

Religious Reforms and Revival in Turkey: A Study of Erbakan

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Abstract: Necmettin Erbakan played a key role in making Islam potent political force in the secular state. Under his industrialization projects, states managed to provide guaranteed employment for the educated youth, welfare services, and subsidies for their citizens. As the economic expansion became unsustainable, the state's ability to deliver benefits for its citizens declined, which resulted in stronger calls for change' in the system. His Islamist movement represents a response to the imposed modernization process and its failure to deliver its promises. He was able to build the base of Islamist politics across the globe and successfully acts as an inspiration for Islamic Movements around the Earth. Erbakan's era witnessed rapid economic development and the Islamization of Turkish nationalism. This paper deals with various aspect taken by the Necmettin Erbakan during his time in concern with social, economic, as well as religious establishment in the modern Turkey.

Key word: Necmettin Erbakan, Social Welfare, Economic growth, Religious Establishment, Turkey

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I. INTRODUCTION

Necmettin Erbakan, the long-time leader of Turkey's Islamic political movement, was briefly Prime Minister in the country's first Islamic-led coalition. He was one of the most influential Turkish politicians in the second half of the 20th century. Erbakan's political vision was radically anti-secular and anti-Western, and throughout his career, he called for the overthrow of Turkey's secular Kemalist regime. Despite political bans and party closures, he always re-emerged and never wavered from his belief in an Islamic Turkey. Even though he hated Kemalism, Erbakan rejected the violent jihadist revolution. Instead, he favored a gradualist, "bottom-up" approach to Islamist revival and political reform that relied heavily on Islamist *Dawa*, or ideological preaching and education. Turkey is the only Muslim country in which Islam is not the state religion, while laicism is enshrined in the constitution. However, Turkey is noticeably more Islamic today than in the 1960s. The relationship between religion and politics has been one of the most important topics in human history. All religions have connected themselves with politics in different patterns. Yavuz and Esposito argue that there is no single pattern of interaction between religion and politics in Islam, but rather several competing ones. Moreover, among the varying patterns, there are dissimilarities in the distribution of power, functions, and relations among institutions according to each country's specific history and politics. In this regard, Turkey is an interesting and important example in terms of its relations with Islam as a strict secular nation-state.¹

Erbakan's wit and colorful personality endeared him even to his opponents. He was affectionately known as "Hodja" or "Teacher" by his followers, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President Abdullah Gül and other protégés. He is credited with laying the foundations for political Islamism in modern Turkey. "Erbakan was a scientist who devoted his life to learning," Erdogan said. "We will remember him with gratitude." He was also one of the founding members of the Developing Eight (D8), an economic alliance of developing countries with large Muslim populations, consisting of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey.²

The moderate Islamists who favoured radical strategies proceeded with their battle through political exercises under the top of adversary parties like the preservationist Progressive Republican Party. Nevertheless, due to the enact of Tranquillity Statement Laws to repress the Sheikh Said revolt supported by Kurdish tribes in the south-eastern part of Anatolia, the weight on the Islamists alongside other resistance bunches progressively enlarged, in this way the exercises of all other ideological groups except for Republican People's Party were restricted. Henceforward, under the shade of stun treatment, which was applied to Turkish society through recently developed Kemalist organization and military elites, Pan Islamism philosophy that some time ago proposed a Muslim association bit by bit changed over to Islamism, along these lines it started to advocate an Islam based state model in Turkey. In any case, since the global and local guess rose after the First World War, Islamism was obliged to forsake its open talk and inevitably introduced to be politicized, for the most part concentrating on the preservation of strict and conventional standards in Turkish society.³

Since its transition to multiparty politics in 1946, competitive elections and peaceful transfer of power following national electoral contests have been the principal characteristic of Turkish politics. Unlike their

counterparts in many other developing countries, including those of the Middle East, political parties in Turkey have displayed a relatively high degree of organizational strength, complexity, and continuity.

On account of the progress to a multi-party framework in Turkey, the weight on Islamists diminished moderately. Islamists at this period started taking an interest in the policymaking procedure of the nation at the lines of the Democrat Party. The Islam well-disposed strategy approaches of Adnan Menderes like the change of Azan (call for supplication) from Turkish to Arabic. It exceptionally added to this very alliance process. In any case, as an outcome of 27th May 1960, rebellion Democrat Party was shut by the Military system, and the exercises of Islamists were cancelled. The primary association of Political Islam was acknowledged because of the activities of Prof. Zahid Kotku.⁴

Zahid Kotku as a response to ceaseless battles and political interests at conservative gatherings and to express the thoughts of Islamists all the more unequivocally chose to set up an ideological group 'that can stand itself' with an Islamic direction. Kotkufavored the initiative of Necmettin Erbakan as a promising and exceptional character of the primary Islamist ideological group in Turkey. In this manner, Necmettin Erbakan, from that point onward, embraced the unquestionable alluring, conventional Islamist initiative that made him the most remarkable figure of political Islam in Turkey.⁵

Likewise, with different Islamists of his age, Erbakan was an enthusiastic devotee to Islamic solidarity and the possibility that the entire of the world's Muslims could be brought together into one Umma, a worldwide Muslim Nation. The perfect of Islamic solidarity was a repetitive subject in his numerous talks, and it ruled his political vocation and activism also. He upheld, for example, for the foundation of a Muslim traditions association, an Islamic NATO, an Islamic United Nations, just as solitary Islamic cash. During his short residency as the Prime Minister of Turkey, Erbakan established the "D8," which was planned as an Islamic equal toward the Western-ruled "Gathering of Seven."⁶

1.1 Personal Account

Necmettin Erbakan was born on October 29, 1926, in Sinop, a port on the Black Sea coast of Turkey. His father, Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, was a judge who held positions in different provinces of Anatolia. Accordingly, Erbakan studied in different schools in Kayseri, central Anatolia, and Trabzon on the Black Sea and later was sent to the Istanbul High School for boys as a boarding student. In 1948 he graduated as an engineer from the Istanbul Technical University Faculty of Engineering and continued to work at that University until 1951. He then left for Germany, where he earned his Ph.D. Upon his return to Istanbul in 1953, he was appointed an Associate Professor at the Department of Mechanical Engineering at Istanbul University and in 1965 he became a professor. Concurrently with his academic work, Erbakan supervised the construction of an electric motor factory.⁷

He was appointed chairman of the board of the Industrial Department of the Union of Turkish Chambers of Trade and Industry in 1966 and served as the union's general secretary. After two years, he was elected to the directorate of the union and, after a year, became its chairman. His political vocation started in 1969 when he was chosen for the Turkish parliament as an autonomous up-and-comer. From that point forward, Erbakan drove five Islamist parties, four of which were restricted because of their dismissal of Turkey's mainstream constitution. The Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party): 1970-1971, Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party): 1974-1980, the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party): 1983-1998, Virtue Party: 1998-2001, Saadet Partisi (2001-present). The Constitutional Court restricted the gatherings Erbakan established because they abused Article 14 of the Turkish Constitution: "None of the rights and opportunities encapsulated in the Constitution will be practiced to disregard the inseparable trustworthiness of the state with its domain and country, of imperiling the presence of the Turkish State and Republic, of annihilating central rights and opportunities, of setting the administration of the state heavily influenced by an individual or a gathering of individuals."⁸

In 1969 Erbakan was chosen as a free possibility for Konya after neglecting to get Demirel's help for his consideration in the Justice Party. The financial emergency of the late 1960s had changed the current parity of class powers. Huge business interests, based for the most part in Istanbul and sorted out into enormous holding organizations, started to conflict with those of little and medium common capital. The Justice Party bit by bit got related to enormous business and subsequently lost the help of different voting demographics. This offered to ascend to numerous littler gatherings. The party's electoral support was based on artisans, small traders, and other low-income groups from rural areas. While the Justice Party was the object of the economic attack, the RPP and the left represented the threat to the family, religion, and cultural values.⁹

