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Abstract: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s machismo towards nuclear ascendancy in the Korean Peninsula constitutes presentiments of regional and global security nightmare and ‘proliferation tipping point.’ The nuclear ascendancy is against American-led ‘global zero’ for a nuclear-free world (Marin-Bosch, 2009; NTI, 15 January 2008; Maliki, 14 March 2014): “America seeks a world in which there are no nuclear weapons” (Daalder and Holune, 5 October 2007). The broad objective of this paper is to examine the nexus between Global Zero Action Plan and denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. The specific objective is to underscore the import of President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine in the political realm of denuclearisation of Korean contumacious nuclear programme. Data were drawn from secondary sources including United Nations’ documents, International Atomic Energy Agency documents, Global Zero official statements, declarations and reports, Text of Trump-Kim declaration, textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers and internet sources. Data were analysed qualitatively by the application of the realist variant of power theory, based on single-case pre-test-post-test non-experimental design and statistical tables. Result shows that President Trump’s actor-based approach through a combination of diplomatic, sanctions, economic, deterrence, and propaganda instruments in pursuing DPRK’s denuclearisation conform squarely to great-power strategy, American foreign policy goals, guidelines and overall national interest necessitated by U.S.-DPRK relations.

Keywords: global zero, America first doctrine, proliferation, denuclearisation, global security

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1. Introduction

The advent of technology brought to culmination of “genocidal effect” thus the dilemma of how to bring the destructiveness of modern weapon into some moral or political relationship for human survival (Kissinger, 2014: 332). Perpetual fear of annihilation remains the logic of ‘Global Zero’ Action Plan. The Plan is a 14-year (2013-2023) and an additional seven years (2024-2030) projection to reach a global zero accord (Mustafa, 2010: 1; Global Zero, 2010: 3) to achieve nuclear-free level which is global, comprehensive, timely, balanced, predictable, secure, verifiable, enforceable, sustainable, and above all, legally-binding (Koplow, 2014: 712-714). Global Zero Action Plan intersects with American nuclear-free world order (Chomsky, 2000: 11; Daalder and Holune, 5 October 2007). Kissinger maintained: Illicit progress toward nuclear weapons has proved difficult to discover and resist... The treaty proscribed but did not prevent signatories such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran from maintaining covert nuclear programmes in violation of NPT safeguards or, in the case of North Korea, withdrawing from the NPT in 2003 and testing and proliferating nuclear technology without international control (Kissinger, 2014: 337).

Trump’s administration drives the third phase of Global Zero vision with his ‘America first doctrine. Explaining the ‘America First’ Doctrine, President Donald Trump sermonised: The American people elected me to make America great again. I promised that my Administration would put the safety, interests, and well-being of our citizens first. An America that is safe, prosperous, and free at home is an America with the strength, confidence, and will to lead abroad. It is an America that can preserve peace, uphold liberty, and create enduring advantages for the American people. Putting American first is the duty of our government and the foundation for U.S. leadership in the world. A strong America is in the vital interests of not only the American people, but also those around the world who want to partner with the United States in pursuit of shared interests, values, and aspirations. (The White House, 2017: (i) and (1).
Part of the strategy to shore that America is safe, prosperous, and free at home is to enthroned a nuclear-weapons-free world through disarmament of all: prohibited weapons based on customary international law which apply to all weapons (e.g., weapons calculated to cause superfluous injury; or inherently indiscriminate weapons); and weapons prohibited by treaty or customary international law (poison, poisoned weapons, poisonous gases, and other chemical weapons; biological weapons; certain environmental modification techniques; weapons that injure by fragments that are non-detectable by X-rays; certain types of mines, booby-traps, and other devices; and blinding lasers (Department of Defence, 2016: 316-317).

This paper set to investigate the intermingling issues between the presentiment of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) radical nuclear programme towards ‘proliferation tipping point’ and disarmament; and how President of the United States (POTUS) Donald Trump’s ‘American First’ foreign policy goals meshes with U.S. drive towards “complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons complex (Sen, 16June 2018) for Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in Korean Peninsula (WMDFZK) to cohere with global zero vision for a nuclear-free world for regional and world peace, security and prosperity.

To address the problematic, the paper is systematised into eight sections viz: 1 - Introduction; 2 – Background to the U.S.-DPRK Denuclearisation Summit; 3 – Nexus Between U.S. Foreign Policy Goals and Disarmament in DPRK; 4 – DPRK’s Nuclear Threat and U.S. Policy Steps; 5 – U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Summit Declaration 2018; 6 – Reactions to U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Summit Declaration; 7 – Trump’s ‘America First Foreign Policy Strategies in DPRK’s Denuclearisation; and 8 – Concluding Remarks.

2. Background to the U.S.-DPRK Denuclearisation Summit

DPRKradical nationalism into nuclear ascendancy drew the label of a “pariah state” (Pierce, 2018: 2) or “rogue state,”from the U.S. and its junior guardians of world order early inthe 1990s, when the country capitalised on international laws doctrine of *jus cogens* (fundamental change in circumstance), provided in Article X of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to breakout. Consistent with the provisions of the NPT, DPRK, on 12 March 1993, gave 90-day notice to withdraw from NPT which it acceded to on 12 December 1985 and put into force on 10 April 1992. DPRK’s action followed discovery of a mismatch between declared plutonium product and nuclear waste solutions and the results of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) analysis which led to insistence by the Agency’s Director General, an Egyptian-born Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, to invoke special (intrusive) inspection procedure, provided for in its Safeguards Agreement.

Pyongyang’s moves attracted United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 825, urging DPRK not to withdraw from NPT and to honour its obligation. A day to the expiration of the notice, on 11 June 1993, the U.S. struck a deal with DPRK. Under the deal, DPRK commits to freeze its nuclear programme under IAEA monitors, open up to IAEA-DPRK periodic technical talks and suspend its withdrawal notice. Under U.S.-DPRK AgreedFramework, U.S. commits to arrange for the provision of a Low Water Reactor (LWR) for DPRK (https://www.iaea.org). U.S. influence on KEDO-DPRK nuclear plant project supplies, discovery of “programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons,” IAEA’s request for clarification talks on the status of the programme and IAEA-DPRK exchange of letters, resolutions, DPRK’s breakout from NPT for technical reasons of national security, report of IAEA to the UNSC and consequent UNSC interventions through resolutions, among many others, characterised the DPRK’ denuclearisation process.

