The Islamic Episteme of Development of Polities in International Affairs

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Abstract: The article discusses Islamic legal contributions to the development of socio-political organizations that are transnational and transcend racial and geopolitical fixations. This is best enshrined in the premise that humanity is one and unitarily aided through God’s guidance so the believers may be led to the Sharī‘ah (etymology: path or way) and know human brotherhood as revealed in the Holy Qur’ān. The epistemological difference between Islamic and non-Islamic polities, particularly in the West, is found in the social sciences. Islam advocates the build-up and consolidation of communities, while the West emphasizes sanctity of individuality. The focal point of this study is the concept of ‘Ummah’ (community of believers), whose notion is surveyed throughout its utilization by the leadership of the Prophet, the establishment of caliphas, sultanates, and imamates up to colonial impositions of the so-called modern ‘nation-state’ system. The article argues that there are ontological, epistemological, and normative differences spanning the divide between Muslim and Western worldviews especially through the development and management of their polities.

Date of Submission: 05-09-2017
Date of acceptance: 28-09-2017

I. Introduction

The Islamic religions should enhance people’s lives, while defining limits for life according to the Sharī‘ah. This is derived from two aspects. The first is the origin or theoretical foundation of religion, from which conduct, behavior and purpose of existence are related to God and creation. This is known as ‘ilm al-taqādūdah or al-dīn al-dīn. The second pertains to the system which defines the conduct of man in accordance with this ‘ilm in terms of social relations, finance and human interaction and is related to jurisprudence by which humans abide. ‘Ilm al-shara’ī wal-shāra’ī is defined as the knowledge of al-khām al-sharī’iyyah, which is derived from ijīhād. These practical provisions are organized into two groups. The first is represented by ritual provisions such as prayer, pilgrimage and alms-giving meant as a bridge between man and the Creator. The second is related to mutual provisions (al-khām al-mu’āmalāt), such as contracts, penalties and crimes, and refers to relationships between individuals, groups or nations.

Al-khām al-mu’āmalāt (mutual provisions) specifically addresses preaching and spreading Islam and all matters pertaining to Muslims’ relationships with others during peace and war, as found throughout books of jurisprudential literature such as al-Siyar (the Islamic International Law), al-jihād (excretion especially in the religious path) and al-maghāz (conduct of battles); examples include al-jihād and the provisions for prisoners, sacrifice, al-dhimma (a covenant of protection of the People of the Book, while living in the Abode of Islam), al-jīzā (poll tax), tribute, amnesty and spoils. In modern legal terminology, this is understood as General International Law. In this respect, ‘Abd al-Razāq al-Sanhārī asserts that general and legislative law have always existed in Islamic jurisprudence, though in the classical period it distinguished between the rights of the Divine and the rights of man.

Islamic jurisprudence is, moreover, geared towards addressing public interests and contemporary events. In his al-muwāfqiyyah, al-Shāhībī indicates that Islamic legal provisions do not separate the people’s present needs and interests from their future needs and interests. For al-Shāhībī, the sources of Islamic jurisprudence ensured the development of people needs; thus, according to him, a legal provision exists within the Qur’ān for all matters. Aside from explicit textual provisions found within the Qur’ān or Prophetic tradition, according to jīhād (independent legal reasoning, engaged by a mujtahid) is itself source of the origins of Islamic law, and an instrument for comprehensiveness and sustainability of al-Shāhībī. Jurists highlight its significance concerning applications of provisions or generalities and specifications of external incidents by using primary sources to derive a needed provision. In this manner, Jurists engaged in new cases and compiled comprehensive works to address those cases, delving into a range of issues such as al-jihād, al-maghāz, al-khārīj (land tax levied on lands deemed to be owned by the state but left in the possession of individuals), al-stīsah al-

DOI: 10.9790/0837-2209131326
shar' iyyah (administrative state organizations and public institutions) and siyar, in a manner strikingly similar to modern international law. It is not identical to the modern understanding of international law, however, for al-siyarat addresses Muslims’ commitments toward non-Muslims, even if they are individuals residing within d'Er al-IshtEm.10

In addition to the dictionary definition of al-Erah(pl. of siyar, conduct of the state), which refers to a path or authority, the word also connotes the Prophet’s Erabor maghÉzÉÉ and the narration of events that took place from the birth of the Prophet until his death, along with the lives of the companions and the spread of Islam.11 The term came into dominance through jurists’ use of it to refer to issues of al-maghÉzÉÉand-jihad, and Muslims’ treatments of non-Muslims, including infidels, aggressors and others such as al-musta'manin (aliens promised security by Muslims), apostates and ahl al-dhimmia (non-Muslims subjects of the Islamic state), whether in times of peace or war.12 It also included the practices by the Rightly Guided Caliphs. In his SÉrah, Ibn Hisham cites a prophetic tradition regarding the meaning of this term, as narrated by Ibn Ishaq, when the Prophet ordained Bilal ibn Rabah to transfer authority to ‘Abd al-Ra'ImEn ibn ‘Afw during the Duwmat al-Jandal battle (5/626), commanding combat against non-Muslims, but with fairness over spoils of war and forbidding betrayal, mutilation or the killing of children.13

Similarly, according to Ibn Sa’d’s 'UbaqÉÉ al-Kubra and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s ZÉd al-Ma’Éd, the Prophet’s delegate al-‘Ala’ Ibn al-Hadramin the 7/628 visited then governor of province of Bahrain (the territory of Bahrain is the region extending from what is now Kuwait to Jafar, the old name of Ras Al Khaimah in the 8th century, Al-Mundhir Ibn Sawa (d. 11/633), who responded by inquiring as to the fate of the Magians (Zoroastrians) and Jews who lived within his domain. The Prophet responded by allowing him to keep his post, requesting that Muslims be allowed to practice their religion and that non-Muslims be allowed to left free and made to pay jizya (polltax).14

AbÉEra'É al-UabarÉ, in his TÉrkkh al-UabarÉ, asserts that the second Caliph, ‘Umar ibn al-KHáfÉÉ, gave judges high salaries to avoid bribery, thus promoting unbiased and just verdicts. Judges were mandated to work toward the public interest. In addition, he issued codes of conduct to be followed in courts regardless of judges’ status, whether they be rich or poor.

