IOSR Journal Of Economics and Finance (IOSR-JEF)
e-ISSN: 2321-5933, p-ISSN: 2321-5925.Volume 17, Issue 4 Ser. 1 (July. – August. 2026), PP 61-69
www.Iosrjournals.Org

Vietnam-United States Import-Export Performance Under Trump 2.0: Opportunities, Challenges, And Strategic Responses

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Abstract
This article rewrites and systematizes the attached Vietnamese research report into an English-language scientific article on Vietnam-United States import-export relations under the second Trump administration, commonly referred to as Trump 2.0. The study examines the evolution of bilateral trade, the structure of Vietnam's exports and imports, the effects of U.S.-China trade tensions, and the likely implications of a more protectionist U.S. trade agenda for Vietnam. Drawing on secondary data compiled from Vietnam Customs, the General Statistics Office of Vietnam, the U.S. Census Bureau, the World Bank, the IMF, WTO-related trade concepts, and sectoral reports cited in the original study, the article applies descriptive statistics, comparative analysis, and scenario analysis. The findings show that the United States has become Vietnam's most important export market, while Vietnam's imports from the United States have expanded more slowly. As shown in Table 1, Vietnam's export turnover to the United States increased from USD 38.46 billion in 2016 to USD 125.00 billion in 2024, while imports from the United States rose from USD 9.00 billion to USD 16.00 billion. This widening surplus creates opportunities for export-led growth but also increases exposure to tariff retaliation, anti-dumping investigations, countervailing duties, and stricter rules-of-origin enforcement. The article argues that Vietnam can benefit from supply-chain relocation and market substitution effects caused by U.S.-China rivalry, but only if policy makers and firms strengthen compliance, diversify markets, upgrade domestic supporting industries, and pursue active economic diplomacy. Two scenarios for 2025-2030 are assessed: a moderate scenario in which the United States maintains a relatively pragmatic approach toward Vietnam, and a restrictive scenario in which higher tariffs and trade-defense instruments constrain export growth. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for the Vietnamese government, industry associations, and exporting enterprises.
Keywords: *Vietnam; United States; Trump 2.0; import-export; trade surplus; protectionism; rules of origin; supply chain; anti-dumping; scenario analysis.*

Date of Submission: 05-07-2026 Date of Acceptance: 15-07-2026

I. Introduction

International trade has been one of the main pillars of Vietnam's economic transformation since the launch of Doi Moi and the country's deeper integration into regional and global markets. Among Vietnam's trade partners, the United States occupies a particularly important position because of its large consumer market, high purchasing power, demanding technical standards, and strategic role in global supply chains. The attached report emphasizes that the United States became Vietnam's largest export market in 2024, with export turnover estimated at nearly USD 119.6 billion and a substantial trade surplus for Vietnam. This pattern reflects Vietnam's export-oriented development model, but it also creates policy risks because the United States has repeatedly scrutinized trading partners with large bilateral surpluses.

The context of Trump 2.0 gives the topic heightened significance. During Donald Trump's first presidency, U.S. trade policy was characterized by the slogan America First, withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, extensive use of tariffs, and more assertive application of trade-remedy instruments. Although the most visible target was China, other export-oriented economies also faced stronger monitoring. Vietnam benefited from some trade diversion effects as firms and buyers sought alternatives to Chinese production, but the country was simultaneously exposed to allegations of transshipment, currency manipulation, origin fraud, and unfair subsidies. A second Trump administration therefore represents both an opportunity and a challenge for Vietnam's export strategy.

The purpose of this article is to convert the original research report into a concise but academically structured scientific paper. The article addresses three research questions. First, what are the main trends and characteristics of Vietnam-United States import-export relations in the period 2016-2024? Second, how might

U.S. protectionist policies under Trump 2.0 affect Vietnam's key export sectors and trade balance? Third, what strategic responses should the Vietnamese state and enterprises adopt to sustain export growth while reducing legal and policy risks? These questions are addressed through a synthesis of theoretical foundations, descriptive data, sectoral analysis, and scenario-based forecasting.