DPRK became one of the most “vexing and persistent problems” of the U.S. through the George W. Bush and Obama presidencies into Trump’s and had had nuclear deadlock with the U.S. a third-time in 25 years (Litvak, 2017: 11). DPRK’s global challenge passed through bilateral and multilateral Six-Party Talks (made up of China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and the United States). The Six-Party negotiation, buoyed by implementation challenges, was suspended in 2009, created enhanced activities in the nuclear cycle as window for proliferation of nuclear materials to other revisionist ‘rogue’ or ‘outlawed’ states (Chanlett-Avery and Reinhart, 2013; Curtis, 1995: 146) who threaten their neighbours and entire world.

The U.S. accused DPRK, in October 2002, of violating the Agreed Framework by pursuing a secret uranium enrichment programme. Consequently, the U.S. suspended shipments of heavy fuel oil under the Framework and as a reprisal, DPRK expelled IAEA safeguards inspectors, demobilised IAEA equipment, and cancelled, on 10 January 2003, its suspended notification of withdrawal from NPT (UNODA, 1985). Following the sognun or ‘military-first’ ideology:

DPRK reinforced long-range artillery forces near the DMZ and substantially increased the number of mobile ballistic missiles that could strike a variety of targets in the Republic of Korea [ROK] and Japan... DPRK continues to pursue a nuclear weapons programme, having conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. In April 2013, less than two months after its third nuclear test, Pyongyang promulgated a domestic “Law on Consolidating Position as a Nuclear Weapons State” to provide a legal basis for its nuclear programme and another signal that it does not intend to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons development which the law added, “can only be used by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korea’s People’s Army (Kim Jong-
un) to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear-weapons State and make retaliatory strikes (U.S. Department of Defence, 2015: 5, 10 and 21)

DPRK’s “‘creep-out’ cheating” (Eke, 2007: 157) under the subterfuge of withdrawal from NPT and reinforcement of “nuclear weapons cycle” (Kristensen, 2016) pitted it against the U.S., its Asian neighbours, UN and IAEA. DPRK’s nuclear debate centre on three broad, inter-related and mutually reinforcing pillars of IAEA: non-proliferation, peaceful uses, and disarmament. The U.S. argues: An effective non-proliferation regime, whose members comply with their obligations provide an essential foundation for progress on disarmament and makes possible greater cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. With the right to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology comes the responsibility of non-proliferation. Progress on disarmament reinforces efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and to enforce compliance with obligations, thereby also facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation (U.S. Delegation, 2010).

Despite operationalisation of the NPT, nearly three decades since relaxation of U.S.-USSR cold war politics, struggle for possession of nuclear weapons elixir of life by countries such as DPRK and other nth countries through ‘nuclear machismo’ continued to haunt man and civilisation.

Trump’s denuclearisation pathways are a strategic undertaking partially reinforced by ‘Global Zero,’ a non-partisan group of 300 world leaders, launched in Paris, December 2008 to achieve a nuclear-free world (Abrams, 2018; Daalder and Lodal, 2008; Neuneck, 2009:61) through negotiations in the third phase of the ‘Zero’ plan, scheduled to begin in 2019, during the term of President Barack Obama’s successor (Global Zero, 2010; Mustafa, 2010: 3). States of immediate proliferation concern are DPRK which leads Iran, with no known weapons or fissile material stockpiles to build weapons; Syria, which suffered Israeli airstrike in September 2007 on what the U.S. officials alleged was the construction site of a nuclear research reactor similar to Pyongyang’s Yongbyon reactor (Arms Control Association, U.S. Department of State and Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute, 21 June 2018).

Against the danger posed by DPRK’s nuclear-cycle complex, the UN and its watchdog [IAEA] slammed Pyongyang with over nine UNSC Resolutions: 1718 [2006], 1874 [2009], 2087 [2013], 2094 [2013], 2270 [2016], 2321 [2016], 2371 [2017], 2375 [2017], and 2379 [2017]. In the latest GC resolution of 26 September 2014, IAEA in paragraphs:

(iv) Condemns the three nuclear tests conducted by DPRK in violation and flagrant disregard of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (v) "Calls upon the DPRK to refrain from conducting any further nuclear test pursuant to the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions; and (vi) Calls upon the DPRK to come into full compliance with the NPT and to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of Agency comprehensive safeguards, including all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the safeguards agreement which the Agency has not been able to conduct since 1994, and to resolve any outstanding issues that may have arisen due to the long absence of Agency safeguards and the lack of Agency access since April 2009 (UNSC, 2006).

DPRK’s nuclear and missile programme increased global anxiety: while Japan, in a security dilemma, sought to acquire medium-range air-launched cruise missiles, capable of striking Pyongyang, for deterrent purposes; UK government urged that military option must remain on the table in dealing with DPRK’s nuclear programme; the U.S. President Trump warned that the U.S. may have to destroy North Korea if “Rocket Man” Kim Jong-un continued to threaten its allies in the region; and Russia urged that Chinese roadmap should be used to give Pyongyang direct talks with Washington including security guarantees (Sputnik News, 13 June 2018). Earlier in a unilateral talk, the U.S., ROK and Japan, urged DPRK to stand down its destructive and reckless path of weapons development. Timeline of U.S.-DPRK standoff is presented in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2016</td>
<td>The spy runs a power, Kim Jong-un as he says his country can produce hydrogen bomb. He first6 showed a nuclear weapon that could target the United States. The main test, a drill, was Wedensday, an engineering expert said it is a genuine hydrogen bomb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2016</td>
<td>North Korea sent up a satellite. The United States calls this a disguised test of an engine powerful enough to launch an ICBM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>North Korea claims it can miniaturise a nuclear device to fit onto a missile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>North Korea says it has successfully tested an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), with a range of 2,000 to 3,400 miles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2016</td>
<td>North Korea conducts its fifth and largest nuclear test on the anniversary of the country’s founding. It said it has mastered the ability to mount a warhead on a ballistic missile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2017</td>
<td>North Korea reveals a new ICBM design, displaying the missiles at a military parade to mark the birthday of founding leader Kim Il-Sung. Within three months, the missiles are tested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2017</td>
<td>North Korea tests an ICBM for the first time, saying it can launch a missile that can reach the continental United States. The Hwasong-14, is tested again three weeks later, this time in a night launch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2017</td>
<td>North Korea fires an intermediate range missile over northern Japan, prompting warnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2017</td>
<td>North Korea said it successfully conducted a test of a hydrogen bomb, making the country's sixth nuclear test. The bomb was the most powerful the country had tested and led to a magnitude 6.3 earthquake.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It was followed soon afterwards by another missile launch that flew over Japan, which led US President Donald Trump to warn leaders at the U General Assembly that the US may have to take advantage of the superpowers.


