The Implications Of Resolution 2132 And Peace Building In The Conflict Of South Sudan

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Abstract
The study investigated the implications of resolution 2132 and peacebuilding in the South Sudan Conflict. The South Sudan conflict was regarded as one of the worst crises in the international system. The crisis claimed the lives of more than fifty thousand people and led to the displacement of over fourteen thousand Sudanese, including women and children. This necessitated the adoption of resolution 2132 by the United Nations Security Council to bring the war to an end. The theoretical framework adopted for the study was the realist theory of international relations propounded by Hans J. Morgenthau. Secondary sources of data were utilised for the study. It involved the collection of data from sources such as textbooks, seminar papers and journals, etc. The work observed that the South Sudan conflict witnessed one of the most grave humanitarian crises since the First and Second World Wars. Hundreds of thousands lost their lives, while many were displaced, including women and children. The Red Cross put the death toll at over 50,000 and the number of internally displaced at 14,000. The work recommends that there is a need to draft a new constitution for the country that would require the establishment of a political and economic system that guarantees each and every South Sudanese equity and equality. The politics of winner takes all should be ruled out, while the separation of powers between the executive, judiciary, legislature and the local government must be strengthened. Division of labour among the various security forces must be emphasised so that they are divorced from politics.
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I.   Introduction

Warner (2016) noted that despite gaining independence, the prevailing social, political and economic conditions indicated that South Sudan embarked on its new path as a fragile state. Sudan, on the other hand, had to contend with the significant reduction of its territory and the loss of approximately 75 per cent of its oil reserves to South Sudan (Ottaway et. al, 2012). Sefa-Nyarko (2016) observed that, nonetheless, South Sudan had inherited a legacy of underdevelopment from years of marginalisation, epitomised by poor infrastructure, low human capital, limited financial resources, and weak civilian and security institutions. This fragile environment in which the new state found itself was further exacerbated by massive corruption in the government, disagreement among political leaders and a trend of ethnic entrenchment in the society (Nyarko, 2016).

Rolandsen (2015) posit that the increasing political tensions in December 2013, founded on rising suspicions particularly in the executive arm, led to the outbreak of conflict. President Kiir had accused his deputy, Machar, of masterminding a coup attempt; an allegation that Machar vehemently denied. Noteworthy, although ethnicity did not account as an immediate cause of conflict, the warring parties exploited ethnic differences to settle political and ideological differences. The conflict was characterised by acts of war crimes such as genocide, forceful displacement, destruction of properties and extreme violence against women and children (Rolandsen, 2015). Hundreds of people, including women and children, were forced to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. The two faces behind this conflict were Salva Kiir and Riek Machar.

Responding to the rapidly deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis in South Sudan, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution which is known as 2132 among others, which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and overall increased force levels of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (United Nations Security Council, 2013). In resolution 2132 (2013), the 15-member body decided that the Mission would augment its military component up to 12,500 troops of all ranks, as well as a

police component up to 1,323, including appropriate Formed Police Units. Authorising the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to facilitate inter-mission cooperation, the Council also approved the appropriate transfer of troops, force enablers and multipliers from other missions, in particular the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (United Nations Security Council, 2011). Such a drastic response from the Security Council can be explained by the fact that many people had lost their lives; the Red Cross put the number of lives lost at over 50,000 people during the first three months of the conflict, which is higher than those who had been killed in Syria. It is based on the above that this study investigates the implications of resolution 2132 and Peace Building in the South Sudan Conflict.

Problem Statement

The South Sudan conflict was one of the most devastating conflicts in the Middle East in recent times. The conflict that began in 2013 lasted for more than five years as with devastating effects on lives and properties. As noted by Blackings (2016), the conflict continued with heavy casualties witnessed until 2015, when a temporary peace treaty was signed. Cessation of hostilities did not last long as both sides accused each other of violating the terms of the peace treaty. Episodic violence kept erupting as the country remained unstable. Even the Southern parts that were relatively peaceful and known for their high crop yields came under attack. This affected food production in the country and diminished supply quantities (Keitany, 2016). Janssen (2017, p.98) captured the situation when he posited that "the government lost monopoly over coercive power and was unable to administer justice, provide basic services to the citizens and guarantee their security". Also, domestic sovereignty and more particularly the legitimacy of the political elites were highly disputed as the country was staring into a possible genocide (African Union 2014).

