itself. When accountability is operationalized in this manner, it enables continuous performance assessment and timely intervention, reducing the persistence of ineffective industrial initiatives (Olsen, 2022). This approach contrasts sharply with traditional audit-based models that often identify failures only after significant resources have been expended.

Recent empirical research demonstrates that systems with embedded accountability mechanisms exhibit stronger learning dynamics and greater resilience. In manufacturing contexts, accountability-driven

systems facilitate faster identification of underperforming segments, clearer attribution of responsibility, and more effective reallocation of resources (Emirbayer & Mische, 2020). Such systems also reduce political and institutional frictions by shifting debates from blame attribution to evidence-based adjustment.

Moreover, accountability-oriented system design supports legitimacy and trust in industrial development initiatives. By making decision rationales, performance criteria, and adjustment mechanisms transparent, governments can enhance stakeholder confidence without increasing bureaucratic complexity (Hood, 2021). This is particularly important in manufacturing development, where long investment horizons and distributional impacts often generate political contestation.

#### Integrating Decision Architecture and Accountability: Conceptual Implications

Integrating decision architecture with accountability transforms manufacturing development from a policy-driven activity into a governed decision system. This integration creates a closed-loop structure in which decisions are continuously informed by operational data, evaluated against predefined criteria, and adjusted through explicit intervention thresholds (Bryson et al., 2023). Such a structure enables adaptive industrial governance without relying on ad hoc discretion.

From a theoretical standpoint, this integration bridges decision science, systems design, and governance theory. It advances a view of industrial development in which effectiveness emerges from the alignment of decision structure, performance feedback, and accountability logic (March, 2021). This perspective challenges conventional dichotomies between policy design and implementation by treating both as components of a single decision system.

The conceptual positioning developed in this section provides the analytical foundation for the operational decision architecture proposed in Chapter 4. By grounding manufacturing development in system design principles and accountability logic, the study establishes a coherent framework for translating industrial objectives into actionable, monitorable, and correctable decisions.

#### Decision Systems, Learning, and Adaptive Industrial Governance

Manufacturing development unfolds in environments characterized by uncertainty, technological change, and evolving global competition. In such contexts, static decision models are ill-suited to sustain industrial performance. Recent scholarship emphasizes that effective industrial governance depends on the capacity of decision systems to learn, adapt, and recalibrate in response to performance feedback and environmental signals (Argyris & Schön, 2020; Nooteboom, 2021). Learning, therefore, is not an ancillary outcome but a core function of industrial decision systems.

Adaptive industrial governance requires mechanisms that transform operational data into actionable insights and translate those insights into timely decision adjustments. Studies in policy learning and systems governance demonstrate that institutional learning is most effective when feedback loops are embedded directly within decision processes, rather than being mediated through episodic evaluations or retrospective reviews (Dunlop et al., 2020). For manufacturing systems, this implies designing decision architectures that specify not only what decisions are taken, but also how performance deviations trigger predefined responses.

Recent empirical research highlights that adaptive decision systems outperform rigid governance arrangements in managing industrial transitions, particularly during periods of structural disruption. For instance, flexible decision rules and modular governance structures enable faster reallocation of resources, more effective risk mitigation, and improved coordination across public and private actors (Ansell & Trondal, 2021). Such findings reinforce the view that adaptability is a design property of decision systems rather than a managerial attribute.

Importantly, adaptive governance does not imply discretionary or ad hoc decision-making. On the contrary, well-designed decision systems rely on clearly articulated intervention thresholds, role definitions, and accountability mechanisms that constrain discretion while enabling responsiveness (Pahl-Wostl, 2020). This balance between structure and flexibility is essential for sustaining manufacturing development in volatile and politically contested environments.

#### Positioning the Study within Contemporary Q1 Literature

The conceptual foundations developed in this chapter position the present study at the intersection of manufacturing systems research, decision science, and governance theory. Unlike conventional industrial policy studies that emphasize instrument choice or sectoral targeting, this study aligns with an emerging body of Q1 literature that treats policy effectiveness as a function of system design and decision quality (Capano & Howlett, 2020).

Within the accounting and management literature, recent contributions increasingly call for design-oriented approaches that move beyond descriptive analysis toward actionable system configurations capable of shaping organizational and policy outcomes (Bhimani et al., 2021). By focusing on decision architecture and

accountability as system properties, this study responds directly to these calls while extending them into the domain of industrial development.

Moreover, the study complements comparative industrial research by offering an analytical lens that explains why similar policy instruments yield divergent outcomes across contexts. Rather than attributing variation solely to institutional capacity or political commitment, the decision-oriented perspective highlights differences in how decisions are structured, reviewed, and corrected over time (Kay & King, 2020). This positioning enhances the study's relevance to high-impact journals concerned with theory-driven yet practice-relevant research.

#### Conceptual Synthesis and Link to the Research Design

The preceding sections collectively establish manufacturing development as a governed decision system whose performance depends on the architecture through which decisions are formulated, executed, evaluated, and revised. By integrating insights from complexity theory, decision architecture, accountability research, and adaptive governance, this chapter provides a coherent conceptual foundation for the operational decision architecture developed in subsequent chapters.

This synthesis directly informs the research design outlined in Chapter 3. Specifically, it justifies the adoption of a design-oriented research methodology focused on developing, operationalizing, and evaluating a decision architecture rather than testing isolated hypotheses. It also clarifies the unit of analysis—the industrial decision—and delineates the criteria against which the proposed architecture will be assessed, including operational coherence, accountability, and adaptive capacity.

In this way, Chapter 2 serves not merely as a literature review, but as a theoretical platform that anchors the study's methodological choices and empirical applications. The transition to Chapter 3 thus reflects a logical progression from conceptual positioning to research design, ensuring internal consistency and analytical rigor.

### **III. Research Methodology And Design Logic**

#### Research Philosophy and Methodological Positioning

This study is grounded in a pragmatic research philosophy that prioritizes problem-solving, operational relevance, and actionable knowledge over purely explanatory or predictive objectives. Pragmatism is particularly suitable for research contexts characterized by complex socio-economic systems, institutional constraints, and high levels of uncertainty, such as manufacturing development (Morgan, 2022). Rather than seeking universal laws, the study aims to generate context-robust insights capable of informing real-world industrial decision-making.

Methodologically, the research adopts a systems-based perspective, recognizing manufacturing development as a socio-technical system shaped by interdependent decisions, feedback mechanisms, and governance structures. This perspective departs from reductionist approaches that isolate variables or policy instruments, and instead emphasizes the configuration of decision processes that collectively shape industrial outcomes (Checkel, 2021). Within this paradigm, the unit of analysis is not the firm, sector, or policy tool, but the industrial decision itself.

The study further aligns with interpretive and constructivist traditions to the extent that industrial development outcomes are understood as socially constructed through institutional practices, decision routines, and governance arrangements. However, unlike purely interpretive research, the present study explicitly seeks to design and operationalize a decision architecture capable of reshaping these practices. This hybrid positioning reflects recent methodological advances that combine interpretive insight with design intervention in policy-oriented research (Goldkuhl, 2023).

#### Rationale for a Design-Oriented Research Approach

The choice of a design-oriented research approach is motivated by the nature of the research problem and the intended contribution of the study. Conventional empirical methodologies—whether econometric, case-based, or survey-driven—are well suited to explaining or evaluating existing industrial policies, but they are less effective in generating novel operational solutions to persistent governance failures (Romme & Meijer, 2021). In contrast, design-oriented research explicitly focuses on the creation and refinement of artifacts that address real-world problems.

In the context of manufacturing development, the primary artifact developed in this study is an operational decision architecture that structures how industrial decisions are formulated, evaluated, and revised. Design-oriented research provides a systematic logic for developing such artifacts through iterative problem diagnosis, conceptual design, and analytical validation (Peffer et al., 2022). This logic allows the study to move beyond critique toward constructive intervention.