The contribution of the article is threefold. It first provides a systematic English-language presentation of the original Vietnamese report for an academic audience. It then links empirical trade data with theories of comparative advantage, protectionism, trade balance, and trade defense. Finally, it offers policy implications at both macro and micro levels. The article does not claim to provide an econometric causal estimate of tariff impacts. Instead, it uses a structured scenario approach to interpret the likely direction of impacts and to support practical recommendations. This is appropriate because Trump 2.0 policy instruments have been evolving and because trade outcomes depend not only on tariffs but also on diplomatic negotiation, industry adaptation, and global demand conditions.

II. Literature Review And Theoretical Background

The original report reviews both international and Vietnamese studies on U.S. trade policy, U.S.-Vietnam relations, and the spillover effects of U.S.-China trade tensions. International literature generally agrees that the first Trump administration represented a turning point in U.S. trade strategy. Welfens (2020) and Lohman (2022), for example, interpret the withdrawal from the TPP and the turn toward bilateral bargaining as signals of a more nationalist and transactional approach to economic governance. Chikermane (2024) further suggests that a second Trump administration would likely reinforce domestic manufacturing, strategic autonomy, and geopolitical bargaining. Such findings are relevant to Vietnam because its export model depends heavily on stable market access and predictable trade rules.

Several studies focus more directly on Vietnam. Siracusa and Nguyen (2019) argue that U.S.-Vietnam relations under Trump were shaped by a combination of strategic cooperation and trade tension. Martin (2016, 2018) examines U.S. regulations affecting Vietnamese exports, including catfish inspection, anti-dumping procedures, and the post-TPP context. Rotunno et al. (2023) and Dhar et al. (2022) show that U.S.-China tariff escalation created trade diversion opportunities for Vietnam, especially in labor-intensive and assembly-based sectors. However, these opportunities came with heightened risks because the United States could suspect that Chinese goods were being rerouted through Vietnam to avoid tariffs.

Vietnamese studies cited in the original report similarly emphasize the double-edged nature of the U.S. market. Ministry-level reports, CIEM (2020), and several academic articles note that the United States is central to Vietnam's export performance, particularly for garments, footwear, wood products, electronics, and seafood. At the same time, Vietnamese exporters face strict technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, labor and environmental requirements, and a growing number of trade-remedy investigations. This literature identifies a research gap: while many studies discuss Trump 1.0 or the U.S.-China trade war, fewer provide a structured assessment of Trump 2.0 scenarios and their implications for Vietnam's trade policy.

The theoretical foundation of the study is built on four concepts. The first is comparative advantage. Following Ricardo and later Heckscher-Ohlin reasoning, countries tend to specialize in goods for which they have relatively lower opportunity costs or factor endowments. Vietnam's export strengths in labor-intensive manufacturing, electronics assembly, furniture, agriculture, and seafood can be partly explained by its labor force, geographic position, and integration into global production networks. However, comparative advantage is not static. It can be upgraded through technology, skills, infrastructure, and domestic supporting industries.

The second concept is trade protectionism. Protectionism refers to the use of tariffs, quotas, subsidies, local-content requirements, technical barriers, or trade-remedy instruments to protect domestic industries. In the U.S. context, protectionism is often justified by arguments about trade deficits, national security, industrial employment, and unfair foreign competition. Trump-era policy illustrates the political economy of protectionism: tariff threats are used not only to protect specific sectors but also as bargaining tools in broader negotiations. For Vietnam, this means that trade policy risk depends not only on sector performance but also on the overall bilateral balance and diplomatic context.

