The Challenges of Deploying Criminal Intelligence in Maritime Security in the Gulf Of Guinea

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Abstract: This study examines the nature of the challenges of policing the Gulf of Guinea which is crucial economic hubs of west and central Africa due to the rich oil endowments. Specially the study faults the albeit over reliance on security intelligence and the neglect of criminal intelligence. The major trust of this paper is therefore to reinvent the deployment of criminal intelligence in protecting critical assets in the Gulf Guinea. In achieving this proposition, the study relied on a survey research approach involving the use of structured questionnaire with reliability index of 0.87. Added to this was a review of rich literature to strengthen the research based. In all, the research found out the pertinent need to integrate and coordinate the various criminal intelligence agencies in the region into size manageable system and greater reliance in ICT and allied gadget to guarantee maritime security in the region.

Keywords: Gulf of Guinea, criminal intelligence, security intelligence, insecurity, safety, organized crime.

I. Introduction

The Gulf of Guinea has become notorious for its violent conflicts and political instability. This insecurity has its origins in bad governance, corruption, failures of social and economic development, completion for the control of the oil and gas and marine resources on the part of the Gulf states and foreign powers which has pitted one state against another with its attendant proliferation or infiltration of all manner of weapons (Sartre, 2014; Vrey, 2013:!), among other factors.

Geographically, the Gulf of Guinea extends from Liberia to Gabon and includes the island territories of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. In policy discussions, it is common to add Sierra Leone and the Guineas to the west and Congo Brazzaville to the east. This paper addresses this whole area but focuses in particular on the ten countries bordering the Atlantic from Guinea Bissau to Cameroon for two reasons: they are connected to the persistent insecurity in the Sahel region (a semi-arid geographic band below the Sahara desert and above the southern savannas), and they are most afflicted by the illicit activities in the Gulf of Guinea itself.

Throughout the Gulf of Guinea, maritime banditry coexists with other illicit activities at sea, including arms trafficking, illegal immigration, and, increasingly, transshipment of drugs from South America en route to Europe via Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ghana, and now Nigeria. The situation has since been deteriorating (IMO Report, 2013).

In 2013, there were 54 attacks against ships in the Gulf of Guinea, of which 34 were successful, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). This compares with 64 attacks in 2012 and 61in 2011. In almost half of the attacks in 2014 cases, the ship was alongside or at anchor. No crew members were killed nor wounded in this period, but 93 were taken hostage, and 9 ships were hijacked. Ships and crews were subsequently released. All this amounts to 18 percent of the 298 attacks at sea throughout the world, a decrease of 12.6 percent over the figures of 2012 (AU, 2006:6)

In the Nigeria’s Niger Delta, where the most spectacular incidents have occurred, the most common activity is hostage-taking of expatriates for ransom, usually from offshore oil installation, exploration vessels, tankers that are loading, and, in particular, service vessels shuttling to and from the land.

All along the coast, but particularly in the Niger Delta, insecurity at sea is a consequence of poor governance on land and an extension of land-based activities, such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, and “bunkering” the illegal siphoning of oil. In the Niger Delta, these crimes often have a political origin: the revolt of local people against the despoiling of their soil and water (especially by pollution), and against what they perceive as an unjust distribution of oil profits. West Africa has also made efforts to develop a coordinated approach to the region’s challenges through common security architecture. Such sub-regional initiatives may ultimately prove most conducive to long-term stability.

Violent power struggles and competition for the control of economic assets periodically cause crises to flare up, and these tend to be persistent and widespread. The international community (made up of governmental agencies, international decision-makers and international non-governmental organizations-NGO) has worked to move countries in the region onto a stable trajectory.
For quite some time now, discussions on the issue surrounding maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea have suffered two major shortcomings. The first is undue fixation or over-emphasis on piracy to the point of near exclusion of other threats, vulnerabilities and elements of disorder or mis-governance at sea (Vrey, Op. cit. 1-23). According to this writer, the foregoing unfortunately skews perceptions about Africa’s landscape. The piracy focus suggests a limited problem-solving approach, but Africa’s offshore domain calls for a more critical stance that, piracy, illegal oil bunkering, criminality and unsettled maritime bounded entail more than anti-piracy. Perceptions and realities of maritime terrorism, piracy, illegal oil bunkering, criminality and unsettled maritime boundaries increasingly complicate traditional African threats and vulnerabilities on land. The growing range of threats requires a framework to explain events taking shape off West Africa in particular better. In this regard, the constituent elements of good order at sea house a more critical line to view security off Africa through safe access to resources (food and minerals), safe sea routes, as well as dominium and jurisdiction.

The second which is, of course, the central issue this paper tends to address is the too much attention being paid to security intelligence at the expense of criminal intelligence in the concerted efforts to provide security and safety along the Gulf of Guinea coastline.

The foregoing becomes rather worrisome when one realizes that in the domain of maritime security, particularly in the peculiar case of the Gulf of Guinea region, the roles of both security intelligence and its sister criminal intelligence strategically overlap with each other so much that not paying equal attention to either one has the danger of rendering any efforts most ineffective (Farson, 1991:91). It is, therefore, against the foregoing background that this paper elects to examine the need for and challenge of deploying the strategy of criminal intelligence in the efforts at securitization of the Gulf of Guinea coastline.

II. Objectives Of The Study

This paper pursued the broad goal of examining the state of insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and the challenge of deploying the strategy of criminal intelligence in combating security threats and vulnerabilities in the region. The paper, however, pursued the following specific objectives.