From the table 1, one can correctly assert that DPRK’s nuclear weapon capability was developing and the potential nuclear blackmail of the US, the European and other military partners in the cold war years, and unilateralism in the post-cold war world. The American post-cold war diplomatic strategies were dictated by the need to achieve its foreign policy goals as package of U.S. national interests abroad, including mostly the hitherto USSR ‘captive states. The U.S. internationalist pillars of security strategy in the Trump administration were anchored to pursue America first objectives of the foreign policy goals.

The U.S. foreign policy instruments which include broad political, economic and military are in ascending order of severity and impact when matched with the level of national interest depending on the expected pressure that can be brought to bear on an adversary to compel good behaviour. In consideration of these conditioning factors, the U.S. State Department, in broad terms, defined American foreign policy goals, to include power, peace, prosperity, and principle (4Ps).

(i) **Power** - Powers is the key requirement for the most basic goal of self-defence and the preservation of national independence, territory and other cherished values through deterrence and defence in a ‘dirty pool’ characterised by struggle and uncertainty. America’s projection of power in the 21st century is amply evidenced in various reports of U.S. Department of Defence which strategically seeks, among others, to:

- protect all important military bases of U.S. homeland, overseas garrisons and the allies, and try to destroy all the enemies nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery systems;
- make sure the U.S. will be able to deliver its forces to any part of the world and eliminate all threats;
- take advantage of the super-capabilities of reconnaissance and combined operations of U.S. military forces, strike heavy blows at all moving and fixed targets of enemies so as make sure that they have no place to hide;
- further strengthen the operating and survival capabilities of U.S. space system and its auxiliary facilities, etc.

U.S. President George W. Bush underscored America’s global power in 1991 when he poignantly stated, *inter alia*: “the United States has a new credibility and that what we say goes, and that there is no place for lawless aggression in the Persian Gulf and in this new world order that we seek to create.” Another classic example was President Trump’s Jerusalem declaration on 6 December 2017 and consequent opening of American Embassy in Jerusalem on 14 May 2018, amidst international opposition (Eke, 2016: 97; 2018).

(ii) **Peace** - Peace takes the form of promotion of cooperation between states and international institutions as the basis for ‘sustained cooperation’ in the world. At the UN, the U.S. seeks to lead the international community in the pursuit of peace and when it can be effective using alternative mechanisms, coalitions, partnerships, alliances, and organisations, to act when the UN proves unable or unwilling to do so, as was the case in the 1991
Gulf War in Iraq, where the U.S. used “coalition of the willing,” composed of more than 28 countries (Eke, 2017).

(iii) Prosperity - Prosperity is both goal and means of U.S. foreign policy to give high priority to economic national interest as a basic force through economic incentive or aid to strengthen and broaden support from countries that would not generally support American policies in the UN. The U.S. uses its economic prosperity to pursue seven goals which include: achieving peace and security; governing justly and democratically; investing in people; promoting economic growth and prosperity; providing humanitarian assistance; promoting international understanding; and strengthening U.S. consular and management capabilities (U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, Strategic Plan, Fiscal Year 2007-2012: transformational Diplomacy, revised May 7, 2007 @ https://www.usaid.gov/policy/coordination/stratplan_fy07-12-pdf, February 23, 2010).

(iv) Principle - American principle involves values, ideas, and beliefs that guide U.S. foreign policy actions. It includes legal, cultural, and moral principles. Under Trump’s “principled realism,” paradigm shifted from idealism to pragmatism. Trump proclaimed ‘America First’ doctrine and in his ‘America First Foreign Policy’ document drafted by U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley, ties U.S. foreign aid more directly to countries’ UN votes (Rose, 2018). On 20 December 2017, Trump declared: “All of these nations that take our money and then they vote against us at the Security Council or they vote against us ... at the Assembly ... Well, we’re watching those votes. Let them vote against us; we’ll save a lot” (Landler, 2017). The Trump administration holds that: An American First National Strategy is based on American principles, a clear-eyed assessment of U.S. interests, and a determination to tackle the challenges that we face. It is a strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology. It is based upon the view that peace, security, and prosperity depend on strong, sovereign nations that respect their citizens at home and cooperate to advance peace, and it is grounded in the realisation that American principles are a lasting force for good in the world (White House, 2017: 1).

Impliedly, the U.S. believes in working within the bounds and norms of multilateral organisations, for example the UN, but upholding, on moral principles. American cultural precepts of liberty, freedom and right to all nations, to act in the fashion of a global ‘Policeman’ and if need arises, seize the initiative or act alone when multilateralism lags behind or fails, for global peace and security.

The 4Ps stand distinctly inclusive and exclusive depending on the major considerations, for instance, during the Persian Gulf War, “all of the 4Ps were served in some way. Likewise, the Marshall Plan was able to achieve the goals of peace, power, and prosperity (Jentleson, 2018). The 4Ps of American foreign policy are a function of its grand strategy guiding all aspects of reciprocal relationships between social and economic activity toward the achievement of war aims (Lindell Hart in Eke, 2007: 23). American principled realism is a mix of ‘non-intervention’ and ‘non-avoidance’ strategy in U.S. foreign policy which in Thomas Christensen’s notion of grand strategy is “the full package of domestic and international policies designed to increase power and national security” in peacetime as well as wartime to pursue vital strong foreign policy outcomes whether real or imagined.Although there had been the challenge of balancing American power and principle (Millikan, 1994), there seems to be harmony of the U.S. 4Ps in the case of denuclearisation process in the Korean peninsula.