The same approach was adopted by the third Caliph, ‘UthmÉÉn ibn ‘AffÉÉn, at the beginning of his tenure, when he instructed governors to serve as shepherds to their flock, and not tax-collectors, and to campaign for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.15

al-Siyarin the Era of Classical Jurists

Among the first scholars in the field of al-siyarah ‘Amir ibn Shara’Él-Sha’abi (d. 103/721),16 AbÉ ‘Umro ‘Abd al-Ra'ImÉÉ al-AwzÉÉ (d. 157/774),17 SufyÉÉn al-Thawré (d. 161/778),18 and Ibrahim ibn Mu'ámmad al-FazarÉ (d. 186/802).19 AbÉExanÉÉn and his disciples acted as precursors in the field.20

These scholars emphasized al-siyarand al-magha'í, with a focus on the military campaigns of the Prophet and on military commanders in their struggles for the sake of Allah. Their main concern was deriving the principles of legitimacy, based on recorded military campaigns. Some sought to explore the principles of SharÉÉ'ah and its applications in formalizing relations with other nations, which became an effectively permanent aspect of new interpretations of al-siyar, transforming the historical narrative into a standard fundamental approach.21

As evidenced by this relatively newer meaning of siyar, it is essential to delve into the jurists’ definitions of siyarin and modern eras, taking into account historical chronology. Classical jurists in this respect include al-SarakhÉÉ (d. 483/1090), al-Nasa'ÉÉ (d. 537/1143), al-KassÉÉn (d. 587/1191), al-MufriZÉÉ (d. 610/1213), al-NawawÉÉ (d. 776/1374), al-‘AyaÉÉn (d. 855/1451) and al-UalÉÉn (d. 12th century).

Al-SarakhÉÉ defined al-siyaras a plural of sirah (conduct), and it is on such a premise that the work of AbÉExasan al-ShaybÉÉn (d. 189/904) was titled Kitab al-Siyar al-‘OaghÉÉr, as it shed light upon the conduct of Muslims in their interactions with infidels during war. This included people of the covenant such as al-musta'manin and ahl al-dhimmia, al-mutadÉÉn (apostates), ahl al-baqhÉÉ (people of oppression) and so on.22 Najm al-DÉÉn ibn ‘aafÉÉl-Nasa'ÉÉ defined al-siyaras matters pertaining to affairs of war. Al-KassÉÉn, in turn, asserted that the book KitÉÉb al-Siyar must address the methods of warriors and their organization within the limits of what was permissible and what was prohibited in the course of battle, reminiscent of modern ‘rules of engagement’.23 Al-MufriZÉÉ defined as-ÉÉrhas the process of marching; however, his discourse was dominated by jihÉd al-kufar (struggle against the infidels).24 Al-NawawÉÉ, however, defined al-siyaras a plural of sirah (path or conduct), referring to the conduct and traditions of the Prophet in his battles and conquests.25 The discussions within these works were geared to al-jihÉÉd and its provisos, and some of these jurists titled their works KitÉÉb al-JihÉÉd.26 A number of these books included chapters dedicated to war against infidels: Bab QitÉÉl a-MushrikÉÉn (Chapter of War against Infidels).27

Other scholars expanded their definitions of al-siyarto include siyar al-‘UalÉÉb (conduct of companions), as found in al-‘AyaÉÉn’s reflection upon the meaning of al-siyar as a plural of sÉÉrah (path), and as

DOI: 10.9790/0837-2209131326 www.iosrjournals.org 14 | Page
with the S̄urat al-‘Umarayn Abū Efo Baker and ‘Umar, meaning their path, way or conduct. Furthermore, al-siyar compiled the siyar of the Prophet and his conduct in battles and conquests, along with siyar al-Sahabah and what was narrated regarding them in this matter.\textsuperscript{28} Kitāb al-Siyar includes Muslims’ conduct and interactions with others, encompassing al-Siyar fi al-Mu‘amalat (the conduct of relations with non-Muslims). The term muqâghāt al-Siyar refers to the preemptive first move to march towards the enemy, and Kitāb al-Jihād refers to the conceptual struggle against enemies to preach the word of Allah and destroy the rule of idolaters.\textsuperscript{29} A similar approach was adopted by al-Údār al-Islām (d. 12\textsuperscript{th}-18\textsuperscript{th}) in assessing leaders’ conduct with invaders, supporters and infidels.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{al-Siyarīn the Era of Modern Jurists}

Contemporary scholars also address the definition of al-siyar in their works. For example, Muhammad Abu Zahra refersto al-siyaras provisions for jihad and war, prohibitions, provisions for reconciliation and truces to end hostilities, conditions for extending safety, provisions for booty, ransom and slavery, and other matters that may occur during war or its aftermath. In general, he discusses the structure of international relations among Muslims and non-Muslims during the course of peace and war, focusing more on times of war.\textsuperscript{31}

Muḥammad Kamāl al-Walī refers to al-siyaras the science examining the relations of Muslims with other nations, meaning the conduct of Muslims with others in terms of war, treaties, safe conduct and ahl al-dhimma (non-Muslims subject to the Islamic state).\textsuperscript{32} In his approach, Walī balances al-siyar and modern international law. Originally, al-siyar addressed Muslims’ commitment to non-Muslims, even if they were individuals residing within dīr al-Islām (abode of Islam), and therefore was not limited to matters of international relations only.\textsuperscript{33}

Thus, it is possible to summarize the meaning of the science of al-siyar as the regulations of relations with non-Muslims in both the abodes (dīr al-Islām and dīr al-‘arb) during war and peacetime.\textsuperscript{34}

