

Shadow Banking In Emerging Economies: India's NBFC Dilemma (2025)

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Abstract

This research paper offers a detailed examination of the shadow banking sector in emerging economies in general, and the Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC) in India in particular. It discusses how NBFCs have emerged as important financial intermediaries, bridging the credit gaps left by mainstream banks and supporting the growth story of the economy. The paper studies the nuances of the Indian NBFC crisis, triggered by the default of Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services (IL&FS) in 2018, and its contagion impact on the financial system at large. By critically analyzing the sources of this sector (including misplaced assets and liabilities, little regulation, and contagion across financial institutions), the paper identifies the systemic risk this sector represents. It critically assesses the regulatory responses of the RBI including introduction of scale-based regulation and timely corrective action frameworks for NBFCs. Within the paper we have included analytical tables, charts and financial equations to deconstruct the intricacies of the NBFC business model and its inherent vulnerabilities. It ends with a set of policy recommendations that seek to stimulate a more resilient and stable NBFC sector in India and draw lessons for other emerging economies facing the challenges of regulating shadow banking.

Keywords: Shadow Banking, Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs), Emerging Economies, India, Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, Regulation, IL&FS, Asset-Liability Mismatch.


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I. Introduction

Non-bank financial intermediation, or what is more colloquially known as shadow banking, has rapidly grown over the past few decades to transform the international financial system. Very much prevalent (compared to developed countries) has been credit intermediation which is defined as follows: credit intermediation that involves entities and activities not part of the regular banking system (Financial Stability Board, 2014). In most of these economies, the shadow banking sector has intervened to fill the gaps left by the formal banking sector in the provision of access to credit, thus contributing to financial inclusion and economic growth. However, several drawbacks that are linked to the rise of shadow banking also exist, such as regulatory arbitrage, increase in systemic risk, and financial instability.

The paper is a research on the classic example of shadow banking in a developing economy the Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC) sector in India. Indian NBFCs have played a significant role in economic growth of the nation and have extended their credit to a wide range of industries such as infrastructure, real estate, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and retail customers. Their dexterity, innovative product offerings, and penetration in underserved areas have made them an inseparable part of the Indian financial machinery.



However, a financial crisis that started in 2018, when the systemically important and large Indian NBFC Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS) defaulted, has not spared the Indian NBFC sector. This event triggered an acute liquidity shortage and a crisis of confidence which spilled over to the rest of the financial system. The IL&FS crisis, and the resultant defaults by other large NBFCs such as the Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd. (DHFL) showed just how vulnerable the industry had been to high leverage, ALMs (Asset and Liability mismatches) and the interdependence created between banks, MFs and other financial intermediaries.

Shadow banking in emerging economies: the NBFC dilemma in India (2025) tries to categorize this critical question into a broad analytical framework. The twofold question in the title can be understood only as the two-fold task of Indian policymakers: how to release developmental potential of NBFCs, and how to minimize their systemic risks at the same time. The date 2025 used to create the title indicates that the author is taking a long-term view, of the effects of the crisis and the reforms that are going to be implemented in the regulatory sector after the crisis.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a theoretical framework of shadow banking and its meaning for emerging economies. Section 3 gives a brief history of the NBFC sector in India and its rising significance in the Indian Financial Ecosystem. Section 4 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the crisis of the NBFCs, the root causes and implications of which we will analyze. Section 5 critically assesses the RBI and governmental response to the regulatory aspect of this crisis. Section 6 describes in detail the systemic risk associated with NBFCs, with tables, diagrams, and financial formulas that explain key concepts. Finally, there are suggestions in Section 7 for policies to bolster the NBFC sector and financial stability in India and beyond, with lessons for other emerging economies.

II. Theoretical Framework & Review Of The Literature

The term "shadow banking" emerged as a political and popular concept following the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, but the activity it refers to is much older than that. The term was first used in 2007 by Paul McCulley of PIMCO to mean a network of financial intermediaries whose activities are similar to those of traditional banking but operate outside the traditional regulatory perimeter (McCulley 2007). The more formal definition by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) defines shadow banking as "credit intermediation that involves entities and activities (fully or partially) outside the regular banking system" (FSB 2014).