4. DPRK’s Nuclear Threat and U.S. Policy Steps

Following Kim Jong-un New Year’s Day threatening message to test an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), U.S. president-elect Donald Trump swore to take Kim’s threat more seriously than President Obama did (Ruggiero, 2017: 4). As we have earlier observed, U.S.-DPRK relations became frosty given Pyongyang’s nuclear programme, exit from IAEA safeguard obligation and missile threat to Asian neighbours and the U.S. The U.S. authorities argued persuasively that Pyongyang first missile launch were probably for four-fold goals, to: (i) demonstrate countervailing military capabilities against the U.S. deterrence; (ii) demonstrate regime legitimacy to the North Korean people; (iii) show technical capabilities to potential importers of Pyongyang’s missiles in the Middle East; and potentially, (iv) create the capacity for nuclear blackmail. These objectives necessitated U.S.’ four broad policy options to deny DPRK its motives for nuclear capability: (i) enforcement and expansion of U.S. sanctions; (ii) enhancement of military cooperation with allies to further strengthen U.S. alliance commitments; (iii) Congressional commitment of additional resources to support interdictions of Pyongyang’s shipment of arms or other illicit goods that provide hard currency to the regime; and (iv) regime change or simply motivation, negotiation, sanctions, and military options (Chanlett-Avery and Manyin, 2017: 2; Chhabra and Bruce, n.d.:13; Council on Foreign Relations, 2010: 11).

More so, Article VI presents the basic bargain in NPT: “each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control” (Bobbit, 2008: 529). Article VI applies to all parties both the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ in two distinguishable patterns; those have-nots should, “at
the early date,” be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons; and the nuclear-haves should open up for disarmament, for complete nuclear-free world.

As prelude to U.S.-DPRK nuclear summit, President Trump began with improving and leveraging U.S. relations with some ASEANs for a trilateral (U.S., ROK, and Japan) condemnation of DPRK’s reckless nuclear ambition to strengthen negotiation with Pyongyang for reconciliation role and laying foundation for a landmark Inter-Korean [One Korea] Summit in Washington, D.C., which culminated into signing of DPRK-ROK Pannunjom Declaration in April 2018, with commitments to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula (Edit, 11 May 2018).

5. U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Summit Declaration 2018

Despite several political and logistic hiccup over U.S.-DPRK’s meet, Trump’s presidential and business skills influenced his concessions to Kim Jong-un in the June 12, 2018 Trump-Kim declaration was made at the Singapore summit, and hosted by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the Five-Star Capella Hotel, located on the Sentosa Island. The four components of the denuclearisation documents were:

a) the United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the two countries for peace and prosperity;

b) the United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula;

c) reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Pannunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula; and

d) the United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified (CBS News, 12 June 2018; White House, 12 June 2018).

Under the U.S.-DPRK declaration, described by President Trump as “important” and “comprehensive,” DPRK commits to work towards denuclearisation and the U.S., in return, commits to end U.S.-ROK war games in the Korean Peninsula.

6. Reactions to U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Summit Declaration

The U.S.-DPRK bilateral summit yielded declarations which attracted varying interpretations and reactions within the international community and its political actors. There were three groups of strategic stakeholders whose actions lent themselves for scrutiny – foreign powers, particularly the U.S., Asian regional powers, and international organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Joe Manchin</td>
<td>I applaud President Trump, and those on his team…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker of the House Paul Ryan</td>
<td>For decades, America policy towards North Korea has failed, and I commend POTUS for not accepting the status quo. As negotiations now advance, there is still no absolute, unambiguous, remove the nuclear threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. David Purdue</td>
<td>Praised the Trump’s leadership, unverifying resolve to make the world a safer place, dedicated for total denuclearisation, and potential peace treaty to end the Korean War, with comprehensive talks on the table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Rob Portman</td>
<td>I have supported this summit with the goal of achieving a peaceful solution that includes North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Lindsey Graham</td>
<td>Congratulations to President Trump, this is an historic opportunity to end the Korean War, get North Korea to give up their weapons and missiles that threaten us and the world...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. Mike Rounds</td>
<td>Good news coming from Singapore. @POTUS has made early strides in making our world a safer place. A lot of work to do yet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

House of Reps

| Mo Brooks                      | The U.S./North Korea Summit was a historic event and a good first step toward peace.              |
| Bradley Byrne                 | … I have confidence in @POTUS, @SEC/Pompeo, and their team to continue pushing for a strong agreement. |
| Paul Gosar                    | I am encouraged by the news... @POTUS' historic meeting moves us closer to the possibility of a denuclearised Korea. |
| Todd Rokita                   | We finally have a commander-in-chief who, rather than lead from behind, has taken charge and inspired our countrymen to make the world a safer place. |
| Ralph Abraham                 | Once again, President Trump has shown his great leadership skills on a world stage by obtaining North Korea’s commitment to denuclearise. The global community can breathe easier... |
| Andy Harris                   | I am encouraged by positive reports coming from the Singapore Summit. President Trump has made more progress in the last year and half that previous presidents made over several decades. |
| Vicky Hartzler                | I am encouraged with the positive news coming out of today’s summit between the U.S. and North Korea. These talks are an important step towards lasting peace in the region. |
| Don Bacon                     | … president’s first meeting was successful and this effort has confounded presidents before him.   |
| Bill Johnson                  | I applaud President Trump and those on his team... The strategy used by previous administrations, clearly did not work, and it was time for a new approach. |

Table 2: Reactions of Some U.S. Officials’ on Trump-Kim Summit

DOI: 10.9790/0837-2308063046 www.iosrjournals.org 35 | Page
John Jordan  
Congratulations to @POTUS on the historic summit with North Korea! This is an important step towards greater peace and prosperity for the whole world.

Scott Perry  
...Trump’s summit with DPRK leader Kim Jong-un is a momentous, historic undertaking...to get North Korea’s commitment for us to recover the remains of U.S. POWs and our MIAs from the Korean War.

Marsha Blackburn  
Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula will make America and the world more secure... I applaud @realDonaldTrump’s efforts.

Chuck Fleischmann  
Last night, @realDonaldTrump exemplified what it means to be a leader, becoming the first sitting U.S. president to meet with a North Korean head of State.

Rep. Phil Roe  
Trump made strides towards peace with North Korea...a strategy to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula and concrete steps towards de-escalation should be a significant step towards peace and global security.

R. Michael Burgess  
This is a yearning a generation looks before the President Trump is a strong president eager with a true vision for the future. Trump's leadership has set the need international China and other countries would have been impossible to succeed.