We can assume that the rulings of international relations in Islam derive from sources of Islamic law, as with any other branch of Islamic jurisprudence, chiefly primary and secondary sources such as the Noble Qur’ān, Prophetic Sunna, ijma’ (consensus), al-qiyās (analogy) and other sources. In this respect, there is no difference between internal and external sources of law in Islam, as they are equally subject to primary sources, i.e., the Noble Qur’ān and Prophetic traditions.\textsuperscript{35} In terms of epistemology and derived sources, sources of Islamic international law are different from modern international law.\textsuperscript{36} The Qur’ānic term ‘ilāqat al-Duwalayyah (the origin of international relations) in cases of peace and war, along with Muslims’ treatment of non-Muslims in both abodes. All matters pertaining to international relations, treaties, trustworthiness and jihād and its effects may be found in the principles of Shari‘ah and pillars of religion found in the Qur’ān. This is followed by the Prophetic Sunna, al-Sunna al-Qawāliyya (verbal Sunna), al-Sunna al-‘Amaliyyah (the active Sunna) and al-Sunnah al-Taqrībīyyah (confirmative Sunna).\textsuperscript{37} Such sources provide rich accounts of the establishment of new rules,\textsuperscript{38} as indicated earlier in the works of prominent classical scholars in the field of international relations, using various headings such as al-jihād, al-siyar, al-muqâghāt al-Siyar and al-ṣiyāṣah. Even the field of al-siyaris itself was so named by studying the conduct of the Prophet in his dealings with others. As for secondary sources, jurists made use of al-ijma’ (consensus), which signifies the consensus of scholars of the community on issues, following the death of the Prophet.\textsuperscript{39} and al-qiyās (legal decision-making), essentially argumentation by means of analogy.\textsuperscript{40} Both of these secondary sources must be based on legitimate evidence from the Qur’ān or Sunna, culminating in what is known as Mustand al-ījmā’.\textsuperscript{41} Such views based on the majhīl al-majhīl (views based on well-acknowledged legal proofs).\textsuperscript{42} For this reason, the mujhīl al-majhīl could not exceed proscribed limits, and had no right to form provisions, as this was the exclusive domain and right of God alone, while the authority of the mujhīl al-majhīl was limited. As for issues found within the texts, their efforts could not exceed the textual evidence. If an issue could not be found in the text, their efforts could not exceed rules derived through the application of al-qiyās, regarding what was apparent in the text, or the application of rules of Shari‘ah (law) and general axioms, or as established by Shari‘ah means of inference from evidence,\textsuperscript{43} with al-isfāḥān (to deem something good or issue juridic prejudices),\textsuperscript{44} al-ītimā‘ (presumption of continuity, or presuming the continuation of the status quo ante),\textsuperscript{45} and taking into account al-‘Arif (custom),\textsuperscript{46} al-ītimā‘ (to deem something good or issue juridic prejudices),\textsuperscript{47} and al-wajīb (obligation), al-nadīb (assigned), al-

\textbf{The Basis of Commitment in Islamic International Law}

Islamic law abides by rules of international relations which are integrated into domestic law, regardless of treaties, international custom, and Islamic sovereignty and its ability to level force against other countries. Islamic international law is therefore based on the will of the Islamic state, similar to any other Islamic law in the country. Even obligations imposed under bilateral or multilateral international treaties fall under this obligation. At the same time, the provisions of Islamic Shari‘ah law are equally binding on Muslims. Islamic international law and treaties provisions and rules within the scope of al-siyaras a legitimate base of decision-making. Commitment derives from legitimate rules of al-wajīb (obligation), al-nadīb (assigned), al-
ib‘ād (permissible), al-karādha (penance or expiation) and al-ta‘irād (prohibition).\textsuperscript{52} For instance, if the enemy requested amīn al-dhimma, the response should be based on Qur’ānic text, which stipulates granting protection, escort and peace should enemies request it. Q. 9:6, 8:61.

According to the Prophetic tradition, the eternal message of Islam is to be preached through peaceful channels. Historically, prior to engaging in battles, Muslims would first preach Islam. If their opponents declined to accept their message, Muslims would propose alternatives such as tribute payment or jizya (poll tax),\textsuperscript{48} which they would accept and then leave them be.\textsuperscript{49}

Moreover, ‘aqd al-amīn was obligatory for Muslims only and no other parties. As such, Muslims could not take advantage of another party’s weakness to be rid of them, and it was not permissible for a Muslim to kill a boy or woman in war, nor could they act with perfidy, even if they had been betrayed.\textsuperscript{50} This special commitment subjected Muslims to provisions of the law while excluding polytheists and the People of the Book; this is a matter of debate even among Muslim scholars. When the Islamic state was at the height of its power, sovereignty and strength, it nonetheless committed itself to all ethics of Islam in warfare and treaties.\textsuperscript{53} It moreover did not engage in fighting enemies unless justified by the Shari‘ah as a response to comparable aggression.\textsuperscript{54}

As al-Ghazālī indicated, obedience to Allah also required obedience to the authority whom Allah commanded Muslims to obey.\textsuperscript{55} Classical scholars argued that the al-‘ādīm (ruler) is the one addressed in obedience, since rule is a form of declaration and speech, the ruler is each speaker who without condition brings about the issuance of the letter of God. However, the influence and rule only belong to the Divine who controls creation and command, while the rule of force is subject to the landlord. As there is no landlord except the Lord, consequently, there is no judgment or commandment except to Him when obeying the commands of rulers.\textsuperscript{56} This was emphasized further by al-‘Aẓīz ibn ‘Abd al-Salām in his work Qawāf ‘id al-‘Ilm fi Ma‘ādīl al-Anām, in which he discussed who may be obeyed and who must be obeyed, such as Prophets, scholars, judges, religious figures, governors, fathers, mothers, spouses, elders, and laborers; those who do not obey those who should be obeyed disobey the Creator and cause corruption in society in both dīr al-‘Ilm or dīr al-‘Ilm.\textsuperscript{57}