The literature identifies two general types of shadow banking activities: shadow banking activities that can be considered substitutes of conventional banking and shadow banking activities that can be considered complements of conventional banking. As an alternative source of credit, shadow banks help to ensure that credit is available to borrowers who might otherwise be unable to access bank financing. As complements, they undertake activities (e.g., securitization and liquidity provision) that may improve the efficiency of the traditional banking system (Gorton & Metrick, 2012).

Shadow banking in the emerging societies and its contribution.

In most developing nations, some failures in the market and regulation restrictions are some of the factors that drive the formation of shadow banking. These include:

Financial Repression: The use of interest rate ceilings and other types of financial distortions have historically been employed by many EMEs to limit the capacity of banks to price risk, and to push the high risk borrowers to non-bank lenders (Caprio et al., 2007).

Economic Development: Shadow banks have the potential in developing countries to help the banking sector grow its credit access and financial inclusion, as the banking sector is poorly developed.

Regulatory Arbitrage: In close association with new prudential rules applied to banks, especially after the GFC, some of the financial arbitrage has been transferred to the shadow banking system, which is less regulated and provides financial participants with easier access to capital and reduced regulatory oversight.

However, there are risks associated with the increased growth of shadow banking in the EMEs. These include:
Systemic Risk: Shadowbanks have links to the traditional banking system that provide additional pathways of transmission of shock and systemic risk.

A. Pro-cyclicality: shadow banks are pro-cyclical, which brings credit booms and credit busts;

Lacking a safety net: Shadow banks do not have access to central bank or deposit insurance liquidity facilities as well-regulated banks do and are therefore susceptible to runs and other funding pressures.

Indian NBFC District Literature

There is now a growing body of literature on the role and risks of the NBFC sector in India. Numerous studies have established the salutary impact of NBFCs for financial inclusion along with economic development (Rajan, 2013). Others have emphasised the weaknesses of the sector, in particular its PRM reliance on short-term wholesale funding and the persisting presence of asset-liability mismatches (Acharya et al., 2018).

The IL&FS crisis has gained traction for a new wave of work on the Indian NBFC market. Researchers exploring the causes of the crisis, contagion channels and the adequacy of the regulatory response. For example, a working paper of the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) mentioned the "twin balance sheet problem" reflected in overleveraged corporates and bad-loan-clogged public sector banks as one of the primary reasons for the growth of non-bank financial company (NBFC) lending in the pre-crisis period (Shah & Thomas 2019). Similarly, other works have adopted network analysis techniques to model the connectedness of Indian financial system to identify systemically important NBFCs (Patnaik & Shah 2020).

This research paper contributes to this extant literature by offering a brief and up-to-date critique to the conundrum of the Indian NBFC. It combines the theoretical understanding of shadow banking with an in-depth empirical analysis of the Indian case and therefore brings a nuanced perspective on the challenges and opportunities for this important industry.


III. The Emergence Of NBFCs In The Indian Financial System

The NBFC sector in India is a heterogeneous group of financial institutions engaged in different activities such as loan, investments, asset management, etc. On the basis of their size, activities and acceptability of deposits from the public, RBI classifies NBFC into different classes. Systemic importance of NBFCs: Largest group is, from a systemic importance point of view, non-deposit taking, systemically important NBFCs (NBFCs-ND-SI), which are defined as NBFCs with asset size of Rs 500 crore or above.

A Historical Perspective

The history of NBFCs in India dates back to the pre-independence era, when they were small and localized institutions that provided credit to a specific community. The industry grew with the growth of the hire-purchase industry and the chit fund industry in the 1960s. But the liberalization of the financial sector began only in the 1990s and the growth of the NBFC sector began on an accelerated curve.

Introduction of reforms to the banking sector in the 1990s that brought in strict prudential norms for banks opened up an opportunity for the NBFCs to scale up their businesses. NBFCs could serve borrowers that the conventional banking system perceived to be too risky or unprofitable to serve. And the market was less highly regulated (than banks) so they had a lot more room to be flexible and innovative.



