The Politics of the United Nations Reform in the Security Council and Other Organs

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ABSTRACT: The UN being an intricate aspect of world politics and the most visible international institution since WWII has tried to maintain peace globally. In doing so, the UN has been selective in its approach in favour of the founding members. The failure of the League of Nations led to WWII and brought about the founding of the UN which was to guarantee international peace and stability. This research finds the problem of reforming the UN system challenging and the role of the third world agitational, in the whole process. Hence the research primarily set out to achieve the following objectives: to critically examine the current structure of the UN, to examine how these structures particularly the SC impact on the effectiveness of the UN, to analyse the Politics of the reform of the UNSC and to recommend how the flaws in the UNSC might be effectively addressed in the interests of international peace and security. Using the descriptive method, the research argues that like the initial exclusion of the Axis powers and the Soviet Union from the League that led to its collapse, the UN has again excluded not only the Axis powers but also Africa from the UNSC permanent and veto wielding positions. This isolation works against global security. It is in this selective approach that the contributions of Germany, Japan and Nigeria to Peace Support Operations (PSO) funding since 1960 and in other areas though tremendous, have been left out of prominence in the UN. The selective character of the UN and its seeming reluctance to address the causation of war and insecurity in other parts of the world, raises fundamental questions on the capability of the UN to avert any World War, or at best frontally address those factors that pose credible threats to global peace and security. Thus the research examined the viability, feasibility and difficulties in reforming the UN to make it more democratic and responsive to contemporary problems of the international system. Democracy must be seen to be at play in the UNSC. A democratic UNSC will give everyone a voice in the global organisation. Thus to critically examine the current structure of the UN and how it impacts on the effectiveness of the UNSC is the main objective of the research. Using the realists, power theory, we were able to adequately explain the interplay of politics in the international system and in particular, the UNSC. Our findings are: there is little chance that the P-5 will agree to altering the procedures of the UN Charter; the best hope for a meaningful change in the UNSC in the next decade lies in exploring new ways such as a gradual yet fundamental reform. The significance of this is that the UN which was established to guarantee international peace and stability would be ensured if the above findings are put to use in its most powerful organ – the UNSC. The research thus suggests that the UNSC could retain its fifteen (15) members for effectiveness. By so, maintain the P-5 and ten (10) other members representing regions hitherto not represented; who must be given equal status as those of the UNSC P-5 members. Also suggested is Nigeria’s inclusion in the UNSC with veto-wielding power.

Key Words: League of Nations, United Nations (UN), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Reforms, Collective Security, Foreign Policy.

I. Introduction

The evolution of the United Nations Organisation (UNO) also called the UN came after its predecessor the League of Nations - a product of the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 (Geddes &Grosset, 1996). Revolutionary in its original conception, the League was an attempt to establish a collective security system with universal membership that would forestall future threats to peace. After WWI, US President Woodrow Wilson led the effort to create the League of Nations. The League was formed by an amalgamation of two ideas which sought to prevent a recurrence of the catastrophe of 1914-1918by replacing the balance-of-power system with one based on the principle of ‘Collective Security’. In many respects during its first decade, the League made valuable contributions to the management of the post-war international system (Macqueen, 1999).

The failure of the US Congress to ratify American membership of the League despite the leading role of President Woodrow Wilson in its creation as part of the Versailles Peace Treaty was, of course, a fatal drawback in the longer term. Additionally, the nature of IRs in the 1920s contrasted sharply with that of the following decade. By the early 1930s, the international environment had begun to change. The ‘post-traumatic’ calm of the immediate post-war years gave way to a new instability. Territorial and ideological revisionism on the part of the states that for various reasons rejected the post-Versailles status-quo threw down the gauntlet to
The League, whose origins were inextricably tied to that settlement. Not only had it been born of the Versailles Treaty but in its first years it had excluded from membership a number of key powers, most notably Germany and the Soviet Union. Their eventual admission could not eradicate their sense of exclusion from the system which the League sought to manage. In this deteriorating climate the capacity of the League to translate Collective Security from theory into a practical tool of international relations was tested and the League proved ineffective. US isolationism between the world wars along with declining British power and Russia’s withdrawal into revolution left a power vacuum in the League as well as in world politics (Macqueen, 1999).

Summarily, the League failed because of the many flaws in its composition and constitution among which are:

- The necessity for a unanimous vote to enforce international decisions.
- The allowance of recourse to war as an option.
- The initial exclusion of the Axis powers and the Soviet Union.
- A provision to opt out of membership when desired.
- The failure of the League to react to instances of flagrant aggression seen in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria.
- Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia.
- External intervention in Spain Civil War.
- Hitler’s abrogation of the treaty of Versailles and the takeovers of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland (Claude, 1967).

All these lope-holes and particularly the absence of such universality within the League, gave rise to WWII necessitating a new global institution which would prevent the scourge of war that had produced two world wars within three decades, the Holocaust and the advent of the nuclear age. The inability of the regulatory body to curtail war of such alarming nature, led to WWII. Albeit, in the nature of competition lies the causation of war. With the failure of the League of Nations, the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941 containing the Allied War Aims included the creation of a permanent system of collective security. According to this principle, aggression by one state is aggression against all others. These other states are obliged to unite in collective action against the aggressor.

The UN therefore evolved to fill the void or vacuum created by the League of Nations (Geddes & Grosset, 1996). Founded in San Francisco in 1945 with an initial membership of 50 states and now 192 states (www.un.org/News/press/docs/2006/org1469.doc.htm), the UN was created with the purpose to provide a global institutional structure through which states can settle conflicts with the least possible use of force (Schaeter, 2004).

The UN being a mechanism for conflict resolution has been able to attain some measure of international stability, promote development assistance, implement programmes of economic and social development in the third world, coordinate systems for information and planning, and data publication among others. However, the international organisation failed particularly in the isolation of some key players in the Security Council (the most powerful of all its organs) and with other such limitations as:

- The unwillingness of states to surrender their sovereignty.
- Conflicts of interest by the world powers.
- The inability of most members to meet their financial commitments.

Like the League of Nations, the ability of the UN to maintain international peace and security quickly was eroded with the onslaught of the Cold War contest between the US and the Soviet Union and later, in the North-South dispute between the world’s richest as against the world’s poorest nations (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968).

Statement Of The Research Problem

Stating clearly the research problem is the isolation of some key players from the UNSC and system collapse resulting in the increasing authoritarianism being exhibited by the permanent members. The present order of the SC engenders tyranny of the minority. The failure of the Permanent Five (P-5) to expand the SC to include states such as Brazil, Germany, Japan, Nigeria, India, Egypt and Pakistan which have become so relevant in the UN in aspects of regional leadership, aids to less developed countries, funding of the UN, and peace-keeping operations all over the globe and so on, can lead also to the collapse of the UN and another war of global intensity. Worse still, if these states decide to opt out of the UN system, their decision would hamper the effectiveness of the UN and threaten global peace and security. However, if on the other hand they are included in the UNSC, their inclusion could guarantee stability in the international system because that sense of exclusion would have been eliminated. In comparism, one of the reasons why the League of Nations failed – the exclusion of the Axis powers from the membership of the SC- is important in the emerging Third World’s threat to the UN as seen in the demand for reforms in the UN especially in the structure of the most powerful of all six organs. This is also a significant factor in the rising rate of terrorism globally and the increase in arms production and acquisition by states as some states or even individuals find expressions in these acts. Similarly, the first conception of globalisation was premised on three axes: America, Western Europe and Latin America. The cold war between the East and West was essentially because the East was pursuing an ideology that was

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contrary to market economy. The new conception is premised on Latin America and China leaving Africa out. This exclusion has made Africa to learn to be agitational thus asking for reforms in the UNSC to become relevant.

Secondly, the global focus on democratisation as a strategy to securing global peace and security for states is not reflected in the workings of the UN system. Its structure, regimes, policies and programmes have simply remained undemocratic. For instance, the General Assembly (GA), the only organ that includes all member states is given the power only to make recommendations on procedural matters to the UNSC which alone has the power to make resolutions and enforce them. The GA has no veto power over any matter. Again, the UN charter places the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) under the authority of the GA, allowing the body to issue only policy recommendations to the UN system and member states. It is worthy of note here that international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and World Trade Organisation (WTO) have now assumed leadership in the field of global economic policies more than the ECOSOC. In summary since reform could have the effect of democratising the UN by broadening participation at the base – (a substantial and not merely formal democratisation), it is thus suggested that all aspects and particularly the composition of the UNSC of the global organisation be reformed. The UN in its structure, dynamics and impacts has not changed fundamentally to reflect the changing character of the international system. As it is, the UN serves the interests of its founding members at the detriment of other members of the organisation. This is similar to the failure of the League to react to instances of flagrant aggression seen in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria which led to WWII. Thus, the difficulties of reaching an agreement on how to reform these flaws in the UN system i.e. the politics - seen as the process of reconciling conflicting claims is what the research seeks to explain. The research examines the viability, feasibility and difficulties in reforming the UN to make it more democratic and responsive to contemporary problems of the international system. This is done through an analysis of the international politics in the United Nations Security Council reforms. With Harold Lasswell’s conception which defines politics as ‘who gets what, when and how’ at the international level (Lasswell, 1958: 13), one can understand how the ‘Allied Forces’ got their esteemed position as against the ‘Axis Forces’ and others at the inception of the UN. Hence, the conflicts and claims in the reform of the UNSC so fundamental, so different, become practically impossible even though everyone wants it. All these provoke pertinent questions.