Targeted attacks on civilians, gender-based violence, including rape, burning of homes and livestock, murder and kidnapping continue to be widespread. Aid convoys continue to be attacked and relief food looted by different warring groups. According to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), almost 50% of all children eligible to be enrolled were out of school. The violence continued to affect not just school children but also farmers and other workers who had abandoned their duties to find other means of surviving. The situation in South Sudan was among the worst in the world. Bariyo (2014) noted that before the dust of the independence celebrations even settled, the civil war erupted, and as a result, there was no adequate time to establish institutions and response mechanisms that could have at least reduced the effects of the war. It is therefore necessary to interrogate the implications of resolution 2132 and Peace Building in the South Sudan Conflict.

Key Objectives

1. Examine the historical antecedents of the South Sudan conflict.
2. Identify and discuss factors that propel the South Sudan conflict.

Significance of the Paper

The study has policy significance as the study proffers measures on how best to respond to global conflict in the international system. The recommendations of this paper, when properly implemented, will help address the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan.

Conceptual Review
The Concept of Conflict

The World Health Organisation (WHO) has described conflict as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community, leading to injury, death, physical harm or deprivation" (WHO, 2002, p.5). Akpuru-Aja (2009) noted that prior to the existence of any conflict (violent and non-violent conflict), there are usually indicators or catastrophic signals exhibited by the factional leaders in the conflict. These signals include unpleasant utterances, unfriendly attitudes and non-compromising posture, which would normally be noticed among the persons in a conflict. When these warnings are ignored in their early stages, they would normally metamorphose into violent conflict and genocides (Akpuru-Aja, 2009).

Wallensteen (2015) noted that the availability of resources, which individuals assume are scarce, puts them in opposition to one another to possess the resources they need or attain a certain level of power at the expense of a rival group. This means that conflict creates room for unhealthy competition or intra-group/inter-group rivalry that often culminates in clannishness and other forms of divisive strategies aimed at downplaying the success of other groups. There is hardly any conflict scenario where belligerent parties are not concerned

with better ways of winning or making the other party give up on assumed incompatible goals. Conflict is an integral part of a modern society and a necessity for social survival. What this means is that conflict does not always have a negative implication, although conflict can have both functional and dysfunctional connotations. In the view of Szarka (2013), there is a consensus amongst intellectuals that there is hardly any development in the world without some elements of conflict. Developments are modernisation (changes) of existing infrastructures and cultures, which could be resisted.

The positive aspect is that humans have the capacity to engage belligerent parties in peacemaking, peace-building, conflict prevention, conflict management and long-term programmes that sustain peaceful coexistence in the world. This means that proper and timely communication, third-party intervention, and effective mediation and negotiation are all effective conflict-management initiatives. A factor that makes some intra-state or inter-group conflicts remain intractable despite the need for peace is communication breakdown.

International Conflict: International conflict involves two or more countries. This type of conflict requires high-powered diplomacy from both sides to be managed effectively. The conflict between Israel and Palestine has assumed an international dimension as a result of divergent interests from both sides. According to the Human Security Report (2013), armed conflicts are classified into state-based armed conflicts, international conflicts and civil wars, in which at least one of the warring parties is the government of a state. The major causes of international conflict include border disputes, historical animosities, economic disputes, differences in political systems, arms races and the influence of major powers (Miall, 2005). It is during international armed conflicts that security forces exhibit some bizarre acts that relate to weariness, the fear of bombardment, and also the mistreatment of prisoners in a prisoner of war camp (Miall, 2005). This problem escalates when the nations involved fail to manage the situation well. Examples of international conflicts are: the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, the conflict between South Sudan and Sudan, the conflict in Sierra Leone and the conflict in Mali, where the Economic Community of West African States had to intervene through its ECOMOG troops. The failure of states to reach an agreement on a ceasefire or adopt a diplomatic approach has the capacity to make them violate human rights.