Based on this, the Islamic state’s will is subject to Islamic Sharī‘ah. Should its actions stray outside Islamic rulings, its legitimacy is effectively voided. As such, it cannot oblige another to abide by a treaty that is prohibited according to Islamic law, such as preventing the release of Muslim prisoners, or allowing the consumption of alcohol in dīr al-‘Ilm; this type of condition would void the treaty because it permits what is prohibited in Islam, and therefore, the contract is voided for including a prohibited condition.\textsuperscript{58} This view was reflected by Mu‘āmmad ibn ‘Abd al-Shaybānī (d. 189/804), who asserted that what could not be fulfilled religiously could not be the basis for a covenant, and in case it was, such a covenant should be invalidated, because the conditions would violate the Sharī‘ah.\textsuperscript{59}

As explained earlier, rulings of international relations in Islam are derived from the Qur’ānic and Prophetic Sunnah. Specialized jurists devote themselves to rulings derived from these primary sources and their applications. This provides consistency and stability, for even if rulers or regimes change, the legal provisions are not linked to a ruling authority but to the Islamic religion itself, which does not change and is not altered. The Qur’ānic itself emphasizes the inimitability and originality of its verses (Q. 15:9, 30:30), and commands believers not to alter the religion of God in any way.\textsuperscript{60}

Stability is established by the unique characteristics that govern the principles of international relations in Islam. For instance, the respect of human dignity during the times of peace and war essentially preserves the rights of non-Muslims in dīr al-‘Ilm (the abode of peace), and further ensures justice by a Muslim government in its dealings with Muslims and non-Muslims alike, obliging it to fulfill its promises and covenants even with enemies, preventing treachery even in circumstances of betrayal, underlining the virtue of ethics in transactions, and emphasizing the universal Islamic call to humanity. The fact that relationships between Muslims are based on bondsof faith, does not mean loyalty and trust should not exist between Muslims and infidels or unbelievers, and does not prevent righteousness and kindness in interactions.

Such stability is greatly conducive to contentment and security. Moreover, the principles of justice and order extend to all residents of dīr al-‘Ilm (abode of Islam), including foreign residents in the Islamic state. This leads to confidence, prosperity and the best conditions for social and economic progress, stable international relations, rule of ethics, morality and virtue due to foreknowledge of due rights, eliminating the root causes of conflict, exploitation and treachery, and other factors that result from weak systems of law and justice.

Stability does not, however, imply jurisprudential rigidity or an inability to cope with new realities or meet the needs of the nation.\textsuperscript{61} Rather, Islamic legislation represents flexibility and capacity, and is incompatible with stagnancy. The provisions for interactions and international relations derive from Qur’ānic texts, the general principles of which do not vary from one environment to another and are required to be followed in every nation by rulers in a capacity fitting the situation. Religious texts are thus not confined to an understanding of aphrase
or text, but rather follow the spirit of reasonable understanding, hence the meaning of the operative (dalîl, al-mantâq) and the concept of significance (da'âlîl, al-ma'âlîq). Furthermore, while legislative texts are not abstracts of the initial causes and interests, nonetheless, they are explicitly associated with the al-`illa (effective cause or ratio legis) of a particular ruling or indication. This opens the activity of al-qiyâs (legal decision-making and argumentation by the means of analogy) before the al-mu'tahadîn (independent legal reasoning), followed by al-ijmâm (consensus and collective ijtihad) along with the other sources of legislation, including flexibility and scalability to meet the needs, facts, developments and lives of peoples of all ages and places. Such general principles allowed for rapid change and development without limiting rights or preventing growth, and encouraged correct rulings to multiple domains. It is perhaps for this reason that the Prophet deliberately did not specify Abu Bakr as his successor in spite of his position over other companions. Moreover, we find the same in the al-shura (consultation) as a basis for the Islamic political system. An obligation or duty must be issued even if the process was unspecified by religious texts. Rather, it must be selected as an optimal sphere for establishing shura (consultation).

Al-Ijtihād also specifies the manner of the Islamic state’s dealing with other countries in terms of financial, social and political aspects of war and peace within a fixed, legitimate framework. Needless to say, flexibility does not in any way indicate a departure from constant legal judgment, whether in whole or in part, so that development does not lead to distortion and degradation away from the provisions issued by God to humans. In this respect, flexibility and development differ radically from destruction and unbounded actions, as witnessed in some contemporary trends in social and legal life.

**International Relations (Al-`ilm), Islamic Legitimacy, and Real Justice**

All Islamic rulings are subject to Islamic legitimacy, which includes implementation of Allah’s commands and preventing what Allah forbids, effectively enjoining unity on the basis of divine proof and preventing transgression and evil. Q. 3:103-104, 5:2.

Hence, the provisions of international relations and international Islamic organizations are in line with modern international law, as Islam is built on the precept of solidarity. The Islamic nation which inhabits al-Islām is mandated to exist as a coherent unit. War between Muslims is forbidden except for the purpose of upholding the word of God. Thus, it is not permissible to wage war on another for economic enrichment, opening markets, securing transportation or otherwise. Fighting for the sake of Allah cannot be for the sake of hypocrisy or for other than establishing the word of God as supreme.

This legitimacy leads to subjecting the provisions of international relations to true justice, and aims to achieve the fairest possible path of Muslim rulers in the field of international relations, far from considerations of selfishness, injustice and the struggle for self-interest. Even in interaction with enemies, it is not permissible to use hostility and enmity in order to establish justice. The law of God is the charter of absolute truth and justice, and, in this regard, the Qur’ān mandates justice for all and the return of trust as a condition of piety. Q. 4:58, 5:8, 42.

This is reflected in historical reality. For example, as reported during the reign of ’Umar ibn ‘Abd al-`Azīz (91/717-101/720), elders of the people of Samarqand complained in a letter to the Caliph that the conduct of the Muslim commander Qutaybah ibn Muslim al-Bahillī was contrary to the teachings of Islam. The caliph read the letter and wrote on its back a response that assigned a judge and commanded restitution if necessary.