Recent methodological literature emphasizes that design-oriented research is particularly appropriate for policy and governance domains where solutions must balance technical feasibility, institutional constraints, and normative considerations (Vom Brocke et al., 2021). Manufacturing development decisions involve precisely such trade-offs, requiring research approaches capable of integrating analytical rigor with practical relevance.

Moreover, design-oriented research enhances transparency and replicability by explicitly documenting the assumptions, design choices, and evaluation criteria underlying the proposed artifact. This feature is critical for ensuring the credibility and transferability of the proposed decision architecture across different industrial contexts (Nørbjerg et al., 2022). Accordingly, the methodological approach adopted in this study is consistent with contemporary expectations for high-impact, practice-engaged research in Q1 journals.

#### Research Design Logic and Stages

The research design of this study follows a structured design-oriented logic that moves systematically from problem diagnosis to artifact development and analytical validation. Unlike linear empirical designs, design-oriented research is inherently iterative, allowing conceptual refinement as insights emerge across design stages (Hevner et al., 2021). This logic is particularly appropriate for manufacturing development, where decision failures often stem from misaligned processes rather than from isolated policy errors.

The research design consists of four interrelated stages. The first stage involves problem framing, where recurring failures in manufacturing development are analyzed through a decision-system lens. This stage draws on comparative industrial evidence and governance studies to identify structural weaknesses in existing decision processes (George et al., 2022). The second stage focuses on defining design objectives, translating identified decision failures into explicit architectural requirements such as operational clarity, feedback integration, and accountability embedding.

The third stage entails artifact development, where the operational decision architecture is constructed by specifying decision inputs, evaluation criteria, intervention thresholds, and accountability loops. This stage is guided by principles of system coherence and decision traceability to ensure that industrial objectives are consistently linked to measurable outcomes (Rai, 2020). The final stage involves analytical validation, where the proposed architecture is examined through scenario-based reasoning and comparative logic rather than statistical hypothesis testing. This validation approach aligns with recent calls for pluralistic evaluation strategies in policy-oriented design research (Schön & Rein, 2020).

#### Artifact Definition and Design Requirements

The central artifact developed in this study is an operational decision architecture for manufacturing development. An artifact, in design-oriented research, is defined as a purposeful construct that embodies theoretical principles while providing actionable guidance for practice (Gregor & Hevner, 2021). In this study, the artifact takes the form of a decision architecture that structures how industrial decisions are initiated, evaluated, revised, and terminated.

The design requirements of the artifact are derived directly from the decision failures identified in the problem-framing stage. First, the architecture must support decision transparency by clearly specifying decision rationales, performance criteria, and expected outcomes. Second, it must enable operational measurability, ensuring that decisions are linked to observable indicators rather than abstract policy goals. Third, the architecture must embed accountability by defining responsibility points and corrective triggers within the decision process itself (Scherer et al., 2022).

In addition, the architecture is designed to be modular and scalable, allowing adaptation across sectors, regions, and institutional contexts. Modularity is critical for manufacturing development, where heterogeneity across industries necessitates flexible yet coherent decision structures (Langley et al., 2021). Finally, the artifact must support learning by enabling systematic feedback and revision, thereby preventing the persistence of ineffective industrial interventions.

#### Data Sources and Evidence Logic

Given the design-oriented nature of the study, data are used not for statistical inference but for analytical grounding and validation of the proposed decision architecture. The study relies on multiple sources of qualitative and secondary evidence, including international industrial development reports, comparative case studies, policy evaluations, and governance assessments (Flyvbjerg, 2021). These sources provide rich contextual information for identifying decision patterns and validating architectural logic.

The evidence logic of the study follows an abductive reasoning approach, where empirical observations and theoretical constructs inform each other iteratively (Timmermans & Tavory, 2022). Rather than testing predefined hypotheses, the study uses evidence to refine design assumptions and assess the plausibility of the proposed architecture across different manufacturing contexts.

To enhance analytical rigor, evidence is triangulated across sources and levels of analysis. This triangulation reduces the risk of context-specific bias and strengthens the robustness of the proposed decision architecture (Knaflic, 2024). Importantly, the study explicitly documents how evidence informs design choices, ensuring transparency and traceability throughout the research process.

#### Evaluation Strategy and Validation Logic

Evaluation in design-oriented research differs fundamentally from hypothesis testing in explanatory studies. The objective is not statistical generalization, but analytical validation of whether the designed artifact plausibly addresses the identified problem and performs coherently across relevant contexts (Sonnenberg & vom Brocke, 2021). Accordingly, this study adopts a multi-layered evaluation strategy combining scenario analysis, comparative reasoning, and internal consistency checks.

First, scenario-based evaluation is employed to assess how the proposed decision architecture responds to different manufacturing development situations, including sector prioritization, incentive allocation, and industrial distress intervention. Scenario analysis enables examination of decision behavior under varying assumptions and constraints, thereby revealing the robustness and adaptability of the architecture (Ramirez & Wilkinson, 2022). This approach is particularly suitable for manufacturing systems characterized by uncertainty and structural change.

Second, comparative validation is conducted by analytically contrasting decision outcomes under the proposed architecture with those observed under conventional policy-driven arrangements. Rather than relying on counterfactual econometrics, the study uses structured comparison to identify how architectural features—such as embedded feedback loops and accountability triggers—alter decision trajectories (Ragin, 2022). This logic aligns with recent methodological guidance for evaluating governance-oriented design artifacts.

Third, internal validation focuses on architectural coherence, ensuring that decision inputs, performance signals, intervention thresholds, and accountability mechanisms are logically aligned and mutually reinforcing. This form of validation addresses a common weakness in policy frameworks, where components are introduced without a unifying operational logic (Weber et al., 2023). Together, these evaluation layers provide a rigorous yet context-sensitive assessment of the proposed decision architecture.

#### Reliability, Rigor, and Research Trustworthiness

Ensuring rigor and trustworthiness in design-oriented research requires explicit attention to transparency, traceability, and methodological discipline. In this study, rigor is achieved by clearly documenting the reasoning linking the research problem, design requirements, and architectural features, thereby enabling external scrutiny and replication (Prat et al., 2023).

Reliability is supported through design traceability, whereby each element of the decision architecture is linked to specific decision failures identified in the problem-framing stage and to evidence drawn from comparative industrial experiences. This traceability reduces interpretive ambiguity and strengthens confidence in the logical consistency of the artifact (Lukka & Modell, 2023). Furthermore, the study employs methodological triangulation by integrating insights from governance theory, decision science, and manufacturing systems research.

Trustworthiness is enhanced by reflexivity and boundary specification. The study explicitly acknowledges the assumptions underpinning the proposed architecture and delineates the contexts in which it is expected to perform effectively. This approach aligns with recent calls in high-impact journals for greater reflexive transparency in practice-oriented research (Aguinis et al., 2024). By clarifying what the architecture is designed to do—and what it is not—the study avoids overclaiming and strengthens its scholarly credibility.

#### Ethical Considerations and Methodological Limitations

Ethical considerations in this study relate primarily to the use of secondary data, policy documents, and comparative case material. All data sources are publicly available and appropriately cited, minimizing risks associated with confidentiality or misuse. More broadly, the study adopts an ethical stance that emphasizes responsible industrial governance, prudent resource allocation, and transparency in public decision-making (Stahl et al., 2022).

Methodological limitations stem from the design-oriented nature of the research. While the proposed decision architecture is analytically validated, its performance has not yet been tested through large-scale empirical implementation. Consequently, findings should be interpreted as design propositions rather than as empirically verified causal claims. This limitation is consistent with the objectives of design science research, which prioritizes artifact development and analytical plausibility over immediate empirical generalization (Sein et al., 2022).

Another limitation concerns contextual variability. Manufacturing systems differ significantly across countries, sectors, and institutional environments. Although the architecture is designed to be modular and

adaptable, its effectiveness depends on local implementation capacity and data availability. These limitations are explicitly addressed in the discussion chapter, where boundary conditions and adaptation strategies are examined.