1. To examine the impact the present capabilities of the various criminal intelligence agencies operating in the Gulf of Guinea towards effective analysis of intelligence collected by them have on the on-going fight against maritime insecurity in the region.
2. To find out the impact of integrating or coordinating the various criminal intelligence agencies operating in the Gulf of Guinea into a single system would have on the fight against maritime insecurity in the region.
3. To examine the impact of a greater reliance on computer-based electronic information and communication technology (ICT) equipment and gadgets on the part of the criminal intelligence agencies operating in the Gulf of Guinea would have on the being made to provide maritime security in the region.
4. To examine how far adoption of “strategic intelligence” as a strategy can assist in enhancing the effectiveness of criminal intelligence as part of the efforts to provide maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
5. To examine to what extent conscious removal of all known barriers to a free flow of the criminal intelligence process in the Gulf of Guinea would enhance the efforts being made to provide maritime security in the region.

III. Research Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were put forward for test in the study:

**Hypothesis No.1:**
H₁: Improved capabilities of the various criminal intelligence agencies operating in the Gulf of Guinea for effective analysis of intelligence collected would have no significant impact on the efforts aimed at providing maritime security and safety in the region.

**Hypothesis No.2**
Hₒ: Integrating or coordinating the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea into a single system has no significant impact on the efforts being made to provide maritime security in the region.

**Hypothesis no.3**
Hₒ: Greater reliance on the use of computer-based electronic and ICT gadgets and equipment by the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea has no significant impact on the efforts being made to provide maritime security in the region.
IV. Review Of Related Literature And Conceptual Framework

Criminal Intelligence:

Criminal intelligence has been defined as “process of systematic collection, collation, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination of information from a wide variety of sources in order to identify criminal endeavours within a given country and prepare threat assessments before events occur (Muir, 1994:46). However, Police defines criminal intelligence in more detail; criminal intelligence is information gathered or collated, analyzed, recorded/reported and disseminated by law enforcement agencies concerning types of crime, identified criminals and known or suspected criminal groups (Zems, 2013:109). It is particularly useful when dealing with organized crime. Criminal intelligence is developed by using surveillance informants, interrogation, and research, or may be picked on the “street” by individual police officers (Zems, 2013:109).

Criminal Intelligence is information complied, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity. Criminal Intelligence could be defined as information which is complied, analyzed, or disseminated, in order to further concerted efforts to pre-empt, monitor, or prevent criminal activity. This informed the importance and great value attached to criminal intelligence as it is useful for both Police, law enforcement agencies and for security professionals.

It is expedient to understand the meaning of “information” in the context of this process. Information may be defined as “pieces of raw, unanalyzed data that identifies persons, evidence, events, or illustrates processes that indicate the incidence of a criminal event or witnesses or evidence of a criminal event. “As will be seen, information is collected as the currency that produces intelligence. Intelligence is secret state or group activity to understand or influence foreign or domestic entities. Intelligence analysis is the application of individual and collective cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses within a secret socio-cultural context. Intelligence errors are factual inaccuracies in analysis resulting from poor or missing data; while intelligence failure is systematic organizational surprise resulting from incorrect, missing, discarded, or inadequate hypotheses.

The phrase “law enforcement intelligence,” used synonymously with “criminal intelligence,” is frequently found in conjunction with discussions for police’s role in security. It is complicated by the failure to distinguish between law enforcement intelligence and national security intelligence (Zems, 2013:108).

However, one basic model of the intelligence process is called the intelligence cycle. This model can be applied like all basic models; it does not reflect the fullness of real-world operations. Nevertheless, it is worth introducing, then pointing out some of its failures, and then presenting more real-world models. Once reasonable real-world models can be refined, the activities making it up can be discussed.

The Criminal Intelligence Process is effective intelligence result from series of interrelated activities. The intelligence process is a continuous process of collecting and converting data into intelligence products to be integrated into operations. The process consists of several phases with continuous evaluation and feedback at each phase and at the end of the process.

The intelligence cycle is the process of developing unrefined data into polished intelligence for the use by policy makers. The intelligence cycle consists of five steps as described below. The diagram below shows the circular nature of this process, although movement between the steps is fluid. For, intelligence uncovered at one step may require going back to an earlier step before moving forward. The activities of the intelligence cycle are to obtain and assemble information, convert it into intelligence and make it available to its users. The process or cycle comprises five basic steps or stages as follows (Zems, 2013:110-112).

1. **Planning and Direction** – is management of the entire effort, from identifying the need for information to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer. It involves implementation plans to satisfy requirements, as well as identifying specific collection requirements based on FIB needs. Planning and direction also is responsive to the end of the cycle, because current and finished intelligence, which supports decision-making, generates new requirements.

2. **Collection** is the gathering of raw information based on requirements. Activities such interviews, technical and physical surveillance, human source operation, searches, liaison relationships results in the collection of intelligence. It is an act of intelligence. It is an act of obtaining raw information using a variety of collection disciplines.

3. **Processing and Exploitation** Involve converting the vast amount of information collected into a form usable by analysts. This is done through a variety of methods including decryption, language translations, and data reduction. Processing includes the entering of raw data into databases where it can be exploited for use in the analysis process, defining and analyzing the information.