The letter held a strong Muslim army commander accountable. The caliph’s deputy Sulaymān ibn Abī al-Sirrī immediately fulfilled the caliph’s instruction by appointing the judge. Hadīr ibn Jumay’ in Samarqand, whereupon the judge issued a sentence calling for the Muslim army under Qutaybah ibn Muslim al-Bahillī to withdraw from Samarkand, as his conduct was contrary to the teachings of Islam. The violation came during his conquest, when he failed to call the people to Islam or to offer them the opportunity of jizyah. Another example is when Abī ‛Ubaydah returned the jizya and khirāt ḍhīmīn al-dhimmīn the Levant, when he realized he could not provide their required security after observing the gathering Roman army. This is in sharp contrast to colonial powers of the past and modern eras, so characterized by the narcissistic exploitation of vulnerable peoples and the selfish depletion of their resources, giving birth to conflict, justifying treachery, spreading injustice, and justifying favoritism with no thought given to the damage caused to third parties.

An Islamic state that encompasses monotheistic believers in Allah would establish rightness and justice among people, calling for equity and fairness. Its objectives are not to seek glory or extension of control and influence, nor the compulsion of people to a specific religion. They are free to choose the faith they desire, after having become subject to the authority of Islam and the rule of its provisions, and after obstacles are removed from the call to Islam. Therefore, Islam forms the basis for international relations among peoples on the assumption that they are either mu&mīnīn (believers), mu’āhadīn (people with contracts) or people without shared covenants.
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 751/1351) indicated that the status of the infidels was settled by the Prophet in the revealed chapter of ‘Bara’ah’ or “Tawbah” (Repentance) which defined three categories: the muḥārībīn al-‘ālam (warriors against him), aḥl ‘ahd (people of the covenant) and aḥl-dhimmā (non-Muslims subject to Islamic State). In turn, this became aḥl al-‘ahd (people of the covenant) and aḥl al-‘Ibl (magistrates fallen to Islam), which consequently became two parts: muḥārībīn al-‘ālam (warriors against him) and aḥl-dhimmā (non-Muslims subject to the Islamic State). The muḥārībīn al-‘ālam (terror of him) category became three parts: Muslim mu′āminībi (Muslims with belief in him), musalimahu mināmin (those of offensive to him), and khāfīj fumuḥārībīn (warrior fearful of him).70

As for muṣlimānīminān, or foreign non-Muslims residing within dīr al-Isrā’īlm the Islamic state, they held permanent or temporary residence on the basis of ‘āqīd al-dhimmā or ‘āqīd al-amīn. They included aḥl al-muwādā’ī (people of peaceful treaty) and consisted of people of the abode of war and disbelief.71 The sharī’ah singled them out for special treatment, and morality cannot be recognized until treatment of foreigners in the various jurists as the Islamic state refers to as dīr al-Isrā’īl in the abode of Islam, whether Muslim or dīmīn.72 In this matter, in the words of the great scholar Ibn ‘Abīdīn, “the intended meaning of al-dīrīs is the competing region which conquers or vanquishes the property of Islam, or that of kāfīr (disbelievers), and is not intended to mean residential home or abode.”

Muhammad Ibn xassan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/804) addressed this division within the dīrīs and its effects on legal provisions. To al-Shaybānī the dīrīs that which falls under Muslim authority, in which provisions of Islam apply, and in which Muslims are safe and secure. This applies equally to all populations living within its territory, whether they are Muslims, or non-Muslims under Islamic State authority, or dhimmīs, or both Muslims and dhimmīs.76 Most jurists in agreement with the xanāfī School’s position regarding the status of the dīr, such as al-Kassānī (d. 578/1191), as an important work of Badī’i: ‘al-‘Aqīdī,77 agree that there is no disagreement among the xanāfī companions regarding the transformation of dīr al-kuffar into dar al-Islām whenever Islamic provisions appear and are applied.78 Malīkī jurists defined dīr al-Islām as the dīrīs which Islamic provisions are applied.79 Shaṭṭī jurists defined dār al-Isrā’īl as a land in which Islam emerged without coercion and without the giving of jizyā (poll tax), and moreover where Muslim provisions are implemented on the people of dhimmā, in the case that dhimmīs live among them, and heretics (ahl al-bid’a) are not more powerful compared to the people of Sunnah.80 The xanbaqī jurists defined dīrīs similarly to the other Sunni schools, as Abī Ṣa‘īd’s indicated in his work al-Mustamād fī ’Uṣūl al-Dīrīn, in which he defined dīrīs in implementing provisions of Islam without infidelity.81 Moreover, in his reflections on dīr, Ibn al-Qayyim asserted that the dīrīs which had been known as dīr al-Hijrā had the time of the Prophet should be known as dīr al-Isrā’īl. When the people of a region became Muslim, such lands effectively become the bi‘ūd al-Islām (land of Islam).82

Among contemporary scholars such as ‘Abd al-Qādir Ṭūḥād, dīr al-Isrā’īl includes the country in which provisions of Islam are implemented, all or most of which are Muslims, or a country with governs-Muslim subjects even if the majority of the population is non-Muslim, or a country ruled by non-Muslims so long as the provisions of the population are Muslim or appear Muslim, and they do not have what prevents them from manifesting provisions of Islam.83 ‘Abd al-Wahāb Kālīf says that in the view of the majority scholars, dīr al-Islām is a dīrīs that exists under the provisions of Islam and is characterized by the safety of anyone under the protection of Muslims, whether Muslim or dhimmīs.84 Muhammad Abī Zakhrāḥ defined dīr al-ʿIṣlām as the state with authority to govern Muslims and devoted to developing the energies and strength of Muslims.85 Lastly, Muhammad Rashīdī described dīr al-ʿIṣlām is closest to the majority of jurists, as the country which falls under the authority of Islam, and has implemented its provisions and established its rituals.86

With respect to dīr al-‘Ibl, Muhammad Ibn xassan al-Shaybānī submits that it is the country in which provisions of polytheism are predominant, and therein are found the people of war (ahl al-‘Ibl).87 Al-Sarakhsī
The Origin (al-ašt) of the Relationship between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-xarb

It is important to bear in mind the origin of the relationship between the two abodes, or the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, through opinions of prominent classical jurists alongside the views of other jurists, including contemporary jurists. First, we begin with the juridical meaning of the term ‘ašt-origin. According to jurists and traditionalists, the origin is from the Qur’Èn and Prophetic Sunnah, which mean that its substantiation and the origin of the legality of ‘aad al-amÈn (peaceful treaty) with the lawab is based in the Qur’Èn, which stipulates extending protection to the enemy should they surrender or request it, Q. 9:6.