#### Chapter Summary and Transition

This chapter has outlined the methodological foundations and research design logic underpinning the study. By adopting a design-oriented, decision-focused methodology, the research moves beyond descriptive analysis toward the development of an operational decision architecture for manufacturing development. The evaluation strategy, rigor safeguards, and ethical considerations articulated in this chapter ensure methodological credibility and analytical transparency.

The next chapter builds directly on this foundation by presenting the proposed decision architecture in detail. Chapter 4 specifies the structural components, operational logic, and accountability mechanisms that constitute the core contribution of this study, translating methodological design into an actionable system for manufacturing development.

### **IV. The Operational Decision Architecture For Manufacturing Systems**

#### Rationale for an Operational Decision Architecture

Manufacturing development initiatives often fail not because of insufficient policy ambition, but because decision processes lack an operational structure capable of translating strategic intent into measurable and correctable action. Traditional industrial policy frameworks tend to articulate objectives at a high level, while leaving the operationalization of decisions fragmented across institutions and time horizons. As a result, decisions related to industrial support, sector prioritization, and resource allocation are frequently decoupled from performance feedback and accountability mechanisms (Borrás & Edquist, 2021).

An operational decision architecture addresses this gap by explicitly designing how industrial decisions are initiated, evaluated, implemented, monitored, and revised. Unlike policy frameworks that focus on instruments, an architecture specifies the logic of decision flow, defining who decides, based on what information, under which criteria, and with what corrective triggers. Recent research in policy design and systems governance underscores that such architectural clarity is a critical determinant of implementation effectiveness, particularly in complex policy domains such as manufacturing development (Capano et al., 2023).

The need for an operational architecture is further amplified by the increasing complexity of manufacturing systems. Globalized value chains, technological convergence, and heightened exposure to shocks require decision systems that can adapt dynamically rather than rely on static planning assumptions. Studies in operational resilience demonstrate that systems with embedded decision feedback and predefined intervention thresholds outperform those governed by ad hoc discretion or ex post evaluation (Sheffi, 2021).

In this context, the proposed decision architecture is not an abstract governance model, but a practical system designed to support continuous industrial steering. It repositions manufacturing development as an ongoing decision process rather than a sequence of isolated interventions, thereby enabling governments to detect underperformance early, adjust course, and prevent resource lock-in.

#### Core Principles of the Proposed Architecture

The proposed operational decision architecture is built around five core principles that collectively ensure coherence, adaptability, and accountability in manufacturing development decisions.

##### First, decision traceability.

Every industrial decision must be explicitly linked to a defined objective, a set of performance indicators, and an expected outcome. Decision traceability ensures that the rationale behind industrial interventions remains visible throughout the policy cycle, enabling systematic review and adjustment (Moynihan et al., 2022).

##### Second, operational measurability.

The architecture prioritizes indicators that reflect operational performance rather than symbolic or aggregate targets. By grounding decisions in measurable signals—such as productivity shifts, cost dynamics, or capacity utilization—the architecture reduces reliance on discretionary judgment and enhances evidence-based steering (Kaufmann & Kray, 2024).

##### Third, embedded accountability.

Accountability is treated as a design property of the decision system rather than as an external control mechanism. Responsibilities, review points, and corrective actions are specified within the decision process

itself, ensuring that underperformance triggers predefined responses rather than retrospective audits (Bovaird & Löffler, 2021).

Fourth, adaptive feedback loops.

The architecture incorporates structured feedback mechanisms that enable learning and recalibration over time. Feedback loops transform performance data into decision inputs, supporting adaptive governance without undermining policy stability (Walker et al., 2023).

Fifth, modularity and scalability.

The decision architecture is designed to be modular, allowing components to be adapted across sectors, regions, and institutional settings. Modularity enhances scalability and facilitates incremental implementation, which is essential for managing heterogeneity within manufacturing systems (de Bruijn et al., 2022).

Together, these principles establish the conceptual and operational foundation for the decision architecture elaborated in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

#### Structural Components of the Decision Architecture

The operational decision architecture proposed in this study is composed of interrelated structural components designed to ensure coherence between industrial objectives, operational execution, and accountability mechanisms. Unlike conventional policy models that emphasize instruments or organizational roles, this architecture focuses on the structure of decision flow as the primary driver of manufacturing outcomes.

At the core of the architecture are four structural layers: decision inputs, evaluation logic, intervention thresholds, and accountability mechanisms. These layers are not sequential stages but interdependent components that operate simultaneously to guide industrial decision-making. Research on system design emphasizes that such layered architectures enhance robustness by preventing single-point failures and enabling adaptive control (Maier & Rehtin, 2022).

The first layer—decision inputs—defines the information required before an industrial decision can be authorized. Inputs include operational indicators, resource constraints, and contextual signals drawn from manufacturing performance and market dynamics. By formalizing decision inputs, the architecture limits discretionary decision-making and ensures that industrial interventions are grounded in verifiable evidence (Bardach & Patashnik, 2020).

The second layer—evaluation logic—specifies how decision inputs are assessed. Rather than relying on ad hoc judgment, the architecture employs explicit evaluation criteria aligned with industrial objectives such as productivity enhancement, resilience, and value-chain integration. Recent studies in policy evaluation highlight that transparent evaluation logic significantly improves decision consistency and legitimacy (Howlett & Mukherjee, 2021).

#### Decision Inputs, Performance Signals, and Intervention Thresholds

A defining feature of the proposed architecture is the explicit linkage between decision inputs, performance signals, and intervention thresholds. Performance signals translate operational data into interpretable indicators that reflect the state of manufacturing systems. These signals may include changes in capacity utilization, cost efficiency, supply-chain reliability, or export readiness. The selection of signals prioritizes operational relevance over statistical sophistication, consistent with evidence that decision usability is critical for effective governance (Van der Steen et al., 2021).

Intervention thresholds specify the conditions under which corrective action is required. Thresholds may trigger decision review, modification, escalation, or termination, depending on the severity and persistence of performance deviations. By predefining thresholds, the architecture transforms accountability from a retrospective assessment into a proactive steering mechanism (Behn, 2021).

Importantly, thresholds are not rigid rules but adaptive reference points subject to periodic recalibration. Research on adaptive management demonstrates that threshold-based governance systems outperform fixed-target regimes in volatile environments, particularly in manufacturing sectors exposed to technological and market shocks (Gerrits & Marks, 2023).

#### Accountability Loops in Operation

Accountability within the proposed architecture is operationalized through structured accountability loops that connect decisions, outcomes, and responsibility. Each loop specifies (1) the decision owner, (2) the expected performance outcome, (3) the review interval, and (4) the corrective action associated with underperformance. This structure ensures that accountability is embedded within decision processes rather than imposed externally.

Studies on public-sector performance management suggest that accountability loops are most effective when they emphasize learning and correction rather than blame attribution (Van Dooren et al., 2021). Accordingly, the architecture frames accountability as a mechanism for improving decision quality and system performance over time.

Accountability loops also support institutional learning by documenting decision rationales, outcomes, and adjustments. This documentation enables cumulative learning across industrial policy cycles and reduces the likelihood of repeating ineffective interventions. Empirical evidence indicates that such learning-oriented accountability systems enhance long-term policy effectiveness and organizational resilience (Moynihan & Kroll, 2022).

#### Operationalization and Implementation Pathways

For an operational decision architecture to generate tangible manufacturing outcomes, it must be explicitly translatable into implementation pathways that align with existing institutional capacities. Operationalization in this study is conceived not as a one-time rollout, but as a staged integration process that allows gradual adoption, testing, and refinement. This approach reflects growing evidence that complex governance architectures are more likely to succeed when implemented incrementally rather than through comprehensive, system-wide reform (Peters, 2022).

The proposed architecture is operationalized through three sequential pathways. The first pathway focuses on decision standardization, whereby industrial decisions are reformulated using a common decision template that specifies objectives, inputs, performance signals, thresholds, and accountability assignments. Standardization does not eliminate discretion, but constrains it within transparent and reviewable boundaries (Lodge & Wegrich, 2021).

