

Certificate-less Key Generation and Agreement Protocol for ad-hoc network through ID-PKC

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Abstract : Virtual Private Network is a network that provides inter-connectivity to exchange information between the nodes that belongs to the network. A Virtual private network possesses all the features of the private network and is built on existing network, but they suffer severe security problems, particularly authentication problem. This paper introduces an authenticated key agreement protocol based on certificate-less cryptography to authenticate users to establish a secure session between them. The proposed protocol attempts to mitigate the man-in-middle and key compromise impersonation attacks. It is found to be more efficient protocol.

Keywords: Authenticated key agreement, Certificate-less Key Generation, ID-PKC, VPN

I. Introduction

A virtual private network (VPN) has been efficient tools that provide inter-connectivity to exchange information between different (remote) parties that belong to a specific network. The VPN possesses all the features of the private networks which provide closed community of legitimate users that use resources and services. In VPN, the traffic is within the network without being affected by the traffic from outside the network and vice versa. The term virtual means it is build upon existing network (e.g. Internet). The VPN is based on tunneling, which is the process of using internetwork infrastructure to transfer data to a network over another network [1], before tunneling the users need to authenticate before transfer of data. VPN uses passwords in order to authenticate them but this method is vulnerable to different types of attacks [2]. VPN enhances this by two factor authentication that prove the identity of the users by what user knows and something in their possession i.e., token. Recently VPN's make use of X.509 digital certificates to authenticate users generally suffers two major problems managing certificates and scalability of the infrastructure. The alternative is to use authenticated key agreement protocol is used to allow two or more parties to establish a secure session key over open networks each party can encrypt any message such that only the parties sharing secret key can decrypt the message. Authenticated key agreement should not only be secure against passive adversaries but also active adversaries who impersonate one party to communicate with another party. The idea of key agreement protocols has been realized in public key infrastructure [3] Identity based public key cryptography [4], certificate based public key cryptography [5] and certificate-less public key cryptography [6]. PKI protocols experience a heavy certificate management load while ID-PKC requires all the participants to trust an authority (key escrow). A malicious KGC can compute the session keys of the participating entities, thus fully trusting an authority a very strong assumption especially over open networks. Hence ID-PKC seems more suited for smaller networks or closed groups. CL-PKC combines the advantages of the ID-PKC and the traditional PKI. In CL-PKC [15], first an identity dependent partial private key is received from KGC. The entity computes its private key using partial private key and a secret known only to the entity. The entity generates a public key which matches their private keys too. As a result the trust is reduced on KGC. The PKC is more suitable for open networks.

II. Heading s

2.1 SSL VPN:

The SSL VPN is a transport layer protocol, it provides confidentiality, integrity, and digital signature [7]. The SSL VPN consist of one or more devices by which the user can connect to from his/her web browser and the traffic between VPN device and the web browser is encrypted using the SSL [8]. To prepare using VPN based on the PPTP, L2TP, IPSEC it is required to install client software which of high cost. Therefore, the using of SSL is more convenient because it does not require the installation of any software [9].

2.2 Existing System:

Authentication in VPN: Virtual private Networks use different techniques for authentication. Those techniques developed gradually from using user names and passwords to using digital certificates. In the following, we give some details about these techniques.

2.2.1 Single Factor Authentication:

The most popular authentication method is the username and password [10]. The advantage of this method is easiness to implement and its cheap cost. The disadvantage is that the user may forget the password which results in many calls to helpdesk. Consequently, a user tends to select an easy password that he/she can remember and also it will be easy to guess by an attacker. From the previous discussion the risks in using the password authentication method led to the appearance of the two factors method.

2.2.2 Double Factor Authentication:

The solution of the authentication problem in the VPNs is enhanced by using the two factors authentication method, where the identity of a user is proved by something that the user knows (password) and something that belongs to him/her (one time PIN/token)[11]. This approach is facing problems such as difficulty of managing the token, the costs of issuing token for a client and revocation of the token for some client.

2.2.3 Digital Certificate:

A more advanced authentication method that is used with the VPNs is the digital certificates. A digital certificate can be issued for a user or a client (PC) and is stored in a smart card. The digital certificate authentication is considered the most secure authentication technology for VPNs. It does not need knowledge (as password) but on possession. A smart card that contains a digital certificate needs to be protected by some additional code like PIN or fingerprint. This adds additional overhead because the user needs reader to use smart card also to replace the smart card by token it has the previous problems of the second method. Moreover, the use of digital certificate has problems of certificate management in addition to the complexity of infrastructure of PKI.