Al-Ašt could mean ‘the more correct’ (al-arjal) in the sense of priority given to a matter; for instance, the origin of speech is the truth. Among other meanings of al-asl is the ‘continuous rule’. Note that the word al-ašt-in its meanings does not mean that it is commissioned by obligation or sanctity. It is more accurate to say that the ašt-of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims is war, peace or preaching; it does not mean that we are commissioned to issue a ruling on this relationship as an obligatory or forbidden duty, for example. Nevertheless, the intention here is to demonstrate only the general rule which defines the ongoing relationship between Muslims, other nations, and non-Muslim states.

MuÈammad ibn xasan al-ShaybaniÈ’s view of the ašt-al-ilaq-Èt-origin of relations-between Muslims and non-Muslims is found in his masterpiece al-Siyar al-KabÈÈr, in which he notes that in the case of Muslims encountering infidels, if such infidels are among those who were not informed about Islam, then Muslims should not fight them until they have been invited and informed about Islam. If they indeed were informed about Islam, and the Muslims are not aware whether jizya (tribute) should be accepted from them, Muslims should not fight them until they are informed about the jizya. This is as the Prophet ordains Muslim commanders, to fight only as a last measure, as the Qur’Ènic verse reads, Q. 9:29.

Unless they were people within the realm of Islam, the tribute should not be accepted from them if they are apostates, or idolaters, rather, what is accepted from them may beither Islam or the sword. If they decline to accept Islam, they should be fought without the opportunity to reject it.

This practice is based on Islam’s serving as a universal call and general message to all mankind, and is derived from Prophet MuÈammad’s conduct, as he preached to tribes during the season of pilgrimage and others by inviting them to Islam. He then migrated to Yathrib, latter-day MadÈn, and formed the Islamic state. Thereafter, he began sending envoys and letters to kings, princes and world leaders, inviting them to Islam, such as to Hercules, a great Byzantine emperor;” the Persian king Xerxes;” Negus of Abyssinia;” Sirius king of Egypt and Alexandria;” and others. The Prophet preached to them in accordance with Qur’Ènic injunctions of openly calling all people to the religion of Allah and monotheism in the face of disbelief and polytheism, Q. 2:105; 12:108, 5:67.

In the same vein, the first verse God revealed to his Prophet and ordained him to recite was “Read! In the Name of your Lord, Who has created (all that exists)”, Q. 96:1. This presents strong evidence that Islam came as an invitation to all mankind. It was directed for humanity, and, in this respect, all are equal. The Prophet continued to make this call until people entered the religion of Allah in masses, and his successors carried on the message following him.

This is critical, as the nature of relations between Muslims and other nations existed in spite of their faith, languages, culture or skin color. The basis of relationships was, in truth, from the beginning, not war but peace as the original intention, and, moreover, wasa relationship of da’wah (invitation). The Muslim nation is a nation engaged in a global call of faith, which transcends all borders and barriers, and ends in uniform principles, whether borders and barriers are geographic, political, ethnic or linguistic, thus opening the doors of heaven to the mercy of the people of the earth as a whole.

The relationship becomes one of peace or war only after other nations choose to accept or reject Islam’s call. As stated by al-Ghunaimi, the Islamic state’s relationship with any countries in conflict depends on the country’s policy toward the Islamic state; this is the nature of relationships between nation-states or world politics. If the approach is one of peaceful treaty and contract to stop hostilities, known as musalÈda ‘ah; the rule is subject to a Qur’Ènic injunction emphasizing justice even with former adversaries for the sake of equity, Q. 60:8.

Consequently, Muslims cannot legally exercise coercion on those who deal with them fairly, as equity is incompatible with coercion. Even during war, combat cannot be used as compulsion to accept religion. However, if the dÈrÈ rejected Islam’s call with hostility and a warlike stance, the ruling is decided by the verse followed the one noted above, which decrees that befriending transgressors following their rejection of peace encourages evil, Q. 60:9.
According to al-Shaybānī, when Muslims encounter infidels on a battlefield who were not informed about Islam, Muslims should not fight them until they are invited by them to Islam, for accountability requires first having received an invitation to faith, Q. 17:15. The Prophet enjoined his army’s commanders to “Invite them to the testimony that there is no god but Allah.” The rationale behind this is to counter the likely non-Muslim perception that Muslims fight in anticipation of their captivity and that of their wives and their offspring. Alternatively, if they knew that Muslims fight them for the sake of religion, they could respond to it without the need for war. Thus, Muslims should begin by presenting Islam to them for the sake of Allah, by means of wisdom and good advice.

According to Abū Qāsim al-Simānī al-xanāfī (d. 499/1106), in the prophetic Sunnah, anyone who has not received the call of Islam should first be made aware of what the invitation means, with demonstrations of Islamic laws, statutes and provisions. If they accept Islam, Muslims should leave them as they were, calling on them to join al-ʾĪlām and reside in it. If they abstain from the call of Islam, Muslims should ask for jīzah (tribute), and, if the assigned tribute is paid, they should be left in peace. The last resort of warfare exists only if they reject the previous conditions

According to al-Kassīnī (d. 587/1191), if the call for Islam does not reach non-Muslims, Islamic preachers should invite them to Islam in person, through wisdom and fair, rational preaching, Q. 16:125. This invitation should be extended first, because fighting was not intended to impose belief. The call to Islam takes two forms, one through fighting only as a last resort, and the second through direct communication. The latter is greater than the former, because fighting risks spirits, soul and wealth, while communication risks none of that.