Significance Of The Study
This study is considered significant for several reasons; firstly, it seeks to add credence to the present debate on the reform of the UN system. It adds to the existing body of knowledge on the reform of the UNSC and also provides a framework for future research. Secondly, its findings would aid policymakers in framing policies on the UN politics thereby contribute to the advancement of third world states’ desire for a democratic global organisation that carries along every state in the international system. Also, the critical examination and suggestions made on how to bridge the gaps in literature on the reform of the UNSC justifies the study. Finally, it would also help the global organisation to effectively address the flaws in the system. In order therefore to achieve the research objective, this research poses to ask the following questions:

- What is the content, structure and who are the parties to the UNSC politics, if any?
- Who want reforms and for what reason(s)? In other words, what is wrong with the UN as currently constituted?
- What is the nature of the international politics of the UN reforms?

These questions give room for fear that the UN may emerge as an institutional stooge if urgent reforms are not put in place. In our opinion and as stated by Alger (1990), the UN is simply an instrument of states’ foreign policy. The political tussle rather than cordial relationship between the various states and groups of states within the UN over how the organisation might best serve their national interests reveals an important factor: that the UN is a product of the interests of the powerful nation-states that make it up. This severely circumscribes its ability to rise above global conflicts and to pursue an independent role (Claude, 1967).

Theoretical Framework
In the analysis of this research work, the Realist theory or Power school of thought and its descendant neo-realism which has its thesis revolving around the centrality of power in the state and argues that the preoccupation of states is the pursuit of power, are used. Realism dominated the study of IRs in the United States between 1940s and 1960s. Since 1970s however, there has been both a revival of interest in realism as well as an emergence of a broadly based neo-realist approach. Realism posits that the prospects for effecting a dramatic and fundamental transformation in the international system are not much. To them, the international system is shaped by numerous forces, many of which are unchanging and unchangeable. Thus they assume that, there is no essential harmony of interest among nations. Instead realism suggests that states often have conflicting national objectives, some of which may lead to war. Also, realists generally agree that a state’s location affects its national capabilities and its FP orientation. Geography is said to shape the options available
to states and to impose limitations upon the choices open to states in their FPs. Another key issue in the realist theory is the concept of power in the international system. Power is seen as a determinant of behaviour in the international system. Like Mencius and the legalists in China, Kautilya in India, Thucydides in ancient Greece, Machiavelli in Italy (Hobbes, 1964:64), viewed power as crucial in human behaviour and "covenants without the sword are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990:91); realism postulates states constitute the main actors in international system and are preoccupied with the seeking of self-interest – which itself is defined by power. To the realists, it is difficult to achieve conformity or harmony in the behaviour of states because what a state sees as her self-interest may not be the same as another's: hence, there is always a clash of interest in the international system. A state finds itself constantly engaged in the struggle for power internationally. Many realist writers (Spykman, 1939; Morgenthau, 1978; Kennan, 1954; Wolfers, 1962; Kissinger, 1964; Aron, 1966) support the idea that conflict rather than cooperation is more typical of international relations than of interstate relations. Thus, being in pursuit of self-interest, power has no relationship with morality except when morality or ideology is to serve as a means to an end and not an end in itself. The end here becomes self or national interest. This objective sets the framework and the parameters for states’ involvement in International Relations. From the late 1960s, a number of developments confronted analysts with new issues and raised serious doubts about the efficacy of accepted theories of, and approaches to many aspects of contemporary political and economic systems. These developments included the breakdown of the Bretton Woods' economic order, the oil crises of the 1970s, the rise of unemployment and inflation in many Western industrialised states, the assertion of North-South issues on the UN agenda and the post-Vietnam disenchantment with "power politics" (Brown, 1997). This empirical and theoretical dissatisfaction led to concerted efforts to re-evaluate and transcend the realist paradigm. In this wise, the works of Waltz (1979) and Gilpin (1989) have been prominent. Within this realist perspective, international institutions have been understood primarily as the institutional means by which militarily and economically powerful states seek to pursue their national interests. With the development of the neo-realist thinking since the 1970s, the attention of UN activities changed.

Neo-realism or structural realism has provided the approach with renewed intellectual vigour. It sets out to reinvigorate and integrate classical realism (derived largely from the European state system) by developing propositions based upon the disaggregation of independent and dependent variables based on comparative analysis. Thus, it embraced what is termed structural realism identified with the works of Waltz and Morgenthau (Kindermann, 1985:10-11). For neo-realism, power remains a key variable, although it exists less as an end in itself than as a necessary and inevitable component of a political relationship. The neo-realist approach represents an effort to draw from classical realism those elements of a theory adequate to the world of the late 20th century, and also to link conceptually other theoretical efforts. Thus structural realism as viewed by Kindermann’s Munich school of neo-realism has as its basis a constellation, consisting of a “system of interaction i.e. relations between states and other action-systems of international politics at a given moment or within a defined period of history past or present”. If as defined by Waltz, “a structure is the arrangement of the parts of the international system”; then it would mean the coexistence of the primary political units of a given era which may be city-states, nations or empires. Stated differently, Waltz’s structural realism does not approach international relations theory from a reductionist theoretical perspective (Kindermann, 1985). Other contemporary neo-realists’ analysis i.e. Gilpin, argue that states engage in cost-benefit calculations about alternative courses of action available to them (Gilpin, 1981:9-11). To this end, the extent that the anticipated benefits exceed the costs makes states attempt to make changes in the system. In this respect, Gilpin attempts to refine the rationality assumption that is contained in classical realist theory. In Gilpin’s formulation, a state will attempt to change the international system by means of territorial, political or economic expansion until the marginal costs of additional change become equal to or exceed the marginal benefits. An international system is in a condition of equilibrium to the extent that its major actors are satisfied with the territorial, political and economic status quo. Gilpin thus suggests that the primary means by which the issue of disequilibrium has been resolved throughout history has been by war, the result of which has usually been a redistribution of power between the victorious and the vanquished. Hence, realist and neo-realist approaches to the study of international organisation have vividly explained the role of the US as against the workings of the UN – a global institution. Thus, the US interest in particular and those of other major state actors in the international system is placed above morality. Using the UN, the US engages in cost-benefit calculations about alternative courses of action available to them. And to achieve this, self-interest rather than morality is prominent except where morality becomes a means to achieving an end. Understandably, the US invasion of Iraq did not consider morality but was strictly a national matter. In summary, both realist and neo-realist theories are used here for understanding terms relevant to the topic of research. They are meant to open the researcher to arguments that suit the topic of discourse as terms such as International Politics, UN and its Reform are properly dissected, trends and occurrences analysed and the inter-relatedness of terms brought to bear. In this research endeavour, the researcher has, through the use of these theories, explained certain occurrences in the UNSC - the conflict of
interests (the exclusion of some states in the international system from active participation in the UN, the reason why a few out of so many states have held unto their privileged position and won’t let go). It is explained as given rise to the problem experienced globally and solutions were proffered from findings through recommendations.

II. Assumptions

The reforms anticipated in the UN particularly in the membership, composition and functions of the GA, ECOSOC, ICJ and the UNSC, is prompted by the shift in the UN from a political organisation that was originally pro-western to a global organisation that is all embracing. Given these developments in the UN, it is assumed that:

- It is possible that the reform of the UNSC as advocated by the US and allies, will not guarantee international security and stability.
- The proposed reform of the UN if not fundamental, will only consolidate the structures and process of domination and subjugation of Third World states.
- The resistance to democratise the UN by the super powers can lead to serious global instability.