Rep. Ted Poe  
Congratulations Trump, on his meeting with Kim Jong-un and moving forward in negotiations on denuclearising the Korean Peninsula. Doing what no other POTUS has done, Trump has made history with this first meeting.

R. Cathy M. Rodgers  
I’m encouraged by the goals @POTUS set to denuclearize North Korea and protect America.

R. Scan Duffy  
After @POTUS @realDonaldTrump met with Kim, we are closer (but of course, need to solidify process) to denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.


Table 2 summarises Americans’ elation and felicitations for eliciting Kim Jong-un’s commitments and upbeat that President Trump, as a commander-in-chief and realist who embraces challenge, inspires new leadership skills and diplomacy, was using diplomatic first-step to commit Pyongyang to leadership to assure DPRK-ROK peace and unification in the Asian region and global security through denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Senator Rokita revealed the fine mesh between U.S. powers and Trump’s spectacular presidential personality as source of hope for peace and maintained that President Trump was one whose “peace through strength has re-asserted America back to the front of the world stage” (Rokita, 12 June 2018). The U.S. officials as surged President Trump and his team to accept only one outcome: complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation and recovery, from DPRK, U.S. Prisoners of War (POWs) and troops missing in action (MIAs).

Since Pyongyang took the trajectory towards nuclear weapons acquisition through ‘nuclear machismo,’ containment by exerting ‘result-oriented’ pressure on DPRK to extract its full commitment to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula had been an Herculean task but for Trump’s fortuitous combination of war games, threats of direct offensive, economic sanctions, personal diplomacy and strategic linkage politics of damage-limitation through offensive-defense and diversionary great-power economic war on China, despite Trump’s bromance with Xi Jinping, the strong DPRK’s sally.

Trump Campaign adviser and Mr Trump’s daughter-in-law Lara Trump also revealed that:
the “historic” Trump-Kim summit marked Trump’s bold and vigilant leadership in America and the developments with the DPRK regime were yet another validation that the American people were right to entrust POTUS to change the course and direction of America after decades of captivity by the Washington Establishment. President Trump “will continue to succeed in dramatic ways because he will always put America First and wishes only to succeed on behalf of the American people” (Trump, 12 June 2018)

Governors of Alabama, Guam, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Northern Mariana Islands, South Carolina, West Virginia, etc., joined others in pouring encomiums and congratulating President Trump for his achievements in the Trump-Kim declaration.
Beyond American officials, many international leaders and organisations lauded Trump’s achievements. Table 3 captures the views expressed by foreign countries and their leaders.

Table 3: Reactions from some Foreign Countries on Trump-Kim Summit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australia’s Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, hailed the historic denuclearisation summit between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump as a “momentous, historic undertaking” to get North Korea’s commitment for us to recover the remains of U.S. POWs and our MIAs from the Korean War.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Britain

Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson tweeted: “Welcome the news that President Trump and Kim Jong-un have begun constructive talks in Singapore. The DPRK’s commitment to complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula is important first step towards a stable and prosperous future.”

China

Chief of Energy North Korea’s Nuclear Warhead talks to the tension between the two countries, the North Korean nuclear programme... Rhode island Senator. Trump has repeatedly stressed the need for a diplomatic solution... The statement was signed by the two leaders. The joint statement is an important development... and tangible verifiable outcomes... Johnson, 12 June 2018).

Germany

German Chancellor Angela Merkel remarks the Trump-Kim talks is “pleats of hope” of achieving the resolution of DPRK’s nuclear weapons... it would be marvelous if we could experience a detente.

India

Indian government spokesmen. Mohamed Atif Shibli praised the summit meeting as a positive movement the call for an end to the North Korea nuclear arms race... which was established during the early 1970s for Security Ties to Pakistan.

Israel

The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu congratulated President Trump for the “historic” summit with “breakthrough” in terms of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Japan

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told Trump there was “great meaning in Kim’s clearly confirming... the complete denuclearisation no concrete steps had been taken...” and wants sustenance of U.S. ROKmilitary presence in South Korea as vital to security in East Asia.

Russia

The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov issued a formal statement applauding Trump-Kim’s decision, declaring that the two nations’ leaders have achieved a “positive” outcome of the summit. The statement reiterated Russia’s commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Singapore

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong congratulated both leaders in separate letters on the successful outcome of the summit and wished both countries success in implementing the agreement.

South Korea

ROK President Moon Jae-in hailed the Trump-Kim summit as a “historic achievement,” adding that the deal was a “significant step forward” in the ongoing process of denuclearization. The Joint Declaration was signed by both leaders.

Vatican City

Pope Francis expressed hope that the Trump-Kim summit will “continue... of the Korean Peninsula and the entire world.”


Beyond countries enlisted in table 3, Canada, Italy, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Ukraine, and Vietnam (Wikipedia) joined in the praise and the international community underscored the importance of the great powers – Britain, China, France, Russia, United States as well as Germany, Israel and Japan - towards complete, verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

Nonetheless, China, India, Japan, Singapore and ROKof Asian-Pacific axis wereput under security dilemma precipitated by DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme despiteXi’s ‘China Dream’ to leverage “China’s growing military, diplomatic, and economic clout” (Department of Defense, 2016: 1) to play the political godfather to DPRK and in the Asian-Pacific region. India wants to leverage Trump’s U.S. Indian Pacific Strategy for joint initiative in the region of DPRK; Japan fears that “despite Pyongyang’s pledge for denuclearisation no concrete steps had been taken...” and wants sustenance of U.S.-ROKmilitary presence in ROK as vital to security in East Asia; ROK also wants sustenance of its joint military exercise with the U.S. in the region; Singapore, accredited peace-broker between DPRK and U.S., wants faithful implementation of Trump-Kim declaration for complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Interests that underlay the denuclearisation process led the Executive Director of Global Zero Movement Derek Johnson to argue that the Trump-Kim joint declaration gave “cautious sigh of relief” and maintained that:

Even without asubstantive breakthrough, the joint statement is a welcome departure from missile tests, schoolyard taunts and threats of ‘fire and fury.’ Yet, we must be realistic. Ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and bringing peace to the peninsula will require hard work and a sustained commitment to diplomacy and engagement. It will take a patience and persistence to establish the kind of negotiations that can produce actionable steps and tangible, verifiable outcomes (Johnson, 12 June 2018).