The third concept is trade balance. A trade surplus occurs when exports exceed imports, while a deficit occurs when imports exceed exports. From Vietnam's perspective, a surplus with the United States contributes to growth, foreign exchange earnings, employment, and the strengthening of export industries. From the U.S. perspective, however, a persistent deficit may be interpreted politically as evidence of unfairness or insufficient market access for American firms. Table 1 indicates that Vietnam's surplus with the United States rose from USD 29.46 billion in 2016 to USD 109.00 billion in 2024 according to the attached report. This is economically beneficial for Vietnam but politically sensitive under an administration that prioritizes deficit reduction.

The fourth concept is trade defense. Anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, safeguard measures, and Section 301 investigations are legally permitted or politically used instruments that can alter market access. Anti-dumping measures address sales below normal value, countervailing duties address unfair subsidies, and safeguards address sudden import surges that injure domestic industries. Rules of origin are also central because preferential access depends on whether goods genuinely originate in the exporting country. For Vietnam, the most acute challenge is to demonstrate that exported goods are not merely transshipped Chinese products but contain sufficient Vietnamese value added.

III. Methodology

This article uses a qualitative-dominant mixed approach based on secondary data. The empirical basis is the attached Vietnamese research report, especially its descriptive statistics, tables, figure captions, and literature review. The data cover bilateral Vietnam-United States export and import turnover from 2016 to 2024, U.S. import patterns from China and Vietnam from 2017 to 2024, sectoral export structures in 2024, import categories from the United States, and scenario forecasts for 2025-2030. The article preserves the key tables of the report but translates, condenses, and reorganizes them to fit the structure of a scientific paper.

The first method is descriptive statistical analysis. Trade turnover data are used to identify trends in exports, imports, and surplus. Table 1 summarizes the core bilateral data for 2016-2024, while Figure 1 visualizes the increasing gap between Vietnam's exports to the United States and imports from the United States. Descriptive statistics are appropriate because the main purpose is to establish the scale and direction of trade flows before discussing policy implications.

The second method is comparative analysis. The article compares U.S. imports from China and Vietnam in order to assess whether Vietnam has benefited from trade diversion caused by the U.S.-China conflict. Table 2 shows that U.S. imports from China declined significantly in 2019 and 2020, whereas imports from Vietnam rose steadily during the same period. The article also compares Vietnam with major competitors in key sectors such as textiles, footwear, furniture, electronics, and seafood. This comparison helps identify where Vietnam has advantages and where competitive pressure remains strong.

The third method is scenario analysis. Because Trump 2.0 policies are characterized by uncertainty and can change quickly, deterministic forecasting would be inappropriate. Instead, the article follows the original report in presenting two scenarios for 2025-2030. The first assumes a relatively moderate U.S. approach toward Vietnam, similar to the pragmatic pattern observed during parts of Trump 1.0. The second assumes a more restrictive approach involving higher tariffs, stronger origin enforcement, and more frequent trade-remedy investigations. Table 4 and Figure 2 present the resulting trade projections. These scenarios are not predictions in a strict econometric sense; they are analytical tools for strategic planning.

The study has limitations. It relies on secondary data and does not include interviews with firms, customs officials, or policy makers. Some figures for 2023-2024 and 2025-2030 in the original report are estimates or scenario-based calculations rather than final audited statistics. The analysis therefore emphasizes direction, relative magnitude, and strategic implications rather than exact point forecasts. Future research should use firm-level data, computable general equilibrium models, or difference-in-differences designs to estimate the causal impacts of specific tariffs on individual sectors.

IV. Results And Analysis

The most important empirical result is the rapid expansion of Vietnam's exports to the United States. Table 1 shows that Vietnamese exports rose from USD 38.46 billion in 2016 to USD 125.00 billion in 2024. This represents more than a threefold increase over nine years. Imports from the United States also increased, but much more slowly, from USD 9.00 billion to USD 16.00 billion. Consequently, Vietnam's trade surplus widened from USD 29.46 billion to USD 109.00 billion. Figure 1 makes the divergence visually clear: the export line rises steeply after 2018, while the import line remains comparatively flat.