III. Research Methodology

The research depended on both primary as well as secondary sources of data collection using ‘Content Analysis’ which is a systematic, qualitative and objective examination and analysis of the content of available material. Primary source - this is unprocessed data such as interview/questionnaire; and secondary source - as any data that have been processed or published but for which the researcher gave new meaning or interpretation. These include historical data sources, journals, Internet materials, magazines, newspapers, and archival materials. A visit to Embassies and High Commissions availed us the opportunity to interview and in some cases administer questionnaires on target audience. This was done through random sampling for most states and particularly the P-5 member states. Some of these states are India, Germany, South Africa, Japan, France, US, Britain, Israel, Brazil, Russia, Libya and Brazil. When effort made to reach some states failed, we had to rely on other sources for views of states we could not get through interview as time was running against us. Positions of states from the P-5 i.e. US, Britain, Russia, France and China; and others - Italy, South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria and also of individuals were sought for from on the internet and in books. With these, we were able to analyse critically the politics of the UNSC reforms. These data were used to obtain as much valid and reliable information that gave a better understanding to the problem of the research. Data collected were carefully collated and analysed on the basis of their relevance to the topic of discourse using the qualitative method of data analysis.

Politics Of The Security Council Reform And Its Impact On The Effectiveness Of The United Nations

Basically, reform of the United Nations Security Council encompasses a variety of proposals; five key issues including procedural reforms dominate. Such issues as the categories of membership, the question of ‘veto’ held by the P-5, regional representation, size of an enlarged council and the working methods of the Council dominate. In practice, "Security Council reform" usually refers to plans to restructure or expand its membership (Paul and Nahory, 2005). Historically, the United Nations Charter of 1945 was the product of a Europe ravaged by the second World War which was slowly preparing to let go its colonial grasp on the southern hemisphere. When drafted, the Charter’s framers created a structure for the United Nations that built upon the League of Nations. This was established at the behest of American President Woodrow Wilson to deal with the political restructuring of Europe and the chaos that resulted from WWI. The United Nations Charter established the instrumentation of the United Nations that heavily favoured the victors in WWII, and rigidly reflected the political situation of 1944 (Pedrazzi, 2006:16). The magic of the big-five that has kept reform in the UNSC near impossible is the hegemonic structures put in place to ensure they remain in charge i.e. the UN Charter. The UNSC is made up of the five founders of the organisation and the victors in WWII – the Allied Forces. Since history is history of the victorious, the big –five have found themselves in this privileged position and to consolidate it, they gave both permanent membership and veto wielding powers to them. This veto allows a permanent member to block the adoption of a resolution unacceptable to it; particularly over substantial matters. This in other words is the rule of ‘great power unanimity’. Subsequently, decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least nine of the fifteen members. Decisions on all other matters require nine votes including the concurring votes of all P-5 members provided that, in decisions under chapter V article 32, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. At inception, it was imagined that the League of Nations would succeed; however in 1944, the worst conflicts in world history claiming tens of millions of lives occurred in Europe and also throughout Asia (Claude, 1967). Hence the UN when formed was tasked with:

- Maintaining peace and spearheading reconstruction in post-war Europe.
- Providing an open forum for debate amongst the many newly empowered European governments.
Managing the many problems anticipated to result in such a drastically remapped and traumatised post-conflict world.
Implementing the gradual decolonisation of Africa, an idea also first expressed in “The Fourteen Points” of Woodrow Wilson in 1918 (Wilson, 1918 in Vasquez, 1996:38-40).

However, adequate provisions were not made to represent the many underdeveloped regions of the world. Asia was seriously underrepresented while Africa, though having only a few members (Egypt, Liberia and Ethiopia) at inception, was not represented at all in the UNSC out of the 51 states. The Security Council (the UN’s most powerful body and the only one granted the power to enforce its rulings via military force or economic sanctions) was tightly controlled by the veto power of the P-5 members – none of whom are located in the southern hemisphere. All these flaws when compared to the 21st century UN are grossly inadequate. The UN upon formation was set up to serve the interest of its founders, the P-5 (allied forces and winners in the World War II (WWII)). These are France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the People’s Republic of China and Soviet Union (now Russia). The effective projection of military power under international control to enforce international decisions against aggressors was supposed to distinguish the UN from its defunct predecessor – the League of Nations. However, UN’s inability to maintain international peace and security (which is its main objective) during the Cold War contest between the US and the Soviet Union and later in the North/South dispute between the world’s richest as against the world’s poorest nations manifested. It’s Specialised Agencies in specific technical and functional fields such as the IMF, WHO, UNESCO and ILO are designed to promote the interests of the five permanent members (P-5).

The arrangements for UN power sharing discussed above were suitable at the time when they were drafted. However over the past 65 years, the UN became a global organisation with dramatic changes in the global balance of power. For instance, decolonisation created a host of new nations and a swarm of new issues - development aids, environmental issues and new HIV scourge, and a host of others - that the United Nations must currently confront. Over 140 states (51 at inception) have become members of the UN since 1945, owing to the fact that only 50 states ratified the Charter at inception thus bringing the total number of nations represented to 192. Conflict in Europe (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland), has to an extent reduced and the UN has found its focus now shifted to Africa, Asia and the Middle East (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia) where there is still struggle to get rid of the remnants of neo-colonialism and underdevelopment. Relative strengths of countries have shifted since 1945, and new regional powerhouses claim the need for greater and wider representation. States such as Japan, India, Italy and Germany desire more clout within the UN system. More so, there is the shift in economic interest from the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions to the Gulf of Guinea in Africa; as the ‘crude’ here is said to be better than those of both the Caspian and Persian Gulfs. With each passing day, the UN must face new problems on a much larger scale. The old framework of the UN, while suitable at one time is no longer sufficient to fulfill the role of the UN in the 21st century. The Charter of the United Nations has become an anachronism that must be modified into a flexible mechanism more reflective of the current global situation and more able to meet the needs of the modern world.

The Security Council, the most important working body of the United Nations must be able to act quickly and efficiently upon sensitive issues of critical importance. This is because in recent years and in Africa alone, the Security Council has found itself dealing with a drastically increased workload for instance conflict in Darfur, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Currently, issues such as development strategies, desertification, terrorism and bad governance debated by the Security Council involve the African region even though Africa is not represented on the Council. Developing nations, which often have their fate decided by the Council are also restricted with respect to their voice on the Council even though they constitute over two-third of the General Assembly. Even though outside of the top ten (10) donors to the UN budget (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada, Spain, China and Mexico), African states and others making 182 states contribute only 23.908% to the UN budget (Bureau of Public Affairs, 2005), Africa still deserves a say in the community of states. Being a late starter in the development cum security race and for other reasons adduced above, it is pertinent that every region is represented in the UNSC. Thus in order to increase the efficiency of the SC, and to ensure its status as the principal and most important working body of the United Nations, reforms must be implemented that take into account the aforementioned necessary changes.

Response from Interviews Administered On Target Audience

Selecting some SC reform proposals from all P-5 members, and one (1) from Asia, two (2) from Europe and three (3) from Africa, through interviews and questionnaires conducted, the research was able to arrive at some conclusions. We interviewed and in some cases administered questionnaires on diplomats in their Embassies/ High Commissions in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital. Those states’ whose personnel could not be interviewed were accessed through the internet and books. The reason for this selection is based mainly on states role regionally; as this research suggests that only balanced representation in the UNSC could bring about fundamental reform in the UN. Also, such diplomats’ view as Gambari was sort for, via the internet and in.
books. However, all effort to get scholars views from tertiary institutions failed as they were always unavailable. Below is the outcome of the interviews conducted and questionnaires administered on the target audience.

United States’ Position On Unsc Reform

The United States is open to UN Security Council reform and expansion, as one element of the overall agenda for UN reform. It advocates a criteria-based approach under which potential members must be supremely well qualified, based on factors such as: economic size, population, and military capacity, commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the UN, contributions to UN peacekeeping, and record on counterterrorism and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. This has to look of course, at the overall geographic balance of the Council, but its effectiveness remains the benchmark for any reform (Basic Facts about the UN, 1995).

United Kingdom And France’s Position On Unsc Reform

The United Kingdom (UK) and France hold similar views on reform in the UNSC. According to a formal statement made by 10 Downing Street, both the enlargement and improvement of the Council’s working methods must succeed. “We reaffirm the support of our two countries for the candidacies of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan for permanent membership, as well as for permanent representation for Africa on the Council”. UK regrets that negotiations towards this goal have remained in deadlock and is therefore ready to consider an intermediate solution. This could include a new category of seats, with a longer term than those of the current elected members. Those terms would be renewable; at the end of an initial phase. Later, it could be decided that these new types of seats be turned into permanent ones. We will work with all our partners to define the parameters of such a reform. UNSC reform requires a political commitment from the member states at the highest level. We will work in this direction in the coming months with a view to achieving effective reform. (Joint UK-France Summit Declaration, 2008).

