Language, History, and Collective Identity: An Interpretive Approach to Linguistic Constructivism In The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

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Abstract: Framed upon the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this work is an analysis driven by a linguistic-constructivist approach that will focus on the impact of language-use in historic documentation and contemporary discourse on memory, perception, and identity. The semantics, ambiguity, and implications of language used regarding the conflict (c. 1850-present) in various media and historiographic sources will be examined. Through a comparative analysis of Palestinian and Israeli perspectives and linguistic description, contrasts will be drawn in an effort to more clearly render the etic reality of the conflict, as understood through these two emic perceptions of it. This research intends to not only reveal the power of selective language use in shaping perception and identity (in local, national, and international socio-political spheres), but to reveal the implications of the concepts of language structure and language agency as processes that guide and influence human conceptual understandings of conflict.

Language is a profoundly powerful instrument of human intellect. Through its diverse manifestations, logic and order are transposed upon the universe in ways that are meaningful to speakers of the earth’s many tongues. Of its diverse capacities, language’s ability to influence and shape perception, memory, and identity is of considerable interest when considering the role of language in describing historic and contemporary conflicts among cultures. Perhaps in no other instance is this better illustrated than in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Through linguistic choices regarding historic and contemporary events and circumstances – linguistic constructivism, Palestinians, Israelis, and others have (wittingly and unwittingly) impacted all parties involved in profound ways. Historic and linguistic anthropological analysis of these language choices elucidates the interrelationships between language, history, and identity, and reveals the gravity of linguistic constructivism in the conceptualization of historic and lived discordance. Where the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is concerned, linguistic constructivist analysis has vast implications regarding the contrasting Israeli and Palestinian conceptual models of this schism. In order to make these implications as evidential as possible, an historic contextualization of the struggle is necessary.

The Southwest of the Levant currently referred to as Israel and the Palestinian Authority area, has undergone a series of extensive transformations throughout its history. It is an area that has seen the rise and fall of state, national, and imperial polities whose reigns lasted from merely decades to several centuries. Approximately 3,200 years ago, the southwest Levant area was primarily occupied and settled by Jewish, Philistine (Palestinian), and Canaanite peoples. In his work on the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Charles Smith sheds light on the nature of this formative context in which identity became echoed in the region’s associated anthroponymy:

“The names “Israel” and “Palestine” derive from two peoples who entered the region at approximately the same time, the twelfth century before the Christian era. The Jews, who called themselves Bnei Israel, “the people or tribe of Israel”, believed that the land had been given to them by God. Palestine refers to the Philistines, a people of Greek origin who settled in the coastal plains of the area at about the same time the Jews took over the hill country in the interior.”

By the year 1,000BCE, the area came to unified by the Israelites under the rule of King David, placing the Palestinian people in a marginalized position both in terms of demography and influence. Despite the hegemonic nature of the 10th century BCE emergence of the unified Israeli polity, the prior historic claims of both Jewish and Palestinian peoples remain sound regarding their historic presence in the Levant. In the 5th century BCE, the writings of Greek historian and philosopher appeared as the first literary reference to the Levant region as “Palestine”. In terms of demography, Jews maintained a majority in the region until the Babylonian invasions of 6th century BCE. From the 5th century BCE onward, however, Jews in the area were placed in an increasingly marginalized and discriminated position as the region underwent changes in the hands of Persian, Greek, and Roman rule.
Under Roman and later Byzantine rule (c.63-638CE), Palestinian Jews experienced the most severe deterioration of their autonomy and livelihood. Regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this historic environmental context is likely the catalyst that triggered waves of Jewish emigration from the Levant. By the 4th century CE, emigration of Jews from the Levant to the Rhineland region contemporary Germany and central Europe had begun producing a new cultural identity – Ashkenazim6. Literally translated from Hebrew as “German Jews”, the Ashkenazi Jewish communities that developed in central and eastern Europe synthesized and absorbed several of the cultural elements they were exposed to over centuries of co-existence with various European cultures. Despite the term’s literal translation, by the 10th century CE its use came to be applied to all Jews of European descent (i.e. born and enculturated in Europe)6. This historical development of a distinct Ashkenazi Jewish identity and polysemous inclusion of all European Jews warrants recognizing, as it will later bear on linguistic constructivist analyses regarding Israeli identity.