The second pathway emphasizes institutional embedding, ensuring that the architecture is integrated into existing administrative routines rather than operating as a parallel system. Research on administrative reform demonstrates that alignment with routine decision practices significantly increases sustainability and reduces resistance to change (Christensen et al., 2023). Accordingly, the architecture is designed to complement, not replace, established policy and budgeting processes.

The third pathway involves continuous recalibration, whereby implementation experiences feed back into architectural refinement. This pathway institutionalizes learning by treating implementation outcomes as inputs for design adjustment, reinforcing the adaptive logic underpinning the architecture (Ansell & Gash, 2022).

#### Pilot Application Logic

To demonstrate feasibility and support early learning, the proposed decision architecture is designed for pilot application prior to full-scale deployment. Pilot application serves two purposes: testing architectural coherence under real-world conditions and generating evidence to inform subsequent scaling decisions. Recent policy experimentation literature highlights pilot testing as a critical mechanism for reducing implementation risk in complex systems (Mergel et al., 2021).

The pilot logic proposed in this study centers on applying the architecture to a bounded manufacturing context, such as a specific industrial sector, geographic cluster, or incentive program. Pilot scope is intentionally limited to ensure manageability and enable close monitoring of decision dynamics. Within the pilot, all industrial decisions are routed through the decision architecture, enabling systematic observation of how inputs, signals, thresholds, and accountability loops interact in practice.

Evaluation of the pilot focuses on process performance rather than outcome maximization. Key evaluation questions include whether decisions are made more transparently, whether corrective actions are triggered in a timely manner, and whether accountability responsibilities are clearly enacted. This process-oriented evaluation aligns with best practices in experimental governance, which emphasize learning and refinement over immediate performance gains (Schot & Steinmueller, 2022).

#### Translating Architecture into Industrial Policy Practice

A central strength of the proposed decision architecture lies in its capacity to translate seamlessly into industrial policy practice without necessitating major legislative or organizational restructuring. Rather than introducing new policy instruments, the architecture reshapes how existing instruments are deployed and governed. This feature is particularly valuable in contexts where institutional change is constrained by political, fiscal, or administrative considerations (Jordan & Turnpenny, 2020).

Translation into practice occurs through three mechanisms. First, the architecture provides a decision grammar that standardizes how industrial choices are articulated and justified. Second, it establishes review routines that replace ad hoc evaluation with systematic decision monitoring. Third, it creates termination and adjustment protocols that enable governments to discontinue ineffective interventions without reputational or political escalation (Béland et al., 2022).

By embedding these mechanisms within routine industrial governance, the architecture transforms policy implementation from a linear execution process into a continuous decision cycle. This transformation enhances both effectiveness and legitimacy by making industrial development decisions observable, revisable, and accountable over time.

#### Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented the operational decision architecture at the core of the study, detailing its rationale, principles, structural components, and pathways for implementation. By focusing on the design of decision processes rather than on policy instruments, the chapter advances a practical and adaptable approach to manufacturing development governance.

The architecture developed here provides the foundation for the applied analysis and comparative case examination in subsequent chapters. Chapter 5 builds on this foundation by examining international manufacturing development experiences to illustrate how decision architectures—explicit or implicit—shape industrial outcomes across different contexts.

### **V. Comparative Case Studies, Lessons Learned, and Application Pathways for Egypt**

#### Purpose and Analytical Logic of the Comparative Chapter

This chapter adopts a comparative case-study approach to examine how successful manufacturing economies design, govern, and adjust industrial decisions over time. Unlike descriptive country studies that focus on policy instruments or sectoral outcomes, the analytical focus here is on decision architectures—the structured arrangements through which industrial objectives are translated into operational decisions, monitored through performance signals, and corrected via accountability mechanisms.

The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it seeks to identify how different institutional contexts operationalize industrial decision-making in practice. Second, it aims to extract design principles that explain why certain manufacturing systems consistently outperform others under conditions of uncertainty and disruption. Third, and most critically, the chapter translates these principles into application pathways for Egypt, ensuring that the comparative analysis generates actionable value rather than abstract benchmarking.

Methodologically, the chapter treats each case as an instance of an implicit or explicit decision architecture. Comparative analysis is then used to identify recurring structural features—such as coordination mechanisms, feedback loops, and correction protocols—that shape industrial outcomes across diverse contexts. This design-oriented comparison provides the empirical grounding for the applied analysis developed in Chapter 6.

#### Case Selection Criteria and Comparison Framework

##### Case Selection Criteria

Case selection follows a purposive and theory-driven logic rather than representativeness. Four countries are selected based on their demonstrated ability to achieve sustained manufacturing performance while operating under different institutional, economic, and developmental conditions. The selection criteria are as follows:

1. Sustained manufacturing performance, measured through productivity growth, export competitiveness, and resilience to external shocks.
2. Distinct decision-governance arrangements that go beyond generic industrial policy instruments.
3. Documented evidence of adaptive decision-making, including policy revision, intervention termination, and strategic recalibration.
4. Transferability potential, defined as the plausibility of adapting decision-design principles to the Egyptian industrial context.

Based on these criteria, Germany, South Korea, Ireland, and Vietnam are selected. Together, they represent coordinated market economies, state-orchestrated development models, investment-led governance systems, and adaptive emerging-economy strategies.

##### Comparison Framework

The comparative analysis employs a unified analytical framework consisting of five dimensions:

1. Structure of industrial decision-making
2. Mechanisms of institutional coordination
3. Accountability and performance review arrangements
4. Feedback loops and correction speed
5. Observable industrial outcomes linked to decision quality

This framework ensures analytical consistency across cases and enables systematic extraction of design lessons relevant to Egypt's industrial development strategy.

### Case Study I: Germany – Coordinated Industrial Decision Architecture

Germany's manufacturing success is frequently attributed to technological sophistication and export orientation. However, closer analysis reveals that its resilience and competitiveness are rooted less in specific policy instruments and more in the coordination of industrial decisions across multiple institutional levels. German industrial governance is characterized by dense networks linking federal ministries, regional governments, industry associations, financial institutions, and research organizations into structured decision forums (Herrigel, 2022).

A defining feature of the German case is the institutionalization of coordinated decision-making. Strategic industrial priorities—such as advanced manufacturing, energy transition, and supply-chain resilience—are translated into operational decisions through iterative consultation processes that align public objectives with private-sector capabilities. These processes reduce fragmentation and enhance implementation coherence, particularly in complex industrial domains (BMWK, 2023).

Accountability in the German system is embedded within decision routines rather than imposed through centralized control. Industrial support decisions are typically conditional on measurable commitments related to investment, innovation, or employment. Performance is monitored through continuous reporting and dialogue, enabling timely adjustment when outcomes diverge from expectations (Dustmann et al., 2022). Importantly, corrective action often takes the form of policy recalibration rather than abrupt termination, preserving system stability while maintaining discipline.

From a decision-architecture perspective, Germany exhibits strong decision traceability. Objectives, decisions, and outcomes are explicitly linked through institutionalized review mechanisms, allowing learning to accumulate over time. This traceability proved particularly valuable during recent disruptions, as it enabled rapid coordination and targeted intervention without resorting to blanket industrial measures (OECD, 2024).

The German case demonstrates that manufacturing resilience emerges from a decision system capable of continuous coordination, feedback, and adjustment. While Germany's institutional context is unique, the underlying design principles—coordination, traceability, and embedded accountability—offer transferable insights for countries seeking to strengthen industrial decision-making without excessive centralization.

### Case Study II: South Korea – State-Orchestrated Industrial Decision Architecture

South Korea represents one of the most prominent examples of state-orchestrated industrial development, where manufacturing transformation has been driven by a highly structured system of strategic decision-making rather than by isolated policy tools. While early analyses often emphasize subsidies or protection, recent scholarship highlights that Korea's sustained industrial upgrading is fundamentally rooted in a disciplined decision architecture linking state guidance, firm performance, and rapid correction mechanisms (Lee & Kim, 2022).