In 1974 Erbakan was nominated as Deputy Prime Minister to Bulent Ecevit, breaking a historic barrier and lending the NSP (National Salvation Party) a certain legitimacy that had never been granted to Islamic representatives in the Kemalist-based Turkish republic. In 1975, Erbakan turned into a pastor in Suleyman Demirel's legislature. All through the 1970s, the NSP remained the third-biggest gathering in parliament. After the 1980 overthrow, the NSP was shut somewhere near the military. Erbakan was captured and attempted by a military court in Ankara in July 1983 yet was later discharged. In 1985 he made a political

rebound to again turn into the pioneer of an Islamic gathering, this time the RefahPartisi ("Welfare Party"). In 1992, Erdogan entered parliament with 16.7 percent of the votes, together with Türkiye.¹⁰

1.2 Father of Religious Revival

Necmettin Erdogan, the 'star of religion' as his name means, who died in 2011, was the most influential Turkish Islamist politician. He handpicked key personnel, and the Islamist party's doctrine was based principally on his concept of "MilliGörüs. His manifesto, "MilliGörüs" or "National View," was a euphemism for political Islam; the Kemalist idea of the state utilized a strict name inconceivable. Similarly, as with numerous other Islamist Pentecostal tracts, the proclamation required an extreme dismissal of common "Western" qualities and restriction to a wide range of "unbeliever" monetary and political thoughts. The declaration was prominent for its profound bigotry toward all Muslims who didn't share this vision of Islamist restoration and change. Additionally, the plan of the statement was the toppling of the Kemalist mainstream framework in Turkey, and it's supplanting with what Erdogan portrayed as a "just order" because of Islam.¹¹

Many Turkish scholars have described how the basic ideological orientation of the MilliGörüs movement has remained unchanged since its founding. According to SebnemGumuscu, the "MilliGörüs movement under the leadership of Necmettin Erdogan has implicitly envisioned an Islamic state, and it explicitly aimed for Islamization of Turkish society."Erdogan's political vision was established in an exceptionally particular and profoundly ideological comprehension of Muslim history and Western impact on the globe.He held a romanticized perspective on Islam's initial days, during the main ages after the passing of the Prophet Muhammad, and he required an arrival to their model by decontaminating society of its un-Islamic impacts. For Erdogan, the innovation and organizations that made the advanced West more dominant than Muslim nations were, truth be told, initially Islamic.He accused what he depicted as the political, financial, and moral decay of Turkey on defiling Western impacts, which debilitated Islam and the Islamic character of Turkey. As Gunes Murat Tezcur calls attention to, for Erdogan, "Islam was an all-encompassing belief system that was in an unavoidable battle with the West."¹²

Erdogan's political rhetoric was typical of other mainstream Islamists of his generation. He frequently used Manichean language, describing a fundamental struggle between "us versus them," "good versus evil," and "us against the West and the Jews." On "the stump," the author Marvin Howe has observed that Erdogan, "was the consummate Third World radical, crusading against Turkey's Western ties and ubiquitous Zionist plots and in favour of a new Islamic order."In reality, he consistently mixed his ideological hypotheses about the history and the tainting impacts of Western political and monetary hypothesis, especially private enterprise, with a conspiratorial mentality that was profoundly established in hostile to Zionism and against Semitism. Erdogan's perspective was distinctively in plain view in a 2007 meeting:

"All Infidel nations are one Zionist entity; Jews want to rule from Morocco to Indonesia, the Zionists worked for 5,767 years to build a world order in which all money and power depend on Jews, the US dollar is Zionist money, the Jewish "bacteria" must be diagnosed for a cure to be found; Zionists initiated the Crusades, Jews founded Protestantism and the Capitalist order; and Bush attacked Iraq to build Greater Israel so that Jesus can return."¹³

This rant was hardly a one-time occurrence. In 2010, for example, Erdogan said in an interview with the German newspaper *Die Welt* that,

"For 5700 years, the Jews have ruled the world. It is a rule of injustice, cruelty, and violence. They have strong faith, a religion that tells them that they should rule the world. Check out this one-dollar bill. It is a symbol, a pyramid of 13 steps, with an eye to the tip. It is the symbol of Zionist world domination. The stages represent four "open" and other secret societies, behind that there is a "parliament of 300" and 33 rabbis parliaments, and beyond that others, invisible leaders. They rule the world via the capitalist world order".¹⁴

As a dissident and agitator, Erdogan was particularly gifted at associating his ideological and political plan to a person's feeling of strict obligation and commitment. Islamists, as a rule, guarantee the selective right to characterize, as per their guidelines, what a genuine Muslim's obligations are and, by expansion, who is a genuine Muslim and who isn't. Muslims contradicted to Islamism are much of the time derided as deficiently unwavering, or upbraided as renegades. For Erdogan, a Muslim who didn't hold fast to the MilliGörüs political motivation was blameworthy of offense against Islam. In an interview with the London-based *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, Erdogan stated, "Do not consider the Jews and Christians as patrons for Islam. How can any person who deals with the Jews be a real Muslim?" In a 2010 speech before an audience of MilliGörüs members in Duisburg, Germany, Erdogan reportedly stated that there were only two kinds of human beings: one kind actively supports the cause of MilliGörüs, and the second group does not.¹⁵

1.3 National Order Party

After that, the development set up the National Order Party (MilliNizamPartisi) in 1970 as the main Islamist ideological group in Turkey. The primary Party of the National Vision Movement had an Islamic Conservative talk featuring the otherworldly and national redesigning of the Turkish country. Aside from weight

on social equity, local culture, and training, the Party program transparently protested the market economy and premium framework, while it upheld a state-situated economy dependent on 'Fair Order.' The Fair Order before long turned into a trademark of Erbakan arranged political Islam in Turkey with a communist complement strikingly against American dominion. Erbakan's solid resistance against Western dominion, his understanding of the European Union as a Christian Club, alongside furious pundits of Turkish secularism and Kemalist worldview, turned him out to be a dubious figure in Turkish governmental issues. National Order Party under the initiative of Necmettin Erbakan brutally restricted Turkey's nearby relationship with Europe and NATO participation as he proposed an Islam association. In the end, he fundamentally moved toward the Israel-Turkish coalition against Zionist pressure (he was condemned for being hostile to Semitist) just as he looked through close ties with different Islamists around the globe. For NOP, secularism was emancipatory instead of abusive. It ensured the opportunity of conviction and inner voice. It implied that neither the state nor some other substance was permitted to mediate in the realm of still, small voice of the individuals.¹⁶

However, the National Vision Movement proposed goals models that ended up being a sequential issue for Turkey. Henceforth, these activities were profoundly invited by the majority, on account of the talk utilized by his magnetic pioneer. The personality and hostile to debasement arrangements, alongside its location to moderate and strict notions of Turkish individuals, made the gathering rise step by step. The NOP campaigned with the program that the development in material aspects of life must never go without any respect for belief and morality. Turkey owned a thousand years old Islamic heritage, and that could not have been neglected with oppressive and negligent governmental policies. The program of the NOP found support primarily by the conservative members of Süleyman Demirel's Justice Party (AP) to stretch its appeal towards small merchants, town, and village people. The reason for party closure was indicated as due to its attempt to undermine the principle of secularism and establish an Islamic state. After the party was closed, its leader Erbakan fled to Switzerland to avoid prosecution.¹⁷