The minority and often marginalized status of Ashkenazi Jews has characterized the majority of the interactions between Jewish communities and Europeans from the 4th-20th centuries CE7. Aware of the constraints that this position imposed on Ashkenazi Jews’ socio-political ambitions and autonomy, several prominent figures within the European Jewish community began to forward the concept of establishing a Jewish national homeland. Of the figureheads that emerged to champion the Zionist cause10, Theodore Herzl (1860-1904) served as the primary engine of progress and change. Through his efforts, the World Zionist Organization (hereafter WZO) was founded in its first congress in Basel, Switzerland, 189711. Though the WZO managed to foster international political and financial support from the Zionist Fund (hereafter ZF) and the British Parliament, the ultimate goal of Zionism presented a serious obstacle regarding their historic absence from Palestine. Meira Weiss relates this conundrum effectively:

“Zionist ideology has been continuously preoccupied with creating a national mythology that would link its present project of nation-building with the remote Jewish history in the Land of Israel (Zion). The problem faced by Zionism was how to construct a historical bridge to a land from which the Jewish people had been exiled for nearly two millennia.”12

This dilemma within Zionism’s ideological legitimacy did not deter settlement in Palestine. With the support of the ZF, WZO, and British Parliamentary backing, Zionist settlement steadily rose from the late 19th century onward13. Zionist immigration into Palestine came in five primary waves referred to in Hebrew as aliyah14, each the result of socio-political developments in Europe that placed an increasingly discriminatory position, the growing inertia and influence of the Zionist movement, or both15. In 1914 World War I erupted, bringing a halt to the second aliyah. The provincial territory of Palestine was under Ottoman control under which the Palestinian people had experienced relative autonomy within the relatively decentralized form of Turkish government. At this time, the Palestinian population maintained majority, but was growing increasingly aware of continued settlement owing to Zionist immigration. Before the end of the War, the British government, at the request of Zionist interests, forwarded the Balfour Declaration. Through the signing of this document, the British government, at the request of Zionist interests, forwarded the Balfour Declaration. The cumulative effect of these actions left the Palestinians to witness the increasingly rapid transition of ownership of Palestine, and the gradual polarization of demography in the region16. This process was punctuated by the fifth and most intense aliyah from the mid 1930s, paralleling the introduction of the Nuremberg Laws, the Shoah (Holocaust), and World War II. Considered holistically, these historic circumstances led many Palestinians to perceive that the Zionist movement was attempting the total seizure of Palestine – a perspective voiced repeatedly in Zionist rhetoric17.

Tensions between the Palestinians and Jewish settlers crystallized during and after the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt. As Palestinians attempted to politically organize themselves against British colonial and Zionist hegemonic control of Palestine, they found themselves brutally repressed and internally divided by the British
military and government. By the end of WWII, Britain had found its financial and military reserves severely weakened, and tensions between Zionist nationalist interests and the Palestinians increasingly insurmountable struggle for autonomy were rising steadily. In 1947, the United Nations sought to address this issue at the request of the British government. The UN created and proposed Resolution 181, calling for the partition of Palestine. This moment was to be the beginning of a series of tremendous land-losses for the Palestinian people, one that continues to this day.20

On November 29th, 1947, UNR181 passed, and Palestine was split into two separate Jewish and Palestinian states. Owing to the intense resistance of the Palestinians towards partition and the greater ambitions of the Zionist project regarding the territory of Palestine, the region plummeted into civil war.21 On May 15th, 1948, David Ben-Gurion – the first Prime Minister of Israel - declared the independence of the State of Israel, the same day the Arab-Israeli War broke out. By July 1949, the war ended, and the amount of land held by Palestinians decreased even more significantly than that of the 1947 partition.