The UK’s comments on UN Security Council reform would be a more modest expansion of the Security Council than was envisaged at one time. And it would enable countries to be on the Council continuously, perhaps on a re-elected basis, with the perspective that in time there would be a further review of membership that might lead to more permanent members. It’s not our favoured position; our favoured position is permanent membership for some new and major players in the World, like the four mentioned above. However, it does not appear that that is going to be achievable in a way which is harmonious across the whole organisation, so there is a willingness to look for some centre ground. Whether we will get there or not remains unresolved, but there is a willingness to explore that. (Sawers, 2009). There is still a possibility of reaching agreement over the next two-to-three years but it will require a willingness to negotiate, and the willingness to compromise on the part of the major players. To the issue on how Britain can justify its position on the UNSC after more than sixty years of being on the Council, Sawers (2009) said they remain one of the top nations in the World in terms of power projection, the fourth largest contributor to the United Nations and its Peacekeeping operations. Britain has troops deployed on UN mandated operations, in places like Afghanistan, as well as traditional UN roles in places like Cyprus. The UK plays a very big role in the UN and in many ways both Britain and France actually make the UN work and are respected for that. No Permanent Representative (P-5) has suggested that Britain should cease to be a permanent member of the Security Council; everybody recognises the role Britain plays and any solution is going to build on the existing permanent members, rather than reduce their number. It is not anachronistic to have two European countries as permanent members as to the British diplomat, “Russia and China are a couple as well in some ways”. The UK feels its role as of now is justified and expansion to include countries like Japan and India is acceptable as it is more justified if the Security Council is bigger and more representative of the World.

China’s Position On Unsc Reform

China supports an increase in the membership of the Security Council that will augment the number of voices and perspectives heard at sessions. Most important in the reform is the addition of seats for states in Africa and South America; both groups of nations to which the Security Council is often forced to direct action. To this measure, China proposes the addition of new non-permanent rotating seats on the Security Council, which will raise representation. Top priority should be given to developing nations to occupy these seats. China feels Reform must be taken slowly rather than rashly; the current slurry of activity focused on Security Council Reform has only served to generate increased numbers of differing but inherently similar proposals with respect to reform. China believes that states can and must reconcile their differing opinions and reach consensus on a single effective plan. For this reason, the People’s Republic of China has not submitted its own specific proposal to add to the maculated cluster of ones already submitted by other states (Cohen, 1973).

Instead of a rigid proposal describing the exact number of slots to be added, the Peoples Republic has
prepared a series of guidelines and tenets to which it believes any reform must address. The exact manner in which these guidelines are to be implemented should be achieved through consultation, multilateralism and consensus amongst members of the GA. China believes that any reform proposal must focus primarily on increasing representation of the developing world and Africa on the Security Council. This will foster increased multilateralism in maintaining peace and security. It is important that when devising a selection process for new representatives, all states be treated equally. China’s position is that representation should not be assigned based on:

- Percent contribution to the UN budget
- Population
- GDP or regional “powerhouse status.”

Rather, slots should be allocated to a particular continent or region from which all states be given equal opportunity. All new slots on the Security Council should be non-permanent — but length of term is up to the decision of the United Nations. Representation should be geographically uniform and all regions should have proportionately equal representations on the council. By extending representation China believes that transparency will also be increased as a by-product as well as global receptiveness to the Council’s decisions.

China, holding the same position as the other four permanent members is not willing to relinquish its veto power, or to grant additional vetoes. Any new permanent Security Council membership would only serve to create an intransigent working model, which would again need reform after several decades. The course that reform takes will determine the future effectiveness of the United Nations as a body. Therefore it is extremely important that the world agree on a suitable reform plan before it is implemented. This is a task which must not have a set deadline or time course. Rather the United Nations and Security Council must carefully, prudently and slowly consider each aspect of reform and only vote after multiple rounds of substantive debate have occurred. Security Council reform holds great promise if it is done correctly. It will be able to usher in a new era of unparalleled cooperation at the UN, and will allow pressing international issues to be quickly and effectively addressed. China hopes that these reforms do great benefit to the United Nations and the future world (Cohen, 2008).

Russia’s Position On Unsc Reform

Russia in support of reform initiatives made by the UN Secretary General (UNSG) welcomes its intention to increase the effectiveness of the secretariat and the organ as a whole. Russia has been a consistent proponent of principles of multi-polarity and equal security for all states. The argument is that no state has enough military, political or economic resources to secure and maintain its sole leadership in the modern world. To Russia, decisions on reform proposals should be taken exclusively on the basis of the broadest possible consensus among member states. Certain practical steps in that direction have already been made, including some major ones such as the establishment of the Peace-Building Commission and the Human Rights Council. What is left now is to ensure an effective functioning of these bodies in the interests of the whole international community. Russia remains firmly convinced that the expansion of the UNSC should be subject to the broad consensus among member states. While the goal of the Council’s effectiveness through a limited expansion of its membership serves the interests of the entire world, it is unacceptable to rush decisions in that regard as that would inevitably antagonise international relations. Russia with its vast territory (80% larger than that of the US (Megalommatis, 2007)), however feels that even though vast surface may be a criterion, nobody should undermine today, the importance of a country’s democratic credentials in reshaping the UN.

India’s Position On Unsc Reform

Activities of the Security Council have greatly expanded in the past few years. The success of Security Council’s actions depends upon political support of the international community. Any package for restructuring of the Security Council should, therefore, be broad-based. In particular, adequate presence of developing countries is needed in the Security Council. Nations of the world must feel that their stakes in global peace and prosperity are factored into the UN’s decision making. Any expansion of permanent members’ category must be based on an agreed criteria, rather than be a pre-determined selection. There must be an inclusive approach based on transparent consultations. India supports expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members’ categories. The latter is the only avenue for the vast majority of member states to serve on the Security Council. Reform and expansion must be an integral part of a common package (India Quarterly (2002) in Wikipedia, 2009). In an interview in Abuja with India’s High Commissioner to Nigeria in October 2009 - Mahesh Sachdev, the Commissioner maintained that India sees a need for reform in the UN system, specifically the conflict of role between the SC and the GA. To India, these changes must take an organic posture - for instance the composition, management and role of the SC need to be addressed. India is a strong candidate for permanent membership. Fortunately, when America’s president - Barak Obama visited India recently (2010), he promised to ensure that India secures a permanent seat on the UNSC citing India’s global role as his yardstick. Thus to
Italy’s Position On Unsc Reform

Italy has been one of the most active participants in the never ending debate on the reform of the UN Security Council. It has advocated for a long time the addition to the present Council of new non-permanent seats, to be covered, for renewable terms, by the top contributors to UN activities (a proposal which is similar to ‘model B’, as envisaged by the 2004 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, appointed by the SG). Recently, however, Italy has moved to a new proposal, providing for a stronger role of regional groups in the Council: the old and new non-permanent seats would be assigned to these groups, which would freely determine the rules on how to attribute them to the single states. Italy has also always supported a stronger role for the European Union in the Security Council, and this later proposal goes in that direction too.

The U.S. has always held a different position: while previously backing the Japanese and German wishes for permanent seats in the Council, it has recently moved to a more cautious stance. The two countries can however, find a common ground today, as the main Italian objective is to defeat German ambitions to a permanent seat in the Council, while the U.S. seems to be more worried about a reform that could render the Council more ungovernable, than wishing to promote one that would be based on its own vision. Italy and the U.S. could therefore, converge around the line ‘better no reform at all’.

Italy insists on the importance of the values and principles declared in the Charter of the UN for the UNSC reform. It subsequently advocates for Japan, India, Germany and more precisely itself (Italy) as additional UNSC permanent members. It calls for a more representative UNSC; suggesting veto rights for more candidates to be able to reflect today’s world and pertinently address the overwhelming aspirations for Humanism, Democracy, Freedom, Justice and respect of the Human Rights. Italy does not believe we can discuss representativeness with less than at least 13 members with Veto Right in a 192 member organisation. When the five (5) “veto right” members were institutionalised, it was at a time when the GA had only fifty (50) states. This suggests automatically a ratio 1:10 and if we are to apply same then we should propose up to nineteen (19) UNSC permanent members. This arithmetic approach can help better contextualise the overall problem.

Italy ranks 23rd in the world in terms of population while England occupies the 22nd position and France 21st most populated country. Hence, Italy has apparently the same right as England and France to be a UNSC permanent member in terms of population even though dwarfed by countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Philippines and Vietnam. Europe’s exemplary democracy is the world’s number eight (8) in terms of GDP, ahead of Russia, Brazil, South Korea, Canada and Mexico. Italy’s GDP is larger than the GDP of the aforementioned five states that together total more than 626 million people, which means more than ten (10) times Italy’s population (Megalommatis, 2007). To Italy, it equals France and England in all the socio-economic parameters, hence it has a rightful position among the UNSC permanent members. This seat was denied Rome because of its involvement in WWII. As in the case of Japan and Germany, Italy’s inclusion in the UNSC permanent membership would be mainly a historical rectification. Italy in 1945 was considered to be in the same rating with France that was viewed as half victorious - Italy half-defeated. One proposed change is to admit more members: the candidates usually mentioned are Japan, Germany, India and Brazil (the G4 nations), and Nigeria. Britain, France and Russia support G4 membership in the UN. Italy has always opposed this kind
of reform, and has submitted since 1992 another proposal, together with other countries, based on the introduction of semi-permanent membership. In addition South Korea opposed Japan; Pakistan opposes India; and Mexico and Argentina oppose Brazil, a Portuguese-speaking country in a largely Spanish-speaking Latin America. All these countries have traditionally grouped themselves in the so-called Coffee Club; officially called 'Uniting for Consensus'.