Table 1. Vietnam-United States import-export turnover, 2016-2024 (USD billion)

Year	Vietnam exports to U.S.	Vietnam imports from U.S.	Surplus/deficit
2016	38.46	9.00	29.46
2017	41.61	9.21	32.40
2018	47.53	9.35	38.18
2019	58.95	14.36	44.59
2020	77.07	13.00	64.07
2021	96.29	15.27	81.02
2022	110.00	14.00	96.00
2023	118.00	15.00	103.00
2024	125.00	16.00	109.00

Source: Adapted from Table 2.1 of the attached report, based on Vietnam Customs and U.S. Census Bureau data cited in the report.



Figure 1. Vietnam-United States trade trend, 2016-2024. Source: Authors' visualization based on Table 1.

The acceleration after 2018 is consistent with the broader context of U.S.-China trade tensions. As the United States imposed tariffs on Chinese goods, buyers and multinational corporations searched for alternative manufacturing locations. Vietnam was well positioned because it offered competitive labor costs, proximity to China, participation in several free trade agreements, and a gradually improving industrial base. This does not mean that Vietnam simply replaced China. Rather, Vietnam captured selected segments of production, especially assembly, processing, furniture, garments, footwear, and some electronics components. The data in Table 2 support this interpretation by showing that U.S. imports from Vietnam increased while imports from China were affected by tariff escalation and pandemic disruption.

Table 2 indicates that U.S. imports from China fell from USD 539.24 billion in 2018 to USD 451.65 billion in 2019 and USD 435.45 billion in 2020. During the same period, U.S. imports from Vietnam rose from USD 49.20 billion in 2018 to USD 66.60 billion in 2019 and USD 79.60 billion in 2020. This pattern suggests a trade-diversion effect, although it should not be interpreted as a one-to-one substitution. Part of Vietnam's export growth reflected genuine expansion of production capacity, part reflected relocation by foreign-invested firms, and part may have involved deeper integration with Chinese intermediate inputs. This last point is why rules of origin have become increasingly important.

Table 2. U.S. import turnover from China and Vietnam, 2017-2024 (USD billion)

Year	U.S. imports from China	U.S. imports from Vietnam	Note
2017	505.60	46.48	Before the trade conflict
2018	539.24	49.20	Additional U.S. tariffs on China began
2019	451.65	66.60	Peak tariff escalation
2020	435.45	79.60	Tariffs and COVID-19 disruption
2021	506.40	99.20	U.S. demand recovered
2022	537.30	108.00	Preliminary estimate
2023	545.00-550.00	118.00	Preliminary estimate
2024	560.00-570.00	125.00	Preliminary estimate

Source: Adapted from Table 2.2 of the attached report, based on U.S. Census Bureau, World Bank, and IMF data cited in the report.

Sectoral evidence reinforces the strategic significance of the U.S. market. The original report identifies computers, electronic products and components, machinery and equipment, textiles, footwear, wood and wood products, seafood, and selected agricultural products as major export categories. In 2024, computers and electronic components were estimated at USD 23.2 billion, machinery and equipment at USD 22.05 billion, textiles at USD 16.15 billion, wood products at USD 9.05 billion, footwear at USD 8.28 billion, and seafood at USD 1.83 billion. These sectors differ in technology intensity, ownership structure, value added, and exposure to U.S. regulations.

Electronics and machinery represent a shift from purely labor-intensive exports toward higher-value industrial products. However, the high share of foreign-invested firms and imported components means that domestic value added remains limited in some segments. Textiles and footwear continue to employ large numbers of workers and have strong export capacity, but they depend on imported fabric, leather, chemicals, and accessories. Wood products have benefited from demand for furniture and from the relocation of sourcing away from China, yet the industry faces strict requirements on legal timber origin and environmental compliance. Seafood and agricultural exports are promising but highly sensitive to food safety, inspection, traceability, and anti-dumping cases.