2.3 History on key agreement protocols based on certificate-less cryptography:

Certificate-less public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was first proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003 [15]. The CL-PKC is an intermediate between Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Identity based Encryption (IBE). The CL-PKC was proposed to solve the problem of managing certificates in PKI and the key escrow problem in the identity based encryption by generate part of the private key in the key generating Center (KGC) and the rest is generated at the clients side, there is no need for using certificate.

2.3.1 Authenticated key agreement protocols with pairing:

Al-Riyami and Paterson but it different in the calculation of the private key. In 2008 Swanson[16] made analysis of existing certificateless key agreement protocol and prove the failure of these protocols to satisfy key compromise impersonation attacks and known temporary session specific information security. In 2009 Lippold et al[17] proposed formal model for certificateless KAP based on Swanson their security model is stronger than Swanson because it assumes the party uses the replaced public key in his computation rather than the original public key as in Swanson. The Lippold et al protocol is unacceptable because it uses 10 pairing to calculate the session key. In 2010 Zhang[18] et al proposed efficient AKA protocol that requires one pairing operation. In 2011, Mokhtarnameh et al proposed new scheme for AKA and claim that the protocol is secure but Yang et al prove the protocol is vulnerable to man in the middle attack.

2.3.2 Authenticated Key agreement protocols without pairing:

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III. Indentations and EQUATIONS

The target is to achieve higher degree of security by creating one public key for a corresponding private key using the features of ID-PKC [14]. The relevant proposed algorithms are presented in this section. KGC executes Setup algorithm to generate master-key and system parameters. Then, it runs Partial-Private-Key-Extract algorithm to extract the partial private key for each entity. Every entity chooses a secret value and computes its public and private key. Subsequently, two entities run key agreement algorithm online in order to share a session key.

1.1 Setup and Partial-Private-Key-Extract:

1.1.1 KGC performs the following steps during the Setup process:

- a. Select a cyclic additive group G_1 of prime order q , a cyclic multiplicative group G_2 of the same order, a generator P of G_1 , and a bilinear map $e: G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$.
- b. Choose a random master-key, $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and set $P_0 = sP$.
- c. Choose cryptographic hash functions, $H_1: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G$, $H_2: G_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$.

3.1.2 Entity A sends its identity IDA to KGC.

3.1.3 KGC generates the partial private key for entity A using the following steps:

- a. Compute $QA = H_1(IDA)$.
- b. Generate the partial private key $DA = sQA$.
- c. The system parameters $(G_1, G_2, e, P, P_0, H_1, H_2, n)$ are published while the master-key $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ is kept in KGC.
- d. Entity A executes:
 - a. Set-Secret-Value: choose a random value, $x_A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ as the entity's secret value.
 - b. Set-Private-Key: generate the private key, $SA = x_A DA$.
 - c. Set-Public-Key: compute the public key, $PA = x_A QA$. B. Key-Agreement

Assume that an entity A with identity IDA has a long-term private key $SA = x_A DA$ and public key $PA = x_A QA$, and an entity B with identity IDB has private key $SB = x_B DB$ and public key $PB = x_B QB$. A and B participate in the key agreement protocol as follows:

3.2 key agreement protocol:

3.2.1 A chooses a short-term private key, $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ randomly and computes $TA = aP$. B chooses a short-term private key, $b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ randomly and computes $TB = bP$.

3.2.2 A sends (PA, TA) to B. B sends (PB, TB) to A.

3.2.3 A computes $h = aTB$ and $KAB = e(TA + PA, bP_0 + SB)$. B computes $h = bTA$, and $KBA = e(aP_0 + SA, TB + PB)$.

A and B have the same shared secret key $KAB = KBA = e(P, P) a s x_B e(P, QB) a s x_B e(QA, P) b s x_A e(QA, QB) s x_A x_B$. The session key is $K = H_2(QA, QB, h, KAB)$.

3.3 Mathematical Model:

The public-key space K is the set of integer pairs,

$$K = \{(e; n) \mid n = p \cdot q, p, q \text{ are large primes}, 1 < e < n, \text{ and } \gcd(e, n) = 1\} \quad [1]$$

Where n is a product of two large distinct primes, $1 < e < n$ and $\gcd(e, n) = 1$.