In conclusion, Italy expects that third world states would enthusiastically support her bid for a permanent seat against Spain, Portugal, France, Russia, Holland and Germany because Italy was only slightly involved in colonial adventure (Abyssinia, Somalia and Libya) and more recently, the Italian attitude to return antiquities abducted during the colonial times from Axum (Abyssinia) testifies in striking opposition to French and British practices to full rejection of the colonial robbery of Asiatic, African and American antiquities.

**Germany's Position On Unsc Reform**

Recognising that there are many ways for member states to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and underlining the fact that members should be elected with due regards to their records of various contributions to this end, and also to equitabile geographical distribution, Germany views the international system as being able to guarantee peace and security. To the Head of Missions German Embassy in Nigeria (October 2009) - Matthias Velting, the P-5 has done credibly well but could do more. Hence Germany feels that reform is long overdue; arguing that the structure is out-dated. But beyond that, reform in all sectors should be a continuous process. Of particular concern is the SC, and Germany thinks that this organ holds the key to peace and security. The GA according to Germany should be given more powers and the ECOSOC must be made more efficient. Germany insists that the clause 'enemy powers' be expunged from the UN charter. As to the Head of Missions, Germany has become a major positive player in world politics today. In the view of Germany, the Secretariat is too weak an organ to function as the forum where all UN members seat to deliberate. It suggests that the GA be mandated to make changes - some kind of review he said is necessary. In the aspect of human rights and ecological issues (UNEP), Germany supports a broadening of both bodies. When asked whether there is politics in the reform process, the Head of Missions - German Embassy said cooperation among member states within the UN will benefit all. Germany has benefitted politically, economically and otherwise from co-operations and so is every state in the international system. On SC reform, Germany’s standpoint is that veto power must be abolished completely. Germany would make do with a non-permanent seat for now. It advocates for an intermediate or transitional approach to the whole reform process. The concept of a transitional approach was first floated by Germany in the mid-1990s in an attempt to entice skeptical states to begin direct negotiations. Most such proposals included “transitional” permanent seats for Germany and their partners in the Group of Four (G4): Brazil, Japan and India. Although India often notes their preference for a comprehensive and permanent settlement, in reality they appear to accept the idea of a “transitional approach” as well (Freiesleben, 2008). Thus Germany agrees to a representation based on geopolitical bases for now but in future, each state’s capabilities in the international system should be the basis upon which membership must be based.

**Africa’s Representation**

Although no one state from Africa has formally been put forward as a candidate for membership on the Security Council, the African group says the current membership in the Security Council is unacceptable and calls for an enlargement in both permanent and non-permanent seats. It argues that Africa should have no less than two permanent seats with all the privileges of the current five permanent members. The group claims that better African representation in the Council will contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the continent (Koizuma, 2004). It has been suggested severally by states such as Kenya, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, South Africa and many more that an African state should be given a seat on the Security Council, with Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa being the most likely contenders. Currently (2010), no state in Africa has a permanent seat on the Security Council and this is seen as a major reason behind the push to have at least an African state. There are indeed several popular reasons why Africa has a good chance of gaining a Security Council permanent membership:

- Africa is the second-largest and second most populous continent behind Asia (in which Russia and China already have seats and Japan and India are both petitioning for theirs).
- Africa has more UN members than any other continent.
- Africa, as a whole, is seen as militarily non-threatening.

In this campaign, Africa has the support of most of South America and India (the South-South Alliance) and Japan of the G4 nations. There are also calls by the UK, France, and China for more political representation from Africa (Martinetti, 2006).
South Africa’s Position On Unsc Reform

South Africa which has one of the largest and the most developed economies on the continent is widely seen by its government as a favorite to fill one of the "permanent seats" that will be set aside for Africa at the Security Council should the UN adopt model 1. South Africa has credibility among the G-8 states that the other contenders do not have. For instance, it accounts for nearly 40 percent of Africa's economy (People’s Daily, 2004). South Africa has had over time, a stable democratic system and further to that, has just hosted the FIFA World Cup 2010. As a result, the country's economy and infrastructure was upgraded thus making it better advanced for a permanent seat. In fact, the choice of South Africa in Africa for the hosting of the FIFA World cup 2010 goes to advance the fact that by FIFA rating and by extension the world, South Africa is the preferred state. However, South Africa's emergence as a favorite has not been well received by Nigeria which has emotionally invested enormous hopes in the "African permanent seat" on the Security Council (Luck, 2003).

Egypt’s Position On Unsc Reform

Egypt has led resistance to a proposal by Nigeria to adopt a version of the G-4 proposals that removes the right of veto for new members (People’s Daily, 2004). In essence, this may enable the creation of a reformed council that does not have any permanent members. Egypt's $2 billion aid from the US has caused uneasiness on the continent as it is an incentive to subject Egypt to US' agenda rather than promote Africa's interests which are in many cases at odds with Washington's. While the choice of Egypt would satisfy demands for a "Muslim" member, full democracy is lacking in Egypt. Egypt’s coming on board would likely bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power and depending on the result of UNSC membership reform; it could give them a UN veto. Such an outcome would be anathema to Israel as well as the United States and this would be vehemently opposed. Aside from this, Egypt also goes by the name “The ARAB Republic of Egypt”, if so then why not an Arab or Middle East seat at the UNSC.

Nigeria’s Position On The Unsc Reform

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and consistently contributes many troops to UN peacekeeping operations. This is why the recent placement of Nigeria on the terrorist list was vehemently resisted by Nigerians at home and abroad. Arguing against such proposals—it is observed that aside from the difficulty inherent in selecting only two at most, or at least one of the proposed states to represent Africa as a whole, and if the representation for Africa is settled for one then, that has to be Nigeria. Only Nigeria and South Africa practice democracy and have human rights. Again South Africa and Egypt are seen as not being "black enough" to represent Africa, compared to Nigeria that has a complete black population "truly black." This singular view is shared by Oluwemi-Kusa (2007) a Nigerian political scientist. Nigeria not only sees itself as "the only true African candidate" contesting for the UNSC seat but also is not an affiliate to other regions - not even to its coloniser (Britain). However, where that fails, Nigeria is also prepared to back Egypt (despite that Egypt opposed its support for the G-4 proposal) as "a compromise" should there be strong disunity over the African candidature (http://www.africafocus.org/docs05/un0504.php). This can be understood as Nigeria sees South Africa as ‘biting the finger that fed it’.

Nigeria played pivotal role in South Africa’s struggle for independence. Supporting this position, Obasanjo, Nigeria’s former president at the world conference of “Action against Apartheid” in August 1977 warned that Nigeria would find it “difficult to fraternise with enterprises and organisations that are party to the system that holds our brothers and sisters in Southern Africa in bondage—” (Alkali, 1996: 83). Also, Alkali (1996:112) sums it thus ‘--- would South Africa, after apartheid pose any challenge or threat to Nigeria—’. Thus Nigeria expects South Africa to respond positively by supporting her bid to a permanent seat on the UNSC and not oppose it. On the other hand, even though Nigeria with its vast oil reserves is saddled with misgovernment and corruption, it is expected that her role in Peace Keeping Operations - the main objective of the UN - will overshadow her shortfall and give her a place of honour in the international community owing from the fact that the UNSC is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, there is also the realist ranking of military capability over and above economic capability. To them, the ability to coerce is more than the ability to reward. Thus stemming from this, Nigeria deserves to be given a veto wielding seat on the UNSC.