The Concept of Conflict Management

Wallensteen (2015) conceptualises conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scarce resources, status and power in which the opponents aim to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals. From this definition, it is obvious that conflict involves the parties in question striving to out -do one another. Wiseman (2014) sees conflict as a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings, whether tribal, ethnic, cultural, religious, socio-economic or political, is engaged in conscious opposition to one or more identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what appear to be incompatible goals. The position by Wiseman (2014) is not different from that of Wallensteen (2015) except for semantics. March and Simon (2008), on their part, utilised the decision-making paradigm; they posit that conflict is a breakdown in the standard mechanism of decision making so that an individual or group experiences difficulty in selecting an action alternative. Sessy (2014) visualised conflict from the perspective of the distinction between competition and conflict. To him, competition, just like conflict, involves two or more sub-systems (individual or social) engaged in activities that, in some cases, preclude the successful completion of the other. According to him, in competition, you do not need direct interaction, but in conflict, you do because there is a struggle for resources. Urguahart (2010), on his part, highlighted the issue of pay, social distance, and ethnic factors as contributing to conflict situations. He avers that the greater the amount of social distance, the greater the amount of conflict. The analysis by Urguahart is an implicit or tacit reality. Orobator (2016) was quick to suggest causes of conflict as misunderstanding, personality clashes, values and goal differences, sub-standard performance differences over method, responsibility issues, frustration and noncompliance with rules and policies.

Fierabends and Nesvold (2007) believe that setting up departments to resolve conflicts between individuals or groups or necessary, and this is because different departments would be required to look at different activities in different ways. Sofar (2009), on his part, opined that conflict may be resolved through humour. He went on to say that the target of the humour has implications for the degree to which it can help to resolve conflicts.

The Concept of Conflict Resolution

Kriesberg (2008) noted that in war-torn regions of Africa and Southeast Asia, development workers and humanitarian agencies were seeing the need to take account of conflict and conflict resolution as an integral part of their activities. By the closing years of the Cold War, the climate for conflict resolution was changing radically. With relations between the superpowers improving, the ideological and military competition that had fuelled many regional conflicts was fading away. Protracted regional conflicts in Southern Africa, Central

America, and East Asia moved towards settlements. It seemed that the UN could return to play the role its founders expected.

Kaldor (2009) averred that the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought to a close the long period in which a single international conflict dominated the international system. Instead, internal conflicts, ethnic conflicts, conflicts over secession and power struggles within countries became the norm in the 1990s. These reflected not so much struggles between competing centres of power, of the kind that had characterised international conflict for most of the 350 years since the peace of Westphalia, as the fragmentation and breakdown of state structures, economies and whole societies. At their extreme, in parts of Africa, the new wars witnessed the return of mercenary armies and underpaid militias, which preyed on civilian populations, and were fed as much by what were meant to be overt flows of international aid as by covert criminal international networks (Kaldor, 2009). In this new climate, the attention of scholars of international relations and comparative politics turned to exactly the type of conflict that had preoccupied the conflict resolution thinkers for many years.

A richer cross-fertilisation of ideas developed between conflict resolution and these traditional fields. At the same time, practitioners from various backgrounds were attracted to conflict resolution. International statesmen began to use the language, and international organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) set up conflict resolution mechanisms and conflict prevention centres (Kaldor, 2009). A former president of the United States, Jimmy Carter, became one of the most active leaders of a conflict resolution non-governmental organisation (NGO). The Nyerere Foundation was established with comparable aims for Africa.