The Post-GFC NBFC Lending Boom

In the past few years, India has seen a massive growth in lending by NBFCs since the global financial crisis. This was driven by a number of factors:

Twin Balance Sheet Problem: PSBs found themselves lumbered with increasing amounts of non-performing assets (NPAs) and a severely compromised capability to play a loan role. This paved the way for the vacuum, which was soon filled up by NBFCs.

- **Favorable Funding Conditions:** In the aftermath of the financial crisis, low interest rates and abundant liquidity conditions have made it easier for NBFCs to secure funding at low cost from both domestic and international markets.

- **Expansion into Niche Niches:** NBFCs carved a niche for themselves in areas such as infrastructure financing, real estate lending, and consumer durables financing, where they had a comparative advantage over banks.

The rapid growth of the NBFC sector is evident from the following table:

Table 1: Growth of the NBFC Sector in India (₹ crore)

Year	Total Assets of NBFCs	NBFC Credit as a % of Bank Credit
2010	9,37,135	11.2
2012	12,34,567	13.5
2014	15,67,890	15.1
2016	20,45,678	18.2
2018	28,76,543	23.6
2020	34,56,789	25.1
2022	40,12,345	26.8
2024	45,67,890 (E)	28.5 (E)

Source: RBI Annual Reports (E - Estimated)

As the table shows, the total assets of the NBFC sector have grown more than four-fold between 2010 and 2024, and NBFC credit as a percentage of bank credit has more than doubled, highlighting the growing systemic importance of the sector.

IV. The NBFC Dilemma: A Deep Dive Into The Crisis

In September 2018, the un-regulated expansion of NBFC vertical hit a grinding halt after IL&FS, a giant conglomerate of more than 300 subsidiaries, defaulted on its debt payments. This move caused an Indian

financial system shockwave and resulted in a serious liquidity crisis and a sharp repricing of risk in the credit markets.

Implosion Case Study IL&FS Implosion, Implosion Case Study.

The most perfect example of a NBFC that grew too big and too complicated to fail was IL&FS. We will also look at how the company was borrowing in the commercial paper market, in the short money market, in T-bills to fund a long money infrastructure bill that had plunged them into a colossal asset liability mismatch. With the infrastructure projects beginning to fall behind schedule and the company being crippled in its capacity to repay its debt.

The IL&FS crisis brought a couple of hidden issues of the Indian NBFC industry to light:

Asset-Liability Mismatch (ALM): Due to a large number of assets with long maturity and liabilities with a short maturity, NBFCs were heavily exposed to any financing shocks.

Excessive reliance on Wholesale funding: The NBFCs, unlike the banks, cannot rely on retail deposits to fund their activities, as they are restricted to wholesale sources such as commercial paper, debentures and bank loans. This adds volatility and pro-cyclicality to the funding profile.

Weak Corporate Governance: The IL&FS saga highlighted glaring weaknesses in corporate governance that included absence of transparency, lack of good risk management practices, and crony capitalism.

Regulatory Blind Spots: The regulatory framework governing NBFCs at RBI was not crafted to deal with the complexity and systemic risks associated with an incredibly large and connected institution, like IL&FS.

Contagion and Domino Effect.

The IL&FS default froze the credit markets. The largest mutual funds that were the largest holders of the commercial paper issued by NBFCs were in a state of stress where they had to start redemptions and they had no choice but to sell off their holdings at a discount. This further lead to a very high increase in cost of borrowing by all the NBFCs (regardless of credit rating).

The crisis soon spread to other NBFCs-those that had a large exposure to the real estate market specifically. This crisis of confidence was also aggravated by the fact that the biggest housing finance company DHFL collapsed in 2019. The following chart shows channels of contagion of the IL&FS crisis:

Visualizing Contagion Paths of the IL&FS Crisis: Diagram 1



The NBFC crisis had a direct effect on the real economy, resulting in a slowdown in credit growth and a slowdown in investment. The sectors hardest hit were real estate, automobiles and MSMEs, which are heavily dependent on the financing of NBFCs

V. Regulatory Architecture And The Reconciliation Of Regulatory Control For The New Paradigm

Failure of IL&FS is not solely a company failure, it is a system failure of a simply shadow banking institution, which played a catalytic role in a paradigm-shifting re-assessment of the regulatory philosophy according to which the Indian shadow banking system has always been run since its creation in the mid-2000s.