From Johnson’s thesis of “cautious sigh of relief,” one finds China’s position a special concern. China paints a picture of long and tortuous denuclearisation process; described the Singapore summit as an “equal dialogue” and “starting point” between Washington and Pyongyang, adding: no-one will doubt the unique and important role played by China: a role which will continue and no-one would expect the half-day summit to be able to iron out all differences – U.S. ‘wants N Korea disarmament by 2020’ and remove deep-seated mistrust between the two long-time foes (Meixler, 12 June 2018).
China, in a linkage political game, approached U.S.-DPRK milestone in the denuclearisation process from a bruised economic point of view which it hoped to patch up through playing lasting role in DPRK.

Beyond great powers and the Asian Pacific sovereign states, the Trump-Kim declaration evoked reactions from some strategic international organisation stakeholders, including Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the United Nations. Table 4 summarises the organisations’d reactions, expectations and willingness to give ‘technical’ support based on the Trump-Kim summit in the denuclearisation process.

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**Table 4: Reactions of Some International Organisations on Trump-Kim Summit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)</td>
<td>Support of ASEAN countries to Trump-Kim summit, “if it succeeds, some analysts argue, is that it will resonate far beyond US, North Korea and South Korea as direct participants, to include the Middle East.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)</td>
<td>The IAEA Director General conveyed the statement of the “clear intent” to nuclear disarmament during the Trump-Kim summit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>The EU welcomed the US-North Korea talks as “crucial and necessary Trump-Kim Talks”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)</td>
<td>NATO sanctions towards the DPRK were “crucial and necessary Trump-Kim Talks”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations (UN)</td>
<td>The UN Secretary-General called the Trump-Kim summit a “crucial and necessary step” for denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Despite varying opinions, the common denominator was that Trump-Kim summit and its declaration satisfied first-step approach to denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula, although DPRK did not declare its nuclear programme as prescribed by the IAEA safeguard measures, regarding 90-day deadline and the inexplicit commitment to a framework of verification and ‘complete disarmament’ deadline. The benefit of Trump-Kim summit, if it succeeds, some analysts argue, is that it will resonate far beyond US, North Korea and South Korea as direct participants, to include the Middle East. This view is that Trump’s approach:

- Lays U.S. foreign policy of opposing and reversing his predecessor Barack Obama years of Establishment status quo of calling the bluff of opponents which has been seized to develop better missiles and nuclear weapons;
- Pragmatizes U.S. policy of alternate use of carrot and stick with which Washington treated Kim Jong-un as an annoying, spoiled kid to be cajoled and bribed through respect and summit participation as legitimandy change of rule of the game with Pyongyang in winning the hearts and minds of the DPRK’s neighbours who prefer a climb-down in U.S. threats, since they stand to suffer more in any conflict; and
- Emphasizes a new U.S. foreign policy shift from America’s European allies toward Asia – which includes the Middle East – an indication that Washington sees Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Singapore and Seoul as more important than Berlin or London (Frantzman, 11 June 2018: 23-38).

Peace is crucial to America’s shift in emphasis to ‘economic’ Asia following outcomes of political and economic events. Europe loathes Trump-America but Asia and Middle East with Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Cairo and Jerusalem feel more secure with America. Trump became America’s first president to meet a serving North Korean leader after eleven predecessor-presidents in office.

However, experts still worried that although President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un signed for “complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula” which Washington thinks could be achieved by 2020, Pyongyang demands American “reciprocal action” through America’s “security guarantees” by ending U.S.-ROK war games in the peninsula, a condition it had insisted on since the 1990s. The DPRK government argued that the two leaders agreed that “step-by-step and simultaneous action” was needed to achieve denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

In President Trump’s characterisation of Chairman Kim Jong-un’s sas dictor of a “hermit kingdom” (Trump, 12 June 2018), Kim was sardonic that Trump’s “all-or-nothing negotiation,” turned out rhetoric than reality.DPRK’s euphoria was surprised by Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies at Columbia University Charles Armstrong, thus:

He [Kim] received recognition on the world stage by meeting as an equal with the President of the United States, and an agreement with the U.S. to improve relations without conceding anything except to work towards ‘complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula... it is a very important declaration of principles and goals but very vague on specific actions (Sen, 16 June 2018).
Beside Armstrong’s euphoria, Rodon Sinmun’s four-page features on the text of Trump-Kim declaration highlighted Trump’s pledge to cease war games in Korean peninsula and security guarantees without mention of Kim’s part of the alleged promise made to Trump about closing down a test site for missile engines (Zwirko, 12 June 2018). Armstrong and Sinmun euphoria raise more anxiety and doubt that DPRK and its fans understood the deeper meaning of the bilateral declaration and were ready to play to the rule game to avoid a sedulous invitation to avoidable war.

Instructively, professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University Sung-Yoon Lee, relived States’ Ostrich game of ‘nuclear ambiguity’ in disarmament process and posited: Kim’s participation in the summit is his attempt to buy time and money to continue his nuclear efforts… tragicomic moment. President Trump is being played. Moved by hubris, among other things, [Trump is] presuming he can get the North Korean dictator to give up his nuclear arms, the one ace card that North Korea has in overturning the tables against South Korea…North and South Korea have been divided for more than half a century. The North is technically still at war with the South and the United States… North Korea does have a menacing nuclear power… Kim Jong-un has been preparing for this moment his entire life, receiving leadership training… Underestimating the North Korean leader, thinking he’s weird and lazy and being surprised to find out he’s not only not a lunatic, but quite a reasonable and charming, has been a fallacy. Repeatedly, Americans have been played by their assumption of North Korea as an underdog… the summit, however, is a political move, one in which Kim can buy time and money to do what he really wants to do, which is to further advance his nuclear and missile, menacing capabilities (CNBC, 11 June 2018, 2.42 PM ET).

From the foregoing, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer asserted: “the agreement reached between Mr Trump and Kim is ‘short on details’ and ‘vague’ on concrete action. We must get action not just photo ops” (Siddiqui and Gambino, 12 June 2018). The joint agreement views denuclearisation as a “far off goal” with no clear pathway on how to achieve it or verify that DPRK has, in fact, disarmed. Schumer observed too, that the agreement was a “welcomed improvement to see them have a dialogue rather than engaging in name-calling.” We are all rooting for diplomacy to success; we must be clear-eyed about what a diplomatic success looks like with North Korea (Pramuk, 12 June 2018) because, as Gramer and Tankin (2018: 1-7) summed up: The previous track record of nuclear diplomacy with DPRK “does not inspire optimism.”

7. Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy Strategies in DPRK’S Denuclearisation

In the American foreign policy tradition, Trump’s approach was a novel of startup multidimensional instruments of sanctions, military drills, personal and preventive diplomacy as well as carrot of an ‘Olive branch’ in pledges of security guarantee, end of war games, and withdrawal of 32,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in ROKin dealing with the DPRK’s denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula. A realist on the lane of American ‘principled realism,’ Trump knew the stakes between broad choices: global security and complete denuclearisation, on one side; and ‘war games’ and complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula within the threshold of ‘American first’ foreign policy goals and national interest, on another.

In the high-stake game, as in the cat-and-mouse game, Trump knew that it was not cowardice that the cat walks slowly but strategy built on caution! He bent backwards andavoided American traditional ‘god-father’ diplomatic approach which had precluded concessions, particularly U.S.-ROK ‘war games’ in the Korean Peninsulaand had blocked progress on the denuclearisation talks. Trump realised and worked towards the U.S.-DPRK historic document as a political vertebrate forDPRK’s commitments todenuclearised Korean Peninsula, peace, and cooperative U.S.-DPRK relations.

Although skeptics and critics alike warn that Trump-Kim Declaration could collapse based on presidential personalities of the political gladiators, many issues raise cause for more concern. Iran cited example of Washington’s pull out from a similar deal with Iran and warned DPRK to be wary of America because, according to Iran’s government spokesman Mohammed Bagher Nobakht quoted by IRNA news agency, “We don’t know what type of person the North Korean leader is negotiating with; it is not clear that he would not cancel the agreement before returning home” (The Guardian, 12 June 2018). On the contrary, Senator Graham, U.S. House Representative South Carolina, warned:

…if Kim shakes Trump’s hand and receives lavish praise from President Trump and tries to play Trump - look what happened to Canada - bad things are going to happen. So, the worst thing you can do to President Trump, if you’re a foreign leader, is try to play him”(Bryan, 12 June 2018).

Few critics argued that the two-nation agreement offers Pyongyang and Beijing a huge win while Trump appears to have given his Asian allies the cold shoulder (Chandran, 14 June 2018) without deeper understanding that Trump pledges in U.S.-DPRK bilateral relations are not substitute but complementary to a wider U.S.-Asia relations in event of denuclearisation outcome by DPRK. Sachs (7 May 2018) apprised logically that the U.S.-DPRK nuclear tango was geared towards maintaining American global nuclear dominance which complements its power in a way that U.S. will have all-two types of foreign policy; one based on the principle of “might is right”, and another based on the ‘rule of law.’ With both types of foreign policy in
the hand of the U.S., it can use the might-is-right principle to hold other countries accountable to the rule of law, while exempting itself. As logic would expect, U.S. Congress is more likely to iron out and strengthen weak points in the Trump-Kim Declaration during their ratification process and it remains binding commitments howbeit.

More so, proponents of low-score for Trump in the bilateral declaration largely ignored the fact that, in principle, U.S. DPRK policy was tied to extant NPT which recognised China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States as nuclear-weapons States (NWS) and legitimised their nuclear arsenal thresholds referred to, in American nukespeak, as “upload hedge” or “responsive capacity” (Schneider, 2012: 51) for deterrent purposes, except that it “establishes they are not supposed to build and maintain such weapons in perpetuity.” Since the signing of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between U.S. and USSR on 31st July 1991 up until 2013, arms reduction stood at 89% (Russia), 85% (U.S.), 57% (UK), 44% (France), not available record (China) (Kristensen and Norris, 2013). Of the remaining, 92 percent nuclear-weapons are controlled by the U.S. and Russia (Kristensen and Norris, 2018) Russia leads the U.S. (https://www.ploughshares.org) as is reflected in table 5.

Table 5: Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, Late 2009 and February 2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Warheads 8</th>
<th>Warheads 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>6, 8 5 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1 3 0 0 0 6</td>
<td>5 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9 4 0 0 3 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3 0 2 0 8 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2 4 0 2 1 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel*</td>
<td>1 8 0 8 0 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan*</td>
<td>9 0 1 4 5 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India*</td>
<td>8 0 1 3 5 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>8 1 0 5 0 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Non-NPT Nuclear Weapons Possessors.

Table 5 reveals that NPT-recognised five-State nuclear-haves and Israel almost halved their warhead-holdings, but two non-NPT nuclear-possessors – Pakistan and India as well as the n th country - North Korea, on the contrary and against the spirit and letter of NPT, have steadfastly about doubled.

However, as master of the game, Trump assured that the sanctions placed on Pyongyang will remain in force while American government “will be verifying” the exercise (“BBC News, 14 June 2018). Senator Cory Gardner reassured critic that U.S.-ROK military exercise will continue despite the assurances by President Trump that such “war games” will halt. U.S. Defence Secretary James Mattis said he “was not surprised” by Trump’s announcement of suspension of military drills and maintained he “is in full alignment with the President to meet his goal which is denuclearisation of the Peninsula” (“SBS News, 12 June 2018) Mattis added that America’s security alliance with ROK is a crucial element of Washington’s greater presence and the linchpin of peace in the Asia Pacific region which is widely considered critical to the safety of not just Seoul, but Tokyo, Taipei and others.

Although Trump described U.S.-ROK annual war game as “provocative” and “expensive,” and indicated desire to withdraw 32,000 U.S. soldiers currently stationed in ROK, no deadline was stated and it was not based on China-Russia roadmap. President Trump’ pledges were American voluntary decision for reward of expected ‘outcome’ of good behaviour by DPRK for faithful implementation of the four core elements of the Trump-Kim Declaration, leading to complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula and not for ‘ideological’ guess of what Pyongyang could do.