Development and aid workers, who had earlier tended to see their function as 'non-political', now became interested in linking their expertise to conflict resolution approaches, because so many of the areas with which they were most concerned were conflict zones – complex humanitarian emergencies were seen also to be 'complex political emergencies. Overseas development ministries in several countries set up conflict units and began funding conflict prevention and resolution initiatives on a significant scale (HIIK, 2005). International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank also took on conflict prevention roles. The UN secretary-general declared the prevention of violent conflict to be a central goal for the international community in the new millennium.

The Concept of Peacekeeping

The concept of peacekeeping as it is presently conceived and applied in the UN system was not originally provided for in the charter of the world body. It is rather a product of the unexpected changing circumstances of the post-World Wars, and since political organisations are necessarily organic in their development, changing according to the will, which informed them and the circumstances which they encounter, the UN system had no option other than to adapt to the needs of the time (UN, 2007). Since its introduction, the concept has received a very prominent place in the workings of the organisation. The UN has chiefly relied upon the concept in its effort to maintain international peace and security. The idea that led to the formation of the UN in the first place is summarised in the preamble to the charter. It is the need to "save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind …to practice tolerance and to live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security" (UN, 1945, p.3). This appeal to maintain international peace and security has, in fact, been the most pressing problem facing the UN.

Peacekeeping has no generally accepted definition. This view is recognised by many analysts and commentators. In other words, it is an elusive concept with varying definitions. As observed by the committee set up by the General Assembly in 1965 to study peacekeeping, the concept is difficult to categorise (Uruhart, 2010). However, the committee maintained that peacekeeping operations are "the operations of a military, para-military or non-military character which are to be conducted by the United Nations for maintenance of peace and security, except for those which fall under the category of enforcement action under chapter VII B of the UN charter. A second committee on the same subject maintains that the executive competence of the Security Council covers all operations that involve the establishment of a force, military or otherwise, for the mere purpose of observation and investigation, whether or not the action is initiated under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. A close look at the above definitions of the same subject matter suggests that the first has a liberal democratic undertone by the United States and its allies, while the second, represented by the views of the Soviet Union and its allies, with a set authoritarian standard for democracy.

Rosalyn (2010) defines peacekeeping as the operation in which personnel owing allegiance to the UN are engaged in military or para-military duties, and are carrying weapons for their own defence in pursuit of duties designated by the UN as necessary for the maintenance or restoration of peace. The above definition suggests that it is within the exclusive competence of the UN and particularly the General Assembly to initiate a peacekeeping operation, and that the forces, though with military weapons, should not fight except in self-

defence. For Claud (1964), peacekeeping is an interim measure to contain the area of conflict and hold the line until a negotiable settlement of disputes can be achieved. His definition gives the impression that the operation is of a temporary nature and does not specify how the conflict area could be contained by military force or otherwise.

The Concept of Peace-building

Elizabeth and Charles (2014) stated that the initial post-conflict period in most countries is characterised by significant insecurity and political uncertainty. They further stated that Peace processes can advance, but they also often suffer periods of regression (Elizabeth and Charles, 2014). Many countries are governed by transitional political arrangements until after the first post-conflict elections, when newly elected representatives have assumed their executive and legislative functions. So the success of peace-building depends in part on the political decisions of those involved (national and local governments, communities, donors, the UN itself), in part on effective leadership (by national governments and within the UN), and on resources like human capital or donor financing (Elizabeth and Charles, 2014).

There is no simple, clear-cut definition of peace-building that sets it apart from conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian and development assistance (UN, 2009). For one thing, there is considerable overlap of goals and activities along the spectrum from conflict to peace. For another, various peace-building activities may take place in each phase of the spectrum. The UN Charter clearly outlines the mandate of the whole UN system to engage in peace-building (UN, 2009). The first preambular paragraph speaks of saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war," and the first article states that the purpose of the UN is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace" (UN, 2009).

In most post-conflict situations, there are many international actors who contribute to peace-building as security, development and humanitarian staff. Humanitarian and sometimes development staff may already be in a country during conflict, so they are ready on the ground (albeit at diminished capacity). Once the conflict ends at that point, the Security Council may mandate the deployment of a UN country presence. The UN would then draw from its various capacities the resources required to respond to that country`s specific post-conflict security, political, humanitarian and development challenges. A new mission may be designed in parallel with a peace process, or after a peace has been signed.