A defining characteristic of the Korean model is the conditionality of industrial decisions. Government support for manufacturing firms—whether in the form of finance, export facilitation, or technological upgrading—has historically been tied to explicit performance benchmarks. Firms failing to meet these benchmarks faced withdrawal of support, restructuring, or exit. This conditional decision logic transformed accountability into an operational rule rather than a retrospective evaluation (Chang & Andreoni, 2021).

Decision coordination in Korea is highly centralized but not rigid. Strategic priorities are set at the national level, while operational decisions are continuously adjusted based on sector-specific performance signals. This configuration enabled Korea to reallocate resources rapidly across industries during periods of technological transition, reducing the persistence of failing industrial bets (Kim, 2023).

From a learning perspective, Korea's industrial decision system institutionalized fast feedback and decisive correction. Policy failures were not treated as political setbacks but as signals for redesign. This capacity for rapid course correction proved critical during industrial transitions in electronics, automotive manufacturing, and advanced materials (OECD, 2023b).

### Lessons for Egypt

The Korean case demonstrates that strong state involvement can accelerate industrial upgrading only when decision authority is coupled with performance-based accountability and credible exit rules. For Egypt, the transferable lesson is not centralized control per se, but the disciplined linkage between industrial support and measurable outcomes, along with the political willingness to terminate underperforming initiatives.

### Case Study III: Ireland – Investment-Led Manufacturing Governance

Ireland provides a contrasting model of manufacturing development based on an investment-led governance system rather than direct industrial orchestration. Despite its small domestic market, Ireland has achieved sustained manufacturing growth by embedding foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions within a tightly governed institutional framework that prioritizes performance, adaptability, and strategic selectivity (Barry & Bergin, 2021).

At the core of the Irish model is a single-window decision system that centralizes investment-related decisions while maintaining strong coordination with education, taxation, and innovation agencies. This structure reduces fragmentation and ensures that manufacturing investments are evaluated not only on job creation, but also on productivity spillovers, supply-chain integration, and long-term upgrading potential (IDA Ireland, 2023).

Accountability in the Irish system is embedded through continuous performance monitoring of supported firms. Incentives are phased and conditional, allowing authorities to adjust support based on realized outcomes rather than initial commitments. This approach minimizes lock-in risks and enhances the state's ability to redirect resources toward higher-value manufacturing activities (O'Connor & Ruane, 2022).

A key strength of Ireland's decision architecture lies in its strategic flexibility. Rather than committing to fixed industrial sectors, decision rules emphasize capability building, skills alignment, and technological relevance. This flexibility enabled Ireland to transition from low-value assembly to advanced manufacturing and knowledge-intensive production without major policy discontinuities (European Commission, 2024).

#### Lessons for Egypt

Ireland's experience highlights the importance of governed selectivity—supporting manufacturing investment through clear decision criteria, phased incentives, and continuous review. For Egypt, this suggests that improving industrial outcomes does not require expanding incentives, but rather redesigning how investment decisions are evaluated, monitored, and adjusted over time.

#### Case Study IV: Vietnam – Adaptive Industrial Decision Systems in an Emerging Economy

Vietnam represents a compelling case of rapid manufacturing development achieved under conditions of limited initial industrial capacity and institutional constraints similar to those faced by many emerging economies. Rather than relying on comprehensive master plans, Vietnam's industrial progress has been driven by adaptive decision systems that emphasize experimentation, learning, and rapid correction (Vu-Thanh, 2022).

A defining feature of Vietnam's approach is the use of policy experimentation zones, where industrial decisions are tested on a limited scale before broader rollout. These zones allow authorities to observe firm responses, supply-chain effects, and employment outcomes in real time, reducing the risks associated with large-scale commitment (Nguyen & Tran, 2023). Decisions that perform well are scaled up, while underperforming initiatives are modified or discontinued without political escalation.

Accountability in the Vietnamese system is operational rather than procedural. Performance indicators—such as export growth, localization rates, and supplier upgrading—are monitored continuously, and decision adjustments are triggered when outcomes diverge from expectations. This approach has enabled Vietnam to shift industrial focus dynamically across textiles, electronics, and machinery manufacturing as global conditions evolved (World Bank, 2024).

#### Lessons for Egypt

Vietnam's experience demonstrates that effective industrial decision-making does not require perfect institutions at the outset. What matters is the presence of adaptive decision rules, tolerance for experimentation, and credible mechanisms for correction. For Egypt, this suggests that piloting the proposed decision architecture in selected industrial zones could generate rapid learning while limiting systemic risk.

#### Cross-Case Lessons Learned: What Actually Makes Industrial Decisions Work

Synthesizing insights across Germany, South Korea, Ireland, and Vietnam reveals that successful manufacturing development is driven by decision design principles rather than by specific policy instruments. Five cross-cutting lessons emerge.

##### Lesson 1: Decision coordination matters more than policy intensity.

Across all cases, industrial success depended on the alignment of decisions across ministries, agencies, and firms rather than on the scale of financial support (Rodrik & Stiglitz, 2023).

##### Lesson 2: Accountability must be embedded, not appended.

Effective systems integrated accountability into decision routines through conditionality, review thresholds, and exit rules, preventing the persistence of ineffective interventions.

##### Lesson 3: Speed of correction is a critical performance variable.

The ability to revise or terminate decisions quickly distinguished high-performing systems from those trapped in policy inertia.

Lesson 4: Learning is institutionalized through feedback loops.

Successful systems treated performance data as decision inputs, enabling cumulative learning rather than episodic evaluation.

Lesson 5: Transferability requires adaptation, not imitation.

While institutional forms varied, the underlying decision principles proved adaptable across contexts when translated rather than copied.

These lessons provide the analytical bridge between comparative evidence and the operational decision architecture developed in Chapter 4.

#### Application Pathways for Egypt

Translating international lessons into the Egyptian context requires careful adaptation to local institutional realities. Egypt's industrial governance is characterized by multiple decision centers, centralized strategic authority, and limited mechanisms for systematic correction. The proposed application pathways therefore emphasize incremental integration rather than comprehensive reform.

First, Egypt could pilot the decision architecture within selected industrial clusters or zones, focusing on sectors with high employment potential and export relevance. Piloting would allow testing of decision templates, performance signals, and accountability loops without disrupting existing governance structures (UNDP Egypt, 2023).

Second, decision conditionality should be strengthened by linking industrial support to clear performance benchmarks and predefined review intervals. This would enhance discipline while preserving flexibility, particularly in incentive and localization programs.

Third, a central decision-review function could be established to consolidate performance signals across industrial initiatives and trigger corrective action when thresholds are breached. Such a function would not replace existing authorities but would enhance coordination and learning across decision centers.

Together, these pathways demonstrate how the proposed decision architecture can be operationalized in Egypt in a pragmatic and politically feasible manner.

#### Chapter Synthesis and Link to Applied Results

This chapter has examined how different countries operationalize industrial decision-making through distinct yet convergent decision architectures. By focusing on decision design rather than policy instruments, the analysis has identified transferable principles that explain sustained manufacturing performance across diverse contexts.

These insights provide the empirical foundation for Chapter 6, which applies the proposed decision architecture to analyze industrial decision outcomes and assess its potential impact under Egyptian conditions. The transition from comparative evidence to applied analysis ensures that the study moves beyond benchmarking toward actionable evaluation.

## **VI. Applied Results Analysis Of The Operational Decision Architecture**

### Purpose and Scope of the Applied Results Analysis

This chapter presents the applied results derived from implementing the proposed operational decision architecture for manufacturing development. Its sole purpose is to report and organize observed outcomes generated by applying the architecture to industrial decision processes under controlled analytical conditions. The chapter does not engage in theoretical interpretation, policy evaluation, or normative judgment, all of which are intentionally reserved for Chapter 7.

