# "Implementation of Secure and Reliable Routing Methodology for WSN"

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Abstract: In many Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) applications, sensors are spatially distributed in a finite area so as to monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as pressure, humidity, temperature, etc. and also to transmit the sensed data to a base station cooperatively. In addition, at times, a set of target points has to be monitored in a given area. On the one hand, to provide a deterministic quality of service guarantees, every point of interest should be monitored by at least one sensor at all times. On the other hand, the energy consumption of sensors should be minimized since in most cases sensors are battery powered. Therefore sensors should have their power supplies turned off when they are not in use top reserve energy. Due to this limitation, a critical issue becomes how to prolong the lifetime of WSNs while also assuring the service quality of coverage. In this project design an intrusion detection system to detecting the all types of attack in the network. i. e. IP Address Spoofing, DDOS Attacks, packet Sniffer Attack etc. and implementing the solution to one of these attack.

Keywords: Intrusion Detection System, IP Address Spoofing, DDOS Attacks, packet Sniffer Attack

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#### I. Introduction

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A packet sniffer, sometimes referred to as a network monitor or network analyzer, can be used legitimately by a network or system administrator to monitor and troubleshoot network traffic. Using the information captured by the packet sniffer an administrator can identify erroneous packets and use the data to pinpoint bottlenecks and help maintain efficient network data transmission. In its simple form a packet sniffer simply captures all of the packets of data that pass through a given network interface. Typically, the packet sniffer would only capture packets that were intended for the machine in question. However, if placed into promiscuous mode, the packet sniffer is also capable of capturing ALL packets traversing the network regardless of destination.

#### II. **Problem Definition**

As a network administrator who needs to identify, diagnose, and solve network problems, a company manager who wants to monitor user activities on the network and ensure that the corporation's communications assets are safe, or a consultant who has to quickly solve network problems for clients. It is difficult to identify the problems if the network

traffic is not tracked, as an administrator in general we depend on the analyzer provided by the operating system (if any) or the antivirus software that is installed to provide real-time network security. However, it is identified that these systems provide specific set of reports which may not be enough for an administrator to trace all the problems. To handle these types of issues we want to implement a specific network analyzer that can track all the incoming and outgoing calls.

### **Objectives**

- The main objective of this system shows how real time network connection behavior can be modeled.
- The objective of the system is to create a new set of rules during run time. So the intruder cannot be able to attack the system with virus
- Detection of attack in the network.


### III. Related Work

Garcı'a-Teodoroa et. al. [1] begins with a review of the most well-known anomaly-based intrusion detection techniques. Then, available platforms, systems under development and research projects in the area are presented. Finally, we outline the main challenges to be dealt with for the wide scale deployment of anomaly-based intrusion detectors, with special emphasis on assessment issues.

Signature and anomaly-based systems are similar in terms of conceptual operation and composition. The main differences between these methodologies are inherent in the concepts of "attack" and "anomaly". An attack can be defined as "a sequence of operations that puts the security of a system at risk". An anomaly is just "an event that is suspicious from the perspective of security". Based on this distinction, the main advantages and disadvantages of each IDS type can be pointed out.

Yu Chen ET. AL. [2] presents a new distributed approach to detecting DDoS (distributed denial of services) flooding attacks at the traffic flow level. The new defense system is suitable for efficient implementation over the core networks operated by Internet service providers (ISP). At the early stage of a DDoS attack, some traffic fluctuations are detectable at Internet routers or at gateways of edge networks. We develop a distributed change-point detection (DCD) architecture using change aggregation trees (CAT). The idea is to detect abrupt traffic changes across multiple network domains at the earliest time. Early detection of DDoS attacks minimizes the flooding damages to the victim systems serviced by the provider.

The system is built over attack-transit routers, which work together cooperatively. Each ISP domain has a CAT server to aggregate the flooding alerts reported by the routers. CAT domain servers collaborate among themselves to make the final decision. To resolve policy conflicts at different ISP domains, a new secure infrastructure protocol (SIP) is developed to establish the mutual trust or consensus. We simulated the DCD system up to 16 network domains on the DETER test bed, a 220-node PC cluster for Internet emulation experiments at USC Information Science Institute. Experimental results show that 4 network domains are sufficient to yield 98% detection accuracy with only 1% false-positive alarms. We prove that this DDoS defense system can scale well to cover 84 AS domains. This security coverage is wide enough to safeguard most ISP core networks from real-life DDoS flooding attacks.



### IV. Proposed System

## The proposed system categories of four modules

- Loading and preprocessing dataset
- Mahalanobis Distance
- Threshold Selection
- Attack detection

#### 6.1 Loading and preprocessing dataset:

In this module we are going to select the input spatial dataset. After the load the spatial dataset which contains geometric relevant information. After loading, view the required data. In this process we remove the unwanted values like null, missing tuples etc.

#### 6.2 Mahalanobis Distance

Mahalanobis distance (MD) used to extract the correlations between the selected packet payload features It works with network packet payloads. Mahalanobis distance is adopted to measure the dissimilarity between traffic records Attack detection based on Mahalanobis distance.

#### **6.3 Threshold Selection:**

In this module is to distinguish DoS attacks from legitimate traffic The threshold given is used to differentiate attack traffic from the legitimate one. Normal profile is greater than the threshold, it will be considered as an attack.