1.4 The National Salvation Party

National Order Party was spoken to under the top of the Turkish Grand Assembly, yet it likewise encountered a similar end as Democrat Party did. The pioneer of the Party, Necmettin Erbakan, was obliged to leave Turkey for Switzerland. Aftermaths, Necmettin Erbakan, set up the National Salvation Party (MilliSelametPartisi) as a successor of the National Order Party in 1972. National Salvation Party took 11% of absolute votes and entered to Turkish Grand National Assembly with 48 representatives, while the Justice Party lost its votes from 46.5 to 28.9. Therefore, the National Salvation Party set up an alliance government with the Republican People's Party. During this time, Erbakan adopted the nickname 'Conqueror of Cyprus,' his government sent Turkish troops to intervene in Cyprus on July 20, 1974, to save Turkish Cypriots who were endangered after far-right Greek militant group EOKA conducted a coup on the island in a bid to unite it with Greece.¹⁸

Yavuz wrote about NSP's image in the coalition government as follows:

"The image of the MSP in the coalition government was that of a party dedicated to the promotion of Muslim morality, Ottoman heritage, freedom of conscience, the modernizing of Turkey's economy through rapid industrialization, and concern for the 'little man.' This image, in turn, helped the MSP to restore calls for Islamic values as a potent force in Turkish politics and society. The party considered the family to be crucial for molding the moral and spiritual character of the country's youth. It also stressed social and economic justice and the equitable distribution of national wealth."¹⁹

The Turkish case is significant in the sense that the Islamist movement's 'symbolic revolution,' to use Bourdieu's words, against the center, has taken place openly in the public space from the 1980s onwards. An increase in the votes for the political parties that proposed such a 'revolution' as a political project became a significant source of debate during the 1990s. The 1995 elections carried the (Islamist) Welfare Party of Erbakan to power in a coalition government with the center-right True Path Party. Upon coming to power, Erbakan began to give speeches referring to an approaching 'transformation' to an Islamist order that would take place with or without blood' in Turkey. Despite such a discourse, the party did not make any policy moves towards this direction in government. This contradiction is a sign of the instrumentalist features mentioned earlier. Such speeches were nonetheless enough to increase the tension between the secular circles - notably the military-bureaucratic elite - and the Islamist groups. This tension peaked in a soft coup in 1997.²⁰

1.5 The Welfare Party

As a result of the 1980 military overthrow, Turkish city legislative issues more than once entered affected by the military system. National Salvation Party, alongside all other ideological groups in Turkey, was broken up, as the high-position individuals and officials of the Party were prohibited from political exercises. At the time of 1983, the military government allowed to restoration and action of every single ideological group back in Turkey, in this way Necmettin Erbakan set up Welfare Party (RefahPartisi),²¹

“After a less than impressive election performance in 1987, the RP significantly increased its voters in the 1991 national election and came out as the winner of the 1994 local elections, foreshadowing its remarkable success in the national elections a year later”.²²

The municipal elections of March 27, 1994, the national elections of December 1995, and the local elections of June 2, 1996, in which the Welfare Party took 33.5 percent of the votes in forty-one districts, have constituted a series of seismic events in the Turkish political landscape. Despite the opposition of the secularist Turkish armed forces and big business, the WP won 21.1 percent of the vote and seats in the 550 seats Turkish parliament and after great maneuvering formed a coalition government with Tansu Ciller of the True Path Party (TPP). This coalition government between the pro-Islamic Necmettin Erbakan and the Europhile Tansu Ciller indicates the duality of Turkish identity and marks a turning point in the history of the Turkish Republic. On June 28, 1996, for the first time, the Turkish republic had a prime minister whose political philosophy was based on Islam. This event marked a psychological break in Turkish history that was the outcome of a search for new relations between state and society.²³

“The reason for the party’s success included its impressive grassroots organization that successfully combined traditional and cutting-edge methods; its ability to use religious symbolism to coalesce those conservative-Muslim who were economically winners of Turkey’s post-1980 economic liberalization but were excluded from the country’s social-political elite, with the conservative poor who were loser of integration with global economy; the relative Islamization of the Turkish society as the result of the 1980-1983 military regime policies and in line with the global trends; and the fragmentation and corruption of the mainstream parties underweight of economic crises, the Kurdish conflict in the southeast and personal quarrel between mainstream leaders”.²⁴

The blast of political Islam in the Turkish political scene caused alarm among the bureaucratic and military elites of Turkey. The master Islamists exercises of the Welfare Party, alongside its open talk of organization staff, disturbed the pressure. Head administrator Erbakan left on some intense representative changes in household and remote legislative issues. For example, he paid his first state visit to numerous Muslim nations, enabled female officials to wear headscarves in the workplace, and conceded to alteration of working-hours during Ramadan. At last, the dubious gathering program for Sheikhs at Prime Minister Residency expanded the worry of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri), valuing itself as the defender of the mainstream system in Turkey. Hence, upset likewise by the provocative talk of broad communications The Chief of General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces gave a reminder on 28 February 1998, which obliged the renunciation of the Welfare True Path Party alliance government. The backhanded intercession of military powers to neighbourhood governmental issues enrolled in Turkish political history as a Post-present day rebellion, presenting brutal weights against political Islam as well as toward every single Islamic development.

The party was meeting with the demands and interests of the grassroots involved in civil society organizations, investment, and production. The WP had turned to a massive political, social, cultural, economic, educational, and civil society organization with bottom-up and top-down practices to materialize its major goals.²⁵

1.6 The Virtue Party

Following the 28 February overthrow, the Welfare Party was shut by choice of the established court under the allegation of undertaking political exercises against the mainstream quality guideline of the constitution, henceforward, high-position authorities were restricted from governmental issues, including Necmettin Erbakan. As a result of the decision, the development built up the following ideological group of the National View Movement, this time, it was called as Virtue Party. Be that as it may, this period was likewise pregnant with forthcoming political strife for National Vision Movement itself. The new age National Vision Movement lawmakers began to address and reprimand the forceful and non-conventionalists frame of mind of falcon wing of National Vision Movement government officials with the predominant forces of the republic. The fate of the Virtue Party that built up rather than the Welfare Party got like its antecedent, and the Turkish Constitutional Court broke down it too under the charge of being the successor of the Welfare Party. Once again, the accompanying ideological group of the National Vision Movement was shut by the Turkish equity framework under the fault of their enemy of common exercises. As the political battle among traditionalists and trend-setters proceeded, the Turkish Constitutional Court shut the gathering that supplanted with Felicity Party (SaadetPartisi).²⁶

However, the party was torn apart due to split on various issues. A group of party members called as traditionalists continued to defend the old ways in the party while another one called as innovationists declared that the movement needs to change a lot to genuinely incorporate democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, free-market economic system, and multilateralism into its program.²⁷

“With Erbakan temporarily banned from politics, Refah reconstituted itself as the Fazilat Party. Fazilat was a transitional party, serving as the ideological battleground between Erbakan’s closest followers and Turkish political Islam’s younger generation, whose leaders would go on to found the AK Party.”²⁸

1.7 The Felicitation Party

The Felicity Party (SaadetPartisi) is an Islamist Turkish political party, mainly supported by religious people in Turkey. It was founded on 20 July 2001. The SP represents the “National View” of political Islam as formulated by the late Necmettin Erbakan, of which he was the leader in 2003–2004 and again from 2010 onwards. As the establishment of political parties using religious symbols is still banned by the constitution. He declared five pillars as a party base. The five stars in the flag of SP represent these five bases of the party.

1. Love and peace
2. Human Rights, freedom and democracy
3. Justice
4. Welfare
5. Self-respect and Honor.²⁹

“The SP program emphasizes democratization, too. However, its conception of democracy appears to be less liberal and more nationalistic: it highlights collective rights more than individual and human rights and frequently refers to the term and value of the nation and national interest.”