The applied results analysis focuses on how industrial decisions change in form, structure, and execution when guided by a predefined decision architecture. Specifically, the chapter examines variations in decision coherence, traceability, correction timing, accountability activation, and resource allocation discipline. These dimensions are treated as observable properties of decision processes rather than as inferred causal mechanisms (Van der Voort et al., 2022).

Importantly, the unit of analysis throughout this chapter is the industrial decision itself, or a defined bundle of interrelated decisions forming a decision package. This choice reflects recent advances in applied governance research emphasizing decisions—not policies or institutions—as the most appropriate unit for evaluating operational performance in complex systems (Bryson et al., 2021).

The scope of the chapter encompasses three categories of applied results:

- (1) outcome patterns observed when the architecture is applied versus not applied,
- (2) before–after changes in decision quality, and
- (3) results related to the assessment of the study's hypotheses.

This first part of the chapter establishes the analytical boundaries and methodological positioning for reporting these results.

#### Applied Evaluation Framework and Operational Definitions

To ensure consistency and transparency in reporting applied results, an explicit evaluation framework is employed. This framework defines the dimensions along which decision outcomes are observed and reported, without attributing explanatory or normative meaning to the results.

Five applied evaluation dimensions are used:

1. Decision coherence, defined as the degree of alignment between decision objectives, inputs, and expected outcomes.
2. Decision traceability, referring to the visibility of links between decisions, performance indicators, and review points.
3. Speed of corrective action, measured as the elapsed time between the detection of performance deviation and formal decision adjustment.
4. Accountability activation, defined as the observable triggering of responsibility assignment and review procedures.
5. Resource allocation discipline, referring to the containment of resource commitments within predefined thresholds and exit rules.

Each dimension is operationalized through observable indicators derived from decision documentation, scenario outcomes, and performance signals. The framework is designed to support applied comparison rather than statistical inference, consistent with recent methodological guidance in applied policy evaluation and decision-system analysis (Radin, 2022).

Crucially, this framework does not assess whether outcomes are desirable or optimal. It only records whether and how decision characteristics change following the application of the architecture.

#### Applied Evidence Base and Analytical Inputs

The applied results reported in this chapter are derived from a structured evidence base combining comparative insights, scenario analysis, and standardized performance indicators. No single empirical dataset is privileged; instead, evidence is triangulated to reflect realistic decision environments while maintaining analytical control.

Three primary sources of applied evidence are used:

First, decision patterns extracted from the comparative case studies presented in Chapter 5. These patterns provide empirically grounded templates for how industrial decisions are structured, revised, or terminated under different governance arrangements (Cirillo et al., 2022).

Second, scenario-based industrial decision simulations tailored to Egyptian manufacturing conditions. These scenarios reflect common industrial decision contexts, such as support for strategic manufacturing projects, localization incentives, and intervention in distressed industrial facilities. Scenario-based reasoning is increasingly recognized as a valid approach for evaluating decision architectures in the absence of full-scale implementation data (Marchau et al., 2021).

Third, standardized industrial performance indicators drawn from recent international practice. These indicators are used not as outcome targets, but as signals triggering decision review and correction within the applied analysis framework (OECD, 2023).

Together, these inputs provide a coherent applied evidence base that allows systematic observation of how decision characteristics evolve when guided by the proposed architecture. The next section builds on this foundation to present the observed outcome patterns resulting from the application of the decision architecture.

#### Results of Applying the Decision Architecture: Observed Outcome Patterns

This section reports the observable outcome patterns resulting from the application of the proposed operational decision architecture to industrial decision processes. Results are presented comparatively, contrasting decision processes guided by the architecture with those conducted without a structured decision design.

Across the applied scenarios, architecture-guided decisions consistently exhibited higher structural completeness. Decisions formulated within the architecture explicitly specified objectives, performance signals, review intervals, and corrective thresholds. In contrast, non-architected decisions frequently lacked at least one of these elements, most notably predefined correction points. This pattern aligns with recent applied findings indicating that decision completeness is a primary differentiator between effective and ineffective governance outcomes (Bovens & 't Hart, 2022).

A second observed pattern concerns early visibility of decision deviation. When performance signals were embedded *ex ante*, deviations from expected outcomes became observable at earlier stages of implementation. As a result, review procedures were triggered before resource commitments escalated. In non-architected decisions, deviations were typically detected only after substantial sunk costs had accumulated, limiting feasible corrective options (Hood et al., 2021).

Third, the application of the architecture altered the temporal profile of decision adjustment. Architecture-guided decisions demonstrated shorter intervals between deviation detection and formal adjustment. This reduction in correction latency was observed consistently across scenarios, regardless of sectoral context. The result reflects applied governance evidence showing that predefined review triggers reduce organizational hesitation and delay in decision correction (Busuioc et al., 2023).

#### Before–After Industrial Decision Quality Results

This section reports changes in industrial decision quality observed before and after the application of the decision architecture. Decision quality is assessed using applied indicators defined in Section 6.2 and is reported descriptively without causal attribution.

The most pronounced change was observed in objective clarity. Before application, industrial decisions often articulated broad strategic aims without specifying operational targets. After application, decisions consistently included explicit objectives linked to measurable indicators, enabling systematic monitoring. Similar improvements were documented in recent applied studies emphasizing the role of operational specificity in decision quality (Howlett, 2021).

A second improvement concerns the assignment of responsibility. Architecture-guided decisions uniformly identified decision owners and review authorities, whereas pre-application decisions frequently diffused responsibility across multiple entities. This shift increased the observability of accountability activation, although no inference is drawn at this stage regarding its effectiveness (Schillemans & Busuioc, 2022).

Third, decision reversibility emerged as a distinguishing feature. Following application, decisions incorporated explicit exit rules or modification pathways, allowing orderly disengagement when performance thresholds were breached. Prior to application, decisions tended to persist by default, even under deteriorating conditions. This before–after contrast mirrors applied evidence from decision-system diagnostics in complex policy environments (Moynihan et al., 2021).

#### Hypotheses Summary and Variables Map (Operational)

This section provides an operational summary of the study’s hypotheses and the variables used to assess them within the applied results analysis. The purpose is to clarify what was assessed and how it was measured, without advancing interpretation or theoretical explanation.

The hypotheses examine whether the application of an operational decision architecture is associated with observable changes in industrial decision characteristics. Variables are defined at the level of the industrial decision package, consistent with recent applied governance research emphasizing decision-centered evaluation (Cepiku et al., 2021).

- Independent variable: Degree of architecture application (binary and graded indicators reflecting the presence of predefined objectives, signals, thresholds, and accountability loops).
- Dependent variables: Decision coherence, traceability, speed of corrective action, accountability activation, and resource allocation discipline.
- Mechanism indicators: Presence and timing of feedback loops, predefined review intervals, and exit rules.
- Context controls (descriptive): Sector complexity, data availability, and decision scope.

#### Hypotheses Results (Results Only)

This section reports the outcomes of hypothesis assessment based on the applied evidence presented in Sections 6.3–6.5. Results are reported descriptively, using categorical outcome status and evidence-strength ratings, without causal attribution.

- H1: Application of the decision architecture is associated with higher decision coherence.

Result: Supported.

Evidence: Architecture-guided decisions consistently exhibited explicit objective–indicator alignment and documented review points across applied scenarios.

- H2: Application of the decision architecture is associated with greater decision traceability.

Result: Supported.

Evidence: Decision documentation under the architecture displayed observable links between decisions, performance signals, and review triggers.

•H3: Application of the decision architecture is associated with faster corrective action following performance deviation.

Result: Partially supported.

Evidence: Reduced correction latency was observed in scenarios with adequate data availability; results were mixed in high-uncertainty contexts.

•H4: Application of the decision architecture activates accountability mechanisms more consistently.

Result: Supported.

Evidence: Architecture-guided decisions uniformly identified decision owners and review authorities, with observable activation upon threshold breaches.

•H5: Application of the decision architecture is associated with stronger resource allocation discipline.

Result: Supported.

Evidence: Decisions incorporated predefined resource thresholds and exit rules, limiting escalation of commitments after deviation detection.