If the Security Council approves the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, then UN peacekeepers (formed military and police units, observers and advisers) deploy to support national security actors in establishing the safety and security needed for peace-building to get underway (UN, 2009). In addition, UN peacekeepers increasingly play a significant role as early peace-builders themselves. The mandates of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations include many peace-building tasks, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), support to electoral processes and re-establishing governmental authority. International and national civilian staff are employed to support those tasks (UN, 2009).

Theoretical framework
Realist Theory

The theory was propounded by Hans J. Morgenthau. According to Morgenthau (1978), thus, the goal of the state has come to include the search for ways to acquire and keep power, increase power and demonstrate power. In short, in a world of conflicting states seeking power, or a world confirmed by historical experience and by the nature of man, states must engage in power politics to survive, and they should do anything prudent or otherwise to achieve that goal. Realism is one of the theories of international relations. Before the end of the Cold War was the realist theory emerged. The lack of ideological tension in the international political system does not, however, make the theory more or less acceptable in the study and analysis of global politics, and neither does it make the theory redundant in the analysis of a nation's foreign policy formulations and execution. Relating and applying the realist perspective in understanding resolution 2132 and peace building in the South Sudan war, it is pertinent to state that the South Sudan conflict was propelled by the interest of political rivalry.

Methodology

The article adopted the deductive analytical methodological tools guided by the qualitative method, descriptive design, secondary sources of data collection and content analysis.

II.   Results And Analysis

Historical Antecedents of the South Sudan Conflict

South Sudan became independent in 2011 as the youngest nation in the world. It is located in the heart of Africa and borders six countries, consisting of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda. After nearly 40 years of war between the Sudanese government and southern rebels, southern Sudan announced separation from Sudan in a January 2011 referendum (Cheeseman, 2015). During the civil war, more than 2.5 million people were killed, and about 4.5 million were displaced (Blanchard 2016). However, in December 2013, political tensions among major leaders in South Sudan exploded with violence. As observed by Blanchard (2016), the political conflict that triggered the crisis was not based on ethnic identity, but overlapped with pre-existing ethnic and political complaints, sparking armed conflicts and targeted genocide in the capital, Juba and elsewhere. President Salva Kiir accused his former vice president, Riek Machar, of plotting a coup, but Machar continued to deny the allegation. Reportedly, during the first few days of the conflict, hundreds of civilians were killed in attacks targeting the Nuer, Juba's Machar ethnic group (Red Cross, 2015). Subsequently, Nuer's revenge attack against Dinka, Kiir's ethnic group, and retaliatory violence spread. Machar, with the support of several senior military commanders in Nuer, subsequently declared the rebellion. The conflict between government forces and militias loyal to President Kiir and forces associated with Machar caused massive displacement, exacerbating the country's vast pre-existing development needs and problems (Blackings, 2016).

The origin of the South Sudan conflict can be traced to an agreement signed on 9 January 2005 between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the government of the Sudan, which ended the war for independence that started in 1983 (Gary and Adam 2017). Under the terms of the peace agreement, a Southern Sudan Autonomous Region was created and run by the SPLM with a promise that a referendum would be held on independence in 2011. Bariyo (2014) noted that during the six years of autonomy, the desire for political independence kept in-fighting within the SPLM in check, but disputes arose over how to share the oil revenues. One consequence of the war's end was that the oil fields in southern Sudan could be developed far more extensively than was possible during the war, and began to be pumped. Between 2006 and 2009, sales of oil brought in an annual average of US$2.1 billion to the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region. Disputes between leading personalities in the SPLM over how to appropriate the oil revenues led to recurring tensions (Bariyo, 2014). A system emerged during the autonomous period where SPLM leaders used the wealth generated by the oil to buy the loyalty of not only the troops, but the people at large, creating intense competition to control the oil. After the 2011 referendum, which led to 98% of voters choosing independence from the Sudan, on 9 July 2011, South Sudan became an independent nation.