The above conduct refers to the origin of relations between Muslims and others, namely people of war, whose basis under these circumstances is peace. The nature of relations remains the same when the message of Islam has reached them, but they do not know that they can pay jīzah (tribute) to complete the contract of dhimmah. Thus, the Prophet ordered Muslim army commanders to enforce these issues first, prior to waging any war; as invitation must be presented to them first in case they were not previously informed.

Such relations may turn into relations of war, as when nationoffer jīzah (tribute) that cannot be accepted, such as that from apostates and Arab idolaters. In this case, nothing can be accepted except Islam or the sword. If they have refused Islam, they should be fought without offering them the chance to give tribute. Likewise, for those from whom jīzah (tribute) is accepted, if they are offered Islam and refused, and offered the option of tribute and they neither accepted nor abided by it, then relations with them are that of war.

Regarding the origin of relations of Muslims with non-Muslims, the opinion of the majority of jurists is that when non-Muslims refrain from Islam or jīzah, this call for war; in this case, peace is only a truce for preparing for the resumption of fighting. A peace treaty should be established to end musawā’ah (hostilities) with polytheists so as to end the fighting if Muslims are in a position of power. Al-Shāfi’ī is among classical jurists who sided with the view of fighting idol worshippers until they surrendered, and for the People of the Book to pay tribute (jīzah) if they declined to accept Islam.

The majority of scholars are in agreement that al-jihād is a struggle to uphold the word of Allah, and to fight infidels who abstained from Islam and tribute is a duty of Muslims every year. If the call for war is needed more than once a year, Muslims must receive an answer. However, this may not take the form of a truce with the enemy, as a truce is absolute and not restricted by the duration of time. In addition, the permanence of a truce would lead to the abandonment of jihād altogether, and this is not permissible.

In accordance with al-Shaybānī in his al-Siyar al-Kabīr, al-jihād is obligatory upon all Muslims. However, if it is during a time of need and hardship, the Qurʾān mandates the full extent possible of the struggle to achieve peace, justice and the ability to perform religious duties, Q. 22:78.

If Muslims gather together to abandon jihād, they participate in sin, and under these circumstances, the Muslims’ representatives must look into the cause, as they are appointed to address this concern and not disrupt it. The representatives are mandated to motivate Muslims to engage in al-jihād, and should extend an invitation to Islam or the provision of tribute, if the Muslims are capable of it.

Later jurists such as al-Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834) indicated that the invasion of infidels and the disbelieving, calling them to Islam or to provide tribute or to war, is a religious necessity. For this reason, the Almighty sent His messengers and revealed His sacred texts. In this regard, the Messenger of Allah followed this mission to his death, making this matter one of his greatest and most important purposes, as made evident in the Qurʾān and the Prophetic Sunnah.

In this respect, Muḥammad b. Ṣalāh al-Dinānī asserts that even if it not based on Islamic interests, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims must nonetheless ensure Muslims’ prestige in order to enforce legal provisions. Since the application of Islamic provisions in the international arena requires tribute, dignity and prestige, it shall call for tolerance and be characterized by flexibility of impact in terms of good advocacy and good representation of Muslims. Otherwise, Islamic pride is treated lightly, and other states might take advantage of Muslims’ status, as occurred during the treaty capitulations of the Ottomans while they were at the height of their power, and which were the first sign of their weakness and decline.
The Sources of the Origin of Relationship between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-xarb

The majority of jurists are in agreement regarding reference to Qur’ânic verses and the Prophetic Sunnah and the practical nature in which the Prophet conducted his mission. Most Qur’ânic verses directed toward al-jihåd and the battlefield did not restrict Muslim’s obligation when infidels began war against Muslims. As ordained by a Qur’ânic verse, Jihad is obligatory against the transgressors, without transgression of limits, and must be waged until transgressions cease, Q. 2: 190-193.

Allah has ordered war against infidels and polytheists who hold an agenda against and plan to fight Muslims, because fighting was never forbidden, even when otherwise prohibited if those who want to fight you do not respond to facts and instead insist on war. This is supported by the Qur’ânic elaboration on fighting during the Sacred Months, which is seen as a lesser transgression than not protecting the practice of Islam and its holy sites, Q. 2: 217.

Women, boys and monks are not obligated to fight, and their killing is prohibited, lest it be an act of aggression. Those who initially offered tribute, the People of the Book and the al-majûs(Magi), and who desist from polytheism, disbelief in God, fighting the Muslims, accepting Islam or agreeing to be subject to its provisions and renewing their commitment to tribute and ‘aqd al-dhimmah, Allah forgives what they have done prior to that moment. This was ordained by Allah Almighty in fighting infidels who were fighting Muslims in order to eliminate shirk (to attribute associates or partner of Allah in His creation and rule, i.e., to polytheist, an idolater). This was reflected by Ibn ‘Abbâs, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azîz, Mujâhid Abû ‘Abdallâh al-kajîf (d. 104/722), Qâfurî, and was also the view of Ibn Jarîf al-Ubârî (d. 310/922) and the opinion favored by the majority of classical exegetists.117 Al-Îbâsî makes this case by referring to a verse which mandates the killing of infidels until they leave infidelity and polytheism, Q. 2: 193. The term fitnah in this verse refers to al-shirk, while al-kufûr refers to fitnah or perdition and discord, and al-dîn (religion) is obedience to Allah.118 According to the Qur’ân, this had been revealed to the Jews and Christians, but was rejected, Q. 3:19.