The Felicity Party was the only representative of the National Vision. Therefore, salvation and happiness were only possible with the Felicity Party. Because;

1. The Felicity Party was the nation itself.
2. The happiness was only reached with the Felicity Party.
3. For these reasons, the Felicity Party was always the biggest.
4. The Felicity Party was the most powerful institution.
5. The Felicity Party was the most energetic institution.
6. The Felicity Party was the only representative of the National Vision.
7. The Felicity Party believed the nation's happiness; therefore, they were in politics.
8. The Felicity Party was experienced.
9. The Felicity Party was victorious.
10. Only the Felicity Party could provide a job for unemployed, a vaccine for deprived, welfare for the poor, and the wealth for the whole nation.
11. Only the Felicity Party could recover collapsed, the bankrupt economy from the dead-end of the debt and interest.
12. Only the Felicity Party could transfer the opportunities of the state and the nation to our farmers, our workers, our officers, our artisans, our poor, our businessmen and industrialists, without loss instead of draining them to foreigners, rentiers, and to waste.

The Felicity Party, with their path-breaking, conscious, and skillful cadres, could establish a "Habitable Turkey" and "Great Turkey."³⁰

1.8 Political Philosophy

While Erbakan was probably not going to be named a savvy person, he was frequently observed as an ideologist, and his belief system has regularly been depicted as a nationalist. The political way of thinking of Necmettin Erbakan was alluded to as MilliGorus. This term didn't suggest an acknowledgment of the regional country state; rather, it was an Islamic view. Here Erbakan utilized the double methodology. The utilization of the term milli was befuddling, it was picked by Erbakan and his gathering to maintain a strategic distance from a showdown and political confinement. This was a pragmatic move since strict gatherings are illicit in Turkey. Erbakan's way of thinking was known as the national view, however, maybe the term 'country' alludes rather to the "individuals," or maybe a dream of a country characterized by ethnic nearness. It ought to be brought up that the word milli was comprehended in specific settings as millet, the term the Ottomans used to distinguish ethnic or strict gatherings. It seems that Erbakan, then spoke about the Turkish nation, means something other than the citizens of Turkey. He did not include Turkish Jews, Christians, or even Alevi in his definition. In any case, the national view stands in opposition to the leftist point of view of the former RPP and the social democrats in the 1980s, and the right-wing parties' liberal outlook. Both of these were alien philosophies imported from the West and not rooted in the people's history and culture. Erbakan advocated an Islamic fundamentalist political philosophy, which called for a return to national-historical roots alongside modernization. This philosophy was based on a symbiosis between industrialization and culture.³¹

Its point was the production of a solid Turkey - YenienBü'ikTürki'ie ("Great Turkey by and by"), which was another method for saying the entertainment of an Ottoman Islamic domain. He didn't advocate the arrival

of the Ottoman caliphate yet rather the assignment of another one. In this sense, in Turkey as much as in Germany, however not at all like Romania and different nations, requests for the arrival of the illustrious old family are rarely communicated. The strategy pushed for restoring a realm was modernization without westernization. The making of an amazing Muslim country was not only an irredentist patriot thought, yet a significant objective with strict importance. As Toprak called attention to, Muslims thought the vision of extraordinary human progress was firmly associated with the strict strategic after the heavenly order to build up an equitable and amazing Muslim world, dar al-Islam, for the Muslim Ummah. This trademark additionally proposed the significance of the Turkic people groups in the Islamic world.

1.9 Relations with the West

Erbakan's appraisal of the issues confronting Muslim society was firmly associated with his perspective on East-West relations. The principle question for Erbakan, as most Turkish scholarly people, was the reason the once amazing Ottoman Empire became among the less created nations on the planet. Erbakan saw the way to understanding this issue in the connection between Turkey and the West. Erbakan's thoughts were suggestive of the Egyptian fundamentalist Sayyid Qutub. It was of note that both had comparative training and were presented toward the West during their understudy days. This may propose an association between the consciousness of the innovative inadequacy of one's nation's fundamentalist response. According to Emmanuel Sivan, Qutub's thought in the 1950s left a clear mark on Islamic thought in many countries, including Turkey.³²

Erbakan, as Qutub, stressed the inward risk confronting the Islamic world in the twentieth century. This threat originated from Muslim open figures and developments, which, notwithstanding being genuine in their anxiety for their kin's welfare, have wittingly enabled themselves to be charmed by Western thoughts of patriotism, communism, radicalism, financial advancement, and majority rules system. Those stricken by adoration for the West, the "westoxicated," were Muslims in appearance as it were. They utilized the most recent various media helps to impart their thoughts into the subliminal personalities of Muslims and to invigorate westoxication, as such, to advance innovation and easy street. A fundamental aftereffect of this is the Muslim world in a condition of heresy, a condition particularly perilous for being oblivious. In Qutub's terms, dar al-Islam has come back to a condition of jahilivva far more terrible than the one that went before the presence of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in Arabia.³³

Erbakan's ideology, as represented by the National Salvation Party (NSP) or its contemporary form, the Welfare Party (WP), has been described by Binnaz Toprak as

*a continuation of at least a century of debate over Islam and the West. The party stressed that the decline of the Ottoman Empire had been the outcome of rejecting Islamic civilization to westernize. According to the NSP, the grandeur of the empire during its periods of strength had lain in its moral and intellectual excellence, both of which derived from the Islamic faith.*³⁴

In an article titled "Islam ve İlim" ("Islam and Science")⁴¹, he claims that Western countries developed their technology at the expense of the Muslim world. The West borrowed, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the cumulative knowledge which Muslims had accumulated without giving credit to Muslim sources. As a result, the West erroneously took credit for originating many scientific principles which were developed by the Muslims:

*The only source of truth is in Islam studies show that Muslims produce 60-70 percent of the existing knowledge. I claim that what is considered as Western sciences, physics, chemistry, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, geography, and all the existing sciences were founded by Muslims.*³⁵

According to Erbakan, the contribution of the Islamic nation to the development of science and knowledge is genuine. Western countries have fully acknowledged this contribution. Besides, he argued, Turkish history was rich both in military victories and scholarly accomplishments. Today, when Western civilization seems to be at a technological standstill and can no longer solve its problems through science, the Muslim nation can solve them with its special qualities. However, such technological accomplishments and scientific superiority can be realized by the Muslims only if they can recreate their past. Muslims cannot take the lead in the scientific arena if they continue to deny their history and adopt the inadequate world-view of the West.³⁶

The accusations that Erbakan throws at the Western countries that were that they stole Islamic knowledge and are using it against the Islamic world reflects his basic view of East-West relations and the nature of Western imperialism. Like Ali Bulaç, Erbakan sees no difference between the sources of capitalism and socialism. His interpretation, however, is much less sophisticated. Although socialism and capitalism may seem different, he argues, both are, in fact, imperialist by nature and aimed at enslaving other nations by imposing their own culture and economic interests. Erbakan was very sensitive to Western superiority: "Those who always look down on us and show off", he wrote, and on another occasion, "a European does not have the right to show off and look down on us."³⁷

Despite material advancement, both the socialists and the capitalists are also in a spiritual crisis, Erbakan claims. Because the Muslims had, as their great past shows, stood firmly against the West for many

centuries, the Western countries were able to weaken the Ottoman Empire only by introducing into it their own corrupt culture, during the Tanzimat era. In contradiction to many historians, he argues that this was not done through military or scientific superiority but rather through the "back door" of culture and science. According to Erbakan, Turkish intellectuals who adopted the cosmopolitanism of that period were responsible for the material and spiritual decline of the Empire.⁴⁸ Interestingly, Erbakan links moral and cultural achievement with material achievement in the case of the Empire. He did not, however, make the same connection in the case of Europe. This inconsistency suggests that he used different standards to judge the West and to judge the Muslim world.