Table 3 compares Vietnam with major competitors. In textiles, Vietnam competes with Bangladesh, China, and India. Bangladesh has very low labor costs and large-scale garment production; India has a more integrated textile chain; China remains strong because of scale, technology, and industrial ecosystems. In footwear, Indonesia, China, and India are important rivals. In furniture, Vietnam is highly competitive but competes with China, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In electronics, China, Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico have advantages in technology, scale, or proximity to the U.S. market. In seafood and agriculture, Thailand, India, Ecuador, and Bangladesh are relevant competitors. The implication is that Vietnam's export success cannot rely only on low costs. It must increasingly depend on quality, speed, compliance, branding, and supply-chain reliability.

Table 3. Vietnam and major competitors in key export sectors

Sector	Vietnam position	Main competitors	Cost	Quality	Export scale
Textiles and garments	High	Bangladesh, China, India	Low	Medium	Large
Footwear	High	Indonesia, China, India	Medium	Good	Large
Wood and furniture	Leading	China, Malaysia, Indonesia	Medium	High	Large
Electronics and components	Medium	China, Korea, Mexico	Medium	Medium-high	High
Agriculture and seafood	Strong in fish and shrimp	Thailand, India, Ecuador	Medium	Good	Medium

Source: Adapted from Table 2.3 of the attached report, compiled from WTO, ITC Trade Map, World Footwear Yearbook, Statista, FAO, and Vietnamese industry associations cited in the report.

On the import side, the attached report shows that Vietnam imports from the United States mainly consist of computers, electronic products and components, machinery, animal feed and agricultural inputs, cotton, plastic materials, and chemicals. These imports support domestic production and export industries. Cotton, for example, is important for textiles; machinery and electronic components support industrial upgrading; feed ingredients support livestock and food-processing sectors. Increasing imports from the United States could help reduce the bilateral imbalance and provide Vietnam with higher-quality inputs, but it would not automatically solve the structural surplus because Vietnam's export capacity to the U.S. remains much larger than its import absorption from the U.S.

The trade balance is therefore both an economic strength and a policy vulnerability. From Vietnam's perspective, the surplus reflects competitiveness and market success. From the perspective of a U.S. administration that prioritizes deficit reduction, however, it can become a trigger for pressure. The attached report repeatedly notes that large and persistent surpluses can expose Vietnam to accusations of currency manipulation, unfair subsidies, or transshipment. The risk is not theoretical. Previous U.S. investigations into steel, wood products, seafood, and currency issues demonstrate that Vietnam is already within the scope of U.S. trade-defense monitoring.

V. Trump 2.0 Policy Context And Scenario Analysis

Trump 2.0 should be understood as a policy environment characterized by economic nationalism, tariff bargaining, preference for bilateral deals, and a strong focus on domestic manufacturing. In such an environment, trade partners with large surpluses may face pressure to open markets, increase purchases from the United States, strengthen origin control, or accept tariffs. The original report summarizes key expected policy elements as enhanced protectionism, stronger support for U.S. domestic supply chains, stricter enforcement of technical and origin requirements, and greater scrutiny of investment and high-technology flows.

The first scenario in the report assumes that the United States maintains a relatively moderate position toward Vietnam. In this scenario, U.S. policy remains tough in rhetoric but pragmatic in implementation. Vietnam continues to benefit from supply-chain relocation, stable U.S. demand, and most-favored-nation treatment under WTO rules. Export growth remains strong, although the trade surplus continues to rise. Table 4 shows that, under this moderate scenario, Vietnam's exports to the United States could increase from USD 135.0 billion in 2025 to USD 210.0 billion in 2030, while imports from the United States could rise from USD 17.0 billion to USD 24.0 billion.