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War marks a significant point in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. From the end of the war to the present, the Palestinians have experienced an increasingly marginalized position under Israeli occupation, while Israeli settlement continues to spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The contrasts in the recent histories of the Palestinian and Israeli peoples must then be made explicit. For the Israelis, the last century has witnessed the creation of a Jewish national homeland, the securing of Israeli autonomy and socio-political status in the world political arena, and the return to and reclamation of what is perceived to be a promised land. In stark contrast, the Palestinians have endured the loss of any and all autonomy and legitimate claims to their ancestral homelands, the deterioration of their status within Israeli society and the global political community, and the creation of an enormous refugee population currently totaling near four million people.

This brief historic and contemporary comparative analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict serves two basic functions. Firstly, it offers a generalized understanding of the historic and contemporary perspectives maintained by many Palestinian and Israeli people. Secondly, it provides a contextual framework upon which a more detailed analysis can be built. In this sense, applying the analytical lens of linguistic constructivism to this historic contextualization not only re-contextualizes these events, but in so doing will reveal a far more complex, interrelated, and culturally insightful image of the manner in which language choice impacts memory, identity, and place.

The words of the late historian Edward Said frames the implications of such analysis on the manner in which the histories of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are evoked, influenced, and shaped through language:

“Memory and its representations touch very significantly upon questions of identity, of nationalism, of power and authority. Far from being a neutral exercise in facts and basic truths, the study of history, which of course is the underpinning of memory, both in school and university, is to some considerable extent a nationalist effort premised on the need to construct a desirable loyalty to an insider's understanding of one's country, tradition, and faith.”

Said relates the nature of history’s - or histories’ – malleability profoundly. In synthesizing this view of a constructivist model of history with various elements of linguistic anthropology, psychology, agency and structural theory, and an inverted form of cultural materialism, this analysis will demonstrate an influential relationship present among language, history, and collective identity. Namely, that the way in which events are remembered and described through language influences and shapes collective identities. This theoretical orientation can be understood as linguistic constructivism. To better position this theoretical model a more explicit definition is necessary.

Linguistic constructivism posits that conceptual models and systems of thought regarding past events are shaped by language. Language use regarding the description of past events and entities, as they directly or indirectly relate to the present, is invariably selective – relating an agent or collective agency’s value orientations, worldview, and perceptual knowledge. Simply put, when discourse regarding past events occurs, a choice has to be made in order to transmit information and perception. The role of language choice regarding past events/entities is direct in shaping identity in a similar function as lived experience. In a pragmatic sense, while events shape identities through lived experience, the representation of events via language plays an equally significant role in influencing identity through extra-somatic and (omni-) dia-chronically conceptualized experiencing. In this sense, language choice in discourse regarding past events/entities not only evokes certain specific images relevant to speakers, but more significantly, generates conceptual framework structures.

Options, alternatives, and limitations that are perceived by speakers relate linguistic constructivist structure, whereas the choice involved among perceived discourse possibilities relates agency. In this way, speakers inherit the limitations of structure created by previous language-choice acts of agency on the one hand and similarly create new structures that will variously affect whoever they are transmitted to. Through the
balance of linguistic constructivism’s agency and structure, the symbolic meanings of past events are encoded in and influence collective identity.

Said further relates the position of linguistic constructivism in forwarding the concept of “collective memory”. As he states, “collective memory is not an inert and passive thing, but a field of activity in which past events are selected, reconstructed, maintained, modified, and endowed with political meaning”26. It is to this notion of collective memory that this research owes the extended concept of collective identity. Taken holistically then, linguistic constructivism seeks to analyze language choices as they relate collective memory. Owing to memory’s inextricable link to identity, collective memory, once analyzed, will relate collective identities. In so doing, the entire linguistic constructivism approach serves to illustrate not only the linkages between language, memory (history), and identity, but relate the gravity of language choices (in these processes) as they affect perception and behavior.