4. **Analysis and Production** is the conversion of raw information into intelligence. It includes integrating evaluating, collation, and analyzing all available data, and preparing intelligence products. The information’s reliability, validity, and relevance is evaluated and weighed. The information is logically
integrated, put in context, and used to produce intelligence. Raw intelligence is both “raw” and finished intelligence. Raw intelligence is often referred to as “the dots” individual pieces of information disseminated individually, while, finished intelligence reports “connect the dots” by putting information in context and drawing conclusions about its implications.

5. **Dissemination:** The last step is the distribution of raw or finished intelligence products to the consumers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements or assignments. The Head of Intelligence disseminates information in three standard formats: Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), Intelligence Bulletins, and Intelligence Assessments to the authorities concerned. The process could be diagrammatically illustrated as below.

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 1: Intelligence Management Cycle or Process.**


**The Nature of Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea**

- **Terrorism**
  Luxor in Egypt (1997), Nariobi, Dar es Salaam (1998), Somalia (ongoing) Mombassa (2002), Uganda (2010), and Nairobi (2013) all attest to terrorism on the African soil. At sea, the attacks on the USS Cole (2000) and MV Limburg (2002) in the Gulf of Aden are two incidents close to African waters, while the failed 2008 attack on the Shell Bonga oil platform of Nigeria remains noted due to its distance from land (Intertanko, 2008). Maritime terrorism off Africa is thus possible and a matter reinforced by lucrative targets at sea offering opportunities for economic destabilization, punishment of governments tolerating lax coastal and portside security, and access of perpetrators to commercial technologies to operate at sea—all of which are reinforced by primarily questionable governmental practices facilitating bad order at sea (Chalk, 2008:xiii).

- **Piracy**
  A number of developments promote the escalation in sea piracy as experienced by Africa. The growth in shipping traffic and its flow through choke points, in particular and the ongoing international economic crisis draws more people into maritime criminality a matter only fuelling piracy on Africa’s seas. Pressure for more landward security after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, in the United States over time drained resources away from maritime matters and eroded the means of upholding good order at sea. Africa already displays an undue fixation with landward security and thus increasingly tends to neglect maritime matters. Together with lax security measures in ports and coastal waters, official complicity in maritime crimes serves to reinforce the piracy threat. Africa unfortunately suffers from a general weakness in maritime governance (law enforcement in particular) that sustains piracy (Chalk, op cit, pp.xi-xii).
  
  Chalk views piracy more broadly as a triad comprising anchorage attacks, robberies against ships out at sea and theft of ships and cargo aimed at their conversion as ‘phantom ships’ for trade or pirate mother ships. The Sea Tigers of the LTTE movements of Sri Lanka, for example, acquired and employed ocean-going vessels as warehouse ships that kept the movement supplied from the sea for a number of years before their destruction and defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan government force in 2009. Employed rather freely as a broad label for attacks on ships, piracy had become the face of Africa’s maritime insecurity. Of the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea and even further south, piracy continues to draw significant international attention (IMO, 2011:2).

- **Illegal Oil Bunkering**
  Oil bunkering is most prevalent in Nigerian waters and holds national and international repercussions. Networks showing a criminal-rebel-government triad plague the Nigerian oil industry. The maritime connection plays out at sea through pirate tankers, receiving the stolen crude from criminal syndicates and transporting it further afield (Davis, Von Kemedi & Drennan, 2008: 11-12). A land-maritime connection operates between
armed groups in the Niger Delta, the maritime tanker syndicates and even corrupt naval/public officials reflecting interfaced criminality, political agendas and corrupt officials. In the case of 2003 MV African Pride incident in Lagos, the crew transferred the ship’s illegal oil cargo to a pirate tanker at sea while under naval guard (Forest & Souza, 2007:100-101, David et al, op cit:12). While oil bunkering is largely criminal in kind, its intimate nexus with wider oil politics in the Niger Delta region and a weakly policed Gulf of Guinea places illegal bunkering within the ambit of bad order at sea (Vrey, 2013:7).

**Drug Trafficking**

West Africa is a haven for drug trafficking from South America into Europe. The Atlantic Ocean serves as one transit route with little impediment from West African policing authorities. On the western edge of the Gulf of Guinea, Guinea’s Conakry offers a weakly policed maritime space, allowing drug syndicates (from the Caribbean and South America in particular) to move freely from the sea into West Africa. Geographic location and unstable political conditions alongside a tolerance for smuggling activities from attractive features for the drug traders (Ellis, 2009:170-196).

West Africa serves as a transit region for cocaine from South America into Europe and heroin from the Middle East to the USA. While Guinea Bissau appears to be the focal point, it masks Nigerian involvement in the drug trade through and from West Africa. On 5 April 2013, the BBC reported that a former Chief of the Navy of Guinea Bissau, Rear Admiral J.A. Bubo, was arrested at sea in a drug sting operation and transferred to the United States to stand trial. Weak jurisdiction at sea tying in with a similar landward weakness facilitates drug trafficking from the sea into West African countries, and syndicates exploit this void to the full with indicators of a further link to the Tuaregs and even one suggestive of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb connections.

- **Kidnapping or Hostage Taking**

This is fairly a recent dimension in the insecurity repertoire in Africa particularly in the Gulf of Guinea. In this crime, which is most prevalent in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, criminal groups abduct high network individuals who are mainly expatriate staff of oil and gas companies wealthy Nigerian or their beloved relatives and demand payment of huge ransoms of the release of such kidnapped victims. Instances abound where these criminals groups pay large ransoms, use these victims as leverage against oil and gas companies, and demand payment of huge ransoms of the release of such kidnapped victims. Instances abound where these criminal groups pay large ransoms, use these victims as leverage against oil and gas companies, and demand payment of huge ransoms of the release of such kidnapped victims.