Table 4. Forecasts of Vietnam-United States trade under two scenarios, 2025-2030 (USD billion)

Year	Exports: Scenario 1	Exports: Scenario 2	Imports: Scenario 1	Imports: Scenario 2
2025	135.0	130.0	17.0	16.0
2026	150.0	140.0	18.0	17.0
2027	165.0	148.0	19.5	18.0
2028	180.0	155.0	21.0	19.0
2029	195.0	165.0	22.5	20.0
2030	210.0	175.0	24.0	21.0

Source: Adapted from Table 2.6 of the attached report; scenario values are calculated and synthesized by the original research team.



Figure 2. Scenario forecasts for Vietnam-United States trade, 2025-2030. Source: Authors' visualization based on Table 4.

The opportunity in the moderate scenario is clear: Vietnam can consolidate its role as a production and export hub in Asia. The country can attract new foreign direct investment, expand industrial clusters, and develop supporting industries. The U.S. market would continue to absorb Vietnamese goods, especially in electronics, apparel, footwear, furniture, and selected food products. If Vietnam improves labor, environmental, and quality standards, it can move into higher-value segments and reduce vulnerability to price competition.

However, even the moderate scenario contains risks. A trade surplus that reaches USD 118.0 billion in 2025 and USD 186.0 billion in 2030, as implied by the report's projections, would be politically sensitive. The larger the surplus, the easier it becomes for U.S. politicians and industries to argue for investigation. Moreover, if Vietnam's export growth depends heavily on imported Chinese inputs, rules-of-origin risk will intensify. Therefore, the moderate scenario is not a low-risk scenario; it is a scenario in which risks are manageable if Vietnam acts early.

The second scenario assumes that the United States adopts a restrictive approach involving higher tariffs, sanctions, or broader use of trade-defense instruments against Vietnam. Under this scenario, export growth slows because Vietnamese goods become more expensive in the U.S. market and because firms face higher compliance costs. Table 4 shows that exports would still rise from USD 130.0 billion in 2025 to USD 175.0 billion in 2030, but this is USD 35.0 billion lower than the moderate scenario's 2030 export level. Imports from the United States would also grow more slowly, from USD 16.0 billion to USD 21.0 billion.

The restrictive scenario would particularly affect sectors with thin margins, high labor intensity, and high exposure to U.S. investigations. Textiles and footwear could suffer if tariffs erode price competitiveness. Wood products could be exposed to origin and legality questions. Seafood could face anti-dumping and sanitary barriers. Steel and metal products would be vulnerable to both anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations. Electronics could face more complex risks if U.S. technology-control policy intersects with supply chains involving China, Korea, Taiwan, or U.S. intellectual property.

Nevertheless, the restrictive scenario may also generate positive pressure for structural reform. If tariffs and investigations make low-cost assembly less profitable, firms may be forced to upgrade technology, improve traceability, invest in domestic inputs, and diversify customers. Such adjustment is difficult but necessary for long-term competitiveness. Vietnam's policy challenge is to transform external pressure into industrial upgrading rather than allowing it to become a shock that merely reduces orders and employment.

Figure 2 compares the two scenarios. The difference between the export paths illustrates the cost of policy friction. The gap does not mean that restrictive policy would eliminate Vietnam's U.S. market; rather, it means that Vietnam would lose part of its growth potential and would face greater volatility. The figure also shows that imports from the United States remain modest in both scenarios. This suggests that balancing trade through increased U.S. imports alone will be difficult unless Vietnam undertakes broader changes in energy, aircraft, machinery, agriculture, and high-technology procurement.

VI. Policy Recommendations

At the macro level, Vietnam should prioritize proactive economic diplomacy with the United States. Regular dialogue through trade and investment frameworks can reduce misunderstanding and create early-warning mechanisms for disputes. Vietnam should be prepared to explain its exchange-rate policy, origin-control system, subsidy policies, and import plans. Rather than reacting after investigations begin, Vietnam should build channels of technical communication with U.S. agencies, industry associations, and importers. This is especially important under Trump 2.0 because tariff threats may be used as negotiation tools.