With reference to the above Qur’ânic statement by al-Shawkânî (d. 1250/1834), it is indicated that fighting the infidels is for the purpose of avoiding ordeals (fitnah).119

Contemporary Scholars’ Views

Some contemporary scholars believe that relations between Muslims and non-Muslims should be based on peace, such as ‘Abd al-Wahâb Khallîfî in his al-Siyâsah al-Sharî‘iyah, ‘Abd al-Ra‘Îmîn ‘Azîzîmîn in his al-Risâlah al-Khîlîdah, Mu‘âmammad ‘Abdullâh Darîz, Mu‘âmammad Abî Zâhrah, in his al-‘Ilâqat al-Duwalîyyah, Mu‘âmammad Shâlût, in his al-Islam wal-‘Ilâqat al-Duwalîyyah and al-Islam ‘AqidahwaSharî‘ah, as well as Hamîd Sultan, and Mu‘âmammad Sa‘îd Ma’dîkî.120 According to Mu‘âmammad Hafîz Ghanîm, some contemporary scholars, in opposition to leading classical jurists, argue that relations between the Muslims and others should be peaceful, and is an opposing view of some contemporaries contrary to the view of earlier scholars, with the exception of Zafîr al-Qasîmî in his work al-Jihâd wal-Huqûq al-Duwalîyyah.121

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AbH%E2%80%99Ieq al-Sub%E2%80%98ii (2009), al-Muwaafa%E2%80%99at fi Ul%E2%80%99ii al-Shar%E2%80%99ar 'ah, vol. 4: 89-105.


DOI: 10.9790/0837-2209131326 www.iissjournals.org
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31 See Abû Zakhrâ’s introduction to the work of Muhammad ibn Yasan al-Shaybânî (d.189/804), al-Siyar al-Kabir with Sarakhsî, Muhammad ibn Ahmad (d. 483/1090), Sharâ‘ al-Sarâtîyyah, ed. Mustafa Zayd along with the commentaries of Muhammad Abû Zakhrâ’ Cairo: Matba‘at ‘Ali, 1958, p. 33.
37 The establishment of the probative basis of this kind of the Prophet’s Sunna is tantamount to establishing the probative basis of all the different kinds of the Sunna such as the verbal Sunna (al-Sunnah al-Qawwâlîyyah), the active Sunna (al-Sunnah al-Fî‘îyya), and the confirmative Sunna (al-Sunnah al-Taqrî‘îyya). See the ‘Abî al-Wahhâb Khalîflî (1988), ‘Ilm al-u‘lî‘î al-‘Iftî‘, pp. 36-37; Abu Zakhrâ Muhammad (d. 1394/1974), U‘lî‘î al-‘Iftî‘, p. 106, M. C. M. al-Dîwânî, al-Sunnah wa-l-Muhamadatuha fi al-Tashrî‘îyya Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islami, 1985, pp. 47-48.
46 It is a method employed by Muslim jurists to solve problems that find no clear answer in sacred religious texts. It is related to the term mafîla‘a, or ‘public interest. Abî ‘Eîsî al-Shâfî‘î (d. 790/1388), al-Muwafaqât fi U‘lî‘î al-Sharî‘ah, vol. 2: 8-12.
48 The Jizya poll tax was imposed upon male, mature, financial capable non-Muslim individuals once a year of one dinar per month in return for protection and safeguarding of property and protection of family and rights.
50 This practice is based on the The Prophetic hadith which reads as follows: Fulfill the trust of those to whom they are due, and do not be treacherous to the one who betrays you. See ‘Abî ‘Eîsî al-Dîn, Ibn al-‘Azhul ‘Ali‘ (d. 275/888), Sunnan Abî ‘Eîsî ‘Azhul ‘Arabî, Dar al-Hadith, 1974, vol. 5: 185.
According to al-Jawhari, the tax is and was to be levied on able-bodied males of military age (with specific exemptions). Muslim rulers viewed jizya as material proof of non-Muslims' acceptance of submission to the state and its laws. In return, non-Muslim subjects are permitted to practice their faith, enjoy protection from outside aggression, and are exempted from military service and the zakat tax levied upon Muslim citizens. During Muhammad's time, the jizya rate was one dinar per year imposed on male dhimmis in Medina, Mecca, Khaibar, Yemen, and Nejran, a rate that was never permanently fixed, though the payment usually depended on wealth. Kitab al-Kharaj of Abu Yusuf sets the amounts at 48 dirham for the richest (e.g., money changers), 24 for those of moderate wealth, and 12 for craftsmen and manual laborers. See Abu Yusuf, Ya'qub ibn Ibrahim (d. 183/799). Kitab al-Kharaj Beirut: Dar al-Ma'arif, n.d., pp. 122-126; A. S. Tritton (2007). Caliphs and Their Non-Muslim Subjects: A Critical Study of the Covenant of Umar New York: Routledge, pp. 204.


The majority of scholars of the four Sunni schools, indicated that the trubute should not be accepted form the idolaters of the Arabs. SeeKassênÊ, ‘Abê’ al-Dîn Abu Baker ibnMas‘ûd (d. 587/1191). Bad’â ‘al-Sana ‘i fî Tartîb al-Sharâ’a’i.


Some Orientalists who have studied the Prophet the deny the universality of Islam, such as William Muir, who claims that the biography of Islam came later, despite Qur’înic verses and Prophetic traditions. To Muir, the Prophet’s universality of Islam was intended for the Arab world and the spread of Islam, even if the idea of universality originated more from circumstance than plan. William Muir (d. 1905). The Life of Mahomad London: Smith, Elder and CO., 1861, vol. 4: 1-7. In his work on the History of Islam/Annals of ‘lîslam, Italian orientalist Leone Caetani (d. 1926) also denied universality, although he argued that Islam spread peacefully and showed tolerance to other monotheistic religions (i.e., Christianity and Judaism), and did not persecute any members of other faiths. See Thomas Walker Arnold, The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith London: Constable, 1913. This was a model of Orientalist approaches towards Islamic history. The question that arises is how the idea of Islamic universality emerged afterward in spite of the actual and practical revelation of the message of Islam? Moreover, the same question can be asked regarding whether the king Xerxes, Negus of Abyssinia, and Cyrus of Egypt and Alexandria were exposed to the idea of Arab universality.


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103SarakhšÊ, Muñammad ibn Ḍal̤m (d. 483/1090). Sharḥal-Siyar al-Kab̤r̤, vol. 1: 75-76.
106SarakhšÊ, MuñammadibnAlmad̤ (d. 483/1090). Sharḥal-Siyar al-Kab̤r̤, vol. 1.76.
107Ibid, 1:76-77,189.
109ÜEf̤r̤ al-Q̤̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̂