An analysis of the linguistic constructivism involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will not only evidence these theoretical hypotheses, but elucidates the profound complexity that characterizes this struggle, and provides both ominous and optimistic implications regarding a resolution. To accomplish this, analyses of the following areas will be discussed: contrasts between Palestinian and Israeli collective memories and identities of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War; the historic and contemporary use of Hebrew and Hebrew naming practices in Jewish and Israeli culture; and holistic renderings of these phenomena as contextualized by current circumstances in Israel among Israelis and Palestinians.

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War was a decisive event in shaping the histories and identities of both Israeli and Palestinian peoples. The war officially spanned from May 1527 1948 until mid-July 1949, saw the participation of eight nations, and resulted in deaths of tens of thousands of people. The nascent nation of Israel amassed an initial force of 30,000 soldiers, rising to an eventual 115,000 by March27. The combined military strength of the nations aligned against Israel – Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Palestinian Arab Liberation Army – totaled to an eventual 64,200 soldiers28. By July 1949, approximately 4,000 Israeli troops and 2,400 civilians had lost their lives, totaling to 6,373 casualties29. Varying data regarding the causalities of involved Arab forces exists, but estimates place totals between 8,000 and 15,000 casualties30.

Significant though these figures may be, neither Palestinians nor Israelis relate to or express this statistically rendered conception of the 1948 War. Instead, highly relative and contrasting images are expressed through linguistic constructivism in order to relate the nature and significance of the event in ways that are meaningful to Palestinians and Israelis. This is glaringly demonstrated in that Israelis and Palestinians do not refer to this historic event as the “1948 Arab-Israeli War”. Instead, these shared series of events referred to respectively as “The War of Independence/Liberation” and “The Catastrophe”31.

For Israelis, the events of 1948 are remembered, conceptualized, and expressed as a tremendous moment of retribution and triumph in the history of the Jewish people. The success of the Israeli military is understood as being polysemously symbolic. It is a symbol that testifies to the Jews’ endurance, survival, and surmounting of the Shoah in Europe through the creation of a Jewish national homeland, relates the image of one Israeli army’s victory over seven invading Arab armies, and echoes the story of David and Goliath as a lived, practiced, and experienced metaphor. In referring to these events as the “War of Independence/Liberation”, Israelis have constructed this symbolic interpretation of recent history, military acumen and strength, and the domains of fate and myth. The function of this linguistic constructivism has served to crystallize the significance of these events as they pertain to Israeli history and identity32.

Meira Weiss has extended this functionality’s influence further, suggesting “the story of David and Goliath, again a myth of the few versus the many, is similarly used to mobilize citizens into a state of perpetual conscription and a feeling of siege.” Taking into consideration her emphasis on the role of metaphoric extension of mythology to perceived parallels in recent history, linguistic constructivism can then be understood to affect not only contemporary Israeli conceptual models of collective memory and identity, but even concepts of security and the role of citizenship. The linguistic vehicle chosen by Israelis – the War of Independence/Liberation - embodies, expresses, and (covertly and overtly) connotes these orientations - evidencing the gravity of linguistic constructivism33.

Palestinians, by the grace of language choice, have utilized the same linguistic mechanism as Israelis in constructing their conceptual orientations of the events of 1948. Not surprisingly, the linguistic vehicle chosen has been in stark contrast to the Israeli narrative of independence, paralleling the contrasting experiences and histories of the two peoples. For Palestinians, 1948 represents a critical turning point in their history in which the last dregs of their autonomy and of hope in receiving international political recognition were crushed – only to seemingly fade from history. Echoing this sense of profound loss, disgrace, and anguish, the Palestinian people to this day choose to refer to these events as al-nakba (“the catastrophe”)34.