Second, Vietnam should strengthen the institutional system for preventing origin fraud and illegal transshipment. The credibility of the Made in Vietnam label is a strategic national asset. Customs authorities, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, chambers of commerce, and sector associations should coordinate databases on certificates of origin, production capacity, imported inputs, and export volumes. Sudden jumps in exports of products that rely heavily on Chinese inputs should trigger internal review before they trigger U.S. investigations. Digital traceability systems can reduce compliance costs and protect legitimate exporters.

Third, Vietnam should develop domestic supporting industries. Many trade risks arise because export sectors depend on imported raw materials and components. In garments, domestic fabric and dyeing capacity remain limited. In footwear, leather, chemicals, and accessories are often imported. In electronics, high-value components are usually supplied by foreign firms. Supporting-industry policy should focus not on broad subsidies that may invite countervailing duty claims, but on infrastructure, workforce training, technology upgrading, research and development, and supplier-linkage programs between foreign-invested enterprises and domestic small and medium-sized firms.

Fourth, Vietnam should diversify markets without abandoning the United States. The U.S. market is too large to be replaced quickly, but overconcentration creates vulnerability. Vietnam should use the EVFTA, CPTPP, RCEP, and other agreements to expand exports to the European Union, Japan, Korea, Australia, Canada, and ASEAN markets. Market diversification should be sector-specific. High-quality seafood and furniture can target the EU and Japan; textiles and footwear can expand within CPTPP markets; electronics can deepen participation in regional supply chains. Diversification also strengthens Vietnam's bargaining position with the United States because firms are less dependent on one destination.

Fifth, the government should support enterprises in meeting technical, labor, environmental, and food-safety standards. U.S. regulations are complex and can vary by product and state. Small and medium-sized exporters often lack legal and technical capacity to interpret these rules. Public-private compliance centers could provide training on FDA requirements, USDA inspection, customs valuation, anti-dumping documentation, rules of origin, environmental certificates, labor audits, and packaging standards. Such support should be practical, updated regularly, and accessible outside major cities.

At the enterprise level, Vietnamese exporters must move from passive compliance to strategic compliance. Firms should maintain transparent accounting systems, preserve input records, document production processes, and prepare evidence of domestic value added. When facing U.S. trade-remedy investigations, non-cooperation often leads to adverse facts available and higher duties. Enterprises should therefore develop internal trade-compliance teams or cooperate with legal advisers and industry associations. Compliance should be viewed as a market-entry capability rather than a temporary administrative burden.

Enterprises should also upgrade product quality and branding. Low-cost production remains important, but it is insufficient for long-term competitiveness in a protectionist environment. Brands, design, after-sales service, certifications, and sustainability narratives can reduce price sensitivity. In furniture, legality and environmental branding can help differentiate Vietnamese products. In textiles and footwear, compliance with labor and sustainability standards can attract higher-end buyers. In seafood and agriculture, traceability and processing depth can increase value added and reduce vulnerability to raw-product price fluctuations.

Another enterprise-level strategy is supply-chain diversification. Firms should reduce excessive dependence on any single input country, especially when that country is subject to U.S. tariffs. This does not mean eliminating Chinese inputs, which may be impractical, but it does mean building alternative suppliers, increasing domestic sourcing where feasible, and clearly documenting transformation processes. Exporters should also evaluate whether their goods meet substantial transformation criteria and whether certificates of origin accurately reflect production reality.

Finally, enterprises should use digital transformation and risk management tools. Digital enterprise resource planning, barcode or QR traceability, supplier databases, and automated documentation can make customs and origin compliance more efficient. Scenario planning should be embedded in business strategy: firms should estimate how a 10 percent, 20 percent, or 40 percent tariff would affect orders, margins, and sourcing. They should also diversify sales channels through e-commerce, direct distribution, and partnerships with U.S. retailers, rather than relying entirely on intermediaries.