1.10 The Industrialization Process

The precondition for Turkey to turn into an incredible force is its arrival to Islam. When this precondition is met, quick industrialization will follow. Even though Erbakan doesn't present a cognizant monetary outline, mechanical development is by all accounts, the reason for his financial plans, particularly during the 1970s. It was later, towards the late 1970s and during the 1980s, that he moved his accentuation from industrialization to the issues of swelling and the average cost for basic items. He makes an intriguing connection between Islam and industrialization, offering Islam as a mental instrument to facilitate the weight of fast industrialization. Turkey, he accepts, would achieve modern development without, it is trusted, bearing similar social changes realized by the entrepreneur model, with its natural realism.

The religious-oriented National vision Movement thus developed and influenced in the state where Secularism had enough Domination. The movement framed its policy time by time and started engaging with the government and its policy. NSP and WP published their views on industrial development, secularism, education policy, economic reforms, and other relevant issues discussed at the time.³⁸

Fast industrialization was a significant issue for Erbakan. In contrast to the Marxists, who consider industrialization to be an incentive in itself and lessen history to the improvement of methods of creation, he found in it an apparatus for accomplishing his objective of setting up an industrialized, yet Islamic' Turkey. The Turkish country has neglected to industrialize and has along these lines lost its place ever. When the Turkish individuals grasp their social past and build up the otherworldly and moral characteristics vital for difficult work, they will form into a solid, mechanical society. Industrialization, contends Toprak, is just about a matter of strict energy for Erbakan and other gathering pioneers, who over and again bring up their promise to making an industrialized society. Erbakan upheld a gigantic industry battle, which his gathering asserted have started in 1975 and advanced during the period they were alliance accomplices in SuleymanDemirel's Nationalist Front (MihiyetciCephe) legislature of 1975-78.³⁹

Turkey, or the Islamic world, would recapture its lost glory through industrialization. Some portion of Erbakan's energy for industrialization, as Toprak and NecdetOnur call attention to, can be clarified by his history. He lived in Germany during the mid-1950s as a postgraduate understudy and was dazzled with the manner in which the Germans were quickly industrializing regardless of their annihilation in the Second World War. Erbakan saw the speed with which the Germans recovered their quality because of the German individuals' order and duty. The Ottoman Empire, in Erbakan's psyche, as contrasted and the German Reich. Both had lost the fight, however, while the Germans had figured out how to recoup through industrialization accomplished through control and qualities, the Ottoman Empire has never recuperated from its annihilation. To Erbakan, the Germans exhibit the significance of a country's worth framework to its monetary advancement. In this, Erbakan considered Islam to be a strategy for social control, as did the AydinlarOcagi and the decision Motherland Party. All neglected to recognize the genuine social issues that were a result of industrialization.⁴⁰

"After all, Islam had an aspect which addressed itself to man's being in this world, to this basic ontological insecurity, which enabled it to fasten itself on to psychological drives. It is a truism, but still worth emphasizing that Islam has become stronger in Turkey because social mobilization had not decreased but, on the contrary, increased the insecurity of the men who have been projected out of their traditional settings. This insecurity is sometimes cognitive and appears as a search for a convincing political leadership or bountiful economic system. Here Islam assumes an ideological guise and compacts with Marxism."⁴¹

1.11 Domestic Problems

After the military coup, in 1980, Turkey faced a political and financial crisis. During this period, Turkish foreign policy was mostly western-oriented and based on securing itself from Soviet threat, in the 1970s, the circumstances that had led Turkey to link its security interest completely with those of the United States under significant changes. After World War II, Turkish policies towards the Islamic World were affected by the War environment and mainly security concerns.

For Turkish society to regain peace order and social justice, "the revival of moral qualities and the spiritual excellence dormant in the Turkish character is necessary." Erbakan dealt with Turkey's domestic problems into two categories, the material and the spiritual. Regarding the first, he criticized the dependence of the Turkish economy on foreign markets and capital and the unjust distribution of wealth. He also criticizes the weak financial situation, as a result of which Turkey has become dependent on foreign aid and consequently has

lost its autonomy in foreign policy. This criticism is very effective in Turkey, where the trauma of the capitulations is very much alive, and sentiment against Western imperialism is very strong. The temporary rejection of Turkey's application to join the EEC strengthened Erbakan's arguments.⁴²

Erbakan looked to modernize the nation through both profound and specialized advancement programs. In the specialized field, these projects would stress innovativeness as opposed to the impersonation of Western innovation. The advancement of an indigenous innovation combined with quick industrialization would put Turkey in the positions of them wealthy nations, he accepts. Notwithstanding, material prosperity is viewed as a final result of a good and simply equitable society and of a country that has a verifiable awareness, solidarity, and confidence in like manner national objectives.

"In response to the western-dominated international system, Erbakan argued, the Islamic world should setup a parallel advocated Islamic analogs to the UN and UNESCO, a common Islamic market, and a unified Islamic currency- the dinar. Given Turkey's historical leadership of the Islamic World, naturally, Erbakan believed that Turkey should lead the establishment of this new transnational Islamic system."⁴³

Erbakan's concept of law-based society was an arrangement of government which built up the ethical greatness of the individual and brings to control just the individuals who have such greatness, a political framework which disposes of reprobate spending, pay off, and debasement by screening the two lawmakers and open overseers for moral fortitude, notwithstanding ordering target testing for proficient capabilities. It tends to have contended that Erbakan can't acknowledge majority rule government, since as indicated by his comprehension of the essentials of Islam and Islamic precept, God requested a man to lead as per the blessed book and not as per his judgment. People, he accepts, can't make laws; they can apply divine ones.

Erbakan dismissed Western social impacts and underscored the re-formation of what he viewed as a good national awareness. He accepted that Turkey would get up to speed with Western innovation just if its unrivalled culture and ethical quality can be restored.⁴⁴

The idea of Erbakan to finish western domination would only be possible through technological reformation and economic development.

"The refusal of the Westernization process by Erbakan took the form of outward conduct that is more focussed on the Arab and Muslim States. Erbakan's Movement "MilliGorus" presented a different formulation for national identity and history based on a religious reference in opposition to cosmopolitanism. It consists of a resurrection of authenticity and Islamic civilization and Islamic civilization in search of autonomy from the west. The identity reconstruction, according to Erbakan, has to follow a national vision that enhances the Turkish role in the Muslim world to cure the west's double standard policy and injustices".

Toprak argued,

*was an extension of the 19th-century Islamic movement, which had opposed the wholesale acceptance of both the cultural and the technology of the West advocated by the Ottoman "westerners" but instead had argued that Western influences be limited to the technical fields alone.*⁴⁵

Erbakan argued that the Muslim World had declined because it had western ideas, such as secularism. Therefore, the duty of all devout Muslims was to contribute to the establishment of Islam's absolute sovereignty. His MilliGorus was inspired by the Ottoman legacy and by nationalist sways. It was a conservative ideology based on religion. Erbakan was aiming to strengthen traditional Islam and to re-establish it as a driving force in the country. He was an ardent opponent of the west, and he aspired to end the Turkish alliance with the 'Zionist world.'

1.12 Social Life and Education

Another significant element of Erbakan's ideology was the importance of family and social behavior. He sharply criticized the Western orientation of the Turkish elite in this area. He included in his criticism the wearing of long hair and miniskirts; the viewing of pornography and of television shows, films and plays which are influenced by Western culture rather than the 'national' one; the wearing of shorts by women students during gym classes; the youth's lack of respect for parents and older people; the elite's "illness of imitating Western culture"; lack of religious belief among youth; the disappearance of traditional family life; and the growth of nightclubs. These changes in social norms and value systems are an indication of the corruption which has infected Turkish society as a result of Turkey's opening to the West, he claims. Erbakan attributes significant importance to the issue of 'social justice.' He and other party leaders have repeatedly criticized the ruling governments for their indifference to the plight of the poor and underprivileged. While trying to contend with the communists, the Welfare Party has been very vocal in its analysis of rising costs and joblessness, the absence of sufficient standardized savings and restorative protection programs, and the abuse of government credit, which supports the wealthy with social associations.⁴⁶

Another component of Erbakan's reality sees the significance he connects to training. Erbakan vigorously scrutinizes Turkey's instruction framework, contending that it is the one in particular that has neglected to teach its childhood. The nation's training approach has focussed on revoking its history. It has received a bogus objective by tolerating the West's deficient world-see, which has dove the Western nations

themselves into a profound emergency. Moreover, it has not adapted to the test of remote social impacts, which have entered Turkish society as socialism, communism, and cosmopolitanism.