Adam (2018) in his account noted that in 2010, after a disputed election, George Alther led the South Sudan Democratic Movement in rebellion against the government. The same year, a faction of the South Sudan Democratic Movement, called the Cobra Faction, led by David Yau Yau, rebelled against the government they accused of being prejudiced against the Murle. His faction signed a cease-fire with the government in 2011, and his militia was reintegrated into the army, but he then defected again in 2012 (Adam, 2018). After the army's notorious 2010 disarmament campaign with widespread abuses of the Shilluk people, who were alleging persecution by the ruling Dinka John Uliny from the Shilluk people began a rebellion, leading the Upper Nile faction of the South Sudan Democratic Movement (Adam, 2018). Gabriel Tang, who led a militia allied to Khartoum during the Second Sudanese Civil War, clashed regularly with the SPLA until 2011, when his soldiers were reintegrated into the national army. In 2011, Peter Gadet led a rebellion with the South Sudan Liberation Army, but was reintegrated into the army the same year. In a strategy of co-option known as 'big tent', the government often buys off community militia and pardons its leaders (Adam, 2018).

Factors that Propel the South Sudan Conflict

The South Sudan conflict was regarded as one of the worst conflicts in the international system, as it claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands and displaced many, including women and children. The following are some of the major factors that fuel the crisis.

The oil narrative: Martell (2016) stated that natural resources have turned into a course for many African countries in the sense that it has led to a high level of corruption among government officials and, in most cases, prompted the government to disengage from citizens as they rely on oil revenues rather than taxes from citizens. This circumstance applies to South Sudan, where oil income constituted 98 per cent of the national budget and almost all foreign currency earnings (Wel, 2013). Therefore, South Sudan has the world's most oil-dependent budget.

Sudan is ranked in forty-eight (48) positions in the world oil production. The United States is ranked first on the table. Also, Sudan ranked in seventh (7) position in Africa with 530,000 barrels per day, while Nigeria remains in the number one position on the African continent. The data above reveal South Sudan's

endowment of oil resources. The government has, to a great extent, failed to improve the welfare and living conditions of the population despite the huge oil wealth found in the country. This huge mineral deposit became a subject of accumulation by the various groups in Sudan. This was so as the different factions (government and rebel groups) want to have absolute rights over oil fields and other natural resources. To explain economic underdevelopment in most of the developing countries, especially in Africa, the natural resource curse has been widely cited by political economists such as Waal (2014), who have linked natural resources with political instability.

Corruption: Corruption is the bane of socio-economic development in developing countries. It plays a major role in fueling the South Sudan conflict. In South Sudan, political influence is utilised to warrant riches, and evidently, there is a high level of corruption among state authorities. At a point in time, President Kiir reshuffled his whole cabinet in July 2013, thus expelling preeminent elites, for example, former Vice President Rick Machar and other cabinet Ministers. President Kiir purposely blamed the pretentious government authorities for corruption (Lunn, 2016). In addition, President Salva Kiir accused 75 ministers and officials in 2012 of stealing US$4 billion in state funds and demanded the return of stolen funds. As indicated by Martell (2016), just 1.5 per cent of this sum was really recovered. Given the above scenario, one may contend that the conflict in the nation was really a function of displeasure and dissatisfaction experienced by most of the populace. Baffled soldiers, especially junior officers and destitute youths, observe the situation and then take the trust in joining militia groups by taking up arms against every imaginable enemy, including the government and even themselves (Martell, 2016). Because of the high levels of poverty and despair, some youths accept that death on the battlefield is more glorious than the gradual death caused by hunger and poverty.