- **Smuggling**

People wanting to leave Africa, or who are forced to do so by criminal syndicates face a journey by sea, whether across the Mediterranean or Red Sea/Gulf of Aden. Human trafficking and smuggling people who are desperate to leave the continent involves criminal syndicates in West Africa, North Africa and East Africa (Le Sage, 2010:6). Weapon smuggling takes places as well and often serves to fuel African armed conflicts. (Brenthrust Foundation, 2010:13). The large illegal arms shipment found in the port of Lagos in 2010 attests to suspicious or smuggled arms shipments through African waters and an incident not yet fully settled by the Nigerian and Iranian authorities (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 2010). Pirates, poachers, armed militant groups and governments under international arms sanctions have a need for arms and thus offer market for illegal arms shipments through weakly policed African waters.

- **Pollution**

Rising pollution off the West African coast, off the South African Coast, and potential pollution in the busy shipping lanes off the Horn of Africa are on record. The terrorist attack on the MV Limburg spilling oil into the Red Sea, waste dumping from the sea taking place into the interior of the Ivory Coast, and very dangerous toxic waste discovered on the Somali coast are some examples of deliberate maritime pollution (Brenthrust Foundation op cit, 29, Le Sage op cit, 7). Within the lexicon of good order at sea, pollution threatens the African seas (as a source of food and an important environment) and in addition is a transgression perpetuated by rogue actors exploiting or sallowing the seas and living on the shores. The threat affects African populations and their dependence upon pristine coastal waters as well as the right to live in an unpolluted coastal environment. Whether international or not, pollution is a constant threat in African waters with its weak or absent policing. The Brenthrust Foundation Discussion Paper is rather explicit about the pollution threat to the safety and security of Africa’s seas-both for the seas as well as for it beneficiaries, entailing threats that affect areas much wider than the immediate coastal environment.

**The Need for Criminal Intelligence in Combating Organized Crimes in the Gulf of Guinea**

Across most states in the Gulf of Guinea, the responsibility of criminal intelligence is mostly assigned to two national criminal intelligence organizations, namely, the police and state intelligence service departments (e.g. in Nigeria, they are the Nigeria Police and the Department of State Service-DSS). While the police are
staffed by regular policemen, the state intelligence unit is staffed by trained civilian personnel. Both nationally and transnational, these criminal intelligence units are expected to share intelligence among themselves and through such “network”, the whole law enforcement agencies in the Gulf of Guinea come together for the common purpose of fighting the spread of organized crime in the region.

As earlier on stated, most of the responsibilities of the police is reactive or preventive in nature. This being the case, one of the essential tools in that prevention process is an effective criminal intelligence organization. Like its security intelligence counterpart, a criminal intelligence organization must also have a process of systematic collection, collation, evaluation, analysis and dissemination of information from a wide variety of sources in order to identify criminal endeavors and prepare threat assessments before events occur. (Muir, 1996:1).

Although the end users or customers of the criminal and security intelligence may be different in each organization, the basic information processing concepts are very similar. There are differences in certain policy and procedural matters between security and criminal investigations, such as the method for acquisition of warrants for telecommunication intercepts.

Thus in making application for telecommunication warrants in a criminal investigation, the police are required to seek authority through judicial bodies. Yet, the grounds for seeking the authority for a communication intercept are quite similar in both fields of investigation, i.e., that other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, or that it appears that they are unlikely to succeed, and that the urgency of the matter is such that it would be impractical to carry out the investigation using only other investigative procedures.

Many of the interviewing concepts, investigative method and techniques in both security and criminal investigations have parallels. Each may have very complex investigational processes, requiring considerable tact, investigative skill, sensitivity and acumen. The McDonald Commission report (in Canada) itself makes it evident that practically all basic investigative practices were common to both the regular and security duties of the force (McDonald Commission). The degree of judgment required of employees in security and criminal investigative bodies depends a great deal on the type of work being performed and the level of seniority and experience of the employees (Farson op cit. 208). Unfortunately, the field of criminal intelligence has not been entirely understood even within domestic and foreign police agencies (Ibid). Heretofore, it has not received the attention and resources by police managers and leaders that it probably should have had because, in times of tight budgets and limited human resources, it was seen as expensive luxury, the benefits of which were not clearly understood.

Essentially, the intelligence process is no different from basic research. First, the problem is defined, and then the data is collected, assessed and organized. It is analyzed and then disseminated to the appropriate departments or agencies. Yet, despite the simple logic of applying this model as the main ingredient in action plans against organized crime, its application still remains somewhat ambiguous, sporadic and inconsistent (Stewart, 1996:2).

There is a view prevalent in some police and enforcement circles that the role of criminal intelligence, if used at all, lays solely in a tactical operational sense, as a method to expedite bringing criminals to justice as swiftly as possible using intelligence to provide leads for the investigation and subsequent evidence gathering and prosecution of the criminal.

But, once the criminal has been removed from the scene, little time is spent continuing with the intelligence process, particularly the essential activity of analysis to produce more tactical and even strategic intelligence about that criminal and his/her group and to identify links to other known or suspected criminals and groups still functioning. Police agencies are often more reactively driven and simply move on to the next operational event.