Erbakan accepts that verifiable and strict qualities ought to be educated to youngsters. In the event that Turkey is to recover its recorded enormity and become a modern nation, it should receive the correct instruction approach. For him, a significant explanation behind Turkey's underdevelopment is the deficient instructive arrangement of Turkish governments, which has been outfitted to the impersonation of Western culture and innovation. On the off chance that Turkey is to modernize, Turkish governments should ensure all-inclusive advanced education, which stresses national-authentic conventions and qualities frameworks that are innovative instead of imitative, and which will empower skill in specialized fields. Here once more, he accuses the legislature A decent instructive framework can be set up just if the administration quits offering need to "building ballrooms and arenas" instead of colleges and processing plants, he contends in an article distributed in Milli Gazette.

1.13 Economic Development

When Erbakan's government began to work, there had been unemployment, hunger, and economic structure captured by debt. Once the Erbakan government began work, firstly:

- Economic destruction stopped, and the following programs started to be implemented:
- Public welfare
- National economy
- The transition from the rentier economy to the real economy
- National, powerful, rapid, widespread development
- Production, employment, and export campaign programs.⁴⁷

The main issue in the Turkish economy in the 1980s was inflation; thus, the economy and the high cost of living receive greater attention and importance than industrialization, which was a burning issue in the 1970s. Also, the WP has argued infavor of more balanced regional development programs that would give priority to the least developed areas of the country, provide government aid to agriculture and rural communities, and protect small traders and artisans.⁴⁸

There was a broad area of interactions in the economy not regulated by laws that could work only with the adoption of first moral principles from the part of citizens. By implementing these programs, 35 billion dollars, extra income had been added to the total budget of 50 billion dollars in six months. The economic development efforts that made this a great addition to the budget and saved Turkey from the oppression of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) was a product of using completely national sources that God has given to our nation without imposing a penny new debt, a penny new tax and without increasing a penny of the sale prices. Without the addition of new debt, \$ 10 billion of \$ 35 billion saved from interests and obtained from national resources. The nation's money has been directed to the nation instead of rentier circles and foreigners. Thirteen billion dollars was added to the budget by the implementation of the four different resource programs and by directing the existing national facilities to the service of the public. Seven billion dollars was gained by increasing profits of loss-making SOE's [State-Owned Enterprises], which had been losing \$ 5 billion per year before the rule of the National Vision, to \$ 2 billion per year. Since Erbakan's government distributed this \$ 30 billion that added to the household budgets of peasants, workers, civil servants, pensioners, the poor, and the pauper by raising their income, people's purchasing power has increased, tradespeople have become cheerful. Manufacturers employed more people. Thus, the economy experienced a large "abundance era." Even though no new taxes have been introduced, the state's tax revenues increased by \$ 5 billion because people started to pay more taxes due to rising prosperity.⁴⁹

National Vision raised salaries of civil servants by 50 percent on July 1, 1996. After six months on 1 January 1997, civil servant salaries were increased by 30% and then an additional 25%. Thus, officers taking 100 at the beginning of the National Vision government began to take 230 after six months. The minimum wage was \$ 182 in 1995 when the National Vision came to power the minimum wage was subjected to a 20% real increase and reached \$ 210. This increase was equivalent to an increase of about 10% in terms of TL value. The average monthly gross wage in the public sector was \$ 655 in 1996; it increased to 993 dollars in 1997. So it is increased by 52 % in real terms. Bag-Kur retirees' pensions were increased by 300% in 6 months. While retired public servants were getting 100, they took 216 in 6 months. While getting 100, retired workers it took 221.5 in 6 months. The 90 percent of the Social Assistance Fund (Fak-fuk-funds) had been transferred to budget and interest payment. National Vision came to power, used 100 percent of the fund for the poor and orphans. Agriculture and Peasants were supported: Ministry of Agriculture's budget had increased by 89 percent. TMO's grain purchase, compared with \$ 145 million in 1996, increased to \$ 330 million.⁵⁰

1.14 Muslim World and the West

Erdogan argued that the resurgence of Islam in the twentieth century had followed a four-phase course in the relationship between Muslim countries and the West. The primary stage was one of the wars between Western nations and the Islamic world during the main quarter of the century, trailed by Western occupation. The third was freedom, lastly, there was a time of enlivening as the Muslim nations went into a nearby interrelationship dependent on fellowship and participation. In Erdogan's view, this last stage will, in the long run, lead to the making of a United Muslim Nations (as an option in contrast to the UN); a Muslim Economic Community (rather than the EEC), with Islamic Dinar as a typical unit of cash, and a Muslim adaptation of NATO. Erdogan is mindful so as not to submit himself legitimately to an Islamic state dependent on the Shari'a since such an announcement would be an offense against the Kemalist state. In any case, in times of more prominent opportunity, he has given more rein to the declaration of his convictions. The Pakistani test and the Iranian model are talked about by Erdogan and other gathering pioneers in *Milli Gazete*.⁵⁰

He appeared to consider Islamic to be in different nations as unequivocally identified with the Islamic development in Turkey.⁷⁴ How is the future Islamic state to be accomplished? Erdogan considers later to be in Iran as a significant advance towards understanding his proposed Islamic participation. He contends that Iran's move away from a professional American, star Western international strategy assigns the finish of an "ace hireling" relationship, which ought to be trailed by other Muslim nations.⁷⁵ Since the Islamic nations do not have a pioneer, they should consolidate soon to choose their caliph. All social and political establishments ought to be redesigned by the Koran and the Shari'a. Since the NSP-WP dismissed westernization as essential for modernization, it saw the last procedure is very various terms. It acknowledged the need to industrialize yet dismissed the social structures which have went with monetary improvement. As per Alkan's examination, international strategy got one of the more significant issues in Erdogan's talks during the 1980s. The questions of Cyprus, the Common Market, relations with other Islamic nations, the Israeli-Palestinian clash, and Zionism were the most talked-about issues. Toward the finish of the 1980s, consideration was additionally given to the Muslim populace of the Soviet Union. For Erdogan, there was no distinction among socialism and free enterprise. As a belief system, he accepted that socialism was one arm of Zionism and free enterprise the other. He contended that the motivation behind the Yalta gathering was to isolate the world for the sake of Zionism. This sentence clarified his fundamental perspective on the West.⁵⁰

During its initial a half year in office, the Erdogan-drove alliance government needed to address numerous disputable international strategy issues. These subjects incorporated its association with Israel, *Operation Provide Comfort II* towards northern Iraq, the traditions associated with the European Union (EU), and Cyprus. These issues obliged Erdogan to show his hand. For each situation, Erdogan and his supporters indicated that they were eager to stay inside the international strategy accord that has described progressive Kemalist governments before 1996. It is striking that the WP in power has ended up being so helpful on issues in opposition to their essential direction, even in zones where the air inside the nation may have been helpful for a change.⁵¹

The RP has, for quite some time, been rationally badly arranged towards the EU as an organization while needing to keep up business ties with European organizations. In the expressions of Abdullah Gul, perhaps the nearest counselor, a pastor of state and the main moderate inside the parliamentary party, 'Our resistance to the European Union depends on the possibility that we are from an alternate culture, we have an alternate character and an unexpected monetary structure in comparison to European nations.' Erdogan has once in a while underlined these distinctions by causing to notice what he sees as the abuse of Muslim people group inside the EU. The RP additionally has communicated worries about the manner in which the EU decides. Erdogan has alluded to the EU's basic leadership process as occurring inside 'a dim room' without reference to the parliaments or people groups of part states. The RP has been especially worried about this point concerning the traditions association, as Turkey will be obliged to receive the EU's outside exchange arrangements without participating in the Union's conventional basic leadership methods.