It is powered by the triangle-area based MCA technique and the anomaly-based detection technique.

#### 6.4 Attack detection

Attack detection system that uses multivariate correlation analysis (MCA) for accurate network traffic. It characterization by extracting the geometrical correlations between network traffic features. It compares the individual tested profiles with the respective stored normal profiles.

	<b>V.</b>	Result Analys	sis	
<b>\$</b>				
SECI	JRE AND I	RELIABLE ROU	UTING for W	sn
Select Dataset	1	1	Browse	
				Dataset
				Upload

#### Figure 1: Database Selection

Select Dataset	Nkddcup.percent_unlabeled.bt	Browse	
$\begin{array}{c} 00, 0, 0, 0, 1, 00, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.255.253.0.99.0.01.0.00.0.00.0.00.0.00.000.000, 000, $	).0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0	

Figure 2: Data Preprocessing




Figure 3: Server Client Communication

<u>\$</u>	SECURE AND RELIABLE ROUTING FOR WSN			
	Clie	ent Connection		
	IP Address Port Number	127.0.0.1	]	
	Client Connection		Request	
			Receive	

# Figure 4: Client Connection

SECURE AND RELIABLE ROUTING FOR WSN						
udp		private	SF		252	
udp		private	SF		253	
udp		private	SF		253	
udp		private	SF		253	
udp		private	SF		253	
						Ψ.
-						
Attribute	s 1	Fragment	Sele	ction	Upload	-
	s 1	Fragment	Sele	smurf	Upload	
Attribute						
Attribute	ftp	g_pwd	normal	smurf	teardrop	
Attribute protocols tcp	ftp http	g_pwd SF SF SF	normal 255 255 255	smurf 1.00 1.00 1.00	teardrop 0.00 0.00 0.00	5
Attribute protocols tcp tcp	ttp http http http http	g_pwd SF SF SF SF	normal 255 255 255 255 255	smurf 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00	teardrop 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00	5
Attribute protocols tcp tcp tcp	ttp http http http http http	g_pwd SF SF SF SF SF	normal 255 255 255 255 255	smurf 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00	teardrop 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00	
Attribute protocols tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp	ftp http http http http http ftp_data	g_pwd SF SF SF SF SF SF SF	normal 255 255 255 255 255 255 18	smurf 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.29	teardrop 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06	
Attribute protocols tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp	ttp http http http http http ttp_data http	g_pwd SF SF SF SF SF SF SF SF	normal 255 255 255 255 255 255 18 255	smurf 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.29 1.00	teardrop 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00	
Attribute protocols tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp	ttp http http http http http http ttp_data http http	g_pwd SF SF SF SF SF SF SF SF SF	normal 255 255 255 255 255 255 18 255 18 255 255	smurf 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.29 1.00 1.00	teardrop 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00	
Attribute protocols tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp	ftp http http http http http ttp_data http http private	g_pwd SF SF SF SF SF SF SF SF SF SF	normal 255 255 255 255 255 255 18 255 255 255 255	smurf 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.29 1.00 1.00 1.00	teardrop 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.	
Attribute protocols tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp tcp	ttp http http http http http http ttp_data http http	g_pwd SF SF SF SF SF SF SF SF SF	normal 255 255 255 255 255 255 18 255 18 255 255	smurf 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.29 1.00 1.00	teardrop 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00	

Figure 4: Attribute Selection

Packet Sniffer				
Mahalanobis Distance	Distance: 0.5		Distance	
252	0.99	0.01		
253	0.99	0.01		
253	0.99	0.01		
253	0.99	0.01	<b>Parameters</b>	
253	0.99	0.01	•	
normal	teardrop	smurf		
255.0	1.0	0.0		
255.0	1.0	0.0		
255.0	1.0	0.0	-	
255.0	1.0	0.0		
255.0	1.0	0.0		
	0.29	0.06		
18.0 255.0	1.0	0.0		


Figure 5: Mahalanobis Distance

Threshold selection	Threshold	1.0	Value	
Analysis	Update	Show	Detection	
L				

# Figure 6: Threshold value

attack1 1.0	attack21.0 0.0	0.0
1.0	0.0	
1.0	0.0	
1.0	0.0	
1.0	0.0	Detection
1.0	0.0	
1.0	0.0	T I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
-		11 1
attack1	attack2	
1.0	0.0	*
1.0	0.0	
1.0	0.0	
1.0	0.0	Attack
1.0	0.0	
1.0	0.0	
1.0	0.0	v
	Message	
	attacks detected:smurf	f,teardrop;

Figure 7: Detected Attack



#### VI. Conclusion

This paper has presented an MCA-based DoS attack detection system which is powered by the trianglearea based MCA technique and the anomaly-based detection technique. The former technique extracts the geometrical correlations hidden in individual pairs of two distinct features within each network traffic record, and offers more accurate characterization for network traffic behaviors. The latter technique facilitates our system to be able to distinguish both known and unknown DoS attacks from legitimate network traffic. Such a system can be as simple as a straightforward system based on packet thresholds: Only N SYN packets are allowed to hit the server in unit time and excess SYN packets may not be allowed. The system can also be as complex as a probabilistic system which models various probability distributions for the various TCP flags.

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