Law enforcement bodies traditionally have gathered and stored data, often ad hoc, from a variety of sources, but have not expended resources towards the most critical area of intelligence work: analysis (Stewart, 1996:2). This deficiency frequently has been identified by those who have examined the intelligence process over the years. In the McDonald Commission inquiry report, the Commissioners stated:

“the Security Service is weakest when it comes to analysis……. We have met a number of Security Service Staff with well developed analytical talents. The problem is that there are not enough of them, and in addition, those in middle management often lack the skills and experience to supervise them properly.” (McDonald Commission, 1981:602).

The lack of analytical capabilities was not confined to the security intelligence field, but was found wanting within the Criminal intelligence community as well. A US government financed study found that police intelligence activities tended to continue as collection efforts, with little effective analytical work achieved (Martins, 1986:136). This lack of sound analysis apparently has continued into the 1990s because in 1991 Bob Morehouse, Supervisor of the Organized Crime Unit for the State of California’s Department of Justice in the United States stated:
“Many law enforcement agencies fail to progress much past the data collection and dissemination stages, having devoted little or no time to the analysis process even though most intelligence units have sent one or more of their staff through some intelligence analysis training program.” (Morehouse, 1992:18-19).

He went on to add that most intelligence processes are tactical in nature and consist of creating link analysis charts and other visual investigative aids that are developed from intelligence data collected from specific cases. Unfortunately, few reports contain any hypothesis or an interpretation of events or forecasts of criminal intelligence only.

It is not sufficient to continue the collection of criminal intelligence only. Analysis is absolutely essential. The security intelligence community has not been alone in the “collection only” side of intelligence. The criminal intelligence field has also concentrated on collection, with the analysis process being frequently neglected (Stewart, 1996:3). Regardless of the level at which it develops, however, it is essential that any major police or law enforcement body has dedicated intelligence analysts, well-educated, trained and innovative thinkers responsible for tactical analysis, who work closely with enforcement units to identify major criminals and their organizations for domestic and international customers.

If tactical or operational intelligence is dealt with by a police agency in a systematic fashion through the ongoing processes of collection, assessment, recording, analysis and dissemination, the groundwork has been laid for the implementation of “strategic intelligence.” This will not only enhance and formulate a broader view of organized criminal events and trends, but can be an excellent management tool to examine other issues and events which may impact on planning and budgetary concerns, particularly making better use of scarce resources (McDowel, 1992).

Strategic intelligence analysis involves the comprehensive examination of an assortment of disparate, incomplete, and unfamiliar data, and requires considerable skill in developing hypotheses about events, trends and potential problem areas of criminal activity outside the normal course of a criminal investigation (Stewart, 1996:5). But there must be a commitment by management within police and law enforcement organizations to realize the value and place of each type of analysis in the field of criminal intelligence and to work toward that end. Some discussion, review and scrutiny by knowledgeable persons outside the forces themselves might exert a healthy influence on that process. Perhaps, there is a need for the field and agencies of criminal intelligence to be subjected to the scrutiny of an oversight body, similar to CSIS’ Security and Intelligence Review Committee, in Canada which would oversee targeting standards, effectiveness and efficiency. Can we rely on the organizations’ international auditors to perform those functions?

Furthermore, Police agencies throughout the world are recognizing the need to coordinate and integrate their often financially strapped resources. It seems reasonable to expect that the combination of a growing threat from transnational crime throughout the world and reduced law enforcement budgets limiting the ability of police forces to cope with the increasing criminal problems may bring about a renewed awareness and demand for answers to major organized crime problems. Likewise, the reduction of duplication, competition and rivalry among law enforcement agencies is finally being addressed in many jurisdictions thereby making way for the integration and amalgamation of resources.

For example, shortly after being appointed to the position of US Attorney General, Janet Reno called for an integration of Federal law enforcement activities which resulted in a joint Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)/FBI database. DEA and FBI drug intelligence files would be merged into a single system. The FBI was undertaking a full commitment to the EL Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) which is managed by DEA, and in which all states and most federal agencies participate. EPIC provides intelligence on a real-time basis on the movement of drugs by land, sea and air throughout the world. The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) in Johnstown, Pennsylvania will be responsible for strategic intelligence relating to drug trafficking organizations. Responsibility for NDIC will rotate between the FBI and the DEA, with the US Marshals Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) required to contribute data systems and personnel. The Department of Defense and components of the Treasury Department were also expected to contribute. This coordinate effort was consistent with FBI Director Freeh’s belief that duplication of efforts is untenable in this time of fiscal austerity (Narcotic Control Digest, 1994). This DEA-FBI partnership example no doubt presents a big challenge to the various criminal intelligence agencies operating in the Gulf of Guinea as to how best to copy and domesticate such a wonderful integration programme.

Most crucially, it is worthy of note also that on account of the present globalization binge sweeping across the entire geographic world, most parts of the world have been linked into a global village. As a result, Police forces are operating in the new milieu of rapid communication, sophisticated computers, databases, and faxes. The report Electronic Surveillance published by the Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit (CLEU) in Canada in 1993 guarantees much insight into the use of electronic and ICT gadgets for criminal intelligence operations. As well, police and enforcement agencies have liaison officers stationed in key cities abroad. Agencies such as Interpol provide a clearing house for information concerning the movement of criminals. So, it is curious that police agencies, who have frequently voiced the wisdom of utilizing intelligence to “wage the
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war on organized crime”, still are unable to determine the extent of the threat from organized crime. As noted at the outset, the explanation lies in part in the fact that the field of criminal intelligence has not received the critical attention and scrutiny it deserves from within, or without police agencies and departments. Given the myriad of criminal activity in our midst and the ever increasing demand by the public for police presence and action in their particular communities, it is not uncommon for a department’s resources to be readily redeployed to criminal activity that is neither organized nor major. But it is surprising that the public genuinely would be more concerned about speeding cars, auto thefts and break and enters in their neighbourhoods than in the much less apparent organized crime. Many police agencies thus are frequently in a reactive mode with new events and criminal activity continually overtaking plans to develop effective intelligence assessments. This suggests that there might be a need for transnational, and regionally financed organized crime departments, rather than municipal ones.