The sole zone of Turkish international strategy altogether amended by the RP-drove alliance has been relations with the Islamic world. During their initial a half year in force, Erdogan and his important international strategy staff have headed out just to Islamic nations, or nations with a critical Muslim populace – prominently Nigeria. This Islamic activity has comprised of two measurements: a respective measurement, where extensive exertion has been exhausted in improving relations with chose Islamic nations; and a multilateral measurement, eminently through a Turkish drove 'D-8' activity, uniting conspicuous centre forces from the Islamic world to frame an alliance of creating nations.

Maybe the most obvious case of Erdogan's fractional and Islamist-arranged understanding of the world accompanied his visit to the US as the visitor of the American Muslim Council in October 1994. Albeit a gathering was quickly orchestrated with a lesser State Department group, the mind greater part of Erdogan's commitment were with Muslim Americans and their affiliations, and Muslim legislators from abroad, including FIS delegates, Kuwaitis, Pakistanis, Sri Lankans, Sudanese and Yemenis. It was during this excursion that Erdogan conveyed his scandalous discourse about making 'another Muslim world request' to comprise of an

Islamic United Nations, an Islamic NATO, an Islamic United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, typical Islamic money, and an Islamic Common Market. 'At the point when we come to control,' Erbakan announced with trademark boast, 'Turkey will begin such an Islamic Union.'⁵²

Thus, it very well may be presumed that Erbakan's record in remote undertakings has not been ruled by authoritative opinion, yet has been portrayed by adaptability and the functional needs of government. Should the RP stay in power, this situation could without much of a stretch last through 1997, and until the following general political decision. Should the RP neglect to increase a flat out lion's share in parliament by then, the general quality of the state ought to be conclusive in the detailing of international strategy, paying little heed to administrative design. For the following three and potentially as long as eight years, the congruity and complementarity in Turkish international strategy will win. With Erbakan now in his mid-70s, his genuine expectations in force may never be tried.⁵³

1.15 MilliGorus

However, Erbakan was not just active in politics. He was the founder of Turkey's Islamic-rooted National Vision movement, otherwise known as 'MilliGorus,' which also branched out to form many organizations including Turkey's Humanitarian Relief (IHH), which sent the Mavi Marmara aid flotilla to Gaza to break the Israeli blockade. Establish a spiritualist (moral) Turkey Always prefer the Right [Haq] Always keep peace inside and outside Ensure national unity and integrity Aim to reach the honorable place of the past Provide an independent Turkey Desire free, prosperous and pioneering Turkey Those who are eager to achieve these aims are natural members of the National Vision, and they should come and participate in the National Vision.⁵⁴

Regardless of his propensity for fiery talk, Necmettin Erbakan never urged his adherents to wage savage jihad to topple Turkey's common political framework. Rather, he supported a slow, base up Islamization of society, which was to be practiced through the substitution of mainstream laws and standards with Islamic law. This sort of progressive political change required, most importantly, an emotional change in mentality, or the securing of what Erbakan now and again called another Islamic "cognizance" or "mindfulness." Without such an Islamic awareness, Erbakan and MilliGorus activists accepted that Muslims could never effectively resuscitate Islam in the advanced time. Strangely, in a 2007 meeting with Al-Sharq al-Awsat, Erbakan was gotten some information about Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, and he reacted by saying it was generally significant for the head administrator to come back to genuine Islamic awareness.⁵⁵

Here are 7 Characteristics that Differentiate the National Vision from other Wrong (Superstitious) Opinions

1. First of all, the National Vision is based on morality and spirituality.
2. There are three primary features at the heart of the National Vision. These are; a) Being spiritual b) Prefer the Right [Haq] c) Training the human soul
3. Concerning economics, National Vision is based on the "Just Order" framework. Others prominent attribute is relying upon the usurious capitalist order and Zionism.
4. The prominent characteristic of the National Vision in economics is based on national, robust, rapid, and mutual development. National means establishing a factory to set up factories and having advanced technology. Various colonial-type activities have been wasting Turkey's time. The National Vision established the factories in all of Eastern Anatolia -cement factories, sugar mills, slaughterhouses, and their machines. National Vision is the guarantee of our national unity and integrity.
5. In the order of National Vision the necessary policies in health and social services are; to teach and disseminate the obedience to national and moral values; to establish peace, brotherhood, equality, and justice; not to leave anyone in hunger or without shelter, and to provide the provision of health services for all. The deceased leader of the National Vision, Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, ordered to identify the impoverished people with the assistance of village headmen and imams all over Turkey. These poor people were given a salary from the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund. Before Erbakan, the money in this fund used to be spent to pay interests. This trend had stopped as well as the basic needs of our poor people were satisfied.
6. The basic principle is the establishment of a new world based on the accurate consideration of rights, D8 core, and the Islamic Union. This is one of the apparent differences that distinguish National Vision from others. Being bound to the door of the West with neck chains is the characteristics of the others.
7. Our goal is to reach the honored place that our ancestors lived in the past, and to set up "Great Turkey" that provides "the establishment and protection of a new felicity world." The others' pathways are to be connected to the Zionists Israel, to be melted and destroyed via becoming Israel's province.⁵⁶

In the wake of being methodically smothered for quite a long time by the Kemalist state, political Islam remerged in Turkey in 1969 when Erbakan established the Turkish National View development. The development's need was to build up an across the nation grassroots encouraging group of people for the spread of another Islamic cognizance. By 1973, the Turkish National Salvation Party had effectively settled branches in

fifty-two of Turkey's sixty-seven territories. At first, teachers from the Islamist development in Turkey concentrated their effort on two particular populaces: one, the preservationist strict populaces in the country Anatolian locales and, second, the developing number of ruined vagrant specialists in urbanized regions. The preachers reacted legitimately to the requirements of the new urban specialists, offering nourishment, inns, and grants, systems for youthful alumni, help with pursuits of employment, credit to businesspeople, industrialists, and shippers, just as self-improvement ventures for ladies. Related to these welfare administrations, ministers likewise broadly appropriated audiocassettes with accounts of Erbakan's discourses. By 1977, the Islamist development had solidly settled itself everywhere throughout the nation.⁵⁷

During his tenure, Erbakan succeeded in exploiting Turkey's Imam Hatip religious schools to advance the Islamist cause. As the scholar, Nilufer Narlı points out, "One of the Islamist movement's important strategies was to develop an educated counter-elite as a base of support, especially by strengthening the Islamic stream in the educational system."²³ Erbakan allowed the Imam Hatip schools to offer secondary education and permitted its graduates to enter all departments at universities.²⁴ Erbakan was deeply committed to the schools, and he viewed them and Islamic education as the most effective avenue for the redefinition of national identity.²⁵ As Banu Eligür has written, "Islamists regard the Imam Hatip schools as social networks that sustain and enhance their political power by educating the youth according to Islamist principles."²⁶

The progressive change of urban focuses was another focal point of the Islamist political motivation in Turkey. A prime case of this was the Islamist change of the poor Istanbul suburb of Sultanbeyli, a subject investigated inside and out by researcher Cihan Tugal. Tugal portrays how the Erbakan-drove Islamist development changed the Sultanbeyli locale into an "Islamic fortification" with the assistance of different strict gatherings and establishments, book retailers, business visionaries, distributors, and activists, every one of whom started working in the area after the Turkish Islamic Synthesis.⁵⁸ Once more, the objective gatherings were countless vagrant specialists living in the network and adolescents. The Islamists set up a semi-restraining infrastructure over strict training and furnished occupants with a social security net. In that capacity, they supplanted the legislature as the main supplier of basic social administrations.³¹ The net consequence of this was the slow Islamization of regular daily existence. Organizations needed to embrace Islamic images to remain in business, and common Muslims were pushed out of the locale. After the triumph of the Welfare Party Islamists assumed responsibility for a network in what was, at the time, the transcendent secularist arranged metropolitan condition of Istanbul. They told the inhabitants of Sultanbeyli that they were "the beneficiaries of the partners of the prophet"—an immediate mention to their romanticized rendition of Muhammad's departure from Mecca to Medina.³³ Soon from that point onward, Islamists advanced the Sultanbeyli area as the focal point of Turkey's strict recovery, and the region's occupants turned into the political vanguard in the battle to topple Turkey's mainstream framework.