To Gambari (1998), the final challenge for Nigeria’s foreign policy in the 21st century is the demand for the reform of the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions and the democratisation of international relations in general. Thus, multilateralism based on respect for sovereign equality of nations should continue to be an article of faith because it holds the prospect for the democratisation of international relations. He said Nigerians need to remain actively engaged with the UN and continue to maintain the nation’s high visibility in the organisation and utilise it as a center for collectively fashioning a new and just world order. Further to that, the argument that the reform of the UN would be incomplete without the reform of the UNSC, the organ which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is held by this diplomat. In carrying out its
responsibilities under the Charter, the Council acts on behalf of the entire membership of the UN. Unfortunately, the present composition of the Council is clearly unfair, unjust and out of date. Thus to Gambari, the Council must be reformed to take into account; the present power configuration in the world; the need to ensure transparency, efficiency and accountability in its working methods, the use or misuse of veto by the P-5 members, the increased membership of the UN (from 51 in 1945 to 185 in 1998 and 192 in 2010) and the fact that the SC has undergone modification in its composition only once since its inception in 1945 (this was in 1965 when the original number of eleven was increased to fifteen). This increase was only in the non-permanent membership category. Gambari thus argued that as at 1998, Africa had to contend with only three rotating non-permanent seats in the Council. To him, the issue of Africa’s representation in the UNSC, particularly in the category of permanent membership, has come not only to the fore at the UN but has become a compelling preoccupation of the continental Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU).

Politics Of The Reform In Other Organs Of The United Nations Secretariat

Historically, the selection process of the UN Secretary-General has been almost exclusively conducted behind closed doors by the five permanent members of the Security Council. Thus, in choosing the highest international official, there has been no formal and transparent process, timeline, candidate criteria, or background check. (Martens, 2006). In the Secretariat the intensified East-West antagonism during the 1950s, the majority which then prevailed was able to isolate the former Soviet Union and other socialist states. The Soviet Union criticised both GA decisions and their implementation by the Secretariat as Western-dominated. This conflict of interests came to a head over resolutions adopted in connection with the Korean crisis in the early 1950s. The former Soviet Union refused to cooperate with Secretary-General (SG) Trygve Lie of Norway, which ultimately led to his resignation in 1953 (Muller, 1995). A similar conflict between North and South Korea presently (2010) has brought Russia and the US again in a row.

His successor, Dag Hammarskjold of Sweden was also accused of a policy bias against Soviet interests. The socialist states charged the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960-64) with staffing the Secretariat with persons from NATO countries while rejecting persons from socialist countries in technical cooperation with developing countries which in any case served only to further the influence of Western industrialised nations over the countries of the third world. These reservations led to a major crisis when the socialist countries refused to join in sharing the costs of the Congo operation or to make any further payments for the Blue Berets stationed in the Middle East since 1956. As no political solution was found, the GA appointed an eight-member group of experts in 1961 to work out suggestions (Muller, 1995). This group was unable to agree on far-reaching recommendations. Their only suggestion for improving the efficiency of the Secretariat was to curb the growth of expenditures and cut the number of posts. The Soviet expert made a spectacular demand to curtail the SG’s independence by replacing the post with a “troika” of one representative each from the socialist states, the Western military alliance and the non-aligned states. Both the expert group and the Western majority in the GA rejected that suggestion. Two decisive changes were subsequently agreed upon: a greater share of Secretariat posts for persons from socialist countries and an informal agreement that the cost of the Blue Berets was henceforth to be borne by the countries providing.

General Assembly

The General Assembly (GA) is the only intergovernmental body in the world that enjoys a universal membership and also covers a broad spectrum of issues. It deals with critical issues, many of them interlinked and related to development, disarmament, education, environment, health crises, humanitarian assistance, human rights, and counter-terrorism, among many others. Effective policymaking in all these areas by the GA is obviously of crucial importance to the peoples of the world. To make the GA more effective, efficient, and relevant, member states have been discussing the “revitalisation” or “reform” of its working methods for many years now. A discussion on the key issues, prevailing trends and diverging perspectives in the GA revitalisation debate covers such aspects as:

- Enhancing the role and authority of the GA.
- The role of the GA in the election of the Secretary-General (SG).
- Improving the working methods of the GA.

Ironically, efforts to revitalise the GA have suffered from some of the same problems. In the last two sessions, reaching agreement on a resolution on GA revitalisation was far from certain even at the onset of discussions. The resolution adopted on the subject in the 61st session on 14 August 2007 was very short and consisted of just a few paragraphs. It asked the SG to update his report on the implementation of resolutions adopted in the GA revitalisation process and requested the President of the GA to continue the ad hoc working group considering this topic in the 62nd session.
ECOSOC

The ECOSOC was envisaged in the U.N. Charter as the principal body for promoting economic and social development. In pursuing this mandate, ECOSOC has faced a variety of institutional and political challenges. For example, ECOSOC's large but far-from-universal membership; its oversight responsibility for numerous specialised agencies and commissions, and its lack of major financial resources to promote development are cited as factors impeding its effectiveness. Governments, civil society groups and analysts have formulated many ECOSOC reform proposals over the years, but none has gained sufficient attention and support to progress very far toward adoption. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent the agreed framework for measuring progress in the world's efforts to reduce poverty in all its forms and advance human development (UNA-USA & WFUNA, 2009). The MDGs reflect the same aims ECOSOC was mandated to promote according to Chapter IX of the UN Charter. The issues of how best to harness the contribution of civil society through structural reforms in the ECOSOC, ECOSOC's relationships with other U.N. bodies, and what role ECOSOC should play in efforts to achieve the MDGs are pertinent. Various agencies under the ECOSOC such as the Bretton Woods: IMF and the World Bank, ILO, WTO, UNICEF and so on must have their hands on deck for a structural reform to be achieved in the ECOSOC.

International Court Of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) known as the primary means for the resolution of disputes between states, has a dual role: Settling in accordance with international law the legal disputes submitted to it by states and giving advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorised international organs and agencies. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Court falls into two distinct parts, namely, contentious jurisdiction and advisory jurisdiction. Thus over time, the court is recognised for its significant contribution to the development of international law even though, the Court has not operated at full capacity (Keith, 1996). Only four or five cases are referred to the Court for judicial settlement every year. There are a number of reasons for this - foremost among which is the character of the Court itself. In Bingbin’s (2008) view, the limited nature of the Court’s jurisdiction is the essential cause of its ineffectiveness. Currently, there are a proliferation of judicial organs at the international and regional level, such as the International Criminal Court, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the European Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of Justice, to name a few. It is unclear what effect these other judicial organs have on the work of the ICJ. However, many of the other tribunals govern disputes between individuals and states rather than inter-state disputes, with the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea as a notable exception. In addition, some of these dispute resolution fora focus on a special field. The ICJ still plays the most important role in the international judicial system for matters falling outside the jurisdiction of specialised tribunals.

Even though the ICJ was expected to be the “principal judicial organ” for the settlement of disputes among states, it has been criticised for its limited effectiveness and the many failures it has experienced. The ICJ has not lived up to the hopes of many of its early supporters who contrary to popular opinion, thought that the ICJ would evolve into an international government. To begin with, only a total of 63 states have recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (with or without reservations) through the “optional clause” system. Less than hundred (100) cases in more than 50 years is not a heavy caseload though the ICJ’s docket has become more active recently (Weiss, 1987). Moreover, many of the cases have not been of great international importance. In more than twenty (20) contentious cases, the ICJ’s jurisdiction or the admissibility of an application (i.e., the complaint) was challenged, with the ICJ dismissing almost half of these cases (Weiss, 1987). Although states have complied with the ICJ’s judgments in many of the cases, recalcitrant states have on occasion refused to comply (Carter & Trimble, 1995). The reasons for the ICJ’s limited influence vary. These include the limits on the ICJ’s jurisdiction, its relatively rigid procedure, and the enforceability of its decrees. But its jurisdiction is the biggest systematic problem.

From the reform of the ICJ in chapter two, it is clear that while some have argued that the power to request advisory opinions should be opened up to the UN Secretary-General and to state and national courts, so as to extend the advisory jurisdiction of the Court, others have also explored the possibility of permitting international organisations to become parties to contentious proceedings, as international organisations play a more and more important role in the international society (Bowett, 1996). All of these sound reasonable and would certainly improve the jurisdiction and effectiveness of the Court, but they all require amendments to the Statute of the ICJ.

In summary, the ICJ has been criticised for its limited effectiveness and the many failures it has experienced. These circumstances have many reasons, such as the time consuming nature of ICJ proceedings, but the most important reason is the extent of the ICJ’s jurisdiction. If we want to see a more efficient ICJ, some reform steps must be taken to solve the jurisdictional problem. Reforming a World Court is not an easy matter. The goal should be achieved step by step. The ICJ can construe its jurisdiction broadly when there are differences as to what the scope of its jurisdiction is. Of course the relevant provisions or Optional Clause
declaration must be interpreted in a natural and reasonable way, as in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (1998). To extend the construction of the ICJ’s jurisdiction does not mean there should be a license to misuse it. Thus from the fore-going, the World Court can do a much better job of exercising its competence under the current ICJ Statute and in an environment of proliferating international courts and tribunals, if it chooses to interpret its jurisdiction broadly. So it is hoped that the Peace Palace will heat up and the World Court will be in business again.