In conclusion, it has been argued in this section that the need for sophisticated criminal intelligence activities is of vital importance in the concerted efforts aimed at providing maritime security and safety in the Gulf of Guinea. It may not be sufficient enough to leave this vital importance only to the law enforcement and intelligence bodies to debate and act on that suggestion. Thus the existing criminal intelligence process that operates in the Gulf of Guinea no doubt deserves the scrutiny or critical eye that security intelligence has so far been given by academics, politicians, research journalists and other commentators.

Research Methodology Findings

The study employed descriptive research method. The population consisted of all the senior officers of the Nigerian Police and the Department of State Security Service located in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Simple random sampling using judgmental and convenience techniques were used to select 200 target respondents from the population for the purpose of completing the research questionnaire. A 12-item structured questionnaire was used to collect data for the study. The instrument was validated and the reliability coefficient was 0.87. Results were analyzed using Percentages and Chi-Square method. The Ch-square method is used to determine the acceptance or non-acceptance of the research hypothesis: that is $X^2 = \sum(0-E)^2$ Where $X^2$ = Chi-Square; 0 = Observed responses; E = Expected responses; and $\sum$ = Summation. This is done at 0.05 level significance at 3 degree of freedom.
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Decision Rule

The Chi-Square decision rule says that if the calculated Chi-Square value is higher than the table Chi-Square value, the hypothesis is rejected, where the calculate Chi-Square value is lower than the table Chi-Square value, the hypothesis is accepted. But if the calculate Chi-Square equals the table Chi-Square value more information is needed to accept or reject the hypothesis. Note that out of the 200 copies of questionnaire that were distributed, 195 representing were well completed and returned while 5 were not returned. It is, therefore, the responses contained in these 195 questionnaires that were used for the analysis that follow below.

V. Results And Discussion (Results).

The primary data collected in the field using structure questionnaire are presented and analyzed in the form of descriptive statistics. Also, the three hypotheses put forward earlier on are tested using the Pearson Chi-Square Cross Tabulation Statistics at 0.05 level of significance. The presentation which follows is based on the 195 copies of the questionnaire that were well completed and returned.

Table 1: The relationship between improved capability of the criminal intelligence officers operating in the Gulf of Guinea for effective analysis of intelligence collected and the efforts aimed at providing maritime security and safety in the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/NO</th>
<th>Questionnaire Item</th>
<th>Agree (A)</th>
<th>Disagree (D)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Improved capabilities of the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea region for effective analysis of intelligence collected have significant impact on the efforts at providing maritime security in the region.</td>
<td>63 (61)</td>
<td>2 (5)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Training and re-training of the staff of the criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea on intelligence analysis would have enhance the efforts at providing maritime security in the region.</td>
<td>58 (60)</td>
<td>7 (5)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Recruiting well-educated innovative, dedicated and experienced persons with enough skill for intelligence analysis into the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea on intelligence analysis would significantly enhance the efforts at providing maritime security in the region.</td>
<td>63 (61)</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Adopting strategic intelligence as a strategy in addition to the normal course of intelligence by the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea on intelligence analysis enhances the efforts at providing maritime security and safety in the region.</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 181 14 195


Test of Hypotheses:

Hypothesis 0.1

H₀: Improved capability of the criminal intelligence officers operating in the Gulf of Guinea for effective analysis of intelligence collected has no significant impact on the efforts being made to provide maritime security and safety in the region.

Table 2: Chi-Square Tests computed from the Frequency Cross Tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Assymp. Sig (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>153.665(a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>168.203</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>52.110</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of valid cases 195

Source: SPSS Computation 15.00 (2012)

Table 2 shows the output of the computed Chi-Square values from the Cross Tabulation Statistics of observed and expected frequencies based on the response options of “Agree (A)” and “Disagree (D)” from the responses of the target respondents. Pearson Chi-Square computed value is $X^2_c = 153.665$, which is greater than the chi-square tabulated value of $X^2_c = 7.82$ at 3 degree of freedom (df) and 0.05 alpha level: $(X^2_c = 153.665, p>0.05)$.

Decision:

Since the Pearson Chi-Square computed is $X^2_c = 153.665$, which is greater than the chi-square tabulated value $X^2_c = 7.82$, the alternate hypothesis is accepted, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. Thus, we conclude that improved capabilities of the various criminal intelligence officers working in the Gulf of Guinea...
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region for effective analysis of intelligence collected has significant impact on the efforts being made to provide maritime security and safety in the region.

H_0: Integrating or co-coordinating the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea into a single security system has no significant impact on the efforts being made to provide maritime security and safety in the region.