1.16.1 Expansion of the MilliGorus

The MilliGorus development set up its first German branch in 1976. Called the Turkish Union of Europe, the first reason for the association was to fund-raise from the Turkish Diaspora, and for the most part, Sunni Muslim transient laborers, to help Islamist conversion and other political exercises in Turkey. Since its foundation, the development has over and over again changed its name. In 1995, the development was renamed the Islamic Community MilliGörüs and had held this name right up 'til the present time. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the German part of MilliGörüs kept up a solid spotlight on the Islamization of Turkey. The association gave strict disapproval of people a feeling of network and personality in the Diaspora nation. Individuals transparently embraced the Islamist plan proliferated by Necmettin Erbakan and planned to get back once the Islamic change of Turkey had happened. Be that as it may, all through the 1990s, and especially after Erbakan's ouster as leader and the forbidding of the Welfare Party in 1997, MilliGörüs activists in Germany lost confidence in a looming Islamist change of Turkey and started to acknowledge their stay in the Diaspora as lasting.⁵⁹

In early 2008, for example, Necmettin Kutsal, the editor-in-chief of the Milli Gazette (Turkish National daily Newspaper) wrote:

MilliGörüs is much more than the slogan of a political party. In contrast to other organisms, God the Lord created man with the gift of reason and commanded him: Be perfectly honest, as you were commanded. That means you have to fulfill your duties as a servant of God. This starts with the Jihad. The Jihad encompasses all efforts for the fulfilments of Allah's commands, and to keep away from those Allah has forbidden. The main objective of the Jihad is the establishment of a just world. When MilliGörüs speaks of the creation of a new world, she refers to this goal. The Milli Gazette is the bearer of the intellectual heritage of our ancestors, who have entrusted us these grounds. For 600 years, they were the base for a life in a just world. We were great in the past. Therefore we say: "A grand Turkey once again."⁴⁶

The Milli Gazette is, first and foremost, a propaganda tool. The political ideas endorsed by the newspaper are essentially those of Necmettin Erbakan. It is openly anti-Western, anti-capitalist, and anti-Semitic, and supports the overthrow of the secular system in Turkey and the Islamization of European countries

through MilliGörüs branches in Turkish Diaspora communities. ICMG seems especially focused on influencing the youth. Indeed, the educational programs ICMG offers are extensive: weekend seminars, summer camps, Quran classes, after-school clubs, a special club for young children, and a large number of sports and artistic competitions.⁵⁰ In its efforts to inculcate in children a “self-contained Islamic identity,” the ICMG’s educational programs include reading and recitation of the Quran, the study of the Arabic alphabet, and general religious instruction.⁵¹ The MilliGörüs ideology as formulated by Necmettin Erbakan continues to have a prominent role in these programs.⁵²

ICMG’s instruction programs seem to fill two essential needs. The program looks for, most importantly, to establish the frameworks for the foundation of another Islamist movement who can carry on crafted by Islamist recovery and change. For instance, a feature writer in the Milli Gazette requested in May 2009 that the Islamist development teach experts that are better, progressively qualified, increasingly developed, progressively genuine, and more righteous than their foes:

*We must train forces [who] are stronger, [more] skilled and cultured, moral, honest, sincere and virtuous than our Enemies are, with one sentence, we must develop forces that are better.*⁵⁶

The second reason for the ICMG’s instructive projects is to pass on to Europe’s Turkish Diaspora that religion and legislative issues are characteristically interconnected and that a person’s personality is vague from their religion and social legacy. From multiple points of view, this is suggestive of Necmettin Erbakan’s strategies during his short residencies in the official branch in Turkey. Official force isn’t just accomplished through base up Islamization, yet it likewise abets the procedure consequently by making conditions for additional Islamization.

Focused on Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist philosophy, the ICMG in Germany additionally endeavours to imitate a significant number of the techniques utilized by its parent body, the MilliGörüs of Turkey. The gathering’s gradualist endeavours to spread its Islamist belief system in Turkish people group could some time or another represent a considerable test to Germany’s majority rule request. As of now, the Islamist venture in Germany presents clear difficulties to the texture and usefulness of German culture and governmental issues. Fanaticism generates radicalism: to some extent, as a response to Islamist interruption, patriot and xenophobic populist developments are shockingly on the ascent in almost every European nation. Such developments have just shown up at a nearby level in Germany, and their rise at the national level might be just a short time. Countering and minimizing the Islamist motivation, and especially the exercises of the ICMG, is, along these lines, of the highest significance for Germany’s long haul law based soundness. In the same way as other European nations, Germany will, in the long run, need to figure out how to adapt to lawful Islamist gatherings, for example, the ICMG, and to underestimate and ruin their belief system.

II. CONCLUSION

Necmettin Erbakan played a key role in making Islam potent political force in the secular state. Under his industrialization projects, states managed to provide guaranteed employment for the educated youth, welfare services, and subsidies for their citizens. As the economic expansion became unsustainable, the state’s ability to deliver benefits for its citizens declined. This resulted in stronger calls for change’ in the system. His Islamist movement represents a response to the imposed modernization process and its failure to deliver its promises. He was able to build the base of Islamist politics across the globe and successfully acts as an inspiration for Islamic Movements around the Earth. Erbakan’s era witnessed rapid economic development and the Islamization of Turkish nationalism. The main goals of the WP have been the externalization of Islamic identity in the public domain and the construction of a moral and virtuous community. National Salvation Party legitimized Muslim cultural and political demands carved out an influential role for religious interests in modern Turkish politics.

The Islamic community milligörüs (ICMG) is today the most influential Islamist organization in Germany, and one of the most influential Islamist movements operating within the Turkish Diaspora in Europe. According to Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the ICMG in Germany numbers 30,000 members. However, the number of people it reaches through its foundations and services is substantially higher. The ICMG is affiliated with 323 cultural institutions and mosques, which are connected to the movement in different ways. The ICMG’s official public self-projection, disseminated on its website and in the form of various magazines and brochures, attempts to convey the image of a moderate, exclusively religious organization that has abandoned its political, Islamist past. For instance, one ICMG publication outlining the organization’s worldview and goals claims that “the ICMG avows itself to the free democratic basic order and considers it to be the basis for a pluralistic, peaceful, tolerant, and harmonic social life.”

Furthermore, it states that “there is no discrepancy between the way ICMG members think and the way they act.” Also, the ICMG claims to support equal rights for men and women, and it ostensibly rejects the formation of alternate or “parallel” communities for Muslims

During Erbakan’s leadership, Turkey has become “a habitable country” by ensuring the rule of law and by establishing justice in gain-burden distribution. Ensuring national unity and solidarity, “Great Turkey” has

been constructed. That's why ambassadors of contemporary imperialist colonial states aren't interfering in the internal affairs of Turkey. Turkey has become an independent state for real. Turkey has assumed a leading role in re-establishing the civilization of peace. Turkey has to lead the way to the establishment of "Just New World" that has changed history.

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