**Analysing The Politics Of The Unsc Reforms**

Since the birth of the League of Nations in 1919, a residual isolationism in the United States has periodically inhibited the struggle to build even a minimally effective world organisation. However, the establishment of the UN should have changed the world more than it has in the half century that has elapsed. Even though changes (the inclusion of new members, with decolonisation almost complete, with new threats manifesting) have taken place, the world has encountered problems that need to be fixed. The present bears a heavy burden of the past. Development and growth and even human dignity remain for much of the world a distant dream. There is thus a need to have an effective UN and reform is believed to be critical if that goal is to be achieved. The UN, for all the good it has done over the years seems at times to be crumbling under the weight of its own imperfections. Since the end of the Cold War, it has become increasingly polarised and less effective. Its goals have become loftier although it continues to fail to live up to its full potential. Such a situation only benefits such entities as drug traffickers, terrorists, war criminals and powerful states in the international system whose interests are in seeing that the UN is ineffectual.

Typically, the United States (US) invasion of Iraq in March 2003, which launched a unilateral ‘preventive war’, comes to mind. This singular act deepened the unresolved crisis regarding the relevance of the UN in the 21st century international system. The crisis was aggravated seven months later when the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1511 which accepted the occupation and acknowledged the US full powers to rebuild Iraq. This in the eyes of many especially from the Southern Hemisphere is ‘the suicide of the Security Council’, because by recognising that the US can invade a country and manage to obtain the support of the international community, the UN could be considered irrelevant (Martens, 2006). Could this unfortunate incidence be because the US contributes a quarter (¼) of the total UN budget thus having its way in the international system?

Another instance is that of April 2008 shortly after Kosovo gained independence, the Russian Foreign Minister – Sergei Lavron said “Moscow could use its seat on the SC to block Kosovo’s membership of the UN” (Horgan, 2008). To Lavron “ increased tensions in Serbian areas of Kosovo and general dissatisfaction in Serbia is the direct result of what he called irresponsible and short sighted policies aimed at the unilateral declaration on Kosovo’s independence. Hence Lavron accused the Europeans of sanctioning and encouraging that independence. Alexei Malashenko a political analyst of the Moscow Carnegie centre on his part submits that “Russia can count on a few former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan in the GA, to support its position on Kosovo in the UN” (Horgan, 2008). He however noted that the threat of a veto in 2008 no longer has the impact it did when Moscow’s SC seat was held by the Soviet Union. This then means that Russia will have a difficult time enforcing its opposition especially if a majority of UN members favour Kosovo’s admission into the UN. Russia and Serbia will need to go beyond words to deal with the political realities of Kosovo’s independence. Also by implication, Belgrade will ultimately need to back down because its future is with Europe. Serbia’s relation with Russia represents a tactic since Belgrade and Moscow could both like to find a compromise solution on Kosovo (Cohen, 2008).

Another dimension to the conflict of interest in the international system is in the struggle by many states to become veto wielding permanent members of the UNSC. While there are valid reasons for Germany and Japan’s demand for membership of the SC, to make this change would provoke suggestions from states from other regions requesting similar status - states in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil); Asia (India, Pakistan); and Africa (Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa). To therefore suggest the removal of UK and France to be replaced by Germany and Japan who have become more relevant in international affairs (as earlier suggested), the UK might go to Pakistan to draw to its attention the fact that India would like to get on the SC and even give it financial aids. Pakistan would prefer the status quo than have India on the SC. The UK would do the same with Argentina vis-à-vis Brazil. The net effect would be states preferring to stick with the present P-5 than to have change. All these political maneuverings would assure that the UK and France remain on the SC. If that be the case, then the chances of achieving macro-reforms in the UNSC would become slim. This would then imply that except the nexus of the SC is broken; the UN as it gets older will have some fundamental faults that will become apparent as the years roll by.

Thus as Loconte (2005) opined, “Defeating these entities therefore is the reason why it is so important that we get this process of reform right”. The questions however are: what can be done at the UN to make the dreams of the hundreds of millions come true. How can we make the UN a more vibrant organisation for the
world community and better equip it to fully respond to the challenges of the next century. The answers lie in reforming the management (regimes), composition (structure) and programmes (policies) of the UN and this is most eminent in the SC organ of the UN.

In the various positions put forward by states and authoritative bodies, all states agree that reform must not be rushed with Germany calling for a transitional approach to the whole reform process. However, excessive time must not be spent on reform. This is to say that other aspects of the UN system must also be given equal considerations. While China like all other P-5 members is not willing to let go ‘veto-power’ or grant additional ones, it however supports more membership of the UNSC. To China, they would augment the number of voices and perspectives in session - particularly Africa and South America. It thus suggests additional non-permanent rotating seats. In doing this, China emphasises that all states be treated equally without specific considerations such as population, GDP and contribution to UN budget. Also slots must only be based on geo-political representation (Kochler, 2006). China thus allows for reform only for non-permanent seats arguing that additional seats would only create an uncompromising working model that would need further reform. In all, the contending issue is that of ‘veto-power’.

India, while supporting regional rotation of UNSC seats, is more specific on the conflict of roles between the GA and SC. India wants a seat on the UNSC even though it feels that Africa qualifies more when based on regional representation. India’s desire is to see Nigeria as the African representative on the UNSC; however it fears that Nigeria has not put in the necessary machineries in place for its bid. Germany on its part feels that the P-5 has done credibly well even though more still needs to be done. It thus advocates for reform in the whole UN system and this to it is overdue. Germany supports a complete abolition of ‘veto-power’ in the UNSC. This to Germany will place every state on the same footing. It further accepts to make do with a non-permanent seat for now as Europe is already represented however; in future it says a state’s capability should be the criterion to be used. This can be so for now while the issue of ‘veto-power’ is being sorted out (Cohen, 2008).

Thus Britain as stated by Ambassador Sawers (a British diplomat) “there are very important countries of the World - Japan, India, Germany, Brazil and so on, who have important roles that they could play on the UNSC but are not on it let alone playing such roles. So I think there’s a general need to modernise the Security Council, but of course in the process there will be some big winners and big losers and finding a way forward which brings everyone together is going to be quite a tricky diplomatic negotiation”. To Sawers, because of the convergence of views beginning to take place, reform could still take quite some time, though people are beginning to recognise that it is in the wider interest of the United Nations to have a representative Security Council. The positions of the established groupings, the group of countries like Japan, India, Germany and Brazil, who are demanding permanent membership and the group opposing them - Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, Korea and so on, are both realising that neither extreme is likely to prevail. So there is a move to find a more intermediate solution (Sawers, 2009). That’s the one thing that has moved forward in the last couple of years, a willingness to find common and central ground, rather than trying to recruit people to one cause or another in order to out-vote them.

It is however worthy of note that the present global financial crisis has added to the impetus to reform the UN Security Council. Everyone is recognising through the economic crisis global interdependence and how individual nations (individual governments even governments of the United States and China the biggest powers in the World) are unable to create the necessary change on their own. There needs to be a co-ordinate and cooperative effort to move the globe ahead. Sawers (2009) reiterated that, “we came to that conclusion after World War II in the security realm; we are coming to that conclusion also in this economic crisis in the economic realm”. This shows that global councils to address global problems and global issues are increasingly in demand.

In Africa, South Africa being the most economically developed state supports the adoption of the UN model 1. It is expected that South Africa the preferred state of the G-4 would be suggested by the P-5 members. The other contender Egypt is Africa’s ancient civilisation even though technological advancement has overaken it. Egypt is against the G-4 proposal which advocates for the removal of the right of veto for new members. Also, Egypt is in disagreement with Africa’s interest in that it supports US agenda at the UN. Nigeria the third contender is Africa’s most populous state and is a strong advocate of global peace and security. Nigeria supports the removal of veto power (G-4’s position). It however sees itself as the most qualified on the continent for reasons such as playing the big brother, location at the heart of Africa, truly black state, and so on.

In summary, all agree that reform in the UNSC will enhance transparency, increase participation, and bring in more manpower and authority thereby increasing legitimacy and efficacy. It is also widely agreed that elements of secretive process in the SC will be dispelled with a balanced representation. Global receptiveness to Council’s decisions would be enhanced through reform thereby making the whole process better received by all member states in the UN. But the bond of contention lies in the difficulties in reaching an agreement on how to reform the UN system. The politics i.e. the conflicts and claims to this process of reconciling ideas must be
compromised at this stage to make headway in the reform process. Ideas therefore in reforming the SC must focus on its composition - particularly the veto power. The P-5 is no longer necessarily the world’s main states as they were in 1945. However, as founders they could be retained as permanent members with veto power while ten (10) other members representing all other regions are allowed to come on board as permanent members with veto power as well without increasing the membership number from fifteen (15). This arrangement must be reviewed every ten (10) years to reflect changes in the international system. As new regional powers emerge, they are expected to come on board at the end of each decade. This expectedly would enhance efficiency and yet accommodate all thereby making the UNSC democratic.