For each $k = (e; n) \in K$, the plaintext and cipher text spaces,

$$M_k = C_k = \mathbb{Z}_n \quad [2]$$

For each $k = (e; n) \in K$, the encryption function,

$$E_k = P_e; n \quad [3]$$

For each $k = (e; n) \in K$, the corresponding private key,

$$P_k = (d; n) \quad [4]$$

Where $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, and the decryption function is $D_k = P_d; n$. Above equation 1, 2, 3 and 4 gives the RSA key generation mathematical calculation.

3.4 Known-key secrecy:

A and B choose random a & b respectively in each protocol run; they will have distinct session key in each run. Thus, compromising the secret keys will not affect the next session key to be generated.

3.4.1 Forward secrecy:

Even if the adversary knows the long-term private keys of A and B, the adversary still needs to compute h from TA and TB which is a CDH problem. Therefore, compromising the long-term private keys of all entities will not reveal previously established session keys. As a result, the proposed protocol achieves perfect forward secrecy.

3.4.2 KGC forward secrecy:

CL-PKC based schemes do not have key escrow problem. If an adversary has the KGC’s master private key, s , the previously established session keys will not be exposed. Although the adversary may generate the partial private key, both the short-term and long-term private keys of an entity are needed in order to compute the session key.

3.4.3 Key-compromise impersonation:

Assume that an adversary knows the private key of A, SA , and impersonates B to share the session key with A. The adversary will have the knowledge on SA , aP , and b , however, he would not be able to compute $e(P,QB)$ as x_B as SB is unknown. Another option is to compute as x_{BP} which is a CDH problem.

3.4.4 Unknown key-share resilience:

As QA and QB are used for computing the session key; each entity knows who he shares the key with.

3.4.5 No key control:

Minimum two entities collaborate together to generate a session key using their random short-term private keys. However, key control can be imperfect when A sends its (PA, TA) to B, but B does not send its (PB, TB) to A. This particular security attribute can be supported externally using special error checking or troubleshooting methods in the protocols.

3.4.5 Known session-specific temporary information Security:

Even the adversary compromises the short-term private keys of a session; he will not be able to compute the session key as the long-term private keys are unknown to him.

3.4.6 Passive attack:

Assume that the adversary observes the messages (PA, TA, TB, PB) transferred between the entities and he knows the master key of KGC, s . The adversary will not be able to compute the session key as he needs to calculate abP from aP and bP . This is a CDH problem.

IV. Figures and Tables

In this section, the performance and security properties of the proposed two-party protocol are compared to other recent one pass Key agreement protocols in literature. The performance is measured in terms of the computations involved in the session key generation phase. It is assumed that the parties communicate frequently with enough secure storage available to them in Table I. The following abbreviations are used in Table I and Table II.

PA: pairings evaluated by A,

PB: pairings evaluated by B,

SA: scalar point multiplications by A,

SB: scalar point multiplications by B,

EA: exponentiations in G_2 by A.

Table I. A Comparison of Computational Load with Pre- Computations

Operation	PA	PB	SA	SB	EA
Scheme					
Proposed	0	0	2	1	0
Zhang [28]	0	1	2	1	1
Chen [30]	0	1	2	2	2

Table ii. Performance evaluated without pre-computations

Operation	PA	PB	SA	SB	EA
Scheme					
Proposed	0	0	4	3	0
Nilesh[28]	2	2	3	2	1
Bhushan[30]	2	1	2	2	2

It is clear from the above tables that the proposed protocol outperforms the other two schemes. It is noteworthy that the proposed protocol additionally provides the same level of security as the other two schemes and additionally provides key confirmation. Thus, the proposed scheme is more preferred in practical scenarios.

V. Conclusion

In this paper, secure and efficient certificate-less authenticated key generation and agreement protocol are presented which produces distinct public key for a corresponding private key. In the original scheme, a dishonest KGC could restore an entity's public key by one for which it knows the secret value without fear of being recognized. However, in our proposed scheme, the existence of two public key for an identity can only result from the existence of two partial private keys binding that entity to two different public keys; only KGC could have created these two partial private keys. Thus, the new binding technique makes the KGC's substitute of a public key noticeable. The security analysis shows that the key agreement protocol achieves almost all of the known desirable security attributes such as known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation, unknown key-share, known session-specific temporary information security, forward secrecy and no key control. Furthermore, it conveys better efficiency in contrast to the existing protocols. In addition, the key generation and agreement protocols reduce the amount of trust on KGC. Currently, among the future work that we plan to pursue includes investigating the efficiency of the proposed protocol in distributed environments, e.g. peer-to-peer and grid computing platforms.

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