More seriously, pledges to DPRK in the bilateral agreement were no substitute to US’ bilateral agreements and relations with ROK, Japan or India thus Trump and Vice President Pence’s contradictory messages on the fate of joint U.S.-ROK military drills should not be mistaken as relaxation of any measure aimed at piling pressure on Pyongyang regime to “fully expeditiously” disarm and avoid prospect of military confrontation (Jervis and Rapp-Hooper, 2018: 6). Although, the issues were part of the full text of the Trump-
Kim statement, they were not part of the critical four-pronged declaration. Putting the cart before the horse by ending war games and withdrawing military presence before complete denuclearisation of Korean peninsula amounts to allowing the World surviving ‘Superpower,’ in the words of Kaplan, to be overtaken by power-seeker (DPRK).

In the U.S.-DPRK nuclear tango, China recovered its torn-coat after U.S.-sponsored UN weapons inspection in Iraq when therewere such common headlines as “China Doubts UN Sanctions on Iraq” (Shi, 1998); “Iraq and the U.S.: Saddam Wins the First Round” (Hiro, 1998); “Iraq, We Win, then What?”; and “Warning Signals from U.S.: Iraq Finally Bows to Pressure on Weapons Inspection…” (Ojewale, 2002). Like DPRK, Iraq played politics of ‘waiting game’ and ‘hiding the hazards,’ only to bow to pressure when diplomatic route had been closed.

It is also instructive that Xi played linkage political game in the U.S.-DPRK talks over Trump’s economic policy against China when Xi summoned and persuaded Kim to cancel the Trump-Kim summit (Bandow, May 30, 2018) because the issues, Xi persuaded Kim, were not of interest to DPRK and its regime. The strategic goal of Russia and China in the U.S.-DPRK denuclearisation tango was to score global relevance (Sharkov, 30 May 2018; Bandow, 2018), particularly following Sino-American tit-for-tat trade war. It behooves Pyongyang authorities to put its ‘thinking cap’, better still, ‘outside the box’ to distill its position as a possible ‘political pawn’ in the Sino-American great-power politics.

It is doubtful that Pyongyang can interpret that all-nine UNSCRs, one after another, unanimously condemned its illicit but contumacious nuclear and ballistic missiles and all, except Resolution 2087 of January 2013, made references to acting under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter. These whole developments demonstrate unity of purpose and strength among the Permanent Five (P5) and the ten non-permanent and elected members of the UNSC against Pyongyang’s nuclear programme.

It is instructive to draw lessons from politics of Iraq alleged Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons programme, the politics that lead to the unanimous (14-0) passage of UNSCR 1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003 for U.S.-British ‘Operation Desert Thunder,’ great-powers ‘occupation forces and post-war reconstruction activities in Iraq despite Chinese, French and Russian opposition against the use of force (Eke, 2010: 102-103). If the Iraqi case provides any logical outcome, the DPRK should understand China’s game and the reality that no great-power chooses to assemble its war arsenal at a cost without extracting compensatory spoils. It is no longer in doubt that DPRK’s nuclear programme is least exaggerated, contumacious and poses regional and global threat (UNSCR 1695, 15 July 2006).

From America’s power-projection, Bruce Anderson provides an authoritative perspective on the implication of Trump-Kim summit declaration on American foreign policy goals, national interest and Trump’s ‘America first’ doctrine. Anderson coherently and copiously asserted:

The landmark summit between President Trump and Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim services the U.S. national interests…is beneficial since it satisfies all national interest’s components – power, peace, prosperity and principles. First, based on realism, the power objective can be exerted through the reassertion of U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific region vital to its interests through coercive self-help strategies, coercive diplomacy to ensure survival and if the summit fails, through the more aggressive policy of deterrence for survival purposes. Second, according to international institutionalism, the peace objective can be met by formally ending Korean war through joining international diplomatic efforts to broker peace between two Koreas; lowering regional instability by spearheading the improvement in DPRK nuclear counter-proliferation strategies, as well as halting further development and proliferation of ballistic missiles in association with international institutions. Third, based on economism, prosperity objective can be pursued by aligning the U.S. and North Korea interests for economic development and implementing economic policies to strengthen global capitalism through the incorporation of North Korea into regional and global economic systems. Lastly, according to democratic idealism, principles objective is serviced by pursuing political policies for human rights protection in the short-term and possible democracy promotion in the long-term periods (Anderson, 22 May 2018).

However, the U.S. ‘selling point’ in the Trump-Kim summit declaration is: complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament of the Korean Peninsula – a very high bar with promise for regional and global peace, prosperity through economic conversion of nuclear weapons, and the projection of American principles through principled realism.

I. CONCLUDING REMARKS

DPRK’s nuclear programme is not only edging proliferation to ‘tipping point’ but places its citizens, development and cherished values in harm’s way, particularly given the evasive game Pyongyang is playing in the process of denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula. Although international society operates with institutions which are ‘non-judgmental’ and by extension, non-problem-solving safe that they “give – or withdraw – their blessings to those who can and do act” (Brown and Ainley, 2005: 136-137), Trump’s ‘principled realism’ gives
them the vertebrate. As logic would expect, great-powers can always legitimise their actions, however ‘illegitimate’, in order not to leave ‘legitimacy gap’ or impression that they acted outside the bounds and norms of the society.

More so, attempts to underscoring American presidential initiatives from Democrats-Republicans ideologica lines misread domestic support for U.S. foreign policies, particularly in the U.S.-DPRK nuclear stand-off. The issue of denuclearisation to promote peace in the Korean Peninsula, Asia, and the world is widely supported by international community - great power, ASEAN countries and primary disarmament stakeholders. It would amount to avoidable mistake for Pyongyang to take Trump’s display of humility and diplomatic fortitudefor granted. The DPRK authorities should appropriately learn from the UN disarmament in Iraq, decode the unity of great actors across the Atlantic, and metaphors of Trump-Kim Declaration in Sentosa (‘peace and tranquility’), formerly Pulau Belakang Mati (‘Island of death from behind’).

President Trump exhausted the course of actor-based approach and combination of diplomatic, sanctions, economic, deterrence, and propaganda instruments of foreign policy in pursuing DPRK’s denuclearisation conform squarely to the ‘America First’ doctrine, great-power strategy, American foreign policy goals, guidelines and overall national interests in the U.S.-DPRK relations. It is doubtful that if Kim takes the opportunity of the U.S.-DPRK declaration to backstab Trump, the U.S. and global society by re-foisting ‘the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons,’ it would not attract collateral damage: sacrifice DPRK’s sovereignty and Chinese and Russian long-standing relationship and influence for American maximum economic and geostrategic interests in the Asia-Pacific corridor.

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