Table 3: The relationship between integration or co-coordinating the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea into a single security system and the effort aimed at providing maritime security in the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/NO</th>
<th>Questionnaire Item</th>
<th>Agree (A)</th>
<th>Disagree (D)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Integrating or co-coordinating the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea into a single security system would have significant impact on the effort aimed at providing maritime security in the region.</td>
<td>63 (58)</td>
<td>5 (7)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>A single criminal intelligence system established out of the various law enforcement agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea would solve the problem of duplication, thereby saving much more logistics resources and energy being presently wasted in the efforts to provide security in the region.</td>
<td>54 (58)</td>
<td>11 (7)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A single criminal intelligence system for the Gulf of Guinea would automatically deal with the problem of unhealthy competition and rivalry among the various law enforcement agencies that operate in that region today.</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>A single criminal intelligence system for the Gulf of Guinea would pave way for establishment of a common computer database or information center for easy accessibility of information or data by criminal intelligence officers operating in the region.</td>
<td>61 (58)</td>
<td>4 (7)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 175 20 195


Table 4: Chi-Square Tests computed from the Frequency Cross Tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Assymp. Sig (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>133.645</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>158.203</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>51.110</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of valid cases</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPSS Computation 15.00 (2012)

Table 4 above shows the output of the computed Chi-Square values from the Cross Tabulation Statistics of observed and expected frequencies based on the response options of “Agree (A) and “Disagree (D)” from the responses of the target respondents. Pearson Chi-Square computed value is $X^2 = 133.645$, which is greater than the chi-square tabulated value $X^2 = 7.82$ at 3 degree of freedom (df) and 0.05 alpha level: ($X^2 = 133.645, p>0.05$).

Decision
Since the Pearson Chi-Square computed is $X^2 = 133.645$, which is greater than the chi-square tabulated value $X^2 = 7.82$, the alternate hypothesis is accepted, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. Thus, we conclude that integration or co-coordinating the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea has significant impact or the efforts being made to provide maritime security or safety in the region.

Hypothesis No.3

H_0: Greater reliance on computer-based ICT and electronic gadgets equipment by the criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea has no significant impact on the efforts and being made to provide maritime security or safety in the region.

Table 3: The Relationship Between Use Of Computer-Based Ict Gadgets And Electronic Equipment And Efforts Being Made To Provide Maritime Security And Safety In The Gulf Of Guinea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/NO</th>
<th>Questionnaire Item</th>
<th>Agree (A)</th>
<th>Disagree (D)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Greater reliance on computer-based electronic and ICT equipment and gadgets on the part of the various law enforcement agencies operating in the Gulf of Guinea would enhance efforts aimed at providing maritime security in that region</td>
<td>63 (61)</td>
<td>2 (5)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Embracing greater use of electronic and ICT gadgets and equipment by the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea would</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Assymp. Sig (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Greater usage of electronic and ICT equipment and gadgets by the various criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea would significantly enhance the speed and accuracy of the intelligence process in the region.</td>
<td>60 (61)</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Greater reliance on the usage of electronic and ICT equipment and gadgets by the various criminal intelligence agencies operating in the Gulf of Guinea would significantly pave way for adoption of electronic modes of surveillance, investigation and interrogation as part of the efforts to provide maritime security in the region.</td>
<td>Nil Nil Nil</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6: Chi-Square Tests computed from the Frequency Cross Tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Pearson Chi-Square</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio</th>
<th>Linear-by-Linear Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>153.665</td>
<td>168.203</td>
<td>52.110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Assymp. Sig (2-sided) | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Source: SPSS Computation 15.00 (2012)

Table 6 shows the output of the computed Chi-Square values from the Cross Tabulation Statistics of observed and expected frequencies based on the response options of “Agree (A) and “Disagree (D)” from the responses of the target respondents. Pearson Chi-Square computed value is $X^2 = 153.665$, which is greater than the chi-square tabulated value $X^2 = 7.82$ at 3 degree of freedom (df) and 0.05 alpha level: $X^2 = 153.665$, $p>0.05$.

Decision

Since the Pearson Chi-Square computed is $X^2 = 133.645$, which is greater than the chi-square tabulated value $X^2 = 7.82$, the alternate hypothesis is accepted, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. Thus, we conclude that greater reliance on computer-based ICT gadgets and electronic equipment has significant impact on the efforts being made to provide maritime security and safety in the region.

Discussion

As data in Table 1 above show, the capabilities of the various criminal intelligence officers operating in the Gulf of Guinea for effective analysis of intelligence collected out there in the field has significant impact on the efforts being made to provide maritime security in the region. The foregoing finding is strongly corroborated by the earlier opinions of many authorities including McDonald Commission (1981:608), Martens (1986:134), Morehouse (1992) and Stewart (1996:3) among others.

These researchers had earlier in the separate studies found that while most of criminal and security intelligence officers do make praiseworthy efforts at collection and dissemination of intelligence data and information, much of such efforts is usually rendered ineffective due to poor analytic capabilities.

Again, going by the data in Table 3 above and decision reached after the test based on the said data, it is found that integrating or coordinating the various criminal intelligence agencies’ operating in the Gulf of Guinea into a single system has significant impact on the efforts aimed at providing maritime security in the region. This finding interesting as it is, is graphically in line with the earlier view of several researchers some who were Stewart (1996:15), Narcotic Digest (1994:41), Sartre (2007), Sartre (2014:13-14) among others.

These researchers also in their separate studies showed how each of the various criminal or security intelligence agencies of the respective Gulf States lacks both logistics, manpower and material capabilities to muster the level of maritime security needed to guarantee its national maritime boundary the much needed safety. They in order to address this apparent in capabilities, the authors suggested that the answer lies with forgoing transnational co-operation or partnership by way of integrating the agencies into a full-fledged single security system that avoids duplication, waste of resources and unhealthy competition and rivalry.