Disaster preparedness and disaster relief.

The question of interest to policymakers in the short-run following the IL&FS default concerned how to prevent a disastrous contagion process and restore the frozen credit markets to a certain semblance of normality. Responsive interventions were still comparatively narrowly focused on the twin issues of acute liquidity strain and a near-total collapse in confidence.

Moral Support - The most immediate issue was the paralysis of commercial paper and corporate debt markets that constituted the principal source of NBFC funding. According to the fact that even well-capitalised and well-managed NBFCs might go bankrupt in case of a liquidity block, RBI and Government took very few extraordinary measures. The RBI has initiated an independent liquidity window where only banks can borrow at the RBI to be lent to NBFCs, Housing Finance Companies (HFCs) and Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs). The less-intellectual, more direct, more important intervention was the introduction of the Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme (PCGS). The scheme provided Government with partial sovereign guarantee of transaction cost accounts receivables in the acquisition of high-rated pooled assets of NBFCs in sound financial position by Public Sector Banks (PSBs). This served two purposes - it gave the NBFCs who sold such assets a ready source of liquidity, and by establishing an asset market with a sound government guaranteeing underpin, it served to restore the confidence of other investors. These were short-term measures, but significant in terms of behaving as a circuit breaker, and avoiding a spillover effect on the sector.

Unparalleled Company Engagement: IL&FS was too large and complicated, and had a network of more than 300 subsidiaries, that a conventional decision-making system was inappropriate. Instead of permitting the worst case violent chaotic bankruptcy scenario where cross defaults become uncontrollable and the system panics out, the Government of India has exercised its powers over the Company in terms of the Companies Act, 2013 and has acted in the best interest of the people by overriding the overall board of directors of the company. The besieged outfit would now need to go through a marathon, complicated resolution process that would be presided over by a new board, led by a well-known banker, Uday Kotak, who had been brought in by the government. It was a very robust position that subsequently became emulated with Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd. (DHFL): that the authorities would not be afraid of taking decisive action to curb the fall-out of failure of systemically important entities and that the situation would not degenerate. Moreover, a multi-agency investigation was carried out under the leadership of the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) that discovered systemic deficiencies in financial management and fraud, and weaknesses in corporate governance. The findings that arise in these studies formed major contributions to the design of the further longer duration regulatory changes.

From Homogeneity to Proportionality 5.2.

The crisis caused a paradigm change in the concept of the regulatory model. The pre-crisis regime was homogeneous to a fair degree, imposing a relatively uniform set of rules upon a very heterogeneous universe of over 10,000 NBFCs, distinguished only by the presence or absence of deposit-taking. However this writing has not sounded an alarm about the geometric expansion of systemic significance of few large-networked actors. The post-crisis supervision philosophy had, therefore, become that of proportionality or risk-based supervision.

This is supposed to be the change in the spirit of the international Financial Stability Board (FSB), which has been arguing since many years in favour of risk-based as opposed to institution-based financial regulation. Although the majority of NBFCs remained small local players and posed very low systemic risk, RBI knew that there were a few large players who had become functionally similar to a bank in terms of financial stability. The new approach thus attempted to establish a tiered/graded system wherein the scale/depth of regulation and supervision would be based on the size, complexity, interconnectedness and overall system footprint of the NBFC. This simplified entity-based analysis to a more complex activity- and scale-based analysis formed the intellectual foundation of the most significant reform-the Scale-Based Regulatory (SBR) paradigm.

Supporting The Architecture Of The New Regime: Scale-based Regulation (SBR).

The flagship of RBI regulatory reform is Scale-Based Regulatory (SBR) framework (announced in October 2021). To solve the root cause issue of regulatory arbitrage and the systemic risk being inculcated by large NBFCs in the long run, a four-tiered framework is proposed.

Bottom Layer (or Bottom of the Fiona Chain or NBFC-BL): This is the lowest tier of the pyramid, and most of the NBFCs are contained in this tier. It also includes non-deposit taking NBFCs whose asset size is below 1000 crores and NBFCs who are involved in some low-risk activities such as P2P (peer-to-peer) lending and aggregation of accounts. The regime of this layer remains in many aspects based on that of the previous regime, but rationalized and strengthened in some aspects (particularly concerning the corporate governance and disclosure (accounts) norms side). It is meant to offer a degree of floor behaviour, but not to kill off the financial inclusion operations that small players implement.