The use of the term al-nakba refers to not only the experiences of the Palestinians during the war and its lasting aftermath, but also designates a dissonance in the actual time-span of the event when compared with the Israeli model. Al-nakba is perceived as beginning 6 months prior to the 1948 War, in November-1947,
during which time Israeli Special Forces began what several historians are recasting today as a campaign of ethnic cleansing.35 Referred to by internal Israeli memoirs of officials as “Plan Dalet”, these Israeli military operations targeted settlements with the intention of systematically removing the indigenous Palestinian population by means of aggressive psychological warfare36. This Israeli military strategy entailed massacres, rape, and summary executions of men of military age (classified by IDF logistics files as men ages 13-56), and the evacuation and eventual razing of hundreds of Palestinian settlements.38 From November 1947 to April 1948, orders for Plan Dalet increasingly included the phrase tihur – “cleansing/purification”, reflecting through linguistic constructivism the Israeli perception of Palestinian presence within the newly defined state of Israel as “impure” or “tainting” to the emerging collective identity of Israel.39

Two effects that have had a profound impact on Palestinian collective memory and identity have resulted from this Israeli policy of “cleansing”40. These have occurred within the larger domain of displacement, and affect Palestinian identity today as the disparities of loss and destruction of settlements and the creation of a tremendous refugee population. Though estimates vary from as few as 250,000 to as many as 800,000 refugees, recent research has tended to favor a larger figure of 700,000+ refugees having been generated in the process of 1948.41 Today, these refugees number around four million, a figure that “constitutes the largest single national group among the more than 20 million refugees world-wide.” Extensive research has evidenced the destruction of at least 418 villages, a loss that has severely challenged Palestinian collective identity. As Pappe’s research reveals, once villages were abandoned they were often laced with landmines to ensure the impossibility of later repopulation. Going a step further in preventing the reclamation of land, Walid Khalidi relates the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) policy of removing Palestinian and Arabic names from regional maps of successfully razed and depopulated villages.42 This later tactic constitutes what Rashid Khalidi refers to as “memoricide”, the act of destroying memory itself by ‘killing’ its observable triggers within the perceptible world.43

Taken holistically, the polysemous understanding that al-nakba embodies as linguistic construct is that of a conceptual framework for collective Palestinian memory and identity as they relate to the atrocities endured and disparities produced by the events of 1948 – and their slightly broader time-scale from the twilight of 1947 onwards. The complex and multi-faceted nature of this language choice has become symbolically encoded within it, functioning today as the linguistic constructivist structure that reminds and informs of historic oppression, injustice, and discordance.

For both Israelis and Palestinians, the role of linguistic constructivism in selecting how to portray events within their histories directly correlates with the construction of both memory and identity through language choice. Though encoding relative perceptions and readings of the destructive nature of the 1948 war and its significance as either a pejorative or an ameliorative event, the mechanism and capacity of linguistic constructivism was also used for other ends of identity construction. This directly concerns the linguistic decisions of the Zionist movement in its modifications and use of Hebrew as pragmatic language of discourse.

Hebrew has been spoken for several millennia in both Palestine and throughout the earth. Until the mid-19th century, the use of Hebrew has been almost entirely confined to a liturgical context of use. The rise of Zionism in Europe and later in Palestine recognized altered this contextual use profoundly. In attempting to establish a Jewish national homeland, Zionism sought to not only create its own political autonomy, but to do so with the forwarding of a new identity separate from the Ashkenazi European past. So it was that “Hebrew became a modern language during the nineteenth century and the dominant native tongue later in Palestine”. Through the linguistic engineering efforts of Zionists such as Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, the Hebrew language came to removed from a purely religious use and transformed into a synthesized Sephardic and Ashkenazi phonological project whereby the “new” Hebrew came to borrow phonological patterns from each language in a manner that rendered it distinct from either.44 Though such linguistic manipulation and re-contextualization was initially rejected as being unorthodox and blasphemous, the constant association of this particular form of Hebrew with Zionist ambitions of establishing a homeland caused its rapid acceptance.45

It is essential to bear in mind precisely how abstract and profound the introduction and acceptance of a new spoken form of an ancient language within less than a century remains to be 46. As recent analysis on the poetics of this linguistic phenomenon emphasize:

“In observing the history of new spoken Hebrew (for which, unfortunately, we have only partial documentation), two things become clear: first, an enormous revolution was needed to turn it into a secular tongue for daily use; secondly, the linguistic and paralinguistic phenomena which perforce accompanied its revival had no connection whatsoever with any kind of ancient historical situation.”47

The creation of the state of Israel served as the required revolutionary medium for such a tremendous linguistic project. Its success can be accounted by the status of Hebrew as the official language of Israel from 1948 onward. That the manner in which Israelis speak has been chosen in the context of Hebrew’s revival is an explicit representation of linguistic constructivism’s capacity to influence and reflect collective identity.48

This identity construction and modification has extended beyond language engineering in its purest sense, and touched on the domains of the cultural practice of naming. By the arrival of the fourth aliyah,
Ashkenazi Jews immigrating into Palestine began adopting Hebrew surnames. Paralleling the new Hebrew linguistic project’s design of developing a new identity, names were initially chosen on the criteria of their rarity in contemporary use and their historic placement within a particularly military period of Israeli history. This practice was undertaken by even the most influential members of the Zionist movement, including David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, and Binyamin Ze’ev Herzl - who were formerly David Grün, Golda Mabovitch, and Theodore Herzl respectively. Considered holistically, the Zionist practices of forwarding a new form of Hebrew and adopting names from a specific point in Israeli history were chosen to symbolically relate a new Israeli identity. As part of a Zionist intellectual project, this new collective identity was engineered to be distinct and separate from the Ashkenazim European Jewish past, and to evoke an image of an independent, strong, and unified Israeli people.

The impact of this Israeli linguistic constructivist policy has profoundly impacted Palestinian collective identity. Said’s eloquence expresses this extraordinarily:

“For years and years an assiduous campaign to maintain a frozen version of Israel's heroic narrative of repatriation and justice obliterated any possibility of a Palestinian narrative, in large part because certain key components of the Israeli story stressed certain geographical characteristics of Palestine itself. Take the key notion of liberation: so strong was the story of Jewish independence and reemergence after the Holocaust that it became virtually impossible to ask the question, Liberation and independence from whom? If the question was asked it was always answered as liberation from British imperialism. Or, as the story got elaborated, it was defense against invading Arab armies that wanted to crush the young state. The Palestinians thus faded into the encircling and menacing obscurity of "the Arabs," the fact that they were actual residents occluded and simultaneously denied.”

The weight of Said’s words well relates the contemporary role of linguistic constructivism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This can be readily observed in the contrasted conceptualizations of the cultural landscapes of Palestinians and Israelis. Perhaps no better description of this contrast can be presented than through the brevity of appreciating these respective cultural landscapes as being one of settlement, and one of occupation.

![Population in Palestine West of Jordan River by Religion Groups, 1st Century AD Rough Estimates, Thousands](image)

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**Table:**

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- Including “Others”/Divides, other small religious minorities, and since 1900 immigrants from the former U.S.S.R.
- Without religious affiliation.
- Sources: (C) 1975; (Z) 1977; after 1975. Author's estimates based on Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
Endnotes:

[3]. Ibid,24
[4]. Sergio DellaPergola (IUSSP XXIV General Population Conference - S64, 2001) - See attached Fig.1.
[8]. Smith, 25.
[11]. Smith, 29
[13]. DellaPergola (2001)
[14]. State of Israel- Ministry of Immigration Absorption (MOIA) - Literal translation - “ascent”; “return”
[16]. R. Khalidi .57
[17]. Ibid, 58
[20]. See Fig.2.
[21]. R. Khalidi, p 64
[22]. See Fig-2
[30]. Ibid.
[31]. R. Khalidi,106
[34]. R. Khalidi. P 112
[35]. Pappe, 115.
[36]. Dalet – transliterated as the letter “D” in Hebrew
[38]. Pappe, 127.
[40]. Ibid,134
[41]. Ibid, 137
[42]. W. Khalidi. All That . P 45
[47]. Ibid
[48]. Stine, P 122.
[49]. Morris, 459.
[51]. Said, 64.