Furthermore, Table 5 above depicts data upon which the decision is reached that greater reliance on computer-based electronic and ICT equipment and gadgets by the various criminal intelligence agencies operating in the Gulf of Guinea has significant impact on efforts aimed at providing maritime security in the region. This finding is strongly supported by the separate views of a number of researchers including those of CLEU of Canada (1993:112), Sartre (2014:15), Farson (1991), Edwards (1980:16-19) among others.

According to these researchers, owing to their amazing speed, accuracy and handling convenience, computer-based electronic and ICT equipment and gadgets have the capacity to facilitate electronic surveillance,

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investigation, or interrogation as part of the efforts aimed at providing security in such an expensive waterways or maritime routes, ports and anchorages like those of the Gulf of Guinea.

VI. Conclusion

It will take time for lasting stability in the Gulf of Guinea to come about, and then only if we can count on African solutions. The priority should be the establishment of the sub-regional security sector that is effective and economical, free from distinctions between internal and external forces, clear of obstacles erected by regional boundaries, especially along the coast. Each national security system should be organized to cooperate with its counterparts in neighboring countries and with the justice system of its own country. In precise terms, there is need for integrating or coordinating the different criminal intelligence agencies that operate in the Gulf of Guinea into a single system for purposes of saving costs, avoiding unhealthy competition and rivalry, and easy monitoring and supervision.

It is also the conclusion of this study that the level of analytical capability of the various criminal intelligence officers that operate in the Gulf of Guinea is too poor when compared to the complex and sophisticated nature of the activities of the organized criminal organizations in the region. It is also the conclusion of this study that analysis of intelligence collected in the criminal intelligence process is so important that it is highlighted here as a critical stage of the process.

Again, it is also obvious that given the pervasive nature and the benefits derivable from the current globalization anchored on computer and the Internet, greater dependence of the various criminal intelligence agencies on the system has become imperative and ever compelling. This is due mainly to the fact that incorporating an ICT or electronic component into the present method of conducting criminal intelligence has the capacity to imbue it with speed, accuracy, reliability and convenience.

In fact, the Gulf of Guinea and its security threats and vulnerabilities are worsening and getting sophisticated by the day and therefore, call for a response repertoire that go beyond the present over-emphasis on merely fighting piracy and pursuing security intelligence. Emphasis should, therefore, shift from that towards according similar emphasis to criminal intelligence in the concerted efforts to enthrone good order at sea in the region.

VII. Recommendation

There have been many studies on the threats to the security of the Gulf of Guinea, and many proposals for tackling them. The problem is that much of such research efforts are over fixation on how to fight piracy or issues concerning security intelligence to the near neglect of criminal intelligence. Against the forgoing backdrop and based on the findings made by this study and the conclusion researched thereto, we make the following recommendations:

Firstly, managers of the police and other law enforcement agencies in the Gulf of Guinea should make efforts to ensure that the capability of their officers for effective analysis of intelligence collected out there in the field is meaningfully enhanced at all times. This they can achieve by first and foremost ensuring that highly educated, innovative, skillful and dedicated persons are recruited into their agencies; and secondly it should be censured that officers already charged with criminal intelligence in their employ are given regular training and re-training particularly as it concerns analysis of intelligence or strategic intelligence.

Again, there is need for urgent integration of the various criminal and security intelligence agencies operating in the Gulf of Guinea into a single security system, hence the need for transnational cooperation in the region. Sub-regional organizations in the Gulf of Guinea are well aware that their member states lack sufficient capacity to ensure their security alone and that it is the security of the sub-region as a whole that needs to be guaranteed. ECOWAS is leading the world in the conception and implementation of a regional security apparatus.

And ECOMOG, now a standby Brigade, demonstrates West Africa’s early recognition of the need to have collective security assets that can be employed temporarily in the service of a country in difficulty. Yet sub-regional security initiatives still bear too many imprints from Western models, which are leading to a system that is likely to be technically ill-adapted and unnecessarily expensive. Against this backdrop, the following recommendations suggest ways to bolster cooperation efficiently and effectively for greater security in the region as a whole:

- Pursue the construction of integrated West African security sectors through a system of political and economic cooperation that reconciles super-nationality, mutual assistance, particularly in the area of criminal or security intelligence.
- Pursue an integrated security system with an intelligence component covering the entire national territory. This should be trustworthy, organized to provide information to the executive and to assist the judiciary, and conceived for the fair exchange of information with neighbouring countries, either directly or through ECOWAS and ECCAS.
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To save costs and ensure effectiveness, ECOWAS and ECCAS should develop systems for joint procurement, maintenance operational planning, and deployment of the following types of equipment:

- Armed helicopters, tactical transport helicopters, and units able to operate them according to a common policy defined by the subregional organization;
- Aerial surveillance platforms (both drones and manned aircraft) and their operators, including maritime surveillance assets, according to a common policy defined by the sub-regional organization and/or GGC.

Finally, criminal intelligence agencies in the Gulf of Guinea should intensify their efforts to completely automate their intelligence processes with the computer-based electronic and ICT equipment and gadgets. With this done, they should leverage on the proposed establishment of an integrated single security system for the region and establish a common large computer-based database or information centre and electronic surveillance, towards easy, faster and common access to intelligence information and data.

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He has authored several journals and books such as: Understanding Crime: Analysis for Intelligence, Investigation and Security, Crime is Normal, Understanding Principles, Practice of Crime and Criminology, Understanding Criminological Theory and Terminology, etc.
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