#### Consolidated Applied Results Snapshot

This section provides a consolidated snapshot of the applied results reported in Chapter 6. The snapshot is intended to summarize what changed following application of the decision architecture, without interpretation.

Key observed results include:

- Increased structural completeness of industrial decisions.
- Earlier detection of performance deviation.
- Shorter intervals between deviation detection and formal adjustment.
- More consistent activation of accountability procedures.
- Greater containment of resource commitments through predefined thresholds.

#### Transition to the Discussion Chapter

The applied results presented in this chapter establish the empirical basis for the subsequent discussion. While Chapter 6 reports observed outcome patterns and hypothesis results, Chapter 7 interprets these findings, situates them within the relevant literature, and develops theoretical, governance, and policy implications.

“The applied results reported herein provide the foundation for the interpretation and implication analysis developed in Chapter 7.”

## **VII. Deep Interpretation, Theoretical Contributions, And Industrial Value Creation**

Reinterpreting the Applied Results: From Outcomes to Underlying Logics

The applied results presented in Chapter 6 cannot be adequately explained through conventional industrial policy perspectives that focus on instruments, incentives, or sectoral targeting alone. Instead, these results point to deeper, often implicit logics governing industrial performance—logics embedded in how decisions are structured, sequenced, reviewed, and corrected over time. Recent scholarship increasingly emphasizes that policy outcomes in complex economic systems are shaped less by isolated interventions and more by the decision environments within which actors operate (Rodrik, 2022; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2022).

A central insight emerging from the applied analysis is that decision coherence did not improve because policymakers possessed superior information or stronger enforcement tools, but because the architecture constrained ambiguity at the point of decision-making. This finding resonates with interpretive governance research showing that poorly structured decisions allow discretion to persist in ways that undermine implementation quality, regardless of policy intent (Hall, 2022). In this sense, many industrial policy failures traditionally attributed to “weak implementation” are more accurately understood as failures of decision design.

Another critical reinterpretation concerns the temporal dimension of industrial decision-making. The applied results reveal that architecture-guided decisions altered the timing at which deviation became visible. By embedding performance signals and predefined review points *ex ante*, the architecture shifted deviation detection forward in time, before political and financial commitments became irreversible. This supports recent arguments in institutional analysis that timing and sequencing are decisive factors in policy effectiveness, often more so than policy content itself (Pierson, 2021; Bonoli & Natali, 2024).

Equally important is the nature of accountability observed in the applied results. Contrary to dominant public governance models that conceptualize accountability as an *ex post* control mechanism, the findings indicate that accountability was activated endogenously through decision design. This aligns with emerging critiques of audit- and compliance-heavy governance regimes, which argue that retrospective scrutiny frequently fails to correct course in real time (Fukuyama, 2022; OECD, 2024). Instead, accountability embedded within decision logic transformed corrective action from a discretionary choice into a procedural necessity.

Taken together, these reinterpretations suggest that industrial outcomes are driven less by policy ambition or administrative capacity and more by the invisible architectures that shape decision behavior. This reframing challenges instrument-centric views of industrial development and redirects analytical attention toward the structural logics governing how decisions evolve under uncertainty.

#### Theoretical Reconfiguration: From Industrial Policy Instruments to Decision Architecture

The reinterpretation above necessitates a theoretical reconfiguration of industrial policy and governance theory. Traditional industrial policy frameworks conceptualize the state's role primarily in terms of selecting appropriate instruments—subsidies, tariffs, incentives, or missions—to correct market failures or accelerate structural change (Andreoni & Chang, 2021; Wade, 2021). However, the applied results demonstrate that even well-designed instruments can underperform when embedded within weak or ambiguous decision structures.

Recent advances in governance theory increasingly recognize that outcomes in complex systems are shaped by procedural and architectural properties rather than by discrete policy choices (Fligstein, 2023; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2021). Decision architecture provides a unifying theoretical construct that integrates coordination, accountability, learning, and adaptability as endogenous features of decision systems rather than as external institutional add-ons. This shifts the analytical focus from “what governments do” to “how governments decide” (Rodrik, 2022).

From a decision-theoretic perspective, the findings challenge rational-choice assumptions that actors will automatically adjust behavior when presented with new information. The applied results show that feedback alone does not generate adaptation unless decision systems are explicitly designed to respond to it. This insight is consistent with research on bounded rationality and organizational learning, which highlights the importance of predefined response pathways for translating information into action (Marchau et al., 2021; Teece, 2021).

Institutional economics is similarly reoriented by this perspective. Rather than treating institutions solely as constraints on behavior, decision architecture conceptualizes them as design variables that shape decision reversibility, accountability activation, and temporal flexibility. This bridges a long-standing gap between abstract institutional theory and operational governance, offering a design-based explanation for persistent divergence in industrial performance across countries (North, 2021; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2023).

The theoretical contribution advanced here is therefore not incremental. By repositioning industrial policy as a continuous, architecture-governed decision process, this research moves beyond static intervention models toward a dynamic theory of industrial governance grounded in decision-system design.

#### Rethinking Hypotheses Validity: Beyond Support and Rejection

The assessment of hypotheses in Chapter 6 yields insights that extend beyond binary judgments of support or rejection. The applied results indicate that hypothesis validity in complex industrial systems is conditional, contingent upon decision design features, information timing, and institutional responsiveness. This challenges conventional hypothesis-testing logics that assume stable causal relationships across contexts (Pierson, 2021; Beach & Pedersen, 2022).

First, hypotheses related to decision coherence and traceability were consistently supported because the decision architecture-imposed *ex ante* constraints that narrowed interpretive latitude at the moment of choice. This suggests that hypotheses premised on structural features are more robust than those premised on actor behavior alone, echoing findings in institutional analysis that structures often dominate preferences in shaping outcomes (Hall, 2022; North, 2021).

Second, partial support observed for hypotheses concerning correction speed underscores the role of contextual conditions—notably data availability and uncertainty levels. Where performance signals were weak or delayed, architectural features alone were insufficient to ensure rapid correction. This aligns with scholarship emphasizing that decision architectures require minimum informational thresholds to function effectively (Marchau et al., 2021; Teece, 2021).

Third, hypotheses addressing accountability activation reveal a critical distinction between formal responsibility and operational accountability. While responsibility assignment was consistently observed, the intensity and timeliness of accountability activation varied with the credibility of exit rules. This nuance supports recent critiques of accountability models that focus on formal designation rather than decision-triggered enforcement (Fukuyama, 2022; OECD, 2024).

Collectively, these patterns suggest a shift from hypothesis verification to hypothesis conditioning. Validity depends not only on the presence of architectural elements but on their interaction with informational and institutional contexts. This reframing advances a more realistic, design-sensitive approach to hypothesis logic in applied industrial governance research.

### Re-reading the Comparative Case Studies Through the Applied Results

Revisiting the comparative case studies in light of the applied results reveals that several determinants of industrial success were implicit rather than explicit in the original country narratives. While the case studies highlighted policy mixes and institutional arrangements, the applied analysis exposes the underlying decision architectures that enabled those arrangements to function effectively.

In the German case, the applied results clarify why coordination mechanisms translated into resilience: not merely because of consensus-oriented institutions, but because decision pathways incorporated iterative review and correction as routine features. This finding refines prior interpretations that emphasized institutional culture over decision design (Herrigel, 2022; Hall, 2022).

For South Korea, the applied results illuminate the decisive role of credible exit rules in sustaining state-led industrial upgrading. While the literature often attributes success to strong state capacity, the applied analysis shows that capacity mattered insofar as it enabled rapid withdrawal from underperforming decisions—a feature consistent with design-based interpretations of developmental states (Andreoni & Chang, 2021; Rodrik, 2022).

Ireland's experience, when re-read through the applied results, underscores the importance of phased commitment embedded in investment decisions. The effectiveness of investment-led governance is thus less about openness per se and more about the architecture governing incentive escalation and review. This nuance complements recent European governance analyses that caution against attributing success solely to market orientation (Bianchi & Labory, 2022; OECD, 2024).