Availability of arms to civilians: The narrative on access to arms is essential in examining the conflict in South Sudan. The independence of South Sudan and the failure of the government to conduct an immediate disarmament of the public left thousands of civilians armed. Access to weapons enabled militia groups and civilians to take the responsibility of their security into their own hands, thus challenging the government's monopoly over the use of violence (Andrew, 2019). The recognition that thousands of arms are owned by civilians led to calls by regional governments and humanitarian agencies to the UN Security Council to impose an embargo on weapons and other ammunition on South Sudan. The challenge to this narrative is that it does offer reasons why individuals within the same society would be involved in killing other communities. The proliferation of arms in South Sudan was a major factor that led to the conflict.

The role of Sudan in the conflict: Proponents of this narrative are keen on referring to past efforts by Khartoum to destabilise the southern region and even provide support to South Sudanese to carry out attacks in the region (Blanchard, 2016). A case in point is the support of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) by Khartoum between 1983 and 2005 (Young 2006). This alliance saw the SSDF, headed by, among others, Riek Machar, supporting garrisons of the Sudanese Armed Forces and protecting oil fields in the Northern part of South Sudan on behalf of the Khartoum government. In exchange, the SSDF received technical and military assistance from the Arab North, including arms believed to have been instrumental in the 1991 Bor Massacre (Canadian Department of Justice, 2014). Sudan and South Sudan have also been caught up in a dispute over the oil-rich Abyei region, which both parties insist belongs to their side of the border (Born and Ravivn, 2017).

Ethnicity in South Sudan Conflict: Ethnicity has been the oversimplified explanation of the conflict in South Sudan. The elites, for example, Kiir and Machar had controlled their political intrigue and contrasts and presented them for ethnic patriotism, preparing their kinsmen into taking an interest in a violent clash that has taken a huge number of lives and rendered a large number of South Sudanese destitute and homeless, while others have been turned into refugees to neighboring countries (Institute for peace and security studies, 2018).

Summary of Findings
1. There have been concerns over, inter alia, insufficient funding of these institutions, lack of leverage, insufficient command and control structures, and parallelisms.
   The work observed that complex military-political relations in South Sudan were also visible and caused a hindrance to peace.
2. There have been strong affiliations between soldiers and political elites, specifically from their ethnic groups, to whom they seem to pay more allegiance than to the state. This complex relationship is not new and began long ago, during and after the struggle for independence.
3. The work also observed that the South Sudan conflict witnessed one of the most grave humanitarian crises since the First and Second World Wars. Hundreds of thousands lost their lives, while many were displaced,

including women and children. The Red Cross put the death toll at over 50,000 and the number of internally displaced at 14,000.

4. The study observed that sustainable peace in South Sudan cannot be realised until key factors are addressed. These include an inadequate sense of nationalism due to the presence of ethnic identities stronger than national identity; a lack of strong institutions to ensure full implementation of peace agreements; a lack of neutral security forces that do not take sides in the conflict; and a lack of political will to achieve peace.

III.   Conclusion

The state-building process in South Sudan is threatened by weak institutional arrangements between various arms of government, thereby interfering with the effective implementation of the peace agreement. This problem is further expounded by the tendencies of foreign donors to deal with specific institutions, such as departments, rather than facilitate and develop cross-departmental collaboration. Years of conflict have detached citizens from the government. To many, the government in itself has been the cause of all the violence and destruction. As such, many civilians do consider the existing government as illegitimate and one that cannot adequately address their views. It is therefore imperative that the government needs to incorporate citizens in the formulation of government policy in accordance with internationally recognised practices of good governance. This will ensure that government policy is an initiative of the people.

IV.   Recommendations

1. There is a need to establish a temporary Transitional Authority under a Security Council Resolution that will include nominees from the political, economic, professional, diaspora, religious and cultural spheres of South Sudan and the international community.

2. There is a need for the international community to create a special fund for the Sudanese to enable victims of the conflict to get back on their feet. Those displaced, children and women need to be reintegrated into society why infrastructures destroyed as a result of the war need to be rebuilt.

3. It is necessary to continue negotiations among the various groups, with the involvement of the international community is also a key path to a sustainable, peaceful resolution to end the protracted conflict.

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