VII. Conclusion

Vietnam-United States trade relations under Trump 2.0 combine strong economic complementarity with significant policy risk. Vietnam supplies a wide range of consumer goods, industrial products, and intermediate inputs to a large U.S. market, while the United States supplies Vietnam with machinery, technology, agricultural inputs, and selected high-value goods. The relationship has grown rapidly, especially since 2018, as U.S.-China tensions and supply-chain diversification created new opportunities for Vietnam. Table 1 confirms the scale of growth, and Table 2 indicates that Vietnam has gained importance in U.S. import sourcing as China's position became more contested.

The central finding is that Vietnam's success creates its own vulnerability. A large and persistent surplus with the United States strengthens Vietnam's export-led growth but increases exposure to U.S. pressure. Trump 2.0 is likely to interpret trade balances through a political lens, making Vietnam vulnerable to tariffs, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, rules-of-origin enforcement, and negotiation demands. The scenario analysis shows that a restrictive U.S. policy environment could reduce Vietnam's 2030 export potential by about USD 35 billion compared with a moderate scenario. This does not imply collapse, but it does imply slower growth, higher compliance costs, and greater uncertainty.

The article therefore recommends a dual strategy: defend and upgrade. Vietnam should defend market access through diplomacy, transparent exchange-rate policy, strong origin enforcement, and compliance with U.S. standards. At the same time, it should upgrade its export model by increasing domestic value added, developing supporting industries, improving labor and environmental standards, building brands, and diversifying markets. Enterprises must treat compliance, traceability, and risk management as core competitive capabilities. Government must provide institutional support without creating subsidy structures that could be challenged abroad.

Further research should move beyond descriptive and scenario analysis. Firm-level studies could identify which types of enterprises are most exposed to U.S. tariffs and investigations. Sector-specific models could estimate employment, value-added, and price impacts. Econometric work could distinguish genuine trade diversion from transshipment risk. Comparative studies with Mexico, India, Indonesia, and Bangladesh could clarify Vietnam's relative position in the post-China-plus-one supply chain. Such research would help policy makers and firms design more precise responses to a rapidly changing trade environment.

VIII. Limitations And Future Research

This article is based primarily on a synthesis and academic rewriting of the attached research report; therefore, its empirical scope is bounded by the availability and structure of the original secondary data. The tables provide a useful foundation for trend analysis, but several values for 2023-2024 and for the 2025-2030 period are estimates or scenario assumptions. They should be read as planning figures rather than as final verified trade statistics. This limitation is not unusual in policy-oriented trade research, because governments and firms often need to make strategic decisions before all official data are finalized.

A second limitation is the absence of firm-level evidence. The impact of Trump 2.0 policies will not be uniform across Vietnamese enterprises. Large foreign-invested exporters may have stronger legal teams, better documentation systems, and more flexible supply chains. Small and medium-sized domestic firms may be more vulnerable to sudden tariff changes, rules-of-origin audits, and compliance costs. Future research should therefore collect survey and interview data from exporters, logistics firms, customs brokers, industry associations, and U.S. buyers in order to understand how firms actually adjust when policy risk increases.

A third limitation concerns the treatment of causality. The article identifies plausible associations between the U.S.-China trade war, supply-chain relocation, and Vietnam's export growth, but it does not estimate causal effects. A stronger quantitative design could compare tariff-affected and non-tariff-affected products before and after U.S. policy changes, or use a gravity model to separate the effects of demand growth, exchange rates, tariffs, shipping costs, and foreign direct investment. Sector-specific computable general equilibrium models could also estimate employment and welfare impacts under different tariff rates.

Future studies should also examine the environmental and social dimensions of Vietnam's export expansion. U.S. and European buyers increasingly require evidence of sustainable sourcing, labor compliance, carbon management, and responsible production. If Vietnam responds to Trump 2.0 only by seeking short-term export growth, it may miss the opportunity to transform its export model. A more comprehensive research agenda should connect trade policy with green industrial upgrading, digital customs systems, workforce skills, and the development of Vietnamese brands in global markets.

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