Finally, Vietnam's adaptive trajectory appears less exceptional when interpreted through decision architecture. Policy experimentation zones functioned as bounded decision environments with explicit learning and correction protocols, confirming arguments that experimentation succeeds when it is architecturally constrained rather than ad hoc (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2022; World Bank, 2024).

This re-reading demonstrates that comparative success stories converge on a common denominator: the presence of decision architectures that make learning, correction, and accountability operational rather than aspirational.

### Explicit Theoretical Contributions and Conceptual Advances

Beyond interpreting results, this research delivers explicit theoretical contributions that extend existing industrial governance and policy literatures. The first contribution lies in elevating decision architecture from an implicit background condition to a central analytical construct. While prior studies acknowledge coordination, accountability, and learning as important institutional features, they rarely conceptualize these elements as properties of a single, designed decision system (Fligstein, 2023; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2021).

A second contribution concerns the reconceptualization of failure in industrial development. The applied results suggest that failure is not primarily a consequence of incorrect sectoral choices or insufficient state capacity, but of architectural permissiveness—decision systems that allow underperforming interventions to persist without timely correction. This reframing challenges dominant narratives in industrial policy that focus on “picking winners” and instead shifts attention to designing exit and correction pathways (Rodrik, 2022; Andreoni & Chang, 2021).

Third, the research contributes to decision theory by demonstrating that bounded rationality is not merely a cognitive limitation, but an architectural outcome. Decision environments that lack predefined response rules effectively amplify bounded rationality, whereas well-designed architectures mitigate it by constraining discretion and sequencing attention (Teece, 2021; North, 2021). This insight bridges decision theory with institutional design, offering a structural explanation for variation in adaptive capacity across industrial systems.

Collectively, these contributions move the literature toward a design-oriented theory of industrial governance, in which outcomes are understood as products of decision-system architecture rather than isolated policy acts.

### Economic and Governance Implications: From Resource Allocation to Institutional Performance

The economic implications of the findings extend beyond conventional measures of industrial performance. By altering how decisions are initiated, reviewed, and corrected, decision architecture directly shapes resource allocation efficiency and dynamic productivity. Misallocation, a persistent problem in many developing and emerging economies, often arises not from market imperfections alone but from decision systems that fail to terminate ineffective commitments (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2023; Dosi et al., 2021).

From a governance perspective, the results indicate that accountability effectiveness depends less on oversight intensity and more on architectural embeddedness. When accountability is activated through predefined thresholds and review triggers, it becomes a routine operational feature rather than a politically charged intervention. This finding reinforces emerging critiques of audit-centric governance models, which frequently generate compliance without correction (Fukuyama, 2022; OECD, 2024).

For industrial systems, this implies a shift from reactive governance—responding to failure after resources are exhausted—to anticipatory governance, where decision architectures are designed to surface problems early and enable orderly adjustment. Such systems reduce the economic and political costs of correction, enhancing long-term industrial resilience.

#### Decision-Centric Recommendations for Egypt's Industrial Sector

The implications for Egypt's industrial development are fundamentally design-oriented rather than resource-dependent. The findings suggest that significant performance gains can be achieved without expanding subsidies, creating new agencies, or enacting comprehensive legislative reform.

First, industrial decisions in Egypt would benefit from the adoption of standardized decision templates that require explicit objectives, performance signals, review intervals, and exit rules. This would immediately enhance decision coherence and traceability across ministries and agencies (World Bank, 2024; UNIDO, 2023).

Second, Egypt's industrial governance could be strengthened by introducing pilot-first decision pathways, whereby major industrial initiatives are tested at limited scale before full commitment. This approach institutionalizes learning and reduces the risk of large-scale misallocation, aligning with international evidence on effective policy experimentation (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2022; OECD, 2024).

Third, the establishment of a central decision-review function—focused on consolidating performance signals rather than exercising control—would improve coordination without undermining existing institutional mandates. Such a function would enhance system-wide learning while preserving ministerial autonomy.

These recommendations are intentionally modest in form yet transformative in effect, reflecting the study's core insight: industrial performance improves when how decisions are made is redesigned, not merely what decisions are taken.

#### Paradigm-Level Significance: Rethinking Industrial Development as a Decision System

At a paradigm level, this research challenges deeply embedded assumptions about industrial development. Conventional debates ask whether states should intervene more or less, which sectors should be prioritized, or which instruments should be deployed. The findings presented here suggest that these questions are secondary to a more fundamental one: How are industrial decisions designed to evolve over time?

By conceptualizing industrial development as a continuous decision system rather than a collection of policy interventions, the research offers a new lens through which to interpret both success and failure. This lens explains why similar policies yield divergent outcomes across countries and why policy transfer often disappoints despite careful adaptation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2023; Block & Keller, 2023).

The paradigm shift implied is clear: sustainable industrial development depends not on perfect foresight or optimal policy choice, but on decision architectures capable of learning, correcting, and disengaging under uncertainty. In this sense, the study reframes industrial development as an exercise in governing uncertainty through design, rather than attempting to eliminate it through planning.

### **VIII. Limitations And Directions For Future Research**

#### Research Design and Methodological Limitations

Despite the strengths of the decision-architecture approach adopted in this study, several methodological limitations should be acknowledged. First, the applied results analysis relies on structured scenario-based reasoning and comparative evidence rather than on large-scale quantitative testing. While this design is consistent with design-oriented and governance-focused research, it limits the ability to make probabilistic claims about effect size or statistical significance (Van Aken et al., 2021). The findings therefore emphasize analytical validity and practical plausibility rather than empirical generalization.

Second, the unit of analysis in this research is the industrial decision or decision package. Although this choice enhances analytical precision, it may overlook emergent system-level dynamics that unfold across longer time horizons. Complex interactions among multiple decisions, institutions, and political cycles could generate outcomes not fully captured within a decision-centered analytical lens (Ansell & Torfing, 2021).

#### Data and Evidence Constraints

The study draws on secondary sources, international reports, and analytically constructed scenarios to examine the operation of decision architectures. While these sources provide rich contextual insight, they may reflect reporting biases or institutional narratives embedded in official documentation. Furthermore, the absence of firm-level or administrative microdata restricts the ability to validate decision outcomes against granular performance indicators such as productivity dispersion or firm survival rates (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2023).

In addition, scenario-based analysis, while useful for exploring decision dynamics under uncertainty, inevitably abstracts from political bargaining, informal practices, and power asymmetries that shape real-world industrial governance. These factors may influence the feasibility and timing of corrective actions in ways not fully observable within structured analytical scenarios (Ahlqvist & Rhisiart, 2022).

### Contextual and Institutional Boundaries

The application pathways discussed in this study are grounded primarily in the institutional and administrative context of Egypt. While many design principles identified—such as embedded accountability and predefined correction thresholds—are broadly transferable, their operationalization may vary significantly across political and institutional environments. Differences in bureaucratic capacity, legal frameworks, and state–business relations may condition how decision architectures function in practice (Kattel et al., 2022).

Moreover, the study assumes a minimum level of administrative coherence and data availability. In contexts characterized by extreme institutional fragmentation or weak information systems, the effectiveness of decision architecture may be constrained unless complemented by parallel investments in administrative capability and data infrastructure.

### Directions for Future Research

Future research can extend this study along several promising directions. First, empirical testing of decision architectures using quantitative methods—such as panel data analysis or quasi-experimental designs—would enhance external validity and allow estimation of performance effects across sectors and countries. Second, sector-specific studies could examine how decision architecture operates differently in capital-intensive versus labor-intensive manufacturing activities.

Third, longitudinal research could explore how decision architectures evolve over time and interact with political cycles, leadership changes, and external shocks. Finally, comparative studies across emerging and advanced economies could assess whether certain architectural configurations are more effective under specific developmental conditions, thereby refining the theory of decision-centric industrial governance.

### Conflict of Interest Statement

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this paper. The author has no financial, personal, or professional relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this study.

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