Some groups have advanced arguments against increasing the membership of the council. One such group is the “Representation through more effective Regionalism” (Paul and Nahory, 2005). They argue on the grounds that an enlargement would make the Council cumbersome and ineffective (unable to take urgent required steps because the consultations would be in different time zones, languages and countries. To them, this would give rise to hopeless awkward and inefficient institution). An expansion they argue, will lead to an All-Powerful Executive Committee (P-5). Considering this argument to be true is why we have suggested in this research the maintenance of fifteen members in the UNSC. Thus, under the new arrangement, the P-5 will be made more democratic and powerful. Many ambassadors of Council members from all regions and tribes argued that enlargement is not an effective route to better representation. To them, the new states will only pursue their national interests thus leaving the system without accountability and when in conflict, they will block Council’s remedial action with negative effects on their neighbours using the case of Rwanda which disgustedly sat on the Council during the genocide. Also, if they are small and weak states, they will be exposed to threats, pressure or bribery to vote for the great power’s interest and not the interest of the regions they represent. This is why the position of this research is not for an expanded or enlarged UNSC but for the maintenance of the fifteen (15) members which includes the leading power(s) of each region that better represents the globe.

Hitherto, while some scholars (Thalif, 2005; Paul and Nahory, 2005) would suggest that problems at the UN are a reason for American disengagement, some others (Cardoso, 2004 and Dodds, 2008) have argued that, those problems and the interconnected nature of today’s world are exactly the reasons that the US should become more involved in the UN and in the process of UN reform. Again, as argued by some states in the P-5 (Britain to be précised) states who claim that the present UNSC decisions lack legitimacy because the membership is unrepresentative are wrong. The UNSC certainly does not lack legitimacy in the sense that it is well founded in the UN Charter and every member of the United Nations is signed up to the provisions of the UN Charter which set out the legality and legitimacy of the Security Council (Sawers, 2009). Rather, a more representative Security Council would have added authority. This is because, if states like India, Nigeria and Japan for instance were party to its decisions, they would carry more responsibility for implementing those decisions as well. Implementation does rest on rather limited number of states at the moment and that is another value and benefit of SC reform.

From the analysis above, the UK and France are the most obvious members to be dropped if there be any need. Germany and Japan (ironically the two big losers of WWII) are the obvious candidates to join the SC. Reasons are that these two have become economically stronger than most UNSC members and hence more relevant in the international system. Germany for instance would like permanent membership on the SC because this would reflect its economic strength. The saying which went for the UK in the early 1960s that “it had lost an empire but not yet found a new role” - can be said of Germany now that it has regained its unity but is yet to find a new role. Being on the SC would give Germany hopefully, a clear sense of direction. Japan too is increasing its financial contributions to UN operations. In the late 1980s, it gave more foreign aid than did the US (Suter, 1990). It is now the second largest financial contributor to the UN regular budgets after the US. Between the year 2004-2006, Japan contributed 19.468% of the total assessed contributions. In 2001-2003, Japan voluntarily contributed approximately US$2.1 billion to the UN, its funds and programmes, and specialised agencies; making it the second largest contributor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan Report, 2005). It is now (2011) the third largest economy in the world. In particular, Japan advocates for a suspension of veto power for a period of fifteen (15) years after which new states are given veto power.

The African Union (the Manghreb North African states) in its Draft Resolution of July 14 2005 (Thalif, 2005) was initially in favour of waiving the claim to veto power in order to improve the prospects of access to permanent status but later reached a position to maintain a stance for veto power. This as presented in chapter two may be viewed as playing the ‘role of spoilers’ as they may have come to the conclusion that with only two permanent members in the SC for Africa, none would be given to the Manghreb states. This spoiler position is seen to be pleasing to France who would have the same difficulty supporting Nigeria with the just concluded Bakassi problem. China also is seen to be happy at the spoiler success. The only reason one is able to deduce is that this veto seeking posture of the AU will make for an all-inclusive UNSC and any attempt to reduce or share in the power of the P-5 would be vehemently resisted by the P-5 itself.

China’s position of equal opportunity for all states can be viewed as a deliberate move to bring in weak
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states and thus ensure a continuous domination by the P-5. Consequently, where there is no change or only weak states are brought in, China’s arch enemy -Japan – would not get a permanent seat. Again, the Uniting for Consensus Draft Resolution (model ‘B Green’ and model ‘B Blue’) of July 2005 has a similar mandate. Its real purpose is that these states share in like-mind the need to block their adversaries. Korea, China and Canada oppose Japan; Italy opposes Germany as probably does Spain; Mexico, Columbia and Argentina (being Spanish) oppose Brazil for being Portuguese in their midst. Pakistan obviously opposes India. In Africa, Kenya and Algeria seeing no hope for them in Africa, would rather no one gets it. Canada on the other hand, may oppose Japan because of the problem they have with Japan on immigration and fishing or may just be their way of backing the US in its opposition to change. Japan opposes China for establishing a website which had collected some twenty-two (22) million signatures to oppose the Japanese bid to gain a permanent seat on the SC. With this number in China’s favour, the Japanese may be blocked or forced to make signal concession to them (Razali, 2002).

The above process can only work if limited to a few states as veto position can contribute to deep discussion. Japan believes that the P-5 does not give room for a balance - “they have huge power and can change decisions that can affect other states” says the Japanese head of political desk when interviewed at the Japanese embassy in Abuja. Thus it should be reformed to meet current world demand. India believes it has the capacity to be a member owing from its trade policies and population. In essence, permanent membership should be given to states from all regions provided there is consensus from each region. The issue of consensus cannot be over-emphasised as in 2005, the SC was almost reformed but for the African Union that did not put its acts together hence had no consensus over its candidature. In Africa, Japan feels that two (2) seats are adequate. It thus recommends Nigeria and South Africa. It advocates for eleven (11) SC memberships- the five P-5 members, and six (6) others including Nigeria and Japan. Meanwhile, as UN member states discuss adding new permanent seats to the Security Council, African states disagree on which countries should represent the continent as new permanent member(s). Without consensus on who should be projected for a seat on the SC by the African Union, the reform process is likely to be delayed by Africa. Nigeria whose credentials stand out in Africa, seem too slow in pushing forth her demand for a seat at the UNSC. As presented by the Indian High Commissioner to Nigeria Mahesh Sachdev (2009) when interviewed, Nigeria does not have any policy statement you can lay hands on to show its desire to be on the SC as permanent member. The Commissioner feels Nigeria qualifies most in the continent of Africa for a permanent seat. He maintained that Nigeria’s population, location (Gulf of Guinea) and role in continental politics presents her as the most suitable.

IV. Conclusion

The discussion so far clearly shows that there surely is a lot of difficulty in reconciling conflicting claims over the allocation of social values in society or among nations. This disagreement is only natural thing to expect as realism posits that all states in the international system pursue national interests. Going by Harold Lasswell’s definition of politics which is ‘who gets what, when and how’, power thus becomes the determining factor in international politics and the ability of each state to exhibit its capabilities determines the outcome. This further emphasises the need to bring in regional powers into the UNSC and thus giving the SC more cohesive role. This must necessarily affect its credibility and effectiveness. In the SC also, note must be taken that not all resolutions are implemented. To Japan, rotational monthly leadership in the SC is alright and even better than long terms as long terms may lead to dictatorial resolutions. In Africa, a visit to the Egyptian embassy in a bid to get the view of Egypt through the Egyptian Ambassador to Nigeria revealed the inscription “The ARAB republic of Egypt” on its sign post. This to us is Egypt’s undoing- why would an Arab state vie for an African seat at the UNSC.

From the fore-going, many have advocated for the expansion of more veto wielding power membership in the SC or a complete abrogation of it. However even though the “veto power” of the SC continues to be used politically by the P-5 to advance their national interests, veto power should be retained by the P-5 as a way of recognising their role in conceptualising the idea of the UN and its objectives. On the basis of all analysis, it can be deduced that the best option is that the present way of nominating and endorsing states for two year rotational terms on the SC should be dropped for permanent veto wielding regional representation. This should bring in all regions into the council. Furthermore, states that have contributed immensely to the maintenance of international peace and security or even to the annual UN contribution and the like should be given permanent seats on the council. The present number (fifteen members) should be maintained if the SC is to be effective. This is because looking critically at the SC from inception, it was conceived as the most important of the initial six organs of the UN by virtue of the powers conferred on it by the UN Charter and the role assigned to it with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, various factors such as troop contribution to UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs), population, democratic values, regional power representation, and financial contributions to the UN, economic strength and military capability will determine the likelihood of

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obtaining a seat.

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