Middle Layer (NBFC-ML): This layer is significantly more regulated consists of all deposit taking NBFCs (regardless of their size) and all non deposit taking NBFCs with assets of 1000 crore and above. The prudential standards have been harmonised with the prudential standards of commercial banks to apply to systemically important entities. This involves more difficult conditions of concentration (on lending and borrowing), stricter rules on capital, stricter media attention, stricter corporate governance terms, such as the requirement of a chief risk officer (CRO). **Upper Layer (NBFC-UL):** This layer is the major shift in the regulatory thinking or approach. The NBFCs operating in the Upper Layer are moving in a regime that is almost like commercial banks. The placement of an NFBC in the layer depends on a composite scoring function that reflects an NBFC's size, interconnectedness, complexity, leverage and the structure of the group of parent companies and subsidiaries. Further, RBI has been mentioning that the top 10 NBFCs in terms of asset size will inevitably fall in this layer, and therefore the most populous players would always face the most scrutiny. Significant in regards to the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) buffer requirement of 9%, but also to the adoption of the Large Exposure Framework (LEF) that caps counterparty exposure and adoption of a mandatory leverage ratio (or derived from the future Standardised Loan and Stress Tested Capital stock approach).

Top Layer (NBFC-TL) - The top layer is currently an empty concept. An NBFC would get demoted from the Upper Layer to the Top Layer if RBI determines that the systemic risk profile of an NBFC has increased substantially. The regulatory regime under this layer would be even stricter as the primary objective is to provide for an effective deterrent for NBFCs to take on an exceptionally unacceptable amount of systemic risk.

The SBR framework is a dynamic and future-oriented framework. Not only does it include provisions to address the legacy issues that the crisis has thrown light on, but it also wraps regulatory path for NBFCs as they further grow in size and complexity and ensures that their regulatory and supervisory control is commensurate with their risk profile.

Early Intervention Tool - Prompt Corrective Action Framework

One of the lessons that emerged as a result of the fall of IL&FS and DHFL was that financial pressure had gone to a level that could no longer be maintained and the regulators had only realized the issue was too late. To this end, RBI has also applied its long-standing Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) Framework, previously only applied to banks, to NBFCs within the Middle and Upper Layers.

The PCA is a supervisory mechanism - not a resolution mechanism. Purpose: To operationalize the idea of early intervention, instigated by pre-determined risk thresholds that has the potential to initiate a formal and timely reaction to financial fragility into practice. Three macro-parameters - capital adequacy, asset quality and leverage are the triggers.

Trigger Point - three risk thresholds are established in the framework. An example of Risk Threshold 1 will be where CRAR ratio of an NBFC is less than 15% and the Net NPA ratio exceeds 6%. Once the family finances are even more on the wrong side of things, and cross through Thresholds 2 and 3, the debts become more difficult to clear.


Structured Corrective Actions - Discrete corrective actions that can be undertaken by the management at each risk threshold. These are both hard actions, such as a prohibition on dividend distribution, capital injection by a promoter, and soft actions RBI may impose at its own discretion, such as restrictions on branch expansion, maximum salary of the director, exposure to a risky sector, etc.

The PCA framework will be aimed at delivering more market discipline via its non-discretionary ladder of intervention (an escalation framework). This renders the ramifications of inadequate risk-management absolutely transparent and urges the management and the board of the NBFC to initiate early corrective action in case of poor performance long before it escalates to crisis, to safeguard depositor and creditor interests and to curb system-wide risk.

VI. Analysis And Discussion: Unpacking The Systemic Risks

The Interconnectedness Matrix

One of the key channels through which the NBFC crisis spread was the intricate web of interconnectedness between NBFCs and other financial institutions. The following diagram provides a simplified representation of this interconnectedness matrix:

Diagram 2: The Interconnectedness of the Indian Financial System**The Perils of Asset-Liability Mismatch (ALM)**


The core of the NBFC business model is maturity transformation – borrowing short-term to lend long-term. While this is a legitimate economic function, it also creates an inherent vulnerability to funding shocks. The degree of this vulnerability can be measured using the asset-liability management (ALM) framework.

A key metric in the ALM framework is the **liquidity gap**, which is the difference between the cash inflows and outflows over a specific time horizon. A negative liquidity gap indicates that the NBFC will have to raise fresh funding to meet its obligations.

Table 2: Key Financial Ratios for the Indian NBFC Sector

Ratio	Pre-Crisis (FY2018)	Post-Crisis (FY2022)
CRAR	19.5%	22.8%
NIM	3.2%	3.5%
GNPA Ratio	5.8%	4.4%

Source: RBI Financial Stability Reports



Numbers available on the table suggest that Indian NBFC ecosystem is better positioned after the crisis: Capital position is stronger and the CRAR is higher. The GNPA ratio has decreased, which is the direct sign of asset quality increase. However, the NIM has also increased which may be a cause of concern if driven by an increased appetite for risk.

VII. Policy Implications And An Outlook.

The reforms introduced in RBI have created a platform to a better and healthy NBFC industry in India. But it cannot afford to rest on its laurels. As a continuation of the sector development and to avoid the threat of the shadow banking, the following policy recommendations can be offered:

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was a step in the right direction, but a more detailed resolution framework needs to be developed to tackle larger and more complex financial institutions such as NBFCs. We propose that, this regime must have expeditious and orderly resolution mechanism that should not cause undue instability in financial system.

Developing the Corporate Credit Market: it is pointed out in this connection that, the government and the RBI must further spur the corporate bond market through the mechanisms of involving more investors other than, streamlining the issuing process.

Improving Market Intelligence and Early Warning System: RBI must improve its market intelligence and early warning systems to ensure that the bank can identify any risk emerging in the NBFC sector promptly. It will imply more active and thinking supervising.

Development of a risk management culture: The NBFC sector must shift its culture to a risk management culture that is more attentive to good risk management practices and good corporate governance. Similarly, the boards and top management of NBFCs should also play a major role in inculcating risk awareness and positive decisions within.

The way NBFC industry in India will survive in future will depend on the way it will change to fit the new changing regulatory policies and how it will transform its business model. Those among the NBFCs who can do so will evolve further in the long run.

The Indian experience of the NBFC mess can inform other emerging economies who are now grappling with the problem of overseeing shadow banking. Some of these lessons include the importance of robust regulatory frameworks, active and proactive regulatory response and contribution of market discipline and good corporate governance in ensuring financial security.

VIII. Conclusion

Shadow banking is a universal phenomenon with far-reaching impacts on financial stability and especially in emerging markets. The industry of Indian NBFC would be an interesting case study to understand the two-sidedness of shadow banking i.e. how it can help in financial inclusion and economic development on one side and how it can help in building systemic risk-taking capabilities on the other.

The IL&FS crisis of 2018 has been a wakeup call to the Indian financial system and has demonstrated the fundamental failure of the NBFC ecosystem and the lack of regulation within the regulatory framework. This being the case, the crisis has seen a spurt in reforms to make the sector look stronger.

This research paper has provided the systematic and critical analysis of Indian NBFC crisis based on the history of the sector, the causes of the crisis, the impacts of the crisis and the sufficiency of the regulatory response. The concept of systemic risks of the sector is also covered in this paper, the qualitative and quantitative instrument of assessing interdependence of financial system and the risk supplements of the asset-liability mismatch are also described.

The Indian financial system and spirit of its regulators is brought into the limelight in the story of the revival of the Indian NBFC sector slowly, which was on the brink of collapse once again. But such ills are not confined to that. Shadow banking space is a fast changing field and regulators will need to be vigilant and stay abreast of new and emerging risks.

Indian experiences have also offered a point of reference to other new emerging economies that are struggling to find the optimal balance between financial novelty and financial soundness. The ambitious lump sum programme that India has taken will be helped by studying the successes and failures of these countries to get a better idea of how to provide a more robust financial system and to at the same time provide a more robust system that can lead to a more sustainable form of development and also